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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the foreign-policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the United 
Nations between 1979 and 1989, with reference to certain issues which were of significance to 
Iran and the international community during that period. 
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I deals with Iran's diplomacy in the post- 
World War II and the pre-revolution period at the UN, and provides a historical backdrop to the 
evolution of Iran's foreign policy in the post-revolution period. 
Part II examines the situation which followed the revolution of 1979, when the newly 
formed Islamic government utilised the United Nations to explain to the international community 
the significance of the changes which had taken place in Iran. Following from this, the study has 
chosen to examine three major issues, namely, Human Rights, the Iran-Iraq War and Disarma- 
ment, and the extent to which these issues influenced Iran's post-revolution foreign policy at the 
United Nations. 
The dissertation has relied on information gathered from United Nations Documents, 
Iranian newspaper archives (Kayhan International), and personal interviews conducted in Geneva 
and Tehran. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
This dissertation will undertake an examination of selected political issues which can be 
considered as being both crucial to post-revolution Iran's foreign policy and also of concern to the 
United Nations between the years 1979 and 1989. The UN has served Iran's foreign policy 
interests both in the pre- and post- revolution period mainly by providing a forum in which issues 
having a direct impact on national, regional and global policies were discussed, justified and even 
opposed by the two successive regimes. 
Part I of this dissertation (Chapters II and III) deals with the pre-revolution period of Iran's 
diplomatic history at the United Nations, when it achieved some signal successes in using UN 
channels to fend off successive attempts at superpower intervention. 
Chapter II seeks to bring out how Iran successfully used the newly-fledged United Nations 
system in the post-World War II period to develop what was to become in later years an indepen- 
dent foreign policy. The chapter also throws light on Iran's historical relationships with the 
Soviet Union, Britain and the United States of America, which serve as a backdrop to the exami- 
nation of foreign policy issues during and after the Cold War period. 
Chapter III sets out to encapsulate the evolution of Iran's foreign policy in the Cold War 
period. Firstly, it examines Iran's actions in the United Nations in relation to its overall security 
concerns vis-ä-vis the superpowers, including those relating to regional politics and those affect- 
ing its national interests. Secondly, the chapter signals certain core security concerns, some of 
which were subsequently transformed while others continued unchanged, but all of which came 
under threat in the post-revolution period. 
Part II (Chapters IV to VIII) will examine the situation which followed the Iranian revolu- 
tion of 1979. The United Nations was utilised by the Islamic government as a platform from 
which it explained to the international community the significance of the radical changes which 
-1- 
had taken place in Iran. It did this by discrediting the excesses of the ancien regime and by laying 
the ultimate blame for those excesses on the corrupting influence the superpowers (especially the 
United States) had on the psyche and morale of the Iranian nation. 
- When it became clear that the clerical elements loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini had come to 
gain the upper hand over other competing groups like the nationalists, socialists, leftist and 
liberals, outside observers were given a fair idea of what to expect from the nascent Islamic 
Republic especially in the area of international relations and politics. In this regard, the foreign 
policy formulated by the revolutionary government went through a number of phases, often set- 
ting the pace and agenda for the more powerful actors in the international political system to fol- 
low and respond to. This was also reflected within the United Nations, where Iran sought to jus- 
tify some of its own domestic and foreign policy actions in the name of anti-imperialism and the 
need to rid its political environment of evil and counter-revolutionary forces. 
In this context a domestic issue which drew the attention of the United Nations and proved 
to have considerable impact on Iran's foreign policy was the question of human rights. While 
Chapter VI deals with the subject in a detailed manner, it would be in place to signal the type of 
conceptual problems which make international human rights provisions incompatible with the 
code of practice followed in Iran. 
It can be assumed fairly accurately that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
grand charter of international rights - while being a worthy document - nevertheless developed 
from within a Western tradition, following the scourge of the Second World War. Seyyed Hos- 
sein Nasr, a prolific writer on various aspects of Islam, states that even a fundamental concept 
such as freedom, which is a crucial component of human rights, has evolved differently in Islam 
and in Western philosophical thought. He asserts that the 
"concept of freedom in the Modem West is so deeply affected by the Renaissance and 
post-Renaissance concept of man as being in revolt against heaven and master of the 
earth that it is difficult to envisage the meaning of freedom in the context of a tradi- 
tional civilisation such as that of Islam". ' 
I Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Concept and Reality of Freedom in Islam and Islamic Civilisation", in Alan S. Rosenbaum 
(ed. ), The Philosophy of Human Rights: International Perspectives, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 95. 
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These and other conceptual differences are dealt with in Chapter VI of this thesis, in addi- 
tion to a study of the reasons why Iran had difficulty in acceding to the United Nations' interna- 
tional human rights policy. 
Before the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Islamic government saw the United 
Nations as an impartial body whose members were sympathetic to its revolution. The alacrity 
with which the international community recognised the revolutionary government in Iran, solved 
the problem of recognition. "A state that chooses its form of government has, if it is to continue 
to deal with other states, first of all to be recognised by them. " While this was generally wel- 
comed by the revolutionary leadership, the new government often felt vulnerable to pressure from 
other states who made "use of its desire for recognition to try to force it to behave in a way that 
suits their interests ... continued failure to recognise it may well have no significant effect on 
its 
internal politics, but it can and does act to reduce its influence in world affairs"2. 
In this regard the members of the United Nations Security Council and a block of countries 
belonging to the United Nations General Assembly were unwilling to condemn Iraq for its open 
aggression, because they felt it would balance the perceived threat they felt emerging from 
Islamic Iran. As demonstrated in Chapter VII of this thesis this made policy-makers in Tehran to 
view the United Nations' primary political organ, as being unable to fulfill its role of maintaining 
international peace and security, and as serving only as a tool of American foreign policy. For the 
revolutionary leadership in Tehran, neither the General Assembly nor the Group of Non-aligned 
states at the UN, were sufficiently radical in pursuing the path of "true non-alignment" in matters 
of international politics. However, during this period the role of the United Nations Secretary 
General and the Secretariat took on new significance in Iran's foreign policy process. The office 
and personage of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar came to play an important part in Iran's 
foreign policy at the UN, because of the trust the former was able to instill in the policy-makers in 
Tehran. The shift of negotiations concerning the Iran-Iraq War to the Secretariat brought about by 
2 Peter Calvert, Revolution and International Politics, London, Frances Pinter, 1984, p. 151. Especially see Chapter 
Seven of his book "Diplomacy and Revolution". 
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Iran's refusal to cooperate with what it considered as the biased policies of the Security Council 
can be seen as the main reason why the UN was able to remain as the primary mediating body 
and ultimately responsible for bringing one of the most destructive wars of this century to a close. 
Another important issue to effect Iranian foreign policy and one which was a direct outcome 
of the Iran-Iraq War was the use of chemical weapons and the related question of disarmament. In 
Chapter VIII of this thesis it is shown that Iran was unable to exercise the chemical weapons 
option unlike Iraq as part of its battlefield strategy during the Iran-Iraq War. As for the overall 
question of disarmament within the framework of the United Nations Conference of Disarmament 
(of which Iran is a founding member), Iran's stance continues to be determined by regional secu- 
rity demands which have gone through considerable change in the post-Shah period. After the 
demise of the Pahlavi regime Iran rejected the security structure imposed upon the region by the 
United States and came to base all matters of state including security on the doctrine of 'Indepen- 
dence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic'. While the doctrine itself has never clearly been 
defined beyond following a policy of non-alignment (neither East nor West), it signified a depar- 
ture from the pro-Western strategic thinking of the Pahlavi regime. 
After the political upheavals of 1978-1979, Iran experienced a thorough change of its politi- 
cal structures, these changes in Iran brought about substantial changes in its relations with the 
United Nations. Progress on issues governing relations between itself and the world body in the 
first decade of the revolution either remained functional governed by mutually beneficial parame- 
ters, or were rendered non-functional and obsolete. 
However, the two principal reasons why this dissertation has chosen to examine Iran's 
foreign policy at the UN are because however broad the applicability of the UN Charter may 
seem to be, it does represent at some point the realities which surround the aspirations and aims 
of all nations. "The hope is that common respect for the principles of international behaviour 
within the UN will ensue balance between the pursuit of legitimate national aspirations and the 
realities of power in the world', . 
3 Quoted from Erik Jensen's speech to the Eighth Annual Conference of the Irish National Committee for the Study of 
International Affairs, November 29,1985. Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vo1.2, No. 2,1986. 
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Secondly, historically there has always existed a real relationship between Iran and the UN. 
The former remains a full member of the organisation and as the thesis will demonstrate needed 
the world body to achieve set foreign policy objectives, which included the resolution of disputes. 
The dissertation has relied mainly on information gathered from United Nations documents, 
documents pertaining to the Non-Governmental Organisations accredited to the United Nations, 





The Iranian Case of 1946 at the United Nations: 
The Beginning of Iran's Foreign Policy Trends 
Introduction 
The Iranian case at the United Nations in 1946 marked a landmark in modem world history. 
It derived from a century and a half of Great Power politics which had "conspired" to bottle down 
Persia's reasonable national aspirations. But Persia/Iran adroitly used the platform afforded by 
the brand new United Nations Organisation to show that small countries at last had leverage that 
they could deploy even against Superpowers. Although Stalin's Soviet Union was at that time 
treated by all parties concerned "with kid gloves", Stalin was in effect brought to heel and the 
United Nations was seen to have been successful in restoring peace to a potential trouble-spot. In 
a more negative sense, the Iranian case can also be seen as a first ranging shot in the early dissen- 
sions between the Soviet Union and the Western powers which were presently to be known as the 
Cold War. And the case set Iran's national foreign policy on the road that was to lead inexorably 
to the Islamic Revolution of the late 1970s. 
The main focus of this chapter will be on Iran's relations with the United Nations prior to 
1979 with emphasis on the events and politics which characterised this period, directly involving 
the United Nations, Iran and the principal powers, the Soviet Union, the United States and Bri- 
tain. The Iranian Case of 1946 will be examined in particular. This well documented case when 
analysed will serve as the basis of a historical framework for analysing subsequent relations 
between the United Nations and Iran, especially those after the political upheavals in Iran in 
1978-79 to be discussed in later chapters. 
Chronologically the period covered in this chapter stretches from as far back as 1800 to the 
years immediately after the establishment of the United Nations. While the newly established 
global organisation had become an integral part of great power global relations, it nevertheless 
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served as the main avenue of approach and the major outlet for political expression in the case of 
small states. 
It will be the aim of this chapter to bring out the particular relationship between the United 
Nations and Iran, in the immediate post-World War II era. The development of this relationship 
between the United Nations and Iran will be set in a historical framework of reference, namely the 
early stages of the Cold War. 
That Iran had not developed any salient commitments to further its foreign policy objectives 
but was being forced into relationships by powerful nations is a political fact that emerges from 
this chapter. Also evident is the role played by the newly established United Nations in serving 
the interests of the powerful nations. In this context it is proposed to examine whether Iran's 
association with the United Nations helped it to lay the foundations of an independent foreign 
policy. 
The approach of this chapter is historical in nature. It will trace the events which preceded 
Iran's presentation of its case to the United Nations in 1946. Thereafter what transpired in the 
Security Council between Iran and the member states will be addressed. The perspective of this 
chapter can be summed up as answering the question - what was at stake at the global level for 
Iran, and for the main protagonists of the period, when the case of 1946 was tabled? 
In reviewing the events of 1946 concerning the United Nations and Iran, the early 20th cen- 
tury Iranian policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States of American need to 
be objectively understood, for this is what primarily conditioned the handling of Iran's post-war 
dispute with the Soviet Union - the Iranian Case of 1946. The Iranian Case of 1946 was the first 
such case to be presented at the Security Council of the United Nations. This implies that it was 
looked upon by the international community as a crisis, one which threatened international peace 
and security and amounted to direct interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. 
An appropriate preamble to the Iranian Case of 1946 is to examine the historical back- 
ground, which is crucial to understanding how the events developed and, more importantly, how 
they i. e. the events enabled Iran to handle the situation at a global level. 
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I. A Historical Preamble: Persia's Relations with Britain and Russia 1800-1941 
The unique strategic location of the Middle East has been a prime reason for power rivalries 
erupting periodically in this area. With the building of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic 
importance of the area gained even greater significance and substantially increased the volume of 
trade between East and West. 1 Moreover, the discovery of oil resources further enhanced the 
value of the Middle East and influenced the political stance of the great powers. 
In the late 19th century and early 20th century, when the colonial empires of Britain and 
Imperial Russia still played a large role in world politics, Persia's strategic location took on par- 
ticular significance. In the east it allowed access to India and Central Asia and, toward the South, 
to the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf. To the West lay the gateways to Arabia and Turkey, 
and to the north stood Russia. 
Given this special geographical location of Persia, between the expansionist Russian power 
in the north and the status-quo consolidated power of the British empire in the south and east, 
Persia became a pawn in the game of Anglo-Russian power politics? In 1800, in a move to pro- 
tect her economic interests in India, Great Britain entered into a pact with Fateh Ali Shah, 
monarch of Persia, against France and Afghanistan. After the demise of both Napoleon and the 
Afghan leader, Zaman Shah, the new threat to British interests came from Russia. This was the 
genesis of Anglo-Russian rivalry. Britain wanted to maintain Persia as a buffer state separating 
Russia from India, and Russian took steps to consolidate her empire territories along Persia's 
northern frontiers. 3 
In the latter half of the 19th century, Iran's domestic policy was overtly dependent on the 
great powers. This dependence was more of an economic nature than of a military or political 
one. A significant development which characterises this period was the tobacco concession 
I Franklin S. Harris, The Middle East as Critical Area in the World", Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs, 
1949, P. M. 
Z Peter Avery, Modern Iran, London, Ernest Benn Ltd 1965. The author recounts the view expressed by Lord Curzon 
in the House of Lords in the early part of this century, as to the relative losses Britain would suffer in military and material 
terms, given the growing influence of Russia in Persia. 
3 Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, (Two volumes) London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1921. Extensive treatment of 
19th century Persian politics and diplomacy. 
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granted in 1890 to an English company with a monopoly to buy and sell Persia's entire tobacco 
output. The concession was, however, first backed by and later (in 1892) cancelled by a clergy- 
led movement4 which enjoyed wide support throughout Persia. The outcome of this entire 
episode exposed the weakness of the Shah and, more importantly, reflected the dormant but real 
power of the clergy who had successfully mobilised the public .5 These developments coupled 
with a sizable public debt contributed significantly to the growth of revolutionary sentiment in 
Persia, which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905,6 the establishment of a Parlia- 
ment or Majles in 1906, and the signing of the proposed constitution of 1 January 1907. 
In the year 1907, Britain and Russia signed the Anglo-Russian Convention which called for 
a division of Persia into British and Russian zones of influence. This disillusioned the Persians, 
who were settling down to enjoy the fruits of constitutional government 7 The Convention 
alienated the Persian people from the British, and the Persians turned their sympathies towards 
Germany. Persian sentiment during this time can be summed up in an old oriental proverb, which 
was quoted by an observer in Tehran: 
"Foes are of three kinds, our foes, the friends of our foes and the foes of our friends ... 
England has now become the friend of our foes. "8 
Alluding to the Russians, of course. 
Sir Edward Gray, Britain's Foreign Minister, tried to justify the aims of the convention by 
referring to it as a treaty which would prevent Anglo-Russian rivalries from directly impinging on 
the domestic affairs of Persia. "Neither of the two powers seeks anything from Persia, so that 
Persia can concentrate all her energies on the settlement of her internal affairs. Both ministers are 
4 E. G. Brown, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1910, pp. 31-58, for an excellent 
account of the build up of the Constitutional Revolution. 
s Peter Avery, op. cit., pp. 104-5, "The Crown was humiliated, while the people had shown themselves capable of united 
action and the clergy had been made aware of what in the arena of politics and public morality the forces of religion could 
still achieve". 
6 The British in Persia during this period believed a "native" revolution would reduce Russian influence and thereby en- 
couraged Persian nationalist sentiment. The defeat of the Russians in their war with Japan and the thwarted Russian Revo- 
lution of 1905 encouraged the nationalists in Persia to demand constitutional government. 
7 See Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968. Given 
Britain's larger global strategies, it is believed to have entered into this treaty with Russia in order to counter the growing 
strength of Germany. The Russians on their part were still recovering from their loss of face at the hands of the Japanese. 
8 Youel B. Mina, Iran and the Iranians, Baltimore, Williams and Williams Company, 1913, p. 117. 
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entirely in accord as to the policy of non-intervention in Persia, and have left no possible ground 
for doubt in the matter. "9 This assurance, as will be seen, was never honoured by either party and 
plagued Persian politics right up to 1946. 
With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, although Iran professed neutrality, it 
nevertheless was ravaged by the winds of war. This war period was marked by two significant 
events. Firstly the Germans were leading rebellions in the South of Persia which directly 
threatened Britain's developing oil fields. 10 Secondly, because of the March revolution of 1917 in 
St. Petersburg, it was the Turks rather than the Russians who controlled the North-Western parts 
of Persia. The Turks remained in the area until the signing of the Armistice in 1918. The Ger- 
man presence in the south of Persia was subdued by the British forces, but nevertheless 
"intensified anti-Russian feelings in the country and left the seed for future German influence. "11 
At the end of the war, the internal condition of Persia was pitiable. There was a famine in 
the North-West, a considerable amount of Iranian territory was under the control of rebels, and a 
British-Indian force was occupying the Eastern portion of the country. Amidst this turmoil within 
Persia, both Britain and Russia vied for renewed influence in the country. 
With the coming of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia, the Anglo-Russian convention and 
all Tsarist claims and concessions in Persia were renounced. The British on their part abrogated 
the 1907 convention, and offered a package to the Persians providing for necessary economic and 
military aid. The British offer was accepted by the Persian government as the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement of 1919, only to be overwhelmingly defeated by the Iranian Majies in 1921.12 The 
agreement was defeated due to such broad factors as Iranian nationalism, the relative decline of 
British credibility in the eyes of the Iranians, the British being seen as traitors and associated with 
the hated Iranian elite, and because the agreement was negotiated secretly and seemed too one 
9 Ibid, p. 117. 
10 Sir Percy Sykes, op. cit, has covered the area well in Chapter LXXXV and Chapter LXXXVI, vol1l. 
11 George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry, Ithaca, New York: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1949, p. 151. 




A few months before theAnglo-Persian treaty was defeated by the Majles, the Soviet Union 
entered into a treaty of friendship with Persia which was signed in Moscow on 26 February 1921. 
It voided all previous claims Russia had on Persian resources and territory, including the payment 
of accumulated loans. 14 But the treaty contained one significant, rather controversial provision, 15 
which stated with ambiguity that Russia reserved the right to "advance their troops into the Per- 
sian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations" necessary "if a foreign power 
should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian government 
should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been called upon to do so by Rus- 
sia. "16 This article was referred to constantly by the Russians during the negotiations of 1946 in 
the United Nations. 
In May 1920 Soviet troops had entered the Persian province of Gilan while pursuing white 
Russian forces and, in collusion with Persian rebels, proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Gilan. In 
spite of Persian protests, the Soviets declined all responsibility. The Soviets only withdrew their 
forces six months later, because the Majles threatened to annul the Treaty of Friendship. '7 
Shortly after this, the Republic of Gilan collapsed. 
In the following year, 1921, a Colonel in the Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan, rose to the rank 
of Commander-in-Chief of Persian Forces. He then became the Prime Minister in 1923 and 
finally declared himself, in 1925, the first Pahlavi monarch of Persia (called Iran since 1936 by a 
parliamentary decision), assuming the title of Reza Shah Pahlavi. 
13 Peter Avery, op. cit., pp. 204-209. 
14 Nikki It Keddie, "Iranian politics 1900-1995: Background to Revolution", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, Janu- 
ary 1969. 
15 Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923, Anglo-Russian power politics in Iran, New 
York, Russell F. Moore Company, Inc., 1952, pp. 317-24. The controversial provision was contained in article 6. 
16 Ibid., Article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship: "If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by 
means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against 
Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies and if the Persian govern- 
ment should not be able to put a stop to such menace after being once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the 
right to advance their troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its 
defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been re- 
moved. " 
17 Fatemi, op. cit., pp. 233-43, offers a comprehensive account of the factors which forced the Soviets to negotiate with 
the Iranian government. 
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With the outbreak of the Second World War, Reza Shah refused allied demands for wartime 
cooperation to ship American supplies to Russia; Britain and Russia then jointly occupied Iran in 
August 1941. Minor armed resistance offered by the Iranian Forces was quickly put down. In the 
same year the Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who 
was installed as monarch in September 1941.18 
Ll The Allied Occupation of Iran: August 1941 
The occupation of Iran by Russia hinged around two major strategic considerations. Firstly, 
the protection of her Baku oil fields and, secondly, access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf 
through which Allied support could reach her. 
In the case of Britain, the reason for the occupation of Iran was that, as one author writing in 
1941 remarked, "... no small nation can hope to remain neutral in the face of war as waged by 
Hitler". Preference of the Iranian government for "German officials and technicians in large 
numbers and in key positions" and probable Iranian "... sympathy with Nazi political and racial 
theories", led Britain to occupy Iranian territory. 19 
Hence, from the Allied point of view, the occupation was inevitable. "The position of Iran 
cannot be seen except in the framework of world domination ... a continuation of the 
Drang nach 
Osten - German control of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. "20 The allies emphasised 
that this was strictly a military operation and that their troops would be withdrawn when cir- 
cumstances allowed. 21 The Allies further divided Iran into three zones of influence: the British 
zone comprising the oil fields in the South West; the Soviet zone comprising Iran's five northern 
is Peter Avery, op. cit., see chapters 14-17, which trace the changes from the first Pahlavi reign to the beginning of the 
second, with reference to the socio-political situation in Iran in relation to Britain and Russia. 
19 L. P. Elwell Sutton, Modern Iran, London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1942, p. 1ß4. The book and especially 
Chapter IX was written at the time of the Allied Occupation of Iran and hence gives lucid insight into the Allied and British 
points of view. 
20 Ibid., Elwell Sutton, p. 174. 
2i A note was given to the Iranian ambassador in Moscow in August 1941, by V. M. Molotov, foreign affairs commis- 
sion which read: "The military measures taken are solely against the danger created by the hostile activities of Germans in 
Iran. As soon as this danger which threatens the interests of Iran and the Soviet Union is averted the Soviet Government 
will immediately withdraw its troops". Quoted in Kenneth Lee Hetrick, The United Nations As A National Foreign Policy 
Instrument: The Iranian Case of 1946. Ann Arbor, Michigan University Microfilms International, 1979, p. 48. (Thesis com- 
pleted in 1979). 
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provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Asterabad and Khorassan; and an unoccupied zone 
in the centre of Iran consisting of Tehran, Mashaad and Isfahan. Tehran was later occupied 
jointly by Russian and British forces. 
L2 The Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942 
According to one Iranian author, prior to the Allied occupation, 
"the dictatorial regime of Reza Shah necessitated a certain degree of independence 
from external pressure and British influence ... Persia was relatively free to determine its course of politics ... with its own set of national interests. With the occupation of Iran, once again reduced to a powerless body ... 
in terms of power relationship and 
past experience, the situation was not unprecedented. "22 
Since Iran continued to be of strategic importance to both Britain and Russia, the Tripartite 
Treaty of Alliance of 1942 was entered into by Britain, Russia and Iran. On the face of it the 
treaty pledged to "respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran", 
but its larger aims were to prevent either of the great powers from using Iran as a geo-political 
lever. 23 The treaty was signed on 29 January 1942. It not only formalised the military occupancy 
of Iran, but was to be the basis for the political relations of Iran with the two great powers. 
According to some observers, the Treaty of Alliance, "raised the status of Iran from an actually 
occupied territory to partnership. "24 According to others, Iran's status was further enhanced when 
it declared war on Germany in 1943 and, after the war, agreed to accept and adhere to the declara- 
tion of the United Nations. 25 
Despite all these assurances of sovereignty and political independence, Iran remained a 
country divided into political zones of influence. The authority of the Iranian Central Govern- 
ment was almost negligible and the whole country was in the midst of an economic disaster, exa- 
cerbated by very high inflation. 26 
22 Hossein Kazemzadeh, Iran and Post-War Political Issues: Policy Reflections in the United Nations, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan University Microfilms International, 1978, p. 41, (Thesis completed in 1954). 
23 Lenczowski op. cit., pp. 319-322. For the entire text of the treaty and extensive commentary. 
24 Hossein Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 43. 
25 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, ( vol. II), London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948, pp. 1504-05. Hull recounts how the declara- 
tion of war by Iran on Germany naturally progressed into Iran joining the United Nations and hence becoming an "eligible" 
member of the Allied powers. 
26 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 178. 
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L3 The Significance of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance to Iranian Foreign Relations 
The Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942 contained two provisions which were central to 
Iran's dispute with the Soviet Union and crucial to the negotiations of the dispute at the United 
Nations Security Council. These are embodied in the following articles of the treaty: 
Article 4, sub-clause (i) read: "It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian terri- 
tory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administra- 
tion and the security forces of Iran... " In addition, Article 5, which was invoked consistently by 
the Iranians in 1946, read: "The forces of the allied powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian terri- 
tory not later than six months after all hostilities between the allied powers and Germany and her 
associates have been suspended ... 
"27 
During the time Iran was entering into the Treaty of Alliance, and even later, Iran sought to 
befriend the Americans who, given their larger involvement in the Allied war effort, could not 
directly respond to Iran's overtures. However, Iranian leaders preferred to assign to American 
missions the job of organising areas such as the army, rural police, food supply, etc. These mis- 
sions were directly answerable to the Iranian government. 28 
Towards the end of 1943, the Anglo-Soviet occupation took an adverse turning which 
greatly alarmed the Iranians and altered America's role in the area. The Soviets sealed off the 
Northern provinces to all but Iranian nationals. And this caused great anxiety to the British who 
were unable to handle the grain distribution efficiently in the South, leading to famine-like condi- 
tions. 29 
The major outcome of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance for Iran was that it wanted America 
to enter into its sphere of international relations, which hitherto had been dominated by Britain 
and Russia. With the defeat of Germany imminent, the Americans had suspicions about the 
27 For the entire text of the treaty, see ibid., pp. 219-322. 
28 Ruhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernising Nations, Char- 
lottesville, Virginia, University Press of Virginia, 1975. This gives a detailed account of Iran's foreign relations during 
1942-43, vis-a-vis the major actors operating in the area. 
29 Peter Avery, op. cit., pp. 354-357. The author looks at the events and attributes the causes to a lack of co-ordination 
between American and British support logistics. 
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future plans of Britain and Russia regarding Iran. 
30 Towards the end of the war, Anglo-Soviet 
occupation of Iran entered its second phase. Whereas during the first phase Anglo-Soviet co- 
operation led to the occupation, now a lack of co-operation threatened to continue it. The 
dilemma caused by Anglo-Soviet suspicions of each other did not allow for a unilateral with- 
drawal of troops and it was believed that wartime occupation might extend indefinitely. 31 
Thus it may be safely assumed that one of the reasons for the Americans promoting the idea 
of a meeting of the Allied heads of state in Tehran was its growing alienation from the Anglo- 
Soviet political ventures in Iran. 32 
1.4 The Tehran Declaration of November 1943 
The Tehran Declaration of 1943 was convened to discuss global military strategy and to lay 
plans for a future international organisation. One of the items on the agenda was the question of 
Iran. In a public declaration, the President of the United States of America, the Premier of the 
Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Britain, regarding Iran, affirmed "their desire for the 
maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. "33 
The Tehran Declaration was received with joy by all Iranians and instilled within them 
a new faith in the United States of America, for taking the initiative in helping Iran 
and supporting the Iranian cause at the conference. This favourable disposition was to 
change drastically in the following year. "34 
IL A Backdrop to the Iranian Case of 1946: Historical and Political Events (1944-1946) 
The history of this period between 1943-1946 is crucial, because it has a definite bearing on 
Iranian-Soviet relations, the state of which will be in constant review in the following pages. 
30 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 53. He quotes General Patrick Hurley who, after meeting top Russian, American, British and 
Iranian military and civilian officials, reported to President Roosevelt "In my opinion Britain and Russia aspire to control 
Iran after the war, not jointly but separately. Britain's control would be for the purpose of keeping the monopoly of the oil 
resources which her nationals now own and of establishing a trade monopoly, and Russia's control would serve to secure 
her long-desired access to a warm water port ... " Foreign 
Relations of United States 1943: The Near East and Africa, Wash- 
ington, US Department of State, US Government Printing Office, vol. 4, p. 367, (henceforth cited as Foreign Relations). 
31 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
32 Ibid., p. 54. "The American delegation proposed that the Allied powers support Iran's foreign adviser programme, 
staffed by the Americans and that each of the Allies declare separately its intention to withdraw its troops. " 
33 See Khusrow Sadeghi, A Study of the Tehran Conference of 1943, Tehran University Center for International Studies, 
Tehran, 1978. Gives an interesting account of the formal proceedings of the meeting. 
34 See Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Power Keg in Iran New York, Whittier Book Inc., 1954. 
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Much of the diplomacy which took place is this period served Iran in good stead in the dispute of 
1946 with the Soviet Union. 
The American policy towards Iran after the Tehran Declaration, beginning in 1944, was 
essentially conditioned by its quest for oil concessions within Iran. There were those within Iran 
who favoured American involvement, in contrast to those who hailed from the Iranian communist 
party (TUDEH) and who denounced the government for conducting secret negotiations with the 
Americans. 
The Iranian Majles, sensing the rush for oil concessions, decided unanimously that no con- 
cessions could be granted till after the war. The embassies of the United States, Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union were formally informed accordingly. At this notification from the Iranian 
government, it was only the Soviets who reacted adversely. It called Iran's policy "fascist" and 
criticised Prime Minister Mohammad Saed's government. Soviet-inspired demonstrations 
erupted in the major cities throughout the northern zone and in Tehran. 35 The Prime Minister 
resigned due to the mounting public pressure. It was during this period of unrest that Dr. Moham- 
mad Mossadegh introduced the famed bill which forbade any Prime Minister to enter into discus- 
sions concerning oil concessions and sale of oil. The price for violating this bill was punishable 
by three to eight years of solitary confinement and permanent exclusion from government ser- 
vice. 36 The new law flatly prohibited concessions owned and operated by any foreign country. 
Soviet officials called the legislation "objectionable and obstructive. "37 
A number of significant developments in the politics of Iran between 1944 and 1946 with 
direct consequence on the events of 1946 are addressed below: 
Firstly, it was a widely accepted fact that the Soviet Union had created within Iran a loyal 
and strong following, the TUDEH, or Communist Party of Iran. 
Secondly, on the international level, as reflected at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, 
35 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 64. 
36 Ibid., p. 66. 
37 Ibid. 
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the Russians opposed any international agreements on Iran. 38 None of the great powers was ready 
to condemn Soviet behaviour in Iran for fear of displeasing an ally. 
Thirdly, during the mid-months of 1945, Iranian efforts to send its own soldiers into the 
northern provinces of Azerbaijan to quell riots there were forcibly restrained by Soviet troops. 
Given that the Azerbaijan riots were fuelled by separatist forces, Soviet restrictions on Iranian 
troops entering the province constituted a serious threat to the sovereignty of Iran. This particular 
incident figured prominently later in the debates before the Security Council. 
Fourthly, after the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the cursory way in which the Iran 
issue was dealt with by the great powers when they "decided to remain flexible, to let events in 
Iran, rather than talk around a conference table, dictate their future strategies. "39 
Lastly, in the wake of the Potsdam Conference in August-September 1945, the Soviet 
Union began directly to promote and support separatist movements in the northern Iranian pro- 
vince of Azerbaijan. 40 The British, for their part, "... supported by the Americans ... would not 
allow any encroachment in the south where the oil-producing area was situated. 41 In other words, 
both the Soviet Union and Britain were restricting Iran's authority in her own territories but at the 
same time were careful to stay out of each other's way, given their separate interests in Iran. 
The oil crisis of 1944 showed that there did exist a very strong nationalist sentiment in Iran 
which supported a clear policy of neither "East or West" as regards its oil resources. It also 
showed that Iranian-Soviet relations were not unequivocal and that the former had to appease the 
latter, given the Soviet propensity to cause disturbance within Iran. This prompted the new Prime 
Minister, Morteza Quli Bayat, who was considered fairly neutral in his views, to appoint two 
pro-Soviet cabinet members. The move was designed to reduce Iran-Soviet tensions, and this it 
did considerably through the early months of 1945.42 During this time the Soviets pressed 
38 The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conference Documents, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969, p. 6. This is evident 
when, at the second sitting at Livadia Palace, Stalin gives secondary importance to "occupation zones", a question raised by 
Roosevelt. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Sir Clairmont Skrine, World War in Iran, London, Constable & Co. Ltd., 1962, p. 254. See "Diary of the main 
events in dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union over autonomy of Azerbaijan". 
41 General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, London, John Murray, 1964, p. 337. 
42Fatemi, op. cit., p. 248. 
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indirectly for new oil concessions and began a new propaganda onslaught against the British. 
Prime Minister Bayat was replaced by the "strongly pro-western" Prime Minister, Sadar al 
Ashraf, in June 1945. The Soviets increased pressure on Iran by stepping up support for separa- 
43 tist movements in the northern provinces 
After the Japanese had surrendered to the allies and only six months of legitimate occupa- 
tion remained, in accordance with the provision in the treaty of 1942, the Soviets stepped up their 
support for the separatists of Azerbaijan, under the leadership of Jafar Pishawari. By September 
1945, the new Azerbaijan "Democratic Party" was established and put forward its claims for "pro- 
vincial autonomy". In November, after Iranian officials entered and confiscated party documents 
from the TUDEH party headquarters in Tehran, open rebellion broke out in Soviet-occupied 
Azerbaijan. 44 While protecting the Azerbaijani "Democrats" and refusing entry to an Iranian 
relief force into the northern provinces, 45 the Russians clearly indicated their position to the 
Iranian government, and to the ever watchful Americans and the British, on their plans for adher- 
ing to the set date of withdrawal of troops. 
Publicity was Iran's best weapon to draw international attention to what was happening with 
regard to the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. 46 This prompted American Secretary of State, 
James Byrnes, to send a new proposal to the Soviet Union 47 The proposal called for the removal 
of all foreign troops by 1 January 1946. The State Department sent a similar proposal to Britain, 
who responded quickly, that withdrawal of its troops would take place alongside the Soviets. On 
29 November, the Soviets replied in the negative. According to the Soviets, the unwillingness of 
"reactionary forces" to honour the legitimate demands of the Azerbaijani people, 48 and not the 
`3 General Hassan Arfa, op. cit., pp. 341-342. 
4' Ibid., pp. 345-346. 
45 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 286-287. 
46 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., quotes an unnamed British official who remarked to America's ambassador in Britain, "... the 
Iranian ambassador in Washington apparently needs no coaching in that regard [publicity] judging from the press reports", 
p. 1 17. [The American public was kept well informed of the situation by Iran's ambassador to Washington. Hossein Ala, 
through vivid press releases]. 
47 Secretary Byrnes dispatched the note containing the proposal on 23 November 1945. See Sir Clairmont Skrine, 
op. cit., for a first hand account of the particular exchange. 
43 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 325. He quotes certain Iranian newspapers which print the Soviet Union's point of view, "... 
the evacuation of Russian troops would depend upon the attitude of the ruling class in Iran" ... if the Iranian government 
gave any cause to doubt, the Soviets "... could maintain their troops in the country for an indefinite period. " 
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presence of Soviet troops caused the "undesirable incidents". With regard to stopping the Iranian 
contingent from entering Azerbaijan, the Soviets explained that this was primarily done to 
prevent further bloodshed. Apart from stressing to Secretary Byrnes that it was understood that 
the Soviet troops would evacuate by 2 March 1946, according to the provision of the Treaty, the 
Soviets also justified their presence in Iran by invoking certain provisions laid down in the 
Soviet-Iranian Treaty of February 1921. According to some authors, the Russians were building 
up a legal and judicial reason for not withdrawing their troops by 2 March 1946.49 
III. Iran and the Preparation of the United Nations Charter, April 1945 
With the second World War coming to an end and the seeds of the United Nations already 
sown by the three allied powers (USSR, USA and Great Britain), Iran, with other nations, was 
invited to participate at the San Francisco Conference. Scheduled for 25 April 1945, the Confer- 
ence was to "prepare a charter for the general international organisation for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. "50 Considering that Iran during this time was under military 
occupation, it was her primary aim to rid herself from foreign influence and restore the authority 
of the central government. This was especially true of her lack of control over the occupied terri- 
tories both in the north and south of Iran, controlled by the Soviet and British Forces respectively. 
It has been argued by authors like Hossein Kazemzadeh that to a small nation such as Iran 
its `focal objective' was "how to preserve its integrity and independence, international life and 
international relations. "51 Therefore, to "such a nation, the reason of existence of the international 
organisation will be mainly political, i. e. to maintain the peace and security of the word through 
political as well as legal means. "52 This was further manifested in the "form and substance" of 
amendments which the Iranian delegation proposed. These amendments were as follows: 
(i) To draw up a provision which would be tantamount to Article 10 of the Covenant 
concerning the guarantee of territorial integrity and independence to members of the 
49 Fatemi, op. cit., p. 272. 
50 Hossein Fakher, The Charter and Organisation of the United Nations, Tehran, 1951, p. 20. 
51 Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 49. See Chapter 1, sections II and III. 
52 Aid., Kazemzadeh, p. 50. 
-19 
organisation; 
(ii) To regard "right, justice and international law" as the basis of the maintenance of 
peace and security; 
(iii) To stipulate in the charter that member-states must refrain from "threat or use of 
force" directly or indirectly in any way which would be inconsistent with the purpose 
of the organisation; 
(iv) To recognise the pre-eminence of the General Assembly; 
(v) To accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; 
(vi) To define any threat to the territorial integrity and independence of member-states as 
a breach of international security and peace; 
(vii) To give a clear and exact definition of the term "aggression"; 
(viii) To codify international law; 
(ix) To require the registration of international treaties; 
(x) To apply the principle of rotation and periodicity in the election of members of the 
Economic and Social Council; 
(xi) To establish an intellectual institute of co-operation. 53 
When these proposed amendments are examined in the context of Iran's dilemma with the 
big powers, threatening her sovereignty, Iran's main interest in the establishment of a United 
Nations Organisation was mainly political rather than economic or social. 
Apart from the above mentioned general amendments, Iran had certain specific views on the 
"structure of the organisation and its powers and functions. °54 From the structural point of view 
Iran, like other small states, looked upon the General Assembly as the prominent organ of the 
United Nations; "Iran strove to enhance the status of the General Assembly and its role in the 
53 Based on United Nations Conference on International Organisation, vol. 3, pp. 554-557. (Henceforth cited as UN- 
CIO). 
54 The following description of the Iranian view is largely attributed to Hossein Kazemzadeh's work. Kazetnzadeh, 
op. cit., p. 54. 
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maintenance of international peace and security. "55 It proposed that the General Assembly have 
the power "to draw the attention of the Council to a dispute on all situations capable of endanger- 
ing peace and ... fix an adequate 
delay within which the Council should pronounce its decision on 
the question submitted to it. If, at the expiration of this period, the Council is unable to reach a 
decision, the Assembly can intervene and take necessary measures. "56 This proposal was made in 
the hope of empowering the General Assembly, and was further backed up by the Iranian delega- 
tion with a request that the Security Council be enlarged from 11 to 15 members 57 Needless to 
say, these proposals were not considered seriously by the Great Powers, who were not willing to 
submit to the pressures of small states 58 
In concluding this section on Iran's role at the preparatory conference in San Francisco, it 
would be in place to mention certain proposals and amendments which Iran, along with other 
states, felt were crucial to defining the functions and powers of the emerging United Nations. 
Firstly, the Iranian delegation sought to amend Paragraph I, Chapter I, of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposal concerned with the purposes of the Organisation. It proposed that the purpose of 
the Organisation should not be merely "to maintain international peace and security", but should 
be, "on the basis of right, justice and the principles of international law. "59 This comprises the 
latter part of the first paragraph of Article I of the United Nations Charter. 
Secondly, with regard to the territorial integrity and political independence of member 
states, Iran was particularly interested in a provision which would correspond in spirit to Article 
10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which embodied the provision for the maintenance 
55 There was resentment among the smaller/less powerful member states to the dominant role of the Security Council in 
matters of international peace and security. In the view of Kazemzadeh this resentment lay in the fear that "The would-be 
legislative branch of the world organisation was virtually subordinate to the would- be executive branch", ibid. 
56 UNCIO, vol. 3, p. 555. 
57 The argument for enlargement of the Security Council given by Iran was that it would 
(i) give a more representative character to the Security Council, 
(ii) facilitate the application of the principle of geographical representation, 
(iii) would not impair the Council's efficiency, rather the Council could discharge its "non-security" functions more 
efficiently, UNCIO, vol. 2, p. 275. 
58 It was decided at Yalta by the three big powers, USSR, USA and GB, that the charter and other provisions would be 
along the "lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks". Regarding the voting procedure at the Securi- 
ty Council, see section C of chapter vi of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal in The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, 
Documents, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969, pp. 141-142. 
59 Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 60. In addition to Iran, France and a number of smaller nations supported the recommenda- 
tion. 
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of the status quo 60 According to Kazemzadeh, the deliberations on the part of Iran on this aspect 
resulted in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which reads ... "members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi- 
cal independence of any state" ... 
61 This could be seen as an interpretation of Article 10 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Thirdly, the Iranian delegation "moved to define the threat to international peace and secu- 
rity in terms of the threat against territorial integrity and political independence of member 
states. "62 
The reason for this amendment by the Iranians was to impel the Security Council to take 
immediate action in the case of such a threat. ** The amendment was not adopted immediately, 
but was referred to the Draft Committee. 63 
Fourthly, the delegation of Iran sought a clear-cut definition of the term "aggression" and 
"wished that such a definition be included in the Charter of the United Nations". M 
Fifthly, on the matter of obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and 
whether or not it should be inserted into the Statute of the Court, Iran proposed that all members 
"should make declarations adhering to the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court as soon as possi- 
ble". The Committee adopted the Iranian motion unanimously. 65 
Sixthly, Iran and Venezuela jointly proposed that (i) "member states should release them- 
selves from any obligation which is not consistent with the Charter", and (ii) "member states 
should agree not to undertake such obligations in their future international engagements. "66 
Lastly, "the delegation of Iran declared itself in favour of the registration of treaties with the 
60 Ibid., p. 61. 
61 Article 2, paragraph 4, The United Nations Charter. 
62 UNCIO, vol. 3, p. 556. 
62 One of the early indicators that the Iranians expected the UN to be instrumental in the future negotiations between 
themselves and the USSR, with regard to the withdrawal of all Soviet troops. 
63 UNCIO, vol. 12, pp. 66-67. 
" UNCIO, vol. 3, p. 557. 
65 UNCIO, vol. 13, p. 299. 
66 UNCIO, vo1.13, p. 800. 
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Secretariat of the United Nations and the codification of international law. "67 
At the end of the San Francisco Conference, the Iranians were not elated, but felt that a step 
had been taken in the direction of being able to co-exist with other states, especially the so- called 
"Big Five", with a reduced threat to its sovereignty and national integrity. 
IV. The Iranian Case at the United Nations: 1946 
The diplomatic manouevering, prior to the Iranian Case being introduced at the United 
Nations, is of considerable interest and importance to this paper. It points towards two central 
aspects of Iranian foreign policy strategy: 
(i) The playing of great powers against each other by Iran, taking advantage of the ideological 
splits surfacing between the United States of America, Britain and the Soviet Union. 
(ii) The ability of Iran to negotiate large parts of its foreign policy goals independently and on a 
bilateral basis with the Soviet Union, made possible - to some extent - by the latter's desire 
to show itself as a big power that represents political ethics. The role that Iran played in 
successfully defending its case before the United Nations Security Council can be appreci- 
ated when viewed in this strategic context. 
After the rejection on 29 November 1945 of the United States' proposal for immediate eva- 
cuation by the Soviets, the United States proceeded cautiously, hesitating to accuse the Soviet 
Union on the basis of insufficient and unreliable information regarding Azerbaijan. But by 
December 1945, the United States had enough first hand evidence. The "Democratic Party" of 
Azerbaijan lacked popular support and the confidence of the people 68 Armed with this informa- 
tion, the US proceeded at the second conference of Foreign Minister held in Moscow on 16 
December 1945, to discuss the Iranian case among other things. In spite of the publicity cam- 
paign launched by Iran at the second Moscow conference, and the American sympathy for Iran, it 
67 UNCIO, vol. 3, p. 556. 
68 Mr. T. Cuyler Young, an American press attache and Iranian specialist, after spending five days in Tabriz reported 
that ... 
"the Soviets were providing arms and posting guards around Democratic Party meetings" ... and that 
"a state of ab- 
ject rough concealed terror reigns in Tabriz". Foreign Relations vol. 8, p. 465-466. 
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was not surprising that at the onset of the conference Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
and United States Secretary of State, James Byrnes, came to an agreement that "Iran ought to 
grant Azerbaijan a certain measure of provincial freedom". 69 This was considered as a means to 
reduce the Soviet role in the northern provinces. 
The Iranian issue was not included in the conference agenda because of Soviet opposition, 
but it was discussed informally. Secretary Byrnes expressed his fears that "the Soviet interference 
in Iran may raise a question at the forthcoming United Nations meeting"? o The comment was 
designed to get the Soviets to react on the Iranian issue. Marshall Stalin, however, was of the 
view that Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan had prevented considerable bloodshed. Moreover, he 
explained, the Soviet officials at Baku were under threat from saboteurs from the Northern Pro- 
vinces. Given the provisions of the Iran-Soviet Treaty of 1921, as long as a threat to Soviet Rus- 
sia existed, their troops would continue in Iran. Therefore, no promise could be made to with- 
draw troops by 2 March 1946.71 
The day after Christmas 1945, Mr. Hossein Ala, Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, 
called on George V. Allen, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and Allied Affairs. 
Ambassador Ala said that he had instructions from Tehran to be first assured that Iran had the 
support of the United States before raising the issue at the United Nations 72 A few days follow- 
ing this meeting, the Prime Minister of Iran, Ibrahim Hakimi, authorised the Iranian Ambassador 
to Britain, Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, to bring the matter before the first session of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 73 The United States of America, reluctant at first, agreed later to let 
Iran bring the issue to the United Nations 74 At this juncture, Britain, sensing the possibility of 
69 The Americans believed that if ... "Iran should grant concessions to the Azerbaijanis short of recognising their auton- omy", it would mobilise public opinion and leave ... "no grounds for the charge that people of any part of the country are being deprived of their constitutional rights". This opinion was offered as advice by America's Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Averell Harriman, to the State Department and to American Ambassador Murray in Tehran. Foreign Relations, 
1945, vol. 8, pp. 504- 505. 
70 Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 2, p. 685. 
n Secretary Byrnes warned that since the United States did not consider Iran hostile to the Soviet Union, the issue 
placed the United States in the difficult position of having to "take sides". Stalin replied that "no-one has any need to blush 
if the question is raised in the Assembly. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 2, p. 752. 
'M Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 8, p. 513, and Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. 7, p. 292-293. 
73 Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 391. Both the Foreign Minister of Britain, Mr Bevin, and the American Secretary of State did 
not encourage this move. Nevertheless, on 19 January 1946, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations raised the issue. 
74 Loy Henderson advised Secretary Byrnes not to join the British in discouraging or blocking Iran's complaint, warn- 
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international pressure being brought against them, given their presence as well in Iran, applied 
direct pressure on the Iranian Prime Minister, Ibrahim Hakimi, to withdraw the proposal to lodge 
a complaint at the United Nations. 75 Hakimi's indecisiveness on this matter sparked off unrest in 
the Iranian Majies and culminated in his resignation in January 1946. The Majles elected Ahmad 
Qavam Prime Minister six days later. 76 
IV. 1 The Iranian Complaint to the Security Council, 9 January 1946 
By the provisions laid down in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, the occupying forces of Britain 
and the Soviet Union were to evacuate their troops by 2 March 194677 Some members of the 
Council felt that not only was the Iranian complaint premature but also, given the prescribed 
amount of time, the dispute would resolve itself with or without the Council's vigilance. 
This atmosphere of complacency among certain members did not, however, reflect the glo- 
bal political situation, especially that which was developing between the USSR, USA and Britain 
over the Iranian issue 78 An extract from President Harry Truman's memoirs will help sum up the 
political climate between the Big Three. The President, sensing that his Secretary of State Byrnes 
was caught in a dilemma over how much support to lend Iran without jeopardising Britain's posi- 
tion in the international community (and also as an occupying force in Iran), declared, "I think we 
ought to protest with all the vigour of which we are capable against the Russian programme in 
Iran. There is no justification for it ... We should let our position on Iran be known in no uncer- 
tain terms... I am tired of babying the Soviets. "79 Henceforth, President Truman decided to 
ing that "if it should become known that the United States and the United Kingdom had pressed Iran not to present its case 
before the United Nations Organisation, an immediate impression would be created by all the smaller members of the Unit- 
ed Nations Organisation that the new international organisation is no improvement over the old method of international re- 
lations, when the Great Powers joined together to press small powers to make concessions as was done at Munich". Foreign 
Relations, 1946, vol. 7, pp. 294-295. 
75 Sir Reader Bullard, Britain's Ambassador to Iran, forced Prime Minister Hakimi to draft a retraction letter in 
Bullard's presence then personally sent it from Tehran over British military radio. Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. 7, pp. 299- 
301. 
76 Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 391. 
77 The troops were to be withdrawn six months after the first armistice or armistices had been signed between the Allied 
and Axis powers. Or subsequently, when one party had been defeated. 
78 The victorious allies were parting ways on ideological and global policy issues. To get a good picture of this period, 
popularly referred to as the "Cold War" sec D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960, (2 vols. ), New York, 
Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1961. 
79 Harry S. Truman. Memoirs, Year of Decision, Suffolk, Hodder and Stoughton, 1955. See pp. 491-493. The 
President writes a letter containing the above comments addressed to Jim Byrnes, but he does not send it. The President 
reads the letter to Byrnes at a later date in the Oval office. 
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support Iran at the United Nations. Secretary Byrnes, given his vast experience and sensing the 
tide of rising expectations of the smaller member states on the one hand and the fragile Great 
Power relationships on the other, hastened to comment to the General Assembly on 14 January 
1946: 
"Let us not think that we can give over any and every problem to the United Nations 
and expect it to be solved. Let us avoid casting excessive burdens upon the institu- 
tions of the United Nations, especially in their infancy. I recall to you the clear provi- 
sions of the Charter which obligate member nations to make every effort to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means of their own choice, before calling upon the United 
Nations to intervene. "80 
Uncertain of American support and, as always, seizing the opportune moment, the Iranian 
representative to the United Nations, Mr Seyyed Taqizadeh, brought Soviet activities in Iran to 
the notice of the General Assembly. Mr Taqizadeh's speech did not amount to a formal com- 
plaint, but warned that such a complaint would be forthcoming ... 
"in case no early solution is 
reached. "81 Secretary Byrnes' speech made the day before went in vain, given the eloquence with 
which the Iranian representative appealed to member nations ... "to put their faith in this body, 
which is the centre and hope for humanity in the future". 82 Since there was no appreciable change 
in the internal situation of Iran, the Chairman of the Iranian delegation addressed a letter (through 
the acting Chairman, Gladwyn Jebb) to the first part of the first session of the Assembly, in which 
he spoke "of interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed 
forces, in the internal affairs of Iran", and of a "situation" which was likely "to lead to interna- 
tional friction" 83 
The Iranian delegation referred to the event as a "situation" rather than a "dispute" 84 This, 
according to some authors, reflected a conciliatory stance the Iranians had chosen to take in order 
85 not to "bum all bridges and alienate the Soviet Union", and at the same time to show that Iran 
90 United Nations, Official Records of the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, London, Cathedral 
Hall, Westminster, 10 January 1946. 
31 Ibid., p. 120. 
82 Ibid., p. 121. 
83 United Nations Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, pp. 16-17. (Henceforth 
to be cited as SCOR). 
84 SCOR., First Year, First Series, No. 1, p. 33. 
85 Hossein Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 216. 
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was ready to negotiate, provided that the matter remained before the Council. 
On 30 January 1946, the Security Council requested the parties ... "to inform the Council of 
any results" .. 
86 ensuing from the suggested bilateral negotiations. 87 The negotiations failed to 
produce any positive results 88 
There were two salient features which made the negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union 
less fruitful.. They were as follows: 
(i) Mr Andrei Vyshinsky, who was the Soviet Union's representative to the United Nations, 
had one main objective and that "was to show that the Council could not legally consider 
Iran's complaint. "89 
(ii) Whereas the Iranian delegation continually sought to draw international attention to this 
situation, by insisting that all negotiations be conducted under the Security Council's super- 
vision. 
90 
The prevailing situation was further exacerbated as the 2 March 1946 deadline for the with- 
drawal of Soviet and British troops approached. The Soviets issued a communique on 1 March 
stating that Soviet troops would begin evacuating immediately from the relatively more peaceful 
areas in Eastern Iran, but would remain elsewhere in Iran "pending the examination of the situa- 
tion". 91 
This failure on the part of the Soviets to abide by the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty 
urged the Iranian government to re-open the issue with the Security Council. During the second 
86 SCOR., First Year, First Series, no. 1, p. 70. 
87 On 24 January 1946, the Soviet delegation, in reply to the Iranian charges, denied interference and reminded the 
Council that the presence of troops was justified by the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and - more surprisingly - the Soviet- 
Iranian Treaty of 1921 [which incidentally was not considered applicable after the signing of the Tripartite Treaty]. SCOR., 
First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1: 1, p. 17-19. 
88 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., pp. 151-152. On 26 January 1946, the Iranian delegate, Mr. Taqizadeh, had pre-empted the So- 
viet arguments of 30 January 1946 by distinguishing between "legal authorisation" and "legal obligation", i. e. the Soviet 
forces might remain until 2 March but they "were not obliged to do so". 
89 Vyshinsky maintained that Iran had had differences in the past with the Soviet Union, but had settled them on a bila- 
teral basis. Vyshinsky's argument was based on Article 33 of the Charter which calls for seeking solutions by negotiation 
and other means. SCOR. First Year, First Series, 3rd Meeting, 28 January 1946, p. 42. 
90 By virtue of the fact that the Iranian delegation had described the nature of the situation right from the outset as one 
which "might lead to international friction", hence referring to Article 34, it expected the presence of the Security Council at 
all negotiations. 
91 The Soviet statement was seen as outright flouting of Article Five of the Tripartite Treaty and brought a wave of pro- 
test from the Western powers and bran. For meticulous details regarding the situation we Kenneth Lee, op. cit., pp. 183-186. 
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phase of the Iranian case, the relative position of both parties remained the same. The Iranian 
delegation maintained that the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Iran was an "infringement 
of Iran's sovereignty" and a "heavy burden on the people" ... Mr. Hossein Ala, the Iranian 
representative, concluded by saying that his country expected the Council to ensure complete 
troop withdrawal "within a brief and fixed period... in accord with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter" 92 
On 27 March 1946, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, walked out of the Security 
Council after his delegation had been vastly out-voted on the issue of postponement of the discus- 
sions on Iran. 93 
There were two reasons why the Council rejected Gromyko's request for postponement of 
the Iranian discussions. Firstly, the Soviet forces had failed to evacuate from Iranian territory by 
the set date -2 March 1946. Secondly, Gromyko refused an unconditional withdrawal of 
troops 94 Above all, the Soviet Union did not believe that the Iranian issue deserved to be on the 
Council's agenda, considering that the Soviet Ambassador had sent three notes to the Iranian 
Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, clearly outlining Soviet proposals for negotiations: 95 
(i) The first note announced complete troop withdrawal within five to six weeks given 
that there did not arise "any unforeseen circumstances". To this note Qavam planned 
to reply that four weeks were ample time for withdrawal, and that the offer should be 
communicated to the Security Council. 
(ii) The second note requested the formation of a Soviet-Iranian oil company, with the 
Soviets to be awarded 51% of the shares. To this note Qavam planned to draft a 
counter-proposal for the development of Iranian oil resources. 
92 SCOR, First Year, First Series, 27th meeting, 27 March 1946, p. 69. 
93 Mr Gromyko had moved in the Council only the day before (i. e., 26th meeting/26 March 1946) that discussions on 
Iran should be postponed until 10 April 1946, adding that "the USSR is not prepared and will be unable to take part in a dis- 
cussion of the Iranian statement", SCOR First Year, First Series, 26th Meeting, 26 March 1946, p30. 
94 Ibid., Gromyko qualified the Soviet pledge with withdraw her troops with the phase "unless unforeseen circumstances 
arise". 
95 These proposals received by Premier Qavam were discussed with the American Ambassador to Tehran, Murray, and 
subsequently forwarded on to the State Department on 26 March 1946. The notes were an additional cause for the Soviet 
walkout. The Soviets believed that they had resumed bilateral negotiations with the Iranians and hence the matter did not 
merit being on the agenda of the Council. 
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(iii) The third note contained a Soviet offer to act as mediator between the Iranian 
Government and Azerbaijan, to help reach an accord regarding the autonomy of the 
latter. Qavam decided to reject this note completely. 
In the meantime the Security Council met on 29 March in a public session to resume discus- 
sion of the Iranian situation. Mr. Hossein Ala, the Iranian representative, was embarking on a 
new strategy, having been granted considerable discretion by Prime Minister Qavam to respond 
to questions. Ala began testing Russian assurances [made in secret to Qavam] at the Security 
Council. 96 The Council members suggested that the Council President request the Secretary Gen- 
eral in a statement to obtain details about the status of negotiations between Iran and the Soviet 
Union, and whether or not Soviet troop withdrawal was based on any conditions or agreements. 97 
The Secretary General was to report his findings no later than 3 April 1946. 
The days between 29 March and 3 April were full of tense expectation. President Truman's 
comments at a news conference reflected the United States' position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
Asked if he had "any misgivings about Russia taking a permanent walk", the President replied, 
"no, I haven't" 98 
From Moscow, the newspaper Pravda described the Council's discussion on Iran as being 
"superfluous" 99 When the Council met on 3 April 1946, the Russians and Iranians both replied to 
the Secretary General's inquiries, proving that the fledgling peace organisation was indeed there 
to serve a purpose. 100 
The Soviet letter explained that Iran and the Soviet Union had reached an "understanding" 
whereby Soviet troops would evacuate Iranian soil within one and a half months. 101 The Iranian 
96 SCOR, First Year, First Series, 28th meeting, 29 March 1946, pp. 73-82. Mr. Hossein Ala requested the Council to 
consider the substance of the matter without delay and concluded by saying that it was of the "utmost importance" that the 
Soviet Union directly communicate its assurances of withdrawal to the Council. 
97 Ibid., p. 82. The statement was passed unanimously by all ten members present. 
98 Truman's Public Papers, p. 173. 
99 New York Times, 1 April 1946. 
100 The return of the Soviets to the Security Council after Gromyko's walk out allayed British fears that Moscow prob- 
ably would not respond to the Secretary General's request because the Kremlin leaders would consider it "unnecessary", 
New York Times, 1 April 1946. 
101 SCOR, First Year, First Series, 29th meeting, 3 April 1946, p. 84. 
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delegation led by Mr. Hossein Ala also submitted a lengthy document which flatly denied the 
validity of the Soviet reply. 102 In the aftermath of this impasse, with the Soviet delegation boy- 
cotting Council discussions, the Iranian representative broke new ground. When asked for his 
recommendations on the matter, Mr Ala said that, if the Soviet troops withdrew unconditionally 
by 6 May 1946, Iran would not press the matter before the Council. 103 Faced with a lack of time, 
the Council adjourned until the next day. 
At the first session of the 4 April 1946 meeting, the United States Secretary of State, 
Byrnes, introduced a resolution calling for the postponement of the Iranian issue until 6 May. The 
resolution also contained a provision that if "Iran or any member of the Security Council reported 
anything which threatened to delay the withdrawal, the Council should immediately place the 
issue at the top of its agenda". 104 
There were mixed reactions from the members of the Council. The Australian representa- 
tive was the least pleased with the Council's adoption of the United States' resolution. He argued 
that since there was "no impartial investigation of the facts" and since the Council had not "deter- 
mined the existence of a dispute" and was thereby unable to "declare the Soviet Union a party to 
the dispute", the Council had failed to set a precedent and hence weakened its own "authority and 
prestige". 105 The British representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan, maintained that "in these cir- 
cumstances, I think there can be no doubt that the Council may well rest content to watch the 
implementation of the assurances which it has now received". The Council President, on his part, 
"paid a warm tribute" to Secretary Byrnes and considered "further discussion by the Council of 
the Iranian case unnecessary". 106 On the whole the Council's role thus far was looked upon by 
most countries in the Western World as a success. 
102 Ibid pp. 85-86, according to the Iranian letter, negotiations right from the very outset (30 January 1946) failed to 
produce any "positive results". 
103 Ibid., p. 86. 
104 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 222. 
los The Australian representative's verbatim views on the handling of the Iranian crisis are to be found in SCOR, First 
Year, First Series, 39th meeting 4 April 1946, pp. 90-99. 
106 Ibjd 
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V. Iranian Diplomacy Outside the Auspices of the United Nations 
The 4 April 1946 meeting of the Security Council adopted the USA's resolution and recog- 
nised the Soviet promise to withdraw by 6 May 1946. On 5 April 1946, Prime Minister Qavam 
revealed the details of a newly concurred agreement between his government and the Soviets. 
The agreement was jointly communicated by the Iranians and the Soviets. It remained hinged on 
the following three issues previously raised by the Soviets in March 1946: 
1. The evacuation of Soviet troops by 6 May 1946. 
2. The establishment of an Iranian-Soviet joint venture company to develop Iran's northern oil 
fields; 
(a) The Soviet Government would own 51% of the stock for the first 25 years: for the 
next 25 years each Government would hold equal shares; 
(b) The oil agreement would be ratified by the Majles within seven months of 24 March 
1946. 
3. Azerbaijan was Iran's domestic problem. Reforms and other questions would be fully sub- 
ject to Iran's laws and regulations and would be carried out in a "spirit of benevolence. " 107 
In almost all respects, Prime Minister Qavam was satisfied that he had struck a good deal 
with the Soviets. The question of Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of troops was resolved. With 
regard to oil, he had managed to strike a compromise. 
On 6 May 1946, the Iranian delegation notified the Security Council that the Soviet evacua- 
tion of the North and North-eastern provinces was complete. "So far as the province of Azer- 
baijan is concerned" the report read, "the Government has been informed through other sources 
that the evacuation of USSR troops from that province has been going forward ... These reports 
have not beenlOs verified by direct observations of officials of the Iranian Government". Later in 
the month of May, the Iranian Government informed the Security Council that it had found "no 
107 Lenezowski, op. cit., pp. 300-301. See also Fatemi in Oil Diplomacy, pp. 315-316. 
108 SCOR, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2, p. 51. 
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trace whatever of USSR troops, equipment or means of transport" in the province of Azer- 
baijan. lo9 
Shortly after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Iranian Government turned its attention 
towards the "Azerbaijan People's Republic". Having no support from the Soviet Union, it col- 
lapsed before advancing Iranian troops in December 1946, exactly one year and a day after its 
establishment. 110 The concluding section of the Chapter will examine why the Iranian issue 
remained on the agenda of the Security Council even after the Soviet troops' withdrawal and to 
what extent the United Nations played a role in the Iranian Case of 1946. 
VL Iranian post-war Diplomacy at the United Nations: The Case of 1946 
After the signing of the Soviet-Iranian accord, the Iranian issue took a new turn. Iran 
became the centre of a great power controversy over whether the Council should retain the Iranian 
case on its agenda or not. On the one hand the Soviets wanted Prime Minister Qavam to ask the 
Council to remove the case from its agenda, while the United States of America strongly advised 
Qavam to retain the issue before the Council. 
On 9 April 1946, the Iranian representative, Mr Hossein Ala, in a letter to the Secretary 
General, reaffirmed his government's wish to retain the issue on the Council's agenda. 111 This 
decision was a political victory for the United States in so far as it had succeeded in maintaining 
United Nations pressure on the Soviet Union. But this was soon reversed on 15 April 1946, 
when, at the 33rd Council meting, Mr Ala handed the Council President a telegram from the 
Iranian Prime Minister Qavam which read "... the Iranian government has complete confidence in 
the word and pledge of the USSR government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from 
the Security Council". 112 
The Iranian telegram induced heated debate in the Council. Most Council members asked 
109 Ibid., p. 54. 
110 General Arfs, op. cit., pp. 377-379. 
111 SCOR, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2, p. 47. 
112 SCOR, First Year, First Series, 33rd meeting, 5 April 1946, p. 123. 
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the question whether the Council had the right to retain an issue on its agenda, when the disputing 
parties wished to have that item removed? They all, however, seemed to agree with the view of 
the Brazilian representative, who stated that the Iranian case "... is now under the Council's jur- 
isdiction. It no longer rests with the parties concerned whether or not the question be withdrawn 
from the agenda". 113 
On 23 April 1946, it was decided by the Security Council that the Iranian question would be 
retained on its agenda. 
Conclusion 
Even though the Council was unable to arrive at any concrete decision on the Iranian case of 
1946, as the most powerful political organ of the United Nations it did play a major role in the 
shaping of Iranian foreign policy actions vis-a-vis the great powers. Further, the case of 1946 
itself was a means to determine certain outcomes of great power policies towards each other. A 
careful look at the play of events in Great Power relations in the closing stages of the Iranian Case 
of 1946, will sum up the role of the United Nations in post-war politics. 
At the 23 April 1946 Council meeting, the Soviet representative, Mr Andrie Gromyko, drew 
attention to the fact that the Soviet Union had asked the Council at its meeting on 3 April to drop 
the Iranian issue from its agenda. The Soviet representative was told that this was not possible, as 
Iran had not withdrawn its complaint. Under these circumstances, even after Iran had withdrawn 
its complaint, some Council members were vying with one another to find new grounds to keep 
the question on the agenda. According to Gromyko, certain nations were using Iran as, "small 
change in the bargaining game of international politics. "114 Furthermore, "American insistence 
that the Council remain seized of the issue, even after Soviet-Iranian accord, was interpreted by 
the Soviets as further evidence of an anti-Soviet strain in the United States' foreign policy". 115 
Hence, the Iranian issue at the United Nations was a major contributing factor to the early dissen- 
113 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
114 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 253. 
115 Ibid» p. 258. 
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sions that developed between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. 
However, it must be added that the Iranian case of 1946 was, and is still, considered a prime 
example of the success of the United Nations in restoring international peace. 116 Although it is 
difficult to evaluate the exact role of the United Nations in defusing the Iranian dispute, it is pos- 
sible to weigh the influence it exerted on Iran's foreign policy during that period. 
The Iranian Case of 1946, was the first to be presented before the Security Council of the 
United Nations. If one examines the conditions under which the Iranians submitted their first 
complaint on 19 January 1946, it is evident that they harboured great expectations of the new 
peace organisation. 
Iran's complaints reflected serious threats to her sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the 
Council failed to address the crucial substance in Iran's charge against the Soviet Union. Instead 
of deliberating Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of Iran, the entire question was built up 
around the focus of the withdrawal of troops from Iran. Nevertheless, given the already strained 
relations with the Soviet Union, the Iranians did not press for any Council decisions on the matter 
of interference. 
There are those like Leland Goodrich and Anne Simmons who are of the opinion "that the 
relatively early and satisfactory settlement of the dispute was to a considerable extent a result of 
the action the Council took. " 117 If this analysis is to hold true, then it would seem that Iran put all 
its hope and trust in the United Nations, "to render justice and force a giant power to withdraw its 
troops". 118 An analysis which seems more plausible under the circumstances in which Iran found 
itself would be that advocated by Kenneth Lee Hetrick: 
"Iran's strategies at the United Nations consisted essentially of socialisation and 
embarrassment. Iran sought to `socialise' the dispute, that is, to increase the number 
of participants. Iran sought also to embarrass the Soviet Union, although embarrass- 
ment was largely a concomitant of the first strategy, not a deliberate policy choice. " 119 
11 6 E. Berkley Tompkins, (ed. ), The United Nations: Its Founding, Its Performance and its Future, The United Nations 
in Perspective, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1972, p. 82. In a speech, Henry Cabot Lodge pronounced the handling of 
the Iranian case of 1946 by the United Nations as "a success for the world organisation". 
117 Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simmons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, Washington Dc, The Brooking Institution, 1955, p. 286. 
I18 Hossein Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 221. 
119 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 221. 
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The Iranian government used the United Nations as a lever to wedge open the lid of interna- 
tional public opinion; it did not consider it as a deadly weapon which it could use against the 
Soviets. Iran had no illusions about relying indefinitely on the United Nations. This became very 
evident when Prime Minister Qavam opened direct negotiations with the Soviets which cul- 
minated in Soviet troops withdrawals from Iran. 120 
Finally, what Iranian foreign policy objectives did the United Nations help to satisfy? The 
focal point of the Iranian question in 1946 was the removal of the Soviet troops and a subsequent 
end to Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of Iran. Some analysts suggest that the Soviet 
decision to withdraw its forces from Iran resulted largely from public pressure mobilised through 
the United Nations. Firstly, there was the wider and more general pressure group from the Gen- 
eral Assembly consisting of all member-states. Secondly, there was the narrower but more effec- 
tive pressure group within the Security Council. Iran used the United Nations "to gain additional 
support to improve" her "bargaining position" in "behind-the-scenes" negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. 121 
This chapter has deliberately relied on the historical perspective of Iran-United Nations rela- 
tions for the following reasons; firstly, the corresponding natures of a nascent United Nations 
Organisation on the one hand and a developing Iranian foreign policy on the other provided an 
appropriate backdrop for examining Iran-United Nations relations, especially in the years after 
1978-79. 
Secondly, the Iranian Case of 1946, amply illustrates the strategic importance of Iran to the 
great powers. In succeeding chapters it will become evident how Iran evolved its own particular 
brand of foreign policy, especially during the years of the "oil-boom". During this period too, the 
great powers did play a role in Iranian policy, both domestic and foreign, until the political 
upheavals of 1978-79. 
120 On 5 April 1946, Qavam in a press conference revealed the three-point accord he had entered into with the Soviets. 
The accord covered troops withdrawal, the ]ran-Soviet joint oil venture and Soviet non-interference in Azerbaijan. The en- 
tire accord hinged on the oil concessions offered by Qavam on behalf of the Iranian government to the Soviets. 
121 Kenneth Lee, op. cit., p. 326. 
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Thirdly, the early development of both the United Nations and modem Iranian foreign pol- 
icy worked, to some degree, on each other - especially in regard to the new institution of a UN 
Security Council. The Council - essentially a great-power body - nevertheless cut and had its 
teeth shaped by crises such as that of Iran's. 
Lastly, the role of the United Nations, as we have seen in this paper, helped to shape Iranian 
foreign policy rather than determine it. In many respects, this has remained the case. Our further 
investigations will attempt to focus on those areas where the United Nations has been useful in 
the furtherance of Iran's national foreign policy objectives. 
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Chapter III 
Iran at the United Nations: The Main Landmarks of 
Pre-Revolutionary Foreign Policy 
Introduction 
The evolution of Iran's foreign policy since the end of World War II reflects the changing 
power relationships in the Middle East on the one hand, and the major shifts in the international 
system on the other. The domestic sources of and the interaction between internal and external 
political developments are of crucial importance to any study of Iran's foreign policy. 
In the previous chapter, the dominant theme discussed was the struggle for Iran's survival as 
an independent state during and immediately after World War II and the subsequent use it made 
of the UN to achieve that goal. In this chapter the emergence of Iran thereafter as a major actor in 
the Persian Gulf region, with particular reference to its national foreign policy objectives will be 
discussed. 
The examination of certain aspects of Iranian foreign policy will have a two-fold purpose. 
Firstly it will explain Iran's foreign policy as practised in the United Nations under the Shah, in 
relation to its overall security concerns vis-a-vis the superpowers, those relating to regional poli- 
tics and those affecting its national interests. Secondly it will serve to signal certain core security 
concerns, some of which were transformed while others continued unchanged, but all of which 
came under threat in the post-revolutionary period. 
Emphasis will be laid on the examination of certain regional issues, which continue to have 
a direct impact on Iranian foreign policy. In all respects, cases will be chosen which entailed 
Iranian diplomatic involvement at the United Nations. 
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L Iran's position on international issues at the UN 
Ll The Chinese Representation Question 
In view of the lack of cooperation among the victorious powers immediately after 1945, 
policy makers in Iran realised that the future role of the UN in matters of peace and security 
would be limited in the future. After the collapse of the Mossadegh government in 1953, Iran's 
brief period of neutralism came to an end. 1 Iranian policy makers felt that security could only be 
guaranteed by forming a regional pact. What followed was CENTO -- under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, and a bilateral pact with the US in 1959.2 According to some authors, 
this period being in the midst of the Cold War, saw a change in Iran's foreign policy position at 
the UN, which came to identify itself closely with issues important to the US. 3 Among those 
issues, the Iranian attitude to the question of Chinese representation could be considered as most 
significant. 
For more than a decade (1950-1963), the Iranian government was opposed to the admission 
(or representation) of mainland China to the UN. It joined the UN in condemning China for its 
part in the Korean conflict, and established relations with Taiwan in 1957. When the US sought 
to delay the issue of Chinese representation by declaring it an "important question" -- which 
required a two-thirds majority in order to be discussed -- the Iranian delegation lent full support 
4 
This procedural tactic ensured that any resolution sponsored by the USSR or its allies (in this case 
Albania), seeking to settle the representatives from Peking in the China seat, would be barred. 
Iran continued supporting the US and opposing the USSR resolutions from 1961 to 1963.5 
1 Mossadegh's outright policy of resistance came to be known as "Siyasate Movazenehe Manfi" or "negative equilibri- 
um policy". The policy advocated a "neither east nor west" approach for Iran. Some authors have attributed his political 
demise to this policy. See Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, espe- 
cially p. 43. 
2 "CENTO" (Central Treaty Organization) was the new name given to the "Baghdad Pact", after Iraq withdrew in 1958, 
following a revolution. For documents relating to the US-Iran bilateral pact of 1959 see, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 327, no. 4725, p. 280. 
3 Bruce Russet, International Regions and the International System: a Study in Political Ecology, Chicago, Rand 
McNally & Co., 1967. The author traces the degrees of change in Iran's position at the UN, during and after the Mossadegh 
periods, p. 91. 
4 See John G. Stoessinger, The UN and the Superpowers: Soviet Interaction at the United Nations, New York, Random 
House, 1965, p. 26-36. 
S See United Nations General Assembly Official Records, (hereby cited as UNGAOR), 15th Session, October 1960, 
pp. 559-61; ibid., 16th Session, December 15 1961, pp. 1068-69; ibid., 17th Session, October 30 1962, pp. 647-49; ibid., 18th 
Session, October 21 1963, pp. 18-19. In 1962 and 1963, Iran voted against the USSR and Albanian resolutions, the USSR 
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In 1965, there was a shift in Iran's position; its support for the US-sponsored "important 
question" draft resolution changed to an abstention, as did its opposition to the Albanian draft 
resolution. 6 During the general debate of the UN in the following year, Iran's foreign minister 
pointed out the need for universal membership: 
"The universality of our membership is a matter which we cannot much longer evade, 
if the United Nations is properly to reflect the great changes which have occurred in 
the world. Without taking into account these changes in this forum, the United 
Nations cannot hope to realise its purposes and function effectively as an instrument 
for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and for the harmonisation of policies. "7 
In 1966, the Iranian delegation refrained from voting on either the US or the Albanian-led 
resolutions and also abstained on a new resolution sponsored by Italy calling for an inquiry into 
all the issues surrounding the question .8 The year 1967 saw for the first time in that decade 
Iranian participation in the debate on the question of China. Iran's ambassador, in explaining 
Iran's voting policy in the last two years stated: 
"If my delegation abstained in the last two years both from taking part in the debate 
and from voting, it was because we felt that the problem of the People's Republic of 
China was not placed in its proper context. "9 
He then explained that, henceforth, the Iranian delegation would resume voting for the US 
"important question" resolution because the issue was an important and complex one, calling for 
the possible expulsion of a member state (government). The ambassador added that his delega- 
tion would abstain from the Albanian resolution which sought to expel Taiwan. Given the Iranian 
government's belief in the principle of universality, it therefore could not agree to expel one 
member state in order to bring in another country. 10 During the years 1968 to 1970, the Iranian 
government voted in support of the US-sponsored resolutions and abstained on the Albanian- 
resolution failed by 42: 56: 12, the Albanian resolution by 41: 57: 12. 6 UNGAOR, 20th Session, November 17 1965, pp. 5-6. 
7 UNGAOR, 21st Session, October 14 1966, p. 15. 
8 Ibid., 21st Session, November 18-29 1966. 
9 United Nations General Assembly Plenary, Provisional Verbatim Record, 22nd Session, November 27 1967, pp. 72- 
73. 
10 The statement of the Iranian delegation read, "If the admission of this country [i. e. the People's Republic of China] 
did not have as a counterpart in the [Albanian] draft resolution before us the expulsion of the Government of the Republic 
of China, with which we maintain diplomatic relations, we would have voted in favour of it ... we can only abstain on 
it. " 
Ibid., 22nd Session, November 27 1967, p. 73. 
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sponsored resolutions. I l 
The change in Iran's attitude towards the question of China's representation can be attri- 
buted to a number of trends in the international political scene. Given the geographical distance 
between Iran and China as well as the alliance which had developed during the Cold War with the 
US, Iran had no well-founded reason to alter its foreign policy in any way that would alienate the 
government in Washington. Moreover, during the 1950s mainland China appeared to show close 
links with the Soviet Union, Iran's northern neighbour and principal security threat. 12 China's 
policies during this period toward Korea and Tibet were considered by many countries as being 
expansionist. On the other hand, Iran had maintained diplomatic and commercial ties with 
Taiwan. 
By the late 1960s, however, a number of new trends sought to change Iran's general foreign 
policy orientation. The Sino-Soviet split evident at the beginning of the decade appeared to be 
complete by 1965, and competition between these two giants to gain influence had moved to the 
newly independent African and Asian states. As a result of the thawing of the Cold War, Iran felt 
it was in its interest to secure peace with its northern neighbour, the USSR. 13 Working towards 
this peace, the Shah made official visits to the Soviet Union in 1965 and 1967 and signed a 
number of commercial agreements. 14 
The rapprochement with the Soviet Union led Iranian policy makers to slowly detach Iran 
from the Western sphere of influence and set it on an independent path. This meant that Iran 
would seek to orient its foreign policy on fulfilling the demands dictated by its national interests, 
rather than on satisfying the United States' position on global issues. The post-Cold War scene 
11 Ibid 22nd Session, November 28 1967, pp. 6-9, ibid., 23rd Session, November 19 1968, pp. 108-15; ibid., 24th Ses- 
sion, November 11 1969, pp. 41-50; ibid., 25th Session, November 20 1970, pp. 31-36. 
12 See for example, Shahram G'hubin and Sehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran, Los Angeles, University of Cali- 
fornia Press, 1974 and Ruhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, Charlottesville, University Press of Vir- 
ginia, 1975. 
13 The process of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States prompted the normalisation of Iran-Soviet 
relations. The normalisation process began with Iran pledging to the Soviet Union that no foreign rocketimissile sites on its 
territory would be used against the Soviet Union. See Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, op. cit., p. 316. 
t4 The agreements included the construction of a steel mill in Iran and the transportation of Iranian natural gas to the So- 
viet Union. For text of the agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 633, 
no. 9037, pp. 123-163. 
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was characterised by superpower cooperation in different spheres. Issues like general disarma- 
ment and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular, combined with the, effects of the Sino-Soviet 
split, changed the Chinese representation question in the UN. 
The specialised literature on this period indicates that the Chinese question came to be 
regarded by many states in the UN more as an "institutional" one and less as a "superpower" or 
Cold War issue. During this period, the UN's political role was also at stake due to its inability to 
act in the face of the large-scale conflict raging in Vietnam. Iran among many states came to 
regard the exclusion of mainland China as counter-productive. In 1964 when China detonated its 
first nuclear device, it became clear that Chinese participation in the UN permanent conference on 
disarmament discussions was absolutely necessary. Some scholars believed that UN membership 
would have a sobering effect on Chinese revolutionary foreign policy. 15 It was reasoned that, 
without mainland China's participation in the UN, how could Peking be expected to accept the 
prevailing norms in the conduct of international relations? Moreover, the world body itself could 
not play a meaningful role without Chinese participation. In this regard the Shah stated: 
"It is my belief that Communist China should become a member of the United 
Nations. Unless this is achieved, a general, effective and universal disarmament will 
not be possible. Moreover, it is through the admission of Communist China to United 
Nations membership that we will be able to discern its outlook and strategy with 
regard to various problems. " 16 
Although Iran's change in position towards the question of China preceded the official 
announcement of the visit of President Nixon to that country in 1971, it nevertheless put an end to 
all cautious probing in the matter. On August 19 1971, a month after the announcement in Wash- 
ington, the Iranian government officially recognised the People's Republic of China as "the sole 
legal Government 
... "17 When the question was debated during the 26th Session of the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly (1971), Iran followed its own strategy by voting. 18 This was not surprising as 
15 See Stanley G. Hoffman, "The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities", in David Kay (ed), The 
United Nations Political System, New York, john Wiley and Sons, 1967, pA 19. 
16 Extract from a statement made by the Shah at a press conference in New Delhi, 1969, reprinted in Iran's Foreign Pol- 
icy: A Compendium of the Writings and Statements of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr, Tehran, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, no date, 1969, p. 135. 
17 The English text of the joint Tehran-Peking communiqu6 can be found in Iran: News and Documents, Tehran, Minis- 
try of Information, vol. I1l, no. 22, August 23,1971, pp. 5-6. 
Is Iran abstained on both the United States "important question" motion draft resolution, as well as on that procedural 
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evidenced by 1965 and 1966 when, to demonstrate its independence, it had abstained from voting 
on two resolutions. Various factors have been said to have contributed to its new stance. The 
growing agreement on the need for Peking's inclusion in the UN, especially on disarmament 
matters, was also seen as enhancing the role of the UN in world politics. Secondly, in view of the 
growing polarisation of the Afro-Asian states (and the Asian Group in the UN) on the issue, Iran 
wanted to show deference by playing a bigger role in this caucus. It is also understood that the 
earlier double abstention may have been a reaction to Washington's weapons sales policy ini- 
tiated in 1964.19 
By 1970, as Washington and other member states of the UN were contemplating a new pol- 
icy towards China, the Iranian government undertook parallel activity in order not to be left 
behind. Relations with China could always prove useful vis-a-vis the potential threat from the 
Soviet Union. 20 Regionally, the governments of Iraq, Syria and Egypt had long recognised China, 
which was active in certain parts of the Arabian Peninsula. In the sphere of domestic politics, the 
government felt that it would deprive the Maoist opposition groups of a platform inside Iran. 
After the establishment of ties in August 1971, various visits seemed to reflect common political 
views between the two countries. 21 
LZ The Vietnam War and Czechoslovakia 
The Iranian government's standpoint on these two issues, not unlike many other countries, 
was taken with one eye on the positions of the superpowers. The Iranian government's respective 
positions on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia are two good instances of Iran's independent stance on 
resolution itself. It supported, for the first time, the Albanian proposal for the inclusion of the representative of the People's 
Republic of China into the UN. For the debate and voting, see United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim 
Records, 26th Session, October 25 1971. 
19 Up until 1964, US military aid to Iran was 100% grant-based. By 1965-67, it was a mixture of grants, cash and credit 
sales. By 1969, it had mainly become cash and credit sales. 
20 When the Soviets put forward an Asian-collective security proposal, both Peking and Tehran viewed it as a 
camouflage for Soviet penetration and hegemony in Asia and the Indian Ocean region. See V. Kudrayavtsev, "Problems of 
Collective Security in Asia", International Affairs, (Moscow), no. XII, 1973, and V. Pavolovsky, "Asian Security and Pek- 
ing Policy", Newtimes, no. 23, July 1974, pp. 25-26. 
21 In 1973 China's Foreign Minister, while on a stop-over visit in Tehran, assured the Shah of his government's under- 
standing of Iran's stability policy plans in the Persian Gulf. See, It Foot, "China's New Relationship with Iran", Contem- 
porary Review, no. 266, February 1975, pp. 100-104. 
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issues of foreign policy, which had come to be based more on national interest. In addition, they 
also reflect Iran's concern about excessive superpower involvement in regional politics. 
The position taken by the Iranian government in the UN with regards to Vietnam was as fol- 
lows: 
"We hold the opinion, which is generally shared, that the situation in South-East Asia 
constitutes a formidable danger to world peace. The right of the people of Vietnam 
freely to decide their own future, without interference from outside, admits of no ques- 
tion. We hold that it is our duty to help the people of Vietnam to realise their aim of 
independence free of all external pressures. The war causes untold suffering. It 
threatens to escalate and spread its horrors. Our anxiety is only too well justified. "22 
In the same speech, the Iranian representative ... 
"acknowledged that there [could] be no 
military solution of the Vietnam question" and any "answer to the problem [could] only be of a 
political nature". The Iranian delegation was of the view that this process would have to be based 
upon the proposals stated by the Secretary General. 23 These same points were stressed again by 
the Iranian delegation in the General Assembly debates of 1967,1968 and 1969.24 The absence of 
any direct criticism of US policy in Vietnam by Iran can be attributed to its own future security 
concerns, which could have been jeopardised given the Johnson administration's sensitivity to the 
25 war. However, the Shah is reported to have had his reservations on the matter. 
The Iranian government's stand on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia can be seen as a 
part of its independent national foreign policy which had begun in 1965-1966. As the question of 
Czechoslovakia was not pursued with great vigour in the UN, since it was viewed as an event 
within the Warsaw Pact, it makes the Iranian reaction all the more significant. Although the Shah 
did not allow the Soviet invasion to interfere with Iran's recently improved relations with that 
country26 the Iranian delegation to the UN reminded the USSR of its illegal action. In the 
22 UNGAOR, 21st Session, October 14 1966, p. 16. 
23 Ibid. 
24 United Nations, General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record, 22nd Session, October 2 1967, p. 67; ibid., 23rd 
Session, October 15 1968, p. 37; ibid., 24th Session, October 2 1969, pp. 57-71. 
25 The Shah is reportedly to have stated to the author. "I am for your policy in Vietnam, but I must be opposed to the 
internal interference in which you Americans engage". E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, New York, American 
Universities Field Staff, 1968, p. 216. 
26 It has been reported that when the Shah decided to go ahead with his visit to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the 
invasion, the governments of Britain and the United States strongly advised against it. The Shah however went ahead with 
his scheduled visit, a month after the invasion. See E. A. Bayne, "A Heritage from Xerxes", New York, American Universi- 
ty Field Staff Reports, South WestAsia Series, vol. XVII, no. 1, Iran, May 1969, p. 5. 
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general debate following the invasion, the Iranian representative stated: "It is our view that the 
armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, which has taken place without an appeal from the legal 
government of that country, is unjustifiable" 27 
In comparing the Iranian reactions to the above two issues, it is valid to make the following 
observations. In the case of Vietnam, Iran -- while critical of US interference in the internal 
affairs of that country -- did not view overall American policy as being illegitimate. In the latter 
case, Iran continued its balancing act, i. e. anxious to keep good relations with Moscow while 
recognising the latent danger of dealing with the Soviet Union. In this regard, the usefulness of 
its close links with the US and other Western countries helped it to form what is considered to be 
an independent national foreign policy. However, Iran's position on international issues, 
although guided by its own interest, was able to exert only a limited degree of independence. In 
the context of the UN it sought to maintain a balance between the US and the USSR on issues 
pertinent to its own security policy. 
IL Iran's Position on Regional Issues at the UN 
II. 1 The Arab-Israeli Dispute 
The Iranian government recognised the de facto existence of Israel in the mid-1950s, a state- 
ment reiterating this in 1959 led to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cairo. In the course 
of the next decade Iran's relations with Iraq and Syria along with Egypt suffered an all-time low. 
Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism sought to isolate Iran and posed a direct threat to the Pahlavi 
monarchy. These developments led Iran and Israel to form closer ties, at least in certain areas. 
For example, Iran maintained a sizeable trade delegation in Israel and is said to have benefited 
from Israeli expertise in agriculture. Although no formal diplomatic ties existed between these 
two countries, cooperation was forthcoming in sensitive areas such as intelligence, and the Shah 
was said to admire the Israelis and their achievements 28 Regionally, the Shah's differences with 
27 United Nations, General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Records, 23rd Session, October 15 1968, pp. 38-40. 
28 Persian Kingship in Transition, op. cit., p. 212. 
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Nasser and the growing role of Egypt in the politics of the Middle-East made Iran and Israel 
natural allies. However, in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, this relationship changed con- 
siderably. 
In line with the Shah's belief that Israel must return the territory occupied by force to the 
Arabs, the Iranian government co-sponsored a draft resolution calling on Israel "to rescind all 
measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the 
status of Jerusalem". The resolution was adopted with an overwhelming majority, 29 and was fol- 
lowed by an even more strongly worded draft resolution, adopted with no opposition. 30 The 
emphasis put on withdrawal of Israeli forces by the Iranian government led it closer to the posi- 
tion adopted by certain Arab states and the Afro-Asian non-aligned states31 The statements of the 
Iranian representative to the UN in this context, in consecutive years, reflect in part the main 
preoccupation of Iran's policy makers. In 1968 and 1969 the Iranian representative stressed that 
"no state must be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of war, " and emphasised its views 
regarding withdrawal as a necessary precondition to negotiations. 32 The Iranian government also 
felt that General Assembly politics should not interfere with UN-sponsored diplomacy and nego- 
33 tiations. 
The Iranian government's attitude to the settlement of the dispute, was influenced by a 
number of factors. The speed with which Israel forced a defeat changed Iranian perceptions of the 
relative military capabilities of the main actors in the region. It can be argued that Israel's actions 
in 1967 preoccupied the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean, thus turning those states atten- 
tion away from Iran and the Persian Gulf. In the minds of Iranian policy makers, not having an 
expansionist Arab state in the region was desirable, but this did not rule out the possibility that 
29 The statement is contained in General Assembly Resolution 2253, adopted by a vote of 99: 0: 20, see UNGAOR, 5th 
Emergency Special Session, July 4,1967. 
30 Draft Resolution 528/Rev. 1, was adopted 99: 0: 18, see UNGAOR, 5th Emergency Special Session, July 14 1967. 
31 Given Iran's historical experiences with occupation, this stance was not new. 
32 The quoted statement can be found in United Nations, General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Records, 23rd Ses- 
sion, October 15 1968, p. 37. Also we ibid, 24th Session, October 2 1969, pp. 61-62. 
33 The Shah's personal envoy, Princess Ashraf, stated that she hoped "all parties will endeavour to facilitate [Dr. Gunnar 
Jarring's] delicate task" and that "no decisions ... be adopted by the General Assembly which might hamper that possibili- 
ty". See ibid., 25th Session, October 28 1970, p. 7. 
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one day Israel's role might "change into that of an expansionist proximate one" 34 In addition, 
they noted the pre-emptive nature of the war, the lack of control of the superpowers over their 
clients in the region and the inaction of the UN, when Israel refused to heed the resolutions or 
abide by the Charter. In all probability these factors influenced Iranian policy makers between the 
years 1967 and 1971. The mass proliferation of weapons and the formation of different militant 
groups in the region also increased the gravity of the situation. 
During this period, Iran's relations with many of the Arab states improved, especially with 
Egypt. In March 1971, the Iranian government blamed the non-settlement of the issue on the 
Israeli government's intransigence and praised the Egyptian position as accommodating. 35 It is 
believed that Iran's position on the Palestinian issue had not changed in substance. Any distrust 
of the Arab world basically stemmed from Nasser's call for Arab unity, which conflicted with 
Iran's security perceptions of the region. However, in the aftermath of Nasser's defeat in 1967, 
the Iranian government maintained a position which was closely akin to that of Egypt and other 
Muslim states. But the Iranian government was not willing to take the matter beyond the frame- 
work set by the UN. In this respect, the Iranian foreign minister -- speaking at the UN -- 
emphasised that his government supported "the declaration of the Rabat Islamic Conference, 
which is in conformity with resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Coun- 
cil of the United Nations ... "36 
In conclusion, the reason Iran refused to join the anti-Israeli lobby was because it recognised 
Israel's right to exist and maintained ties with that state. On the other hand, it recognised the 
rights of the Palestinians and sought to maintain its relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and -- 
since the mid-1970s -- Egypt. For a considerable period of time, Iran balanced these two opposing 
forces in her foreign policy by basing her diplomacy on the provisions laid down in the United 
Nations Charter. This non-committed stance on the Palestine question allowed the Shah to argue 
34 Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: De Facto Nonalignment within a Pro-Western Alliance", The Middle 
East Journal, vol. JXIV, no. 3, Summer 1970, p. 318. 
35 See Kayhan International, March 13 and 20,1971. 
36 United Nations, General Assembly. Provisional Verbatim Records, 24th Session, October 2 1969, p. 6 1. Emphasis 
added. 
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that his government had always maintained a firm position on the issue. The following passage 
clearly illustrates this point: 
"With regard to Palestine, we have not adopted a new policy ... Our policy has always 
been clearly defined and undeviating. This policy can be summed up in adherence to 
the principles set out in the United Nation's Charter. "37 
Iran's position as explained above reflected a need for balancing her many interests in mak- 
ing up her foreign policy. Foremost in this regard was the need for stability in the region. With 
the announcement that the British were to evacuate the security zone East of Suez, this need 
became even more acute. Succeeding sections will demonstrate Iran's diplomacy within the UN 
in this context. 
III. Iran's Response to Local Issues at the United Nations 
111.1 The Question of Bahrain 
Iran's claim to Bahrain was based upon the fact that the islands were under Persian rule 
from 1602 to 1787, and although the Portuguese and later the British divested Persia of state con- 
trol, this could not obliterate its legal claim. In more recent times, the argument was that 
Britain's exclusive treaty (1880) with the Sheikh of Bahrain was disguised colonialism which 
should be brought to an end. 38 
The Iranian government thus continued to emphasise its claim to the Islands. These claims 
were sporadic, with the exception of the events following on from the year 1956. The 1956 claim 
was followed up in November 1957, whereupon the Shah instructed the Cabinet to present a bill 
to the Majies (parliament) proclaiming Bahrain as a sovereign part of Iran and designating it as 
Iran's fourteenth province (Ostan). In November 1958, the Shah voiced his readiness to accept 
the allegiance of the rulers of the islands. 39 During the 1960s, however, Iran's claim to Bahrain 
37 Iran's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 126. The passage is quoted from the Shah's interview with the editor of an Arabic 
newspaper, based in Baghdad. 
38 For a historical discussion of the competing claims to Bahrain we Fereydoun Adamiyat, Bahrain Islands: a Legal 
and Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controversy, New York, Praeger, 1955; and J. B. Kelly, "The Persian Claim to 
Bahrain", International Affairs, vol. XX III, no. 1,1957, pp. 54-70. 
39 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XVII, 1970, p. 23.998. 
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fell silent. It was a time when Iran was seeking all the Arab support it could muster to counter 
Egyptian influence in the area. For example, there came into being an understanding between 
Saudi-Arabia and Iran, both of whom were threatened by revolutionary activity sponsored by 
Nasser in Yemen. With the defeat of Nasser's forces in 1967, Saudi-Iranian cooperation appeared 
to slow down, only to be revived by Britain's decision to withdraw from Aden and from the Per- 
sian Gulf region. 
It must be mentioned that the Saudi-Iranian relationship was deemed to stay grounded as 
long as Iran laid claim to Bahrain. For the Saudis, Iran's claim posed the following problems: it 
lent credibility to the revolutionary Arab slogan that Iran had expansionist designs in the Persian 
Gulf, which meant that the Arabs of the region were endangered. This discouraged the Saudi- 
Arabian government from openly cooperating with the Iranians, for fear of causing negative 
repercussions in the Arab world. Secondly, Bahrain refined some of Saudi Arabia's oil but, more 
importantly, it lay only twelve miles from Saudi soil. Iran's presence on the island could cause 
untold geo-strategic complications. Lastly, Iran's claim to Bahrain was a major stumbling block 
for any regional federation or grouping among the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, which Saudi Arabia 
backed, particularly after the British announcement to withdraw from the region. 40 
By the latter half of the 1960s the Iranian government realised that its claim to Bahrain was 
seriously hampering future cooperation with the Arab littoral states, which up to now it had 
treated as a separate issue. In addition, dropping its claim on Bahrain would prove the arguments 
of its enemies wrong and pave the way for a regional security system. The United Nations at this 
juncture proved to be the appropriate forum in which Iran could conduct its diplomacy. 41 
The Iranian leadership had two primary concerns in the process of relinquishing its claim 
over Bahrain: it had to save diplomatic face and it wanted to avoid the possible constraints which 
could be posed by Iranian domestic reaction. In 1969 the Shah, on a visit to India, took the 
opportunity to declare that Iran would not use force in settling the question of Bahrain. He 
40 See "The Settlement of the Bahrain Question: A study in Anglo-Iranian-UN Diplomacy", Iranian Review of Interna- 
tional Relations, no. I, Summer 1974, pp. 34-40. 
41 Ibid. 
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declared that the people of Bahrain would be free to decide their own future 42 In this connection, 
the Shah felt that the matter could be entrusted to the UN and added: "If I agreed to the renounce- 
ment of Iran's claim to Bahrain without first engaging in this experiment, it would undoubtedly 
be construed as a form of betrayal of my people". 43 
After long negotiations with the British government, a formula was agreed upon in March, 
1970, regarding the future status of Bahrain. The Iranian government invited UN Secretary- 
General U Thant to employ his good offices in solving the matter. Without going into detail, it 
will suffice to say that the agreement between the Iranian and British governments was straight- 
forward. The Secretary-General was to appoint a personal representative and a fact-finding team, 
who would visit Bahrain, ascertain the wishes of the people and report them to the Security Coun- 
cil. In the absence of a referendum (which was recommended by the UN), the people of Bahrain 
were to have three choices 
(i) to rejoin Iran as part of that country's sovereign territory; 
(ii) to remain a British protectorate; 
(iii) to gain an independent status, either within the proposed Federation of Arabian Emirates or 
as an independent state. 
Not surprisingly, the personal representative, Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, and his 
four-man team in a short time ascertained that the "overwhelming majority" of Bahrain's popula- 
tion favoured independence. 44 On receiving this report, the Security Council unanimously 
approved it and the governments of both Britain and Iran dropped all claims in deference to the 
outcome. 45 
It can be argued that the UN served the Iranian government as a means to rid itself of a 
42 Salient points of the Shah's speech at New Delhi have been quoted in Iran's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 101-104. 
43 Quoted from an interview of the Shah by a British Labour Party M. P. ibid., p. 105. 
44 Report of the Personal Representative of the Secretary General in Charge of the Good Offices Mission, Bahrain, UN- 
Doc no. S/9772. 
4S For detailed discussions of the legal and political aspects of the settlement we, "Settlement of the Bahrain Question", 
op. cit., pp. 21-54. Edward Gordon "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute", op. cit., American Journal of International Law, 
vol. LXV, no. 3, July 1971, pp. 56-78. For the role played by the UN, we "Report of the Secretary General on the Work of 
the Organization June 16 1969 - July 15 1970", UNGAOR, 25th Session, Supplement IA, pp. 70-74. 
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claim which, if pursued, would have proved more costly than beneficial. Iran's timely decision to 
involve the UN as the final arbiter in the dispute not only served as a face-saving mechanism, but 
also enhanced its prestige in the international community. This was recognised at least by Iran's 
foreign minister who stated: 
"Seldom have governments shown readiness to submit questions of national interest to 
the judgement and action of bodies outside their own control. In this instance, con- 
sideration for the common good, in conformity with the basic principles of the Char- 
ter, prevailed over self-oriented policies. By having recourse to the machinery of the 
United Nations we have shown how effective the United Nations system can be in the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes ... 
"46 
The settlement of the question of Bahrain can be cited as a prime example of the amicable 
settlement of disputes and the value of UN diplomacy in the foreign policy of Iran. By facilitat- 
ing diplomatic contacts between Iran and the United Kingdom, the UN was able to create the 
environment for an impartial enquiry into the issue and at the same time allow the Iranian govern- 
ment to terminate a burdensome claim. 
11L2 The Shatt al-Arab Dispute 
Iran's dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab waterway came to the fore in 1969, when the 
activities of the United Nations served to bring out the differences between the two states; 
Chapter six will deal in more detail with the Iran-Iraq war and the United Nations in the post- 
revolutionary period. 
The dispute which flared in April 1969 has a long history both within and outside intema- 
tional organisations, and basically revolves around the question of a precise boundary between the 
two states. In the winter of 1934, the question was taken to the League of Nations Council by 
Iraq. The dispute was thought to have been settled by the autumn of 1937, after a series of meet- 
ings were undertaken at the suggestion of the League rapporteur (in Rome and Geneva). How- 
ever, the hastiness with which the agreement was concluded was partly necessitated by the Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia and the organisation of a regional nonaggression pact- the Sa'adabad Pact, 47 
46 United Nations, General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Records, 25th Session, October 1 1970, pp. 23-25. 
47 See J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, vol. I1, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 
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brought about by pressure exerted by the British government. Because of these circumstances, 
neither party was satisfied and the Irano-Iraqi treaty of 1937 only offered a brief respite 48 
In July 1958, the monarchy in Iraq was replaced by a republican government by means of a 
violent coup. In the following year Abdal-Karim Qasim emerged as the leader and announced his 
government's withdrawal from the pro-western Baghdad Pact. Qasim claimed that the whole of 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway was part of Iraq's sovereign territory, and he dismissed the 1937 
treaty as having been forced on Iraq by the British government. This was followed by the amass- 
ing of troops on both sides of the border, mutual condemnation and the recall of the Iranian 
ambassador from Baghdad. 49 
In January 1960, the government of Iran formally claimed half of the Shatt al-Arab, and 
accused Iraq of interference with Iranian shipping, misappropriation of the funds collected as fees 
by the Iraqi Port Authority, and various violations along the common frontiers. The Iraqi govern- 
ment in turn, claimed its sovereignty over the entire waterway and the matter rested there until 
1961, when the issue of navigation rights was reopened. The Iranian government demanded that 
Iranian-owned vessels be allowed to berth in the Port of Abadan. The Iraqi Port Authority main- 
tained its position, i. e. that any navigation in the waterway could be undertaken only if Iraqi pilots 
were used. This impasse caused shipping movement in the Shatt al-Arab to slow down and 
affected the Iranian transport of oil. Clearly, the Iraqis were able to exert considerable economic 
pressure on Iran during this period. 
Five years later, almost identical events marked the beginning of the second phase of the 
dispute. In December-January 1965-66, the Iraqi government in its campaign against the Kurds, 
sent troops across the Iranian border, and several Iranians (probably Iranian Kurds) were killed. 
This again led to the deployment of troops along the frontier, with the Iraqi government accusing 
Iran of aiding the Kurdish rebels led by Mustapha Barzani. 50 The Iraqi government sought help 
1956, pp. 214-16. The signatories to the Pact were Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. 
48 For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXC, no. 4402,1938, pp. 21-27. 
49 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Henceforth as Keesing's, vol. XI, 1957-1958, pp. 16305-16307 and ibid., 
vol. }ID, 1959-1960, p. 17357. 
50 See Keesing's, vol. XV, 1965-1966, pp. 21538-21539. 
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from the Arab League in the event of a pre-emptive attack by the Iranians. However, this phase 
of the dispute ended with a meeting between the prime ministers of both states and an agreement 
to set up joint committees to study and monitor frontier problems. 
Despite the formation of these joint committees, there was no progress on the border ques- 
tion. For almost two years (January 1966 to July 1968) the stalemate continued. In January 1968 
when the British Labour government announced its intention to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971, 
a new dimension was added to Iranian foreign policy. The Persian Gulf region, which was hith- 
erto immune from outside interference because of the British presence, was now open to potential 
rivalries from within and without. 51 This shift was accompanied by a sense of urgency in the 
foreign policies of the littoral states and Iran. The Iraqi government was relatively inactive, 
unable to manouever freely, given its relations with the neighbouring states. Kuwait was wary of 
Iraq, after experiencing claims on her national territory. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jor- 
dan were cautious in their relationship, since the regicide which occurred in Iraq in 1958. Syria 
and Egypt were unable to maintain a stable relationship with a state which aspired to lead the 
Arab world as Iraq did. 
Iran's attempt to fill in the void in the aftermath of British withdrawal was based on its 
capacity to develop smooth working relationships with the littoral states. To a certain extent this 
was hampered by Iraq, which attempted to polarise Arab support against Iranian aspirations of 
donning the mantle of peacekeeper in the area. This was evidenced when, in the aftermath of a 
breakdown in dialogue (in Baghdad) between the Iranian and Iraqi governments in the early 
months of 1969, the Iraqi government stressed the "Arab" nature of the Persian Gulf and decried 
the forces of "imperialism" in the area. 52 
In April 1969, it was learnt that the Iranian deputy foreign minister, addressing the Iranian 
House of Senate, had denounced the Iran-Iraq treaty of 1937 as null and void. 53 In response to 
st For an account of Iranian foreign policy objectives in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf see 
R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, The Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean, New York, National Strategy Infor- 
mation Center Inc, 1972, pp. 10-19. 
52 The Times (London) April 11 1969. 
S3 UNDoc S/9185, This information was contained in a letter from the Iraqi acting Permanent Representative to the 
President of the Security Council and was not disputed by Iran. 
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Iraq's threat of use of force (if Iranian ships failed to lower the national flag or allowed its nation- 
als to board the ships while in the waterway), 54 the Iranian government strengthened its border 
forces. For the next two months, the Iranians plied their vessels through the waterway with air 
and naval support, but the Iraqis hesitated to enforce their ultimatum. The salient distinguishing 
factors of this crisis in relation to those that had occurred in the past were: 
(i) the local political nature of the crises; 
(ii) the aggregation of lessons of past crises; and 
(iii) the involvement of the UN in subsequent discussions of the crises in legal terms. 
Past manifestations of the dispute had demonstrated the dissatisfaction of both parties with 
the 1937 treaty. This was evidenced from the poor outcomes of the joint committees established 
since 1966. Even more important, the crises had overspilled into other contentious areas such as 
the question of the Kurds, border skirmishes, Iranian pilgrimages to the holy sites in Iraq and the 
consequences for Iranian navigation in the Shatt al-Arab in the event of unfriendly policies pur- 
sued by Iraq. In the past, Iran -- weak domestically and on poor terms with the Soviet Union -- 
could not afford to challenge Iraqi claims, but by 1969, with a strong economy and a thawing of 
relations with the USSR, it was able to act more firmly. In contrast, Iraq had failed to maintain 
stable relations with its neighbours and had managed to alienate the Kurdish population within its 
own borders. Significantly, Iraq's diplomacy of polarisation had failed to achieve its objectives 
and Arab countries like Egypt remained neutral in the dispute. 
From an examination of the UN diplomacy surrounding the dispute, it becomes apparent 
that the Iranian government desired a change in the 1937 treaty, which it viewed as a colonial 
legacy working to the advantage of Iraq. The Iranian government was also of the opinion that 
Iraq had failed to live up to the obligations imposed by the treaty. Legally, the Iranian govern- 
ment argued that (i) treaties signed under duress and (ii) treaties that are unequal are sufficient 
grounds for abrogation. Politically, it felt that the treaty due to its "colonialistic aspect is null and 
54 UNDoc S/9200. This information was furnished by the Iranian Permanent Representative to the President of the 
Security Council and was not disputed by Iraq. 
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void", and by history and geography the "entire northern shore constitu[ed] Iranian territory. "55 
By 1970 Iraq began to adopt a new tactic to isolate Iran from among the Arab states and the 
Afro-Asian group in general. This led the Iranians to retreat into the legal aspects of the question. 
At the 25th session of the UN, the Iraqi representative opened his speech by referring to the 
"imperialist-Zionist aggression" against the Arab world56 and rejected the notion of a "political 
vacuum" developing. in the aftermath of British withdrawal as "the Trojan Horse of foreign 
imperialistic interests". He also referred to the Persian Gulf as the "Arab Gulf' and supported 
Vietnam in its struggle against the United States 57 
Judging from Iran's brief response to the above issues and its indirect link with the Shatt 
al-Arab question, one can only speculate that Iran was unwilling to enter into a debate with Iraq 
over questions which might force her to take sides at the expense of losing support in the Afro- 
Asian and Arab caucuses. Iran's spokesman made sketchy references to the situation in the 
Middle-East, and stated that the Shah was "ready to declare the Middle East a nuclear free zone" 
and that the "question of security" constituted the "cornerstone of [Iran's] independent national 
foreign policy". 58 With regards to the Shatt al-Arab, the Iranian spokesman reminded the 
members of Iran's record of solving disputes amicably (Bahrain), and called it the "only sore spot 
in the relations with our neighbours". To match Iraqi rhetoric, the Iranian representative added 
that his government considered the 1937 Treaty as "dead" and would not "tolerate the legacy of 
imperialism in any form", while inviting negotiations with the government of Iraq at any time or 
place. 59 
However non-influential the UN was in the resolution of this dispute, it nevertheless pro- 
vided a forum to both parties to state their respective cases. In addition, the attempt by Iran, at 
the United Nations conference on the Law of Treaties in Vienna in May-June 1969,60 to reject the 
55 UNGAOR, 24th Session, 2nd October 1969, p. 15. 
56 UNGAOR, 25th Session, 30th September 1970, p. 13. 
57 Ibid., p. 15. 
S$ UNGAOR, 25th Session, 1st October 1970, p. 5-6. 
59 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
60 For the Iraqi delegate's arguments for upholding the sanctity of treaties, and the Iranian delegate's unsuccessful try at 
amending a provision in the International Law Commission draft, which would increase the possibilities of terminating 
treaties. See United Nations, Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, 2nd Session, Vienna, April 2-May 22 
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1937 treaty as a colonialist document and on grounds of its legalistic interpretation can be con- 
sidered as an antecedent to similar attitudes towards codified international law in the post- 
revolutionary era. Attempts by third parties to mediate were not successful until an accord was 
reached in Algiers in 1975. 
In concluding this section, it would be pertinent to observe that, while policy makers in Iran 
successfully utilised the auspices of the United Nations to settle the question of Bahrain, the same 
kind of success was not possible in the case of the Shatt al-Arab. This was primarily because of 
inherent distrust which existed between the two parties with conflicting regional aspirations, and 
was not due to differences in interpreting the treaty of 1937. It is in this particular context that the 
next case, viz: the Iranian occupation of the three islands in the Persian Gulf, is to be examined. 
11L3 The Question concerning the Islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunb 1971 
By letter dated 3 December 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the 
representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider "the dangerous situa- 
tion in the Arabian Gulf area arising from the occupation by the armed forces of Iran of the 
Islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, on 30 November 1971',. 61 
In a separate letter dated 7th December 1971,62 the representative of Iraq transmitted to the 
Secretary-General the text of a cable dated 30 November 1971 from the ruler of Ras al-Khaima in 
which the ruler stated that Iranian troops had invaded the two islands of Tunb, which were an 
indivisible part of the territory of Ras al-Khaima. Having charged Iran with aggression, the ruler 
requested Iraq to take immediate and effective measures to repulse the aggression and to submit 
the matter to the Security Council, as well as the Council of the League of Arab States. 63 
1969, pp. 110-11 and 136. 
61 UNDoc S/10409,3rd December 1971. Note the reference made to the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf. 
62 UNDoc S/10434,7th December 1971. 
63 The Sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaima remained outside the Union of six of the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms which had de- 
clared themselves as the United Arab Emirates. This lack of international status prompted the ruler of Ras al-Khaima to ask 
the Iraqis to intervene on his country's behalf. 
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The question was adopted as an item on the Security Council's agenda without any objec- 
tion from any of the members, and Iraq among other countries was invited to participate in the 
discussions. 64 It will become clear from an examination of the ensuing discussions that the 
accused in this case were both Iran and the United Kingdom. The statements made by various 
representatives also reflect a serious crisis in the power situation in the Gulf on the eve of the 
British departure. 65 It would be in place to recount briefly the actual incident, i. e. the occupation 
of the islands by Iran, before examining the discussions at the Security Council. 
Shortly before the inauguration of the United Arab Emirates (December 1971), Iran landed 
troops on three small islands -- Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Straits of Hor- 
muz, the strategically important seaway at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In the case of Abu 
Musa the Iranian landings were made in agreement with the State of Sharjah, 66 which previously 
occupied the island under British protection; in the case of the Tunbs, however, which were form- 
erly held by Ras al-Khaima, no such agreement was reached and the Iranian landing was made 
forcibly, involving some fatal casualties on both sides. 67 
On various occasions during the summer of 1971 the Shah of Iran, his Prime Minister Mr. 
Hoveida, and the Foreign Minister, then Mr. Zahedi, all made statements as erting Iran's right to 
the three islands when Britain withdrew from the Gulf at the end of the year. The Shah and his 
ministers further claimed that the islands were Iranian before they were occupied by their present 
Arab owners in the 19th century, when Iran was politically weak; and that with the impending 
departure of the British, Iran would reclaim these islands, if necessary by force, as they were 
imperative to Iran's security. The sovereignty of the islands, they added, was not negotiable. 68 
64 The above question was considered as an agenda item by the Security Council at its 1610th meeting on 9 December 
1971, the other countries invited to speak on the issue were Algeria, Iran, the Libyan Arab Republic, the People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of Yemen, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. 
65 With the forthcoming withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf at the end of 1971, the 150-year-old treaties 
whereby Britain had been responsible for the defence and foreign relations of the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms were terminat- 
ed, being replaced on December 2nd by a new Treaty of friendship between Britain and the United Arab Emirates. 
Keesing's, vo1. XVfII, 1971-72, p. 25010. 
66 Crucial excerpts of the agreement between Iran and the Sheikh of Sharjah with regard to Abu Musa is available in 
ibid., p. 25010. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. Also see The Guardian, 3rd December 1971. "Iran has always said it would take the islands one way or another 
for strategic reasons" ... 
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The Iraqis voiced strong opposition to Iran's claim on the islands, accusing Iran of "expan- 
sionist schemes" which would constitute a "grave threat to peace and international navigation in 
the whole area". On 30 November 1971, following the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs, Iraq 
broke off diplomatic relations with both Iran and Britain. 69 
At the 1610th meeting of the Security Council on 9 December 1971, the Iraqi representative 
stated that the recent events in the Gulf had resulted in a tense and serious situation and posed a 
potential threat to the peace and security of the entire region. The Iraqi representative charged 
further that the armed aggression by Iran was in contravention of Article 2 (4) of the UN charter 
and demonstrated collusion between Iran and the United Kingdom. He concluded his statement 
by noting that Iranian aggressions and violations of the Charter directly threatened Iraqi interests, 
and that his Government reserved the right to take any and every action in order to protect its ter- 
ritorial integrity and vital interests in the Gulf. The representative of Iraq also appealed to the 
Security Council to condemn Iran as an aggressor and Britain as its collaborator. 70 
After the representatives of Kuwait, Algeria and the People's Republic of Yemen had spo- 
ken (all condemning the Iranian use of force), Iran was called to take the floor. The Iranian 
representative stated that his government was justified in its actions with regard to the three 
islands, because there was no doubt that they belonged to Iran. Whereas arrangements had been 
made concerning the islands of Abu Musa which met with the approval of the ruler of Sharjah, 
negotiations to find a solution with regard to the Tunb islands had failed. This left Iran with no 
alternative but to exercise its sovereign rights over what was Iranian territory. He concluded by 
saying that the "Iranian Government [would] not allow a single inch of its territory to be 
violated, " and the entire affair was "an irresponsible attempt to undermine the friendly relations 
that exist between Iran and our Arab brothers, particularly at a time when the greatest degree of 
solidarity and unity is needed among all Moslem states. "71 
69 Keesing's, vo1. XVIII, 1971-72, p. 25011. 
70 Security Council Official Records (SCOR), S/PV 1610,9 December 1971, paragraphs 56-113. 
71 Ibid., paragraphs 193-220. 
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Sir Colin Crowe, the representative of the United Kingdom, recalled the decision of his 
government that the existing treaties between Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial States would 
be terminated and the British forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1971. He further clarified 
that, as a result of the efforts of his government, an agreed settlement had been reached between 
the ruler of Sharjah and Iran on 29 November 1971 (one day before Iranian troops occupied the 
islands). The terms of the agreement were such that neither gave up its claim or recognised the 
other's claim. It was also agreed that Iranian troops should be stationed in certain specified areas 
on the island and that oil revenues forthcoming from the islands or in the vicinity would be 
divided equally between Sharjah and Iran. Sir Colin concluded by stating that the relationship his 
government had with the Persian Gulf and the subsequent ending of that relationship "has inevit- 
ably meant the striking of a balance between the conflicting claims of neighbouring states, and 
taking into account of realities". He also added "I cannot see how the representative of Iraq can 
describe the present situation as dangerous or as a threat to peace. In the view of my Government 
this outcome represents a reasonable and acceptable basis for the future security of the area" 72 
The 1610th meeting of the Security Council concerning Iran's actions vis-a-vis the three 
islands ended on an unresolved note. The Somalian representative observed that the parties 
should settle their disputes amicably, and for this adequate time was necessary "for the workings 
of quiet diplomacy" 73 The members and President endorsed the Somalian representative's 
suggestion and unanimously decided that "the Council defer consideration of the matter to a later 
date". 74 It must be mentioned that this issue was central to Iraq's abrogation of the 1975 Algiers 
Accord preceding the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. 
IV. The Process of Iranian Diplomacy after the Algiers Summit of 1975 
The preoccupation of Iran's strategic thinkers, from the early 1970s to the fall of the Pahlavi 
regime, was to develop and strengthen Iran's role in the Persian Gulf region. This urge to 
'n Ibid., paragraphs 221-230. 
73 Ibid., paragraphs 277-281. 
74 Ibid., paragraphs 282-283. 
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establish control in the Persian Gulf led the Shah to engage his government in a wide range of 
diplomatic activities. 
The single greatest impediment the Shah faced in securing Iran's role in the Gulf area was 
the historically unfavourable nature of his country's relations with the various powers in the Mid- 
dle East and South Asia. Mindful of the potential of Arab solidarity and the risk of total isolation, 
being the only non-Arab state in the region, the Shah took some unprecedented steps which 
surprised many observers and had significant repercussions for the Persian Gulf region. 
These steps were part of Iran's policy towards the region from the early 1970s as was 
reflected in the decision to relinquish her historical claim to Bahrain. But the entire policy of 
vigorously promoting regional cooperation through the resolution of major disputes gathered 
momentum only in the mid 1970s. The first of these constructive engagements were witnessed at 
the OPEC meeting in Algiers in March 1975, where, due to the efforts of Algerian President, 
Houari Boumddienne, Iran and Iraq resolved (if only temporarily) three major disputes. 
The first of these issues was the question of the Shatt al Arab, the second concerned the 
arming and aiding of Kurdish separatists by Iran against Iraq, and the third was the central border 
dispute between the two countries. 
The impasse on the Shatt al-Arab was broken by Iraq, which declared that the river boun- 
dary would henceforth be in the middle of the navigation channel and not along the Iranian shore- 
line. This was followed by an Iranian pledge made in secret to stop arming and aiding the Kurd- 
ish rebels. The central border dispute was almost automatically solved once these two crucial 
issues were resolved. 75 
What brought about the settlement was a convergence of policies of both countries which in 
turn provided a common ground for accommodation. By the mid-seventies both Iran and Iraq 
wanted to keep superpower competition out of the Persian Gulf. Iraq's dependence on Soviet 
military assistance to stem the Kurdish threat forced her to allow the Soviet Union certain naval 
75 Robert D. Tomasek, "The Resolutions of Major Controversies between Iran and Iraq", World Affairs, vol. 139, winter 
1976/77, pp. 223-226. 
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privileges on her territory. This greatly troubled Iraqi policy makers who, with their multiplying 
revenues from oil were seeking to have better relations with the West 76 The Shah on the other 
hand felt that a settlement of disputes with Iraq would keep the Soviets out of the Persian Gulf, 
and would allow Iran to play a more concrete role in formulating the policies of the area. More- 
over, Iran wanted to be truly independent of the United States in this matter, and believed that US 
presence in the Gulf would encourage the Soviet Union to compete, thus complicating the entire 
situation. 
After the Algiers summit, Iran turned her attention to the Arab front and intensified efforts 
to gain further cooperation with a wide variety of regional states located in the Middle East and 
the Persian Gulf. After the October War in 1973 Iran took a number of steps to improve its rela- 
tionship with Egypt. In January 1975 the Shah, on a state visit to Egypt, offered to increase oil 
deliveries to Israel "as an incentive" if it agreed to withdraw from the Sinai oil fields. Prior to 
this, the Shah had announced that his government was ready to help Egypt, financially, to recon- 
struct Port Said, to widen the Suez canal and to establish a number of joint ventures with Egyp- 
tian and Arab firms 77 
Iran's policies towards other Arab states of the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and the various 
sheikhdoms, were cautiously planned. Iran's relationship with Saudi Arabia during this period 
was mainly concerned with trying to harmonise oil pricing policies and other commercial poli- 
cies. Politically there was a convergence of the two countries' policies, in so far as the indispen- 
sability of the Gulfs security to ensure free flow of oil was concerned. In addition, both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran shared the same threat of communist subversion against their monarchies 78 
With the assumption of sovereignty by most of the Arab sheikhdoms in the late sixties and 
early seventies, Iran's policy became more diversified. With the Bahrain dispute resolved, Iran 
wasted no time in recognising the new grouping of the United Arab Emirates. This was done to 
76 Ibid., p. 226. 
Tt R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Search for Regional Co-operation", The Middle East Journal, vol30, no. Z Spring 1976, 
p. 175. 
73 Ibid., p. 176. After the assassination of King Faysal with whom the Shah had good relations, the next king, Khalid, 
also assured the Shah of cooperation and maintenance of peace in the region. 
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improve her image and increase the possibility of a local security federation. When the Sultanate 
of Oman was threatened by rebels in the Dhofar, the Shah helped the Sultan to suppress the rebel- 
lion. This act of Iran drew criticism from certain radical states in the region, but clarified Iran's 
uncompromising attitude towards the security of the Gulf. 79 
Just as in the Middle East and the Gulf areas, Iran stepped up its efforts for greater coopera- 
tion with the regional powers of South Asia. The ascendency of India as a leading power in the 
subcontinent after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the rise of Soviet power in the area 
heightened Iran's concern with the expansion of Soviet influence. This situation was seen as a 
threat to the Pahlavi regime and resulted in Iran co-sponsoring a draft resolution at the United 
Nations declaring the "Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" 80 
The draft resolution was based on the Lusaka Declaration of the third conference of Heads 
of States of Governments of Non-Aligned Countries convened in September 1970. It was at this 
meeting that an appeal was made to all states to "consider the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace 
from which great power rivalries and competition ... should be excluded and that the area should 
be free of nuclear weapons"81 The draft resolution was adopted in December 1971.82 
By the end of 1976, Iran had thus made a number of diplomatic moves to ensure the imple- 
mentation of its regional policy goals. But the atmosphere for durable regional cooperation was 
marred by two factors. First, the ancient Arab-Iranian suspicions and mistrust of each other and 
secondly, the outstanding issue of continued Iranian military presence on the three islands in the 
Persian Gulf. By the late 1970s however, before Iran could reach a compromise between its 
national interests and those of the other member states in the Gulf area, the Shah of Iran lost his 
throne. In concluding this chapter, the failure of Iran to strike a balance between its domestic and 
foreign policy will be briefly discussed. 
79 J. E. Peterson, "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar", 
World Affairs, vol. 139, no. 4, Spring 1977, pp. 278-295. 
80 UNGAOR, 26th Session, 30th November 1971, p. l. The resolution was sponsored by Sri Lanka, Iran, Iraq, Sardinia, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia. 
81 Ibid., p. 2. 
The resolution was adopted by 61 votes to none, with 55 abstentions and is contained in Resolution 2832 of the 26th 
session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
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Conclusion: The Background to the Iranian Revolution 
The subsequent history of Iran proved all these regional and local disputes to be merely 
transient curtain-raisers to a much more fundamental change in direction. Each of these incidents 
and Iran's related activities at the United Nations, had played a small part in shaping Iran's 
foreign policy and moving the country inexorably into a totally different Weltpolitik. Now two 
major influences come to bear on its strategic situation in the Middle East. The first of these was 
the failure of the American security formula viz: to maintain stability and security in the Gulf 
region through Iran. The second is the repercussion that the Islamic revolution had on Iran's mili- 
tary power in the Persian Gulf, which subsequently led to the renunciation of Western links and 
the establishment of ties with more radical states. Both of these resulted in a reversal of trends in 
the political history of Iran, and were forerunners of the radical changes which Iran experienced 
with the advent of the Islamic revolution of 1978179. 
Already by the beginning of 1978, the foundations of the American security formula in the 
Gulf region had begun to shake. By 1979, the civilian unrest which had rocked the Iranian nation 
for over 12 months toppled the Pahlavi monarchy and caused the disintegration of its armed 
forces. All these events occurred with such incredible speed that the Western interests in the Gulf 
were swept aside by the momentum and suddenly left unprotected. 
The United States' policy in the Gulf for over a quarter of a century had been to promote 
Iran as the protector of the Gulf. Under the Nixon administration this proved to be a convenient 
way for the West to protect its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf without getting involved. So 
ingrained was the US policy towards Iran that even President Jimmy Carter, contrary to his 
beliefs in global arms reduction and human rights, saw fit to continue pouring vast quantities of 
military hardware into Iran with only superficial modifications. President Carter even referred to 
Iran as an "island of stability" and offered his solidarity to the Shah over the phone, at a time 
when Iran was experiencing violent political demonstrations. 
When the crisis in Iran mounted to unmanageable proportions, American-based military 
establishments became more and more the targets of nationalist resentment 83 The Carter 
83 For a picture of the situation prevailing in Iran during this period, see Daniel Southerland, "Did Turmoil in Iran Catch 
US Policy Makers Unaware? ", The Christian Science Monitor, December 1978, p. 5. 
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administration's emergency supplies of riot sticks, teargas and so on to the faltering Pahlavi 
regime turned the widespread anti-Shah demonstrations into anti-American ones as well. 
Even before the short-lived government of Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar was formed in 1978, it 
was clear that Iran had slipped out of the American-led Western sphere of influence and could no 
longer act in any sense as an ally in the Gulf. With the coming of Ayatollah Khomeni and the 
newly-formed revolutionary government of Mehdi Bazargan in February 11 1979, the US-Iranian 
special relation came to an end. Subsequently, all traces of American influence in Iran were elim- 
inated. 
One of the direct consequences of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 was a move by the 
revolutionary government to demobilise and purge the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. The disin- 
tegration of the military forces saw the rise of a volunteer force from local revolutionary commit- 
tees, which later on became the `Pasdaran' or Revolutionary Guard. This nationwide organisation 
grew in stature and gradually took over the maintenance of law and order within the country. 
The disintegration of the Iranian armed forces and the decision by the revolutionary govern- 
ment to let expensive military equipment deteriorate were accompanied by the abandonment of 
Iran's air and naval outposts in the Persian Gulf, Oman and on the coast of the Arabian Sea. For 
example, the revolutionary government stopped all construction work of Shah Behar, which was 
to have been a strategic air and naval base on the Arabian Sea close to Pakistan. The Iranian 
forces stationed at Oman, which had been supporting the army of Sultan Qabus against Dhofar 
rebels, were recalled. Iranian naval patrols were withdrawn from the strategic strait of Hormuz, 
and this left this crucial sea lane unguarded for all practical purposes. 
In the sum total, the revolutionary government set out to undo all that the Shah had 
achieved or set out to achieve within the military context of his regional policy. The renunciation 
of its policeman role by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Khomeni had far-reaching conse- 
quences for the security and international relations of the Persian Gulf and Middle East states. 
The most important of these concerned the Gulf states and their ability to keep the industrialised 
West supplied with oil. These states faced the threat of an Iranian-type revolution exported to 
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their own areas, which in turn would have serious implications for regional stability and super- 
power policy and action in the area. After ten years of the Iranian Revolution and eight years of 
the Iran-Iraq war, it is of course apparent that the security of the Gulf continues to hinge on cer- 
tain basic needs -- for example, the continuing necessity to export oil which, during the Iraq-Iran 
conflict, sustained Iran's war effort and has thereafter become crucial to the reconstruction of her 
economy. The next chapter will examine the evolutionary phase of Iran's revolutionary foreign 




The Islamic Revolution in Iran: 
its Impact on Foreign Policy 
Introduction 
The Islamic revolution in Iran can be considered as one of the major events of the 20th cen- 
tury. Few revolutions have shocked the world with such intensity or set in motion such a search 
for causes. The objective of this chapter will not be to analyse the contending theories of revolu- 
tions and their application to the upheavals in Iran; substantial work on this aspect can be found 
elsewhere. 1 The main emphasis will be to examine the overall impact that the revolution had on 
Iranian politics and international relations, particularly on the evolution of its foreign policy over 
the last decade, i. e. 1979-1989. The chapter, will also address the question of continuity and 
change by examining the elements which continue to shape Iran's foreign policy, and those ele- 
ments which have given post-revolutionary foreign policy an identity of its own. To facilitate the 
above, it becomes necessary to divide the chapter into different sections, each addressing a com- 
ponent of Iran's foreign policy process and practice. The chapter will also serve as a link between 
Part I and II of this thesis, and will therefore look at events and issues which have had an impact 
on Iran's foreign policy from a mainly historical perspective. 
Section One will outline the overall position of Iran's international relations under the 
second Pahlavi monarch, and events which led to the resurgence of Islam and the ascendancy of 
the clergy, notably the return from exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. Section Two will study the 
extent to which Islam transcended its populist boundaries to become a geopolitical reality and the 
I See Farrokh Moshiri. The State and Social Revolution in Iran: A Theoretical Perspective, New York, Peter Lang Pub- 
lishing Inc; 1985. The author has made a scholarly attempt to apply available social science theories to the Iranian revolu- 
tion of 1978-79, after utilising a range of theories from Ted Gurr's Relative Deprivation thesis (see Gurr, T. R. Why Men Re- 
bel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Chalmers Johnson's notion of "accelerators" (see Chalmers, J. (ed. ) 
Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1973), to the more recent works of 
Theda Skocpol (Skocpol, T_ "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution", Theory and Society, vol. 11, no. 3, 
May 1982, pp. 265-83) and Charles Tilly (Tilly, C. From Mobilisation to Revolution, Reading Massachussets, Addison- 
Wesley, 1973), he proposes his own model of the Iranian Revolution. The work is a melange of behaviourist models of re- 
volutions and the history, politics and events which led up to the revolution in Iran in 1978-79. 
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driving force behind Iran's foreign policy. Section Three will examine the evolution of Iran's 
foreign policy and diplomacy and the interaction between internal and external political develop- 
ments. Section Four discusses the nature of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy and signals the 
way it demonstrated itself in the foreign policy practice of that country. 
It must be acknowledged that, while certain primary sources of information (interviews, 
Iranian foreign ministry press releases and Iranian press cuttings) have been used, all subsequent 
analyses of the policies and practices of the Islamic government in Iran will include the diverse 
interpretations of scholars and political scientists in the field. 
L Iran's Foreign Policy under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
In the immediate post-war phase up to 1953, the mainstay of Iran's foreign policy was to erase 
the traces of its wartime occupation by the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The political system 
within Iran was far from stable and there was an incessant power struggle between the numerous 
political parties and the Shah. Thus between 1941 and 1953, Iran was ruled by over a dozen 
cabinets whose average life span did not exceed six months? It was during this period that Iran 
achieved remarkable success in consolidating its territorial boundaries and salvaging much of its 
sovereignty against considerable odds. 
After the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Azerbaijan in 1947, Iran turned its atten- 
tion to ridding the country of the well-institutionalised and entrenched British presence. As cer- 
tain authors note "The Soviet danger could be dealt with in the context of the cold war; British 
influence could not" .3 The years between 1950-53 saw the rise of nationalist movement in Iran 
whose main architect was Mohammad Mossadegh. 4 His efforts to lessen the British influence in 
Iran culminated in the nationalisation of oil, hitherto the joint wealth of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
2 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1982. In chapter four of 
his book the author describes the domestic political process of Iran from 1941 till the downfall of Premier Mossadegh in 
1953. 
3 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974, 
p2. 
4 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926-1979, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981. The author 
refers to the nationalist movement as "The Iranian popular movement" which, under Mossadegh, he considers was a "revo- 
lutionary episode". 
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Company (AIOC). Mossadegh was the leader of a small parliamentary group known as the 
"Jebhe-ye-Melk" (National Front) and throughout his career had persistently called for resistance 
to outside powers, especially Great Britain and the Soviet Union. As early as 1944 when both 
Soviet and American companies approached Iran for oil concessions, he was instrumental in 
sponsoring a bill which prohibited all discussions regarding oil concessions until after the end of 
World War 1 1.5 This outright resistance policy of Mossadegh came to be known as "Siyasate 
Movazenehe Manfi" (negative equilibrium policy), which basically advocated a "neither east nor 
west" approach for Iran and was considered by some as the main reason for the collapse of his 
government in 1953. 
In tracing the beginnings of Islamic revolution in modem Iran, the year 1953 (August) and 
the overthrow of the nationalist Mossadegh regime by an American- and British-supported coup, 
would be a justified starting point because it presaged the ensuing quarter century of dictatorial 
rule, culminating in the revolution of 1979. 
L1 1954-1960: Courting the West 
After the overthrow of Mossadegh, the Shah and his advisors saw a permanent solution in 
reconstructing the Iranian economy along Western lines. This policy was adopted with two goals 
in mind. Firstly to increase oil mining by conferring extensive rights on Anglo-American con- 
cerns which were largely starved in the Persian sector by Mossadegh's policies; secondly, through 
this assurance on mining rights to ensure definitely the pledge of Western support on the socio- 
political front, thereby consolidating power in the hands of the Pahlavi regime 6 
As a determined start, Mohammad Reza chose to ignore the clauses in the constitution 
which provided for a freely elected Majles (assembly) and freedom of speech and press, with 
minor exceptions. 
s Ruhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1975. This bill 
was "enacted by the Majles (parliament) into law December 2,1944". 
6 Nicki R Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, London, Yale University Press, 1981, 
p. 146. 
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The 1954 elections to the eighteenth Majles were controlled and candidates were chosen by 
the regime, thus ensuring their co-operation. In 1955 the Shah dismissed Prime Minister Zahedi, 
whom the Americans had seen as Iran's real strong man, and the Shah became Iran's single 
? ruler. 
The year 1954 ushered in a new triangular relationship between the United States, Great 
Britain and Iran. In the early post-war period, Britain monopolised Iranian oil, with the United 
States playing a large role in ministry and governmental advice and support. As of 1954, the 
United States became the dominant power in Iran, taking a 40% share in the oil consortium while 
Britain's share remained the same. Moreover the United States remained as before the primary 
supplier of arms and military advice to the newly reinforced Pahlavi regime. 8 
Earlier hopes of the United States supporting a more democratic government in Iran 
declined. Western governments and corporations felt safer with a centralised government under a 
pro-Western ruler, especially in the troubled fifties when the Communist threat loomed. This 
apprehension was exploited by the Shah, who recognised the real priorities of American business 
and governmental interests. Hence in the widely-read American press there was very little basic 
criticism of the Shah or of United States policy in Iran, between the years 1953 and 1973.9 
After the coup of 1953 which saw the exit of Mossadegh from active political life, political 
power in Iran gradually came under the sole control of the Shah. Elections to the eighteenth 
Majles were "of course not free. It was impossible for any of Mossadegh's supporters, let alone 
the TUDEH Party, to be elected". 10 With the help of General Zahedi, the Shah consolidated his 
power in Iran, rounding this off with the dismissal of Zahedi himself in 1955. It was during this 
period (starting September 1953) that President Eisenhower "announced immediate resumption of 
7 Ibid. 
* Ibid., p. 142. 
9 For example, in 1947 it was argued by the US State Department "that an increase in the power of the Shah might not 
be a bad thing since strong governments in countries bordering the Soviet Union have generally been better able to resist 
Soviet domination". See Habib Ladjervardi: "The Origins of US Support for Autocratic Iran", International Journal for 
Middle East Studies, vol. 15,1983, pp. 234. 
10 The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926-1979, op. cit, p. 192. Iran Between Two Revolutions, op. cit, p. 419, "The 
Iran party, the main pillar of the national front, was outlawed". 
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US aid to Iran by allocating $45 million in emergency funds. "11 Iran obtained a total of $145 mil- 
lion between 1953 and 1957 from the United States in the form of emergency financial aid "to 
ward off government bankruptcy, boost morale among royalists, and inject confidence into the 
business community". 12 
In the middle and late 1950s. the Shah attributed his principal problems to the threat of 
external pressure from the Soviet Union and Iran's problems to the threat of external pressure 
from the Soviet Union and Iran's lack of military security. 13 Military insecurity, according to the 
Shah, was not only the main constraint on Iran's adequate participation in world politics but also 
the root cause for all its domestic, social, economic and political problems. Countries like Iran, 
he argued, must strive for the security which is of primary importance for any kind of advance- 
ment. In the Shah's view, the countries of Western Europe and the Middle East, including Iran, 
despite all differences in levels of socio-economic and technological development, first needed 
adequate security to pursue their individual goals. The Shah further conjured up the communist 
card by arguing that "Freedom-loving people forget but the communist powers never forget that 
most of the world's economically underdeveloped countries are also militarily under- 
developed. "14 
The Shah's view that military power was essential to ward off the communist threat was 
shared by senior American Iran specialists like George Lenczowski who was of the opinion that 
Iran "was an inch away from a communist takeover", but with the return of the Shah into power it 
had "regained its tranquility and reaffirmed its independence". Lenczowski also felt that "the 
issue now facing Iran and the United States was how to reaffirm and institutionalise Iran's 
inherent ties with the West". 
The first step to "institutionalise" Iran's relations with the United States was taken by the 
Shah in the years 1953-1954. Without the interference of Parliament, whose power had 
11 George Lenczowski, "United States support for Iran's Independence and Integrity, 1945-59", The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science: America and the Middle East, May 1972, p33. 
12 Iran Between the Revolutions, op. cit., p. 419. 
13 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for my country, New York, McGraw Hill, 1961, p. 1045. 
14 Ibid., pp. 290-296. 
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considerably diminished, the Shah abolished the legislative restraints on the size of the American 
military missions to Iran. 15 
Large-scale transfers of economic and military aid from the US to Iran followed. According 
to the World Armaments and Disarmament Year Book, Iran received $500 million worth of mili- 
tary aid from the United States between 1953 and 1963. The Shah expanded the Iranian armed 
forces from 120,000 men to over 200,000 men and raised the military budget from $80 million in 
1953 to approximately $183 million in 1963.16 
After Iran established direct links with the United States, its next move was to declare, 
"publically its intention to join the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey, com- 
monly known as the Baghdad Pact, which had been signed at Baghdad on February 24,1955". 17 
This move on the part of Iran marked a major transition in Iran's foreign policy. It was major in 
so far as it signified a break from Iran's foreign policy of "neutralism" under Mossadegh. 18 
Unlike Mossadegh, the Shah firmly believed that "Iran's national security was inseparable from 
domestic security, and domestic security was in turn intertwined with the security of his regime 
and the Pahlavi dynasty". 19 
The creation of the Baghdad Pact was an initiative of UN Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, who envisaged the security alliance in his larger concept of "mobilising" a circle of pro- 
Western defence pacts around Russia. 20 Although the United States remained outside the Pact, it 
welcomed Iran's adherence to it, 21 and made the Pact an integral part of its global alliance 
1s The Iranian people were not against a strong national army, but were afraid that the army/military would become a 
tool for repression in the hands of the Shah. See J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, New York, 
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969, pp. 280-288. 
16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament, Year Book for 1972, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, 1972, P. M. The figures quoted were computed at 1960 prices and exchange rates. 
17 Ruhollah K. Ramazani, op. cit., p. 274. Iran decided to join the pact in October 1955. For a full text of the treaty and 
exchange of letters between Iraq and Turkey, see the United Nations'. Treaty Series, vol. 233, no. 3256,1956. English ver- 
sion, on pp. 210-216. 
iS Ibid., p. 275. Ramazani however believes that Iran never practised a traditional policy of "Neutralism" as opposed to 
"neutrality" for any considerable length of time. He considers Mossadegh's policy of "negative equilibrium" as too brief a 
period to qualify as an established tradition of neutralism in Iranian foreign policy. 
19 Ibid, p. 276. 
20 The Foreign Relations of Iran, op. cit., p. 90. 
21 An official statement made by the United States one day after Iran's public declaration i. e. October 12,1955, read 
"the United States has had a long-standing interest in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran ... That in- 
terest remains a cardinal feature of US policy". See Ralph H. Magnus, (ed) Document on the Middle East, Washington, 
DC, American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1969, P. M. 
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system. Other signatories were Britain, which adhered to the Pact on 4th April, 195522 and Pak- 
istan, on 23rd September, 1955. 
111960-1963: Surfacing of the Real Opposition 
The 1960 elections saw the surfacing of real opposition outside the docile creations of the 
Shah. Prime Minister Eqbal announced in the face of this growing opposition that no pro- 
Mossadegh nor TtJDEH (Communist party) candidates could be elected. 
As the elections result began to come in, evidence of vote fraud became evident and open 
discontent mounted sharply. In late August 1960, the Shah - in order to dissociate himself from 
the rigging and Eqbal's growing unpopularity - advised his Prime Minister and cabinet to resign. 
The Shah nominated Sharif Emami as the new Prime Minister, who in turn announced fresh elec- 
tions in January 1961. Certain much needed reforms in the economy were announced. These 
controls spared the rich and were borne by the middle and popular classes23 
The 1961 elections were again considered dishonest. The Majles, seeing that it had to iden- 
tify with the growth of popular opposition, became the forum of numerous denunciations of corr- 
uption within the governmental machinery. This led to threatened strikes from various sectors, 
with the school teachers going on strike for higher pay and the outlawed National Front Party 
pressing for serious royal concessions. The Shah sent for Dr Ali Amini a prominent member of 
the opposition, asking him to form a government. Amini succeeded Sharif Emami in April 1961. 
Dr Amini quickly set about to implementing social and administrative reforms. The Majles 
was dissolved, which pleased the National Front and other opposition groups who expected new 
elections soon. But when it became apparent that Amini expected to rule by decree without a 
Majles, the opposition could only wait in uncertainty. Amini settled the teachers' strike and had 
two ex-ministers arrested for corruption. 
22 According to Harold Macmillan, John Foster Dulles was unwilling to join the Baghdad Pact until "a Palestine settle- 
ment had been reached and fortified by an American guarantee". Hence Britain among other nations thought "that if Arab- 
Israel tension could be reduced America would join the Baghdad Pact". Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955, 
New York, Harper, 1969, pp. 632-633. 
23 Roots of Revolution, op. cit., p. 153. 
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In his efforts to bring about real change within certain spheres of governmental policy, 
Amini faced stiff opposition from the Shah. One of these efforts was a substantial land reform, 
the other was his move toward improving Iran's foreign exchange position by way of drastic cuts 
on both domestic and foreign spending. In April 1962, Dr. Amini and his finance minister 
resigned after a dispute with the Shah over his refusal to cut down on military spending. 24 
In December 1962, the National Front created a new unified front and began open attacks on 
the Shah. Many leaders were arrested and the Shah himself now tried to create a reformist image 
by imposing on his people the "White Revolution". 
L3 The White Revolution of 1963: Socio-Political Implications 
On January 26,1963, the Shah called for, 
"an empirical need for a revolution based on the most advanced principles of justice 
and human rights that would change the framework of ... (Iranian) society and make it 
comparable to that of most developed countries in the world. "25 
The name "White Revolution" has its sources in the philosophy that changes would be 
accomplished without disorder and bloodshed, not even class hatred. In carrying out such a revo- 
lution the Shah attempted to achieve two objectives: to consolidate and widen the popular bases 
of his monarchy; and to reduce his dependence on the United States. The first objective was 
represented by "centrally controlled general mass mobilisation" and selected socio-economic 
reforms, to reinforce the support of his leadership and thereby gain a higher degree of indepen- 
dence. This would in turn increase his foreign policy options, and would put Iran on a more equal 
footing with the United States. 
In achieving his primary objective, which was the consolidation of personal power, the Shah 
was successful on two counts. For the first time after the 1953 coup, the Shah assumed real polit- 
ical power, making no attempt to hide behind any facade. By endeavouring to combine Western 
democratic values and traditional Iranian culture, the Shah believed he was ensuring the preserva- 
24 Ibid., p. 155. 
25 Quoted in Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 79. 
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tion of the monarchy. Secondly, he attempted to resolve some of the most pertinent problems, 
like land reform, by the effective redistribution of some 19.5% of the arable land to some 743,406 
farming families. Also for the first time, the regime sought to expand agricultural production in 
line with the needs of Iran's industrial development. This stage was launched in 1966 with effec- 
tive results, reflected in a rise in the per capita output and standards of living of the peasantry. 26 
By the end of the 1960s the Shah had achieved a number of short-term goals, thus increas- 
ing his domestic credibility and security. This gave him the confidence to initiate a "national 
independent foreign policy". 
L4 1960s-1970s: Independent National Policy 
"Siyasate Mustaquill-e-Melli" or "Independent National Policy" was a direct consequence 
of the Shah's White Revolution and came to characterise Iranian foreign policy outlook. 
"Independent National Policy"27 replaced the Shah's earlier foreign policy trend of "positive 
nationalism" during the 1950s. In the context of the White Revolution Reza Mohammad Pahlavi 
declared: 
"Our policy is based on the maintenance and preservation of peace. We in Iran have 
adopted a policy of independent nationalism ... we believe that the way to safeguard 
the real interests of our country is by co-existence and sincere co-operation with all 
countries ... At the same time ... the establishment of ... understanding and peace can- 
not be achieved without sincere respect for the principle of co-existence between dif- 
ferent ideologists and systems of government, or without respect for the principle of 
non-interference of countries in the internal affairs of others. "28 
In the view of certain analysts, even though Iran's foreign policy in the decade beginning in 
the sixties could be defined as "de facto non-aligned", because it was moving away from "rigid 
policies of alliance", it nevertheless remained within a "pro-Western alliance" 29 This meant that 
26 /bid. 
27 The Shah wrote that his "independent national policy" had its genesis in his domestic reform movement also known 
as the "White Revolution" (January, 1963). His main argument was that drastic socio-economic reform was the only way to 
free the country from the clutches of outside powers. The main thrust of his "White Revolution" was land reform which was 
aimed at reducing the gap between the rich and poor elements in Iran. He believed that this would engender national unity 
and help Iran to adopt a foreign policy that was truly "independent" and "national" in nature. For a first hand explanation 
see Mission for my Country, op. cit., pp. 8-12. 
23 Quoted in The Rise and Fall of the Shah, op. cit., p. 92. 
29 Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: Defacto Non Alignment within a pro-Western Alliance", Middle East 
Journal, vol. 24, no. 3, summer 1970, p. 302. 
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Iran's freedom to act and chart its own course in regional or international politics was acceptable 
to the acting global powers "so long as [its] foreign policy aspirations [were] not matched by pro- 
portionate implementation". 30 
The preceding declaration can also be construed as a notice to all countries, especially 
powerful neighbours like the Soviet Union, that Iran was no longer in exclusive partnership with 
the United States or for that matter with the West, and that it had gained sufficient stability to 
conduct independently all domestic matters and especially its foreign affairs. 
With the end of the Cold War in sight and the dawning of the age of d&tdnte in Great Power 
relationships, 31 Soviet policy towards Iran assumed a more flexible and conciliatory attitude. This 
attitude was complemented by Iran which, by refusing American missile bases on its territory, 
satisfied in part Soviet strategy, of disallowing foreign missile bases in the neighbourhood of the 
Soviet Union. 32 Hence, for Iran-Soviet relations, the lessening of superpower tensions originating 
in detente, resulted in a rapprochement which on the one hand reduced Iran's northern threat, and 
on the other increased its manoueverability, allowing it to play a more independent role in the 
region. 
In view of the normalisation of Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and encouragement 
from the United States on the international front, the Shah began to eliminate all sources of 
domestic opposition. The much-dreaded SAVAK33 became a key instrument in the Shah's 
30 It may be noted that the narrowing gap between Iran's capability to implement its foreign policy aspirations and the 
freedom to assert its own policies in the Gulf was a phenomenon which caused concern among the global powers in the 
mid- and late 1970s. 
31 In the words of Dr Henry Kissinger, "A certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival" led to 
a Soviet-American dialogue based on the identification of common interests. Though this statement was made in 1972, its 
reference to all issues of "common interest" were those mooted in the 1960s; namely, arms control, nuclear non- 
proliferation, avoidance of nuclear confrontation, to keep third party disputes especially in the Middle-East and S. E. Asia 
from triggering a state of war between themselves, etc. These were some of the issues which characterised the period called 
"detente". Henry Kissinger's quote is incorporated from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Washington DC, 
Government Printing Office, June 19,1972, p. 1045. Also see Alastair Buchan, The End of the Post War Era: A New Bal- 
ance of World Power, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1974. 
32 "The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by means of a note to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran on 15th September 
1962 assured the Soviet Government that it will not grant any foreign nation the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases 
on Iranian soil". Quoted from Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973, op. cit., p. 316. 
33 The Sazeman - E-Ettalat-va-Amniyate-Keshvar (SAVAK) was established in 1957 with American and Israeli techni- 
cal assistance. The SAVAK was a security and intelligence agency known for its brutal methods and had its agents 
throughout Iran and abroad. SAVAK's main targets were Iranian dissidents. See E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transi- 
tion: Conversations with a Monarch whose Office is Transitional and whose Goal is Modernisation, New York, American 
Universities Field Staff, 1968, p. 179. 
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consolidation of power. Political parties had already been banned way back in 1957 and were 
replaced by two puppet parties which were "ignored by the people and only attracted small bands 
of flatterers, self-seekers and ordinary thugs". M This was followed by a ruthless suppression of 
suspected opponents, especially those with links to the National Front Party of Mossadegh or the 
TUDEH Party. Some 600 TUDEH members who had successfully infiltrated the army were 
rooted out. The Shah also ordered a strict watch to be kept on the Ulema (clergy) and potential 
dissenters from the Bazaar. 35 
L5 The Resurgence of the Clergy: Advent of the Ayatollah 
In achieving considerable stability on the socio-economic front, the Shah - in the eyes of 
most of the world and especially in the eyes of his mentor, the United States - firmly entrenched 
himself as a successful monarch. 
Two factors were responsible for the erosion of this seemingly indestructible facade: one 
was the inadequate reconstruction of Iran's rural economy, which only benefited from very 
superficial changes; the second and more prominent factor was the unrest both in the holy city of 
Qom and among certain Mullahs. 
In speaking of religious opposition, both in the early sixties and even later on, one must not 
forget that the clergy had been largely subdued with gifts of land and positions in society. This 
was evident when a large section of the clergy opposed any form of land reform, fearing the loss 
of their personal property. 
It was only with the radical opposition of certain religious leaders like Ruhollah Khomeini 
and the subsequent collaboration of the clergy with certain nationalist movements that made the 
Ulema a substantial threat to the Shah's powers. 
As early as 1944 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had written a highly critical work attacking 
34 The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926-1979, op. cit, p. 197, The two political parties were "Melliyun" (National- 
ist) and "Mardom" (Peoples). These were headed by loyal lieutenants of the Shah. 
35 See Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulema in Twentieth Century Iran" in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, 
(ed) Nikki R. Keddie, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972. 
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Reza Shah, Reza Mohammad Pahlavi's father, and the monarchy in general. But it was not until 
1963 that Khomeini began to preach against the Shah in the chief Faiziyeh Madrasa (religious 
school) of Qom. In March 1963 on the anniversary of the martyrdom of the sixth Imam (leader) 
of the Shi'a Muslims, the Madrasa was attacked by paratroopers and the SAVAK. A number of 
students were killed, and Khomeini was arrested. Released after a short detention, he resumed his 
denunciation of governmental policies since they were, he declared, largely influenced by Amer- 
ica and Israel, who to Khomeini were the enemies of Islam. At dawn on June 4,1963 on the 
anniversary of the most revered martyr Imam Hossein, Ayatollah Khomeini was again arrested. 
In Tehran, processions of mourning for Imam Hossein turned into demonstrations. The demons- 
trations spread the next day to the University and other cities. Troops were heavily deployed for 
the Friday prayers of June 7 when a pamphlet calling for Jihad (holy war) against the regime was 
circulated. The demonstration was finally quelled with the loss of hundreds of lives. 
The religious opposition continued until May 1964, after which Khomeini was exiled to 
Turkey. In 1965 he went to Iraq, where he taught in religious school and spoke against the Shah. 
In 1978, probably under Iranian presure, he was asked to leave Iraq and went on to France. 
After the exile of Khomeini, the clergy and most other representative organs of the Pahlavi 
regime like the Majles were subservient to the increasingly repressive whims of the Shah. This 
was only a lull before the storm which prepared the people even more to favour the winds of 
change that blew from religious heights. The complexity shrouding Islam's Islamic revolution is 
simplified when seen in the context of these developments. It need not be incomprehensible nor 
is it necessary to consider what happened in Iran as an impulsive, reactionary sortie, but rather as 
something that came from within an oppressed people. 
L6 The Islamic Revolution: Change 
The seemingly durable Pahlavi regime began to show signs of collapse from the mid- 
seventies, culminating in the ousting of the Shah. Most observers failed to anticipate this entire 
phenomenon of insurrection, and had expected the regime to last for at least a decade or more. 
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A combination of two unexpected crises brought about the eventual downfall of the Pahlavi 
regime. One was the reappearance of an acute state of inflation, which rendered the basic needs 
for survival scarce and which affected the majority of the population. The second crisis was due 
to foreign pressure on the Shah to relax police controls and observe the human rights of political 
prisoners. 36 
The first crisis was actually felt by the increasingly deprived populace, which in itself 
caused a state of genuine alarm. The second crisis, which was directed towards the Pahlavi 
infrastructure, gave the political dissenters and revolutionaries grounds from where they could 
mobilise. 
To combat inflation, the regime placed the blame on the business community. This caused 
a number of influential businessmen both at the bazaar level and in higher echelons to be jailed. 
By early 1976 every bazaar family had at least one member who had directly suffered from the 
anti-profiteering campaign. 37 These families comprised a large part of the urban population. The 
bazaar community turned to its traditional ally, the Ulema, for help and protection. 
In early 1975, Amnesty International turned its attention to Iran and discovered that it was 
one of the world's "worst violators of human rights". A number of open letters poured in from 
various organs of the international community calling for a rectification in the regime's treatment 
of its political prisoners. At the same time, Iranian students living abroad formed associations 
and societies, and resorted to demonstrations exposing the regime's unpopularity, thus undermin- 
ing the favourable image that the Shah had projected over the years with the help of Western 
mass media. 38 
In early 1977, the regime amnestied 357 political prisoners. In March it allowed the Inter- 
national Commission of the Red Cross to visit prisons and interview inmates. In April it permit- 
ted foreign lawyers to observe the trial of eleven dissidents accused of terrorism. 39 The Shah tried 
36 Iran Between Two Revolutions, op. cit., p. 497. 
37 Ibid., p. 498. 
38 Ibid., p. 499. 
39 Ibid., p. 501. 
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hard to salvage his tarnished image, but this slight loosening of controls encouraged the opposi- 
tion to press for more concessions. 
In May 1977,53 lawyers, most of them pro-Mossadegh nationalists, sent an open letter to 
the imperial palace, and this started a torrent of protests through public communiques. In July of 
the same year, 64 prominent lawyers met openly and drafted a strongly worded manifesto accus- 
ing the government of violating the constitution and demanding immediate rectifications. There 
were many such independent calls of protests from intellectuals, poets and others who had been 
tortured and whose works had been censored 40 In Qom too, theology students formed an educa- 
tional society demanding the return of Khomeini and the reopening of the Faizeyeh Seminary and 
Tehran University, both of which had been closed because of student protests 41 
In mid-November 1977, the revolution came outdoors, into the streets. The turning point 
came when, after nine evenings of peaceful poetry-reading sessions organised by the Writers' 
Association in the Iranian-German Cultural Society at the Aryamehr University, police attempted 
to disband the audience of some 10,000 students. The attempt caused the crowd to march out of 
the campus into the streets shouting anti-regime slogans. This was followed by a clash with the 
police, in which over 70 were injured, 100 or so arrested and one student killed. By January 
1978, street demonstrations were a regular feature. The first serious callings for Ayatollah 
Khomeini's return were made in January 1978.42 The regime denounced him as a foreigner and a 
British spy, who had led a licentious life in his younger days. These accusations enraged both the 
seminaries in Qom and the urban bazaris; some 4,000 theology students and their sympathisers 
clashed with the police, leaving about 70 dead and over 500 injured. 
Martyrs had an important place in the early days of the revolution in Iran, because the death 
of every person killed in a clash with the police and army called for a procession of mourning on 
the fortieth day. This procession of mourning invariably turned violent, claiming more lives. 
Hence the cycle of martyrdom followed by mourning sustained the early pace of the revolution. 
40 Ibid., p. 503. 
41 Ibid., p. 504. 
42 Ibid., p. 505. 
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By November, demonstrations had taken a new turn - "rioting". All targets were symboli- 
cally chosen: military establishments, banks and tourist hotels. No foreigners were harmed. 
Army garrisons refused to interfere and in some instances gave guns to civilian dissidents. 
Muharram marks the anniversary of Shi'ism's greatest martyr, Imam Hossein. On the eve 
of Muharram, Ayatollah Khomeini issued letters saying that "torrents of blood might be spilled ... 
but blood would triumph over the sword ... ", and that good Muslims 
in the army should desert if 
ordered to fire upon their brothers; and that airfields should be blown up if the airforce intervened. 
The first few days of Muharram claimed the lives of around 700 persons (a BBC estimate). After 
the first week of Muharram, marches attended by three hundred thousand to a million people con- 
verged along the various major routes in Tehran and other cities. 
On January 13, a Regency Council was named to take the place of the Shah, so that he 
could go on vacation. On January 15, parliament accepted a new cabinet headed by Shapour 
Bakhtiar. On January 16, the Shah left the country. Even the cosmos responded with an earth- 
quake 21 minutes after the Shah's departure. 43 
L7 The Return of the Ayatollah 
The days of Bakhtiar's government were numbered. Khomeini insisted in his communiques 
from his home outside Paris, that Bakhtiar had been nominated by the Shah and hence his govern- 
ment was illegitimate. January 19, on the fortieth day of Imam Hossein's martyrdom, Khomeini 
called for a massive march against Bakhtiar. Over a million people marched in Tehran and in 
other major cities. 
In the midst of negotiations as to who would represent the people, Khomeini announced his 
intention of returning to Iran for Friday prayers on the sixth of Bahaman (January 27), the 
anniversary of the Prophet Mohammad's death. Bakhtiar closed the airport and asserted that he 
would arrest any provisional government appointed by Khomeini. 
43 Michael J. Fisher, Iran fr' om Religious Dispute to Revolution, Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 204- 
11. 
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At the last minute, Khomeini's aides persuaded Bakhtiar to re-open the airport, and on 
February 1, Khomeini returned to a welcoming crowd of some two million people. 
The military now began to negotiate with Khomeini directly, and one of the first steps 
Bakhtiar hurriedly took was to pass certain important bills to fulfill the demands of the revolu- 
tion: three bills were passed, firstly for the abolishment of SAVAK, secondly withdrawal from 
CENTO, and thirdly the establishment of a jury to try former corrupt officials. Also there was a 
cancellation of expensive military contracts begun under the Shah. 
At this juncture, a very important understanding came about among the people. The revolu- 
tion bestowed upon Khomeini the title of Imam and declared him as "Marja-e-taqlid" (source of 
divine imitation) of the era and therefore whatever he said had to be done without question. 44 
Thus at no period of time did Khomeini assume actual political position or power. In his 
capacity as Imam, political power was inherent in his responsibilities to the Islamic nation to 
fulfill its day-to-day struggle to survive in an increasingly hostile world. 
By February 1979, Bhaktiar's government was replaced by the secular and nationalist party 
of Mehdi Bazargan, known as the Movement for the Liberation of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini 
remained above this power struggle, fully aware of all the events taking place. Throughout this 
period he preached the significance and need for Islamic government in Iran, using symbols of 
Shi'a Islam's resistance to non-Islamic political authority. He reminded the people of the martyr- 
dom of Prophet Mohammad's grandson Hossein who died at Karbala defending the ideals of 
Islam. While the mourning for Hossein was a traditional passive gesture in the Shi'a faith, 
Khomeini asked his followers to change that into one of active fighting for Hossein's ideals, 
namely Islamic justice in all spheres of human activity. 45 
" For more information about the concept of Marja-e-taglid in Shi'a political philosophy read Edward Mortimer, Faith 
and Power: The Politics of Islam., London, Faber, 1982. 
45 See for example Selected Messages and Speeches of Imam Khomeini, Tehran, The Ministry of National Guidance, 
The Hamdami Foundation, 1980. 
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IL The Impact of Ideological Islam on Iran's Political Process 
In order to understand the religious factor (ideology) in the Iranian revolution and the role it 
played in the creation of an Islamic Republic, it is important to put into perspective a combination 
of certain unique elements which transformed Iranian society and politics. This exercise will not 
necessarily contribute something new towards the ongoing discussions in academic circles, but 
may help to dispel the popular myth that labels the Iranian political experience as being nothing 
more than "fundamentalist" in nature 46 
More importantly, the religio-political dimension which continues to play a leading role in 
the political process of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not only created a new scope of study in 
the behaviour of Third World countries, but has also affected the geopolitics of the region, by 
condemning the existing international order as being exploitative and imperialist in design. 
Professor R. K. Ramazani, 47 addressing the issue of why Iran's political behaviour is often 
incomprehensible, has said "If [one] fails to acknowledge, for example, the religious influence of 
the Calvinist cast of mind on Woodrow Wilson's concept of world order, how can [one] possibly 
understand Khomeini's concept of an Islamic world order? "48 Hence the ensuing section tries to 
describe both the secular interpretation of the ideological transformation which took place in Iran 
and the religious or Islamic aspects of the actual government which was formed following the 
upheavals of 1978-79. 
The role of ideology in the political transformation of a society can be viewed as prob- 
" For example, there are some authors who, while acknowledging the international dimensions of "Islamic fundamen- 
talism", stop short of enquiring into the socio-political transformation which Iranian society and politics went through. See 
Mohammad-Reza Djalili, "The International Dimensions of Fundamentalism", World Link, no date. While warning 
Muslim and Non-Muslim countries of the "transitional character" of fundamentalism, the author calls upon nations to "for- 
mulate efficient counter-strategies" against a movement which threatens "the international system" and whose chief archi- 
tect (Khomeini) has encouraged "his followers to take out their sabres and chop up corrupt people". This kind of sensation- 
alism accorded to statements made by Khomeini or any other leader is often quoted out of context. According to others the 
word "fundamentalist" itself is often used loosely. "in the strictest historical sense fundamentalism refers to a movement in 
American Protestantism arising out of a coalition of theologically conservative Evangelicals that came together about 1920 
to struggle against the tendencies commonly labelled 'Modernism' or `Liberalism'". See article by William Shepard, "Fun- 
damentalism, Christian and Islamic", Religion, vol. 17,1987, p. 356. The author prefers to describe the movements in the 
Islamic world as "an ideological orientation", pp. 357-358. 
47 Professor RK. Ramazani of the University of Virginia, has written prolifically on Iran's government, politics and 
foreign policy, both during and after the Pahlavi monarchy. 
48 R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle-East, London and Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 19. 
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lematic. The "middle-class" has many ideas but no ideology of its own. It sets out to revolution- 
ise the dominant ideology (usually dependent capitalism) by means of a borrowed ideology (usu- 
ally nationalism or the native religion). The existing dominant ideology is generally conservative 
and tends to fix or otherwise distort the real essence of the existing order. Thus, the emerging 
dominant ideology must not only offer a more objective analysis of reality but must also engender 
change. In addition, it must also be able to create a melange between theory and practice. Dog- 
matism and rigidity are the common enemies of such an ideology, which needs to be open and 
critical. 49 
In the case of Iran, ideological transformation faced two parallel developments. Firstly, the 
delegitimisation of the old dominant ideology and secondly, the adaptation of the borrowed but 
all-persuasive ideology to the specific needs and interest of the "middle-class" 50 In the case of 
Iran, the borrowed ideology was Islam. Although Islam was all-embracing as a religion long 
before the political revolution of 1979, its subsequent adaptation as an ideology of the state fol- 
lowed only after the displacement of the Pahlavi monarchy, 51 and not before both secular and 
religious forces jointly participated in removing all ideological and other vestiges of the Pahlavi 
state. 52 
However, in the immediate post-revolutionary phase, contrary to the predictions of the 
Western media, 53 the Islamists or clerical element of the revolution gained the upper hand over 
the secular elements, comprising nationalists, socialists, leftists and liberals. What then was the 
reason for the triumph of the Islamists and the subsequent adoption of Islam as the dominant state 
49 See June Nash, Juan Corradi and Hobart Spalding, Jnr., (eds) Ideology and Social Change in Latin America, New 
York, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1977. 
so A number of authors have described the middle-class as the prime mover in the Iranian revolution of 1979. This has 
been attributed to their superiority in numbers and also because a majority of the Iranian intelligentsia critical of the Shah's 
policies were among the middle-class. Though a good number of the participating intelligentsia were socialist in colouring, 
a number of them - both religious and secular - were nationalistic and basically reform-minded. Hossein Bashiriyeh, 
The 
State and Revolution in Iran, London, Croom Helm, 1986. Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, New York, St. 
Martins Press, 1979. See chapter 12. 
st Mansour Farhang, "How the Clergy Gained Power in Iran", in Barbara Freyer Stowasser (ed), The Islamic Impulse, 
London, Croom Helm, 1987. 
52 This crusade entailed a range of activities for example the dismantling and complete purge of the imperial forces, the 
abolition of judicial and security apparatus of the state etc. 
53 Yann Richard, "The Relevance of 'Nationalism' in Contemporary Iran", Middle East Review, vol. xxi, noA, Summer 
1989. The author, who was in Iran during the revolution, recalls that most of the Western media "seemed to think that the 
Revolution was going to turn to the benefit of the National Front (Jebhe-ye-Melli)". p. 27. 
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ideology? 
The revolution was initially supported by a coalition of groups having different and even 
opposing backgrounds, goals and ideologies: M Ironically, in the ensuing struggle for power, 
groups helped to crush each other only to become victims themselves. For example, all groups 
helped to fight Mehdi Bazargan (November 1979, Khomeini's first appointed Prime Minister); 
those who remained then joined in disqualifying Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari (1980, leader of 
the five million Turkish-Azari speaking Iranians and also a high-ranking cleric) 55 The others 
helped the clerics in bringing down Abolhassan Bani Sadr (summer 1981, President of the 
Islamic Republic) and with him the Mojahedeen. 56 Those who still remained helped in removing 
Sadeq Qotabzadeh (summer 1982, foreign minister) who was executed later that year. 57 The 
remainder - and among them Hujjatiyyah (the most strictly orthodox religious grouping) helped 
in the crackdown on the TUDEH (Communist party) in the spring of 1983.58 Finally, the radical 
clerics belonging to the Khomeini factions turned against the Hujjatiyyah in August 1983.59 
Thus, from what started out as working within a political alliance, Khomeini's supporters gradu- 
ally achieved exclusive power within Iran. 60 
For a well laid out description of the secular, religious, nationalist and ethnic groups which were active in the after- 
math of the revolution, see Nozar Alaolmolki, "Iranian opposition to Nozar Khomeini and the Islamic Republic", Australi- 
an Outlook, vol. 23, no. 2, August 1984, pp. 99-105. 
55 Ayatollah Shariatmadari was one of the early opponents of the clergy's participation in politics as well as in the insti- 
tution of the vilayat-e fagih (government of the jurisconsult, office of Ayatollah Khomeini). The clerical community of 
Qom (holy city in Iran) then convened and stripped Shariatmadari of the title of Ayatollah in 1982. See Roots of 
Revolution, op. cit., pp. 263 and 265. 
56 In June 1987 the Mojahedeen (armed guerillas) rallied their support behind the ousted President Bani Sadr. Ironically 
the Mojahedeen had spoken in favour of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic, despite the fact that Khomeini never accepted 
the Mojahedeen as a legitimate Islamic organisation. See "Iranian opposition to Khomeini and the Islamic Republic", 
op. cit., pp-99- 100. 
7 In mid-April 1982, Qotabzadch appeared on national television and confessed to conspiring to destroy all the heads of 
the Islamic Government including Khomeini. He also confirmed that be had enlisted the support of a group of military 
officers and that of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, ibid., p. 100. 
ss Sec Zalmay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Double Track Policy, Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma", Problems of Communism, 
vol. xxxiii, January-February 1984. 
59 See the varied examples of leading orthodox clerics who were removed from their positions because of their opposi- 
tion to Khomeini's views on religion and politics, "Iranian opposition to Khomeini and the Islamic Republic", op. cit., 
p. 101. 
60 Some authors also attribute the triumph of revolutionary Islam as the state ideology in Iran, to the uncompromising 
stance it took on all issues, by contrast with the leftist or nationalist ideologies which were willing to accept compromises. 
Moreover Islam, as a religion with universal scope, tended to be internationalist and even assume certain supranational di- 
mensions. See for example The Political Economy of Modern Iran, 1926-1979, op. cit., especially the comparison of revo- 
lutionary Islam with the uncompromising position taken in Europe by the nationalists, who were in direct opposition to the 
Church. 
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Having come to power in 1979, the revolutionary government, consisting mainly of clerics, 
concentrated on the consolidation, institutionalisation and - if possible - perpetuation of clerical 
rule. It was recognised that to implement Khomeini's revolutionary ideology it was necessary to 
rally a popular front which would actively support the clerics and maintain a critical level of revo- 
lutionary zeal. In addition, power would have to be concentrated within revolutionary institutions 
and active and potential opposition kept at a minimal level. 61 
In realising the above goals, the leadership faced difficulties on various levels. Firstly, 
given that Islam is cross-class in nature, its interests naturally extended beyond the interests of 
any one class; this resulted in inter-class and intra-class conflicts. The fragmentation of Iranian 
society due to this conflict into several factions, each with different interests and motivations, ren- 
dered Islam problematic as an all-embracing ideology. 
At a more general level, the leadership faced difficulties inherited from the previous regime, 
including repression, centralism, corruption etc. It is therefore not surprising that there are 
demands for the rectification of these errors and for popular participation. 62 The inability of the 
revolutionary government to decentralise decision-making, planning and formulation of policy 
outside of a few "Revolutionary Institutions" (Nichadha-ye-Enghelabi) has been partly attributed 
by some authors to the fact that "the old military (opposed to federal) and sectorial (opposed to 
regional) structure of the state remains largely intact. "63 
The above mentioned shortcomings, however basic they may be to consensus-based poli- 
tics, were not too great to be sacrificed by the Iranian leadership at the altar of ideological Islam. 
This attitude led to the alienation of a wide spectrum of supporters for whom Khomeini was the 
undisputed leader. According to some authors, at the present time, the regime has no active 
61 See for example Cheryl Bernard and Zalmay Khalilzad, The Government for God: Iran's Islamic Republic. New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 
62 The most outspoken critic of the Islamic Government in Iran is the ex-president of the Islamic Republic of Iran - Abol 
Hassan Bani-Sadr. Through his newspaper Islamic Revolution, in a column titled the "President's Diary", he condemned 
corruption and equated the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) with the single party of the Shah's regime, the Rastakhiz. In the 
period before being removed from office, Bani-Sadr sent a letter to Khomeini warning that the latter's trust in the IRP 
amounted to committing suicide. See Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, 
pp. 179-85. 
63 Hooshang Amirahamadi and Manoucher Parvin, (eds. ), Post- Revolutionary Iran, London, Westview Press, 1988, 
p. 235. 
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supporters beyond ideological Islamists ... 
64 
111 Ayatollah Khomeini and the Concept of Islamic Government 
Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of Islamic Government is rooted in two basic premises. 
Firstly, the illegitimacy of the Pahlavi monarchy and his lifelong opposition to it. 65 Secondly, his 
singular focus on re-creating Islamic society free from atheistic ideologies of either left or right, 
independent of the influence of the world's major powers. Both these premises, when extended, 
converge on the need to establish an Islamic government. In the words of one author, what 
resulted from the above line of thinking was "The ideologisation process of religion which 
allowed contemporary Muslim thought to make decisive shifts from the traditional theological 
field to the sociological one, and to formulate the content of Islam in terms of norms and values 
66 of socio-political order" 
The historical debate concerning the legal and doctrinal justification for Islamic government 
is too extensive to be discussed here in detail. It will suffice therefore to concentrate on 
Khomeini's concept of Islamic government and - more importantly - the idea of vilayat-e-faqih 
(guardianship of the jurisconsult, an office held by Khomeini). This will provide a backdrop 
against which Khomeini's concept of world order may be examined. 
The concept of hukumat (government) in Ayatollah Khomeini's political thought is rooted 
in vilayat or (guardianship) that is limited to God, to the Prophet Mohammad, to the infallible 
imams (ma'sumin) and, only by extension, to the learned and pious faqih (jurisconsult). To the 
faqih belongs the temporal as well as the spiritual authority, which he should exercise in the 
absence of the twelfth Imam who will appear ultimately as the Mahdi (messiah) or the Sahib-e- 
Zaman (master of the age) to establish just and equitable rule. 67 
64 Homa Katouzian, "Islamic Govenunent and Politics: The Practice and Theory of the Absolute Guardianship of the 
Jurisconsult" in Charles Davies, (ed), After the War Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf, Chichester, West Sussex, Carden Publica- 
tions Ltd, 1990. 
65 In his book Hukumat-i-Islami or Islamic Government, which originally was a series of lectures given at Najaf (Iraq) 
between January 21 and February 8,1970, Khomeini equates monarchy and hereditary succession to a "sinister, evil sys- 
tem" which is contrary to the laws of Islam. See Hamid Algar's translation of the original text Islam and Revolution: Writ- 
ings and Declarations, Imam Khomeini, London, KPI Ltd., 1981, p. 31. 
66 Ali Merad, "The Ideologisation of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World", in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Des- 
souki (eds), Islam and Power, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. p. 37. 
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The interim period according to Khomeini, should be presided over by the rule of the ulema 
(Islamic clergy) or more appropriately the faqih who should exercise authority as the na'ib al 
'amm or the representative of the Mahdi. This notion of the ideal rule implemented by the fagih, 
acting in the absence of the Mahdi, commands wide acceptance among Shi'a mujtahid, 68 in 
Shi'ite jurisprudence. The rule of the vilayat-e-faqih which has been formalised by the constitu- 
tion of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be regarded as a rational step in the development of 
Ja'afri Shi'a political theory. In the opinion of one author the logical basis to the absolute nature 
of the faqih's decrees and edicts was actualised when Ayatollah Khomeini "transformed a size- 
able section of the Shi'ite hierocracy into a revolutionary political party". 69 This revolutionary 
party (The Islamic Republican Party or IRP) consisting of clerics and followers draws on the cult 
of martyrdom to realise the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Government, on behalf of God 
and the hidden Imam (Mahdi). Although Khomeini remained above the politics of the IRP and 
never formally endorsed it, the leadership of the IRP fully supported Khomeini's doctrinal posi- 
tion on Islamic Government. 7o By the end of 1987, the office of vilayat-e-faqih and its nature and 
scope became the topic of a national debate which involved a number of religious politicians and 
scholars. 
The following ruling by Ayatollah Khomeini on the absolute nature of vilayat-e-faqih 
started this long-running controversy. In addition to the existing powers vested in the office of 
vilayat-e-faqih, over economic, social and political affairs, Khomeini added that: 
"The government which is a part of the absolute vice-regency of the Prophet of God ... is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other injunctions ... 
67 See Abdul Aziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism, Albany, 
State University of New York Press, 1981, for an informative study which sets out to compare the classical Shiite tradition 
with regard to the divine law in spheres of political relevance and Khomeini's theory of government. Also see Norman 
Calder, "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical Tradition", Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 1, no. 18, January 1982, pp. 3-20. 
68 Mujtahid means Islamic Scholar capable of independent interpretation of Koranic tennets. 
69 Said Amir Arjomand, "History, Structure and Revolution in the Shi'ite Tradition in Contemporary Iran", Internation- 
al Political Science Review, vol. 10, no. 2,1989, p. 112. The author describes the transformation as the "final stage of the 
growth of Shi'ite clerical authority". 
70 For the IRP's role in shaping the politics of revolutionary Iran, and the selection of one of its members, Mohammad 
Ali Rajai, as the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, see Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini 
Decade, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989, pp. 90-91. In an interview with the New York Times, Mir Hossein Musavi 
(then foreign minister) stated that to defend the revolution they (those committed to the ideals of the IRP) were ready to 
give martyrs. Reprinted in Kayhan International, October 12,198 1. 
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The Government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any Shari'ah agreements which 
it has concluded with the people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of 
the country or Islam. It can also prevent any devotional on non-devotional affair if it 
is opposed to the interests of Islam and for so long as it is so. "71 
The above ruling, taken together with the developments of the last decade, reveals the extent 
to which Khomeini was prepared to rush to the defence of what in his own words has been 
described as Islam-e-nab-e-Mohammadi" or "pure Mohammadan Islam". However it cannot be 
said that Khomeini's doctrinal position on absolute government (as suggested by the text above) 
went unchallenged. In a seminar of jurists and religious personalities the concept of the absolute 
nature of vilayat-e-faqih was discussed. The arbitrariness and lawlessness which may arise out of 
such power were debated upon. What was actually being questioned was the political legitimacy 
of Guardianship of the Jurisconsult or vilayat-e-faqih. Above all it was argued "If the Guardian is 
neither sinless and infallible nor in direct communication with God, on what authority could he 
suspend, modify or replace fundamental shariah [religious] law, whenever he judged them to be 
inexpedient or contrary to the interest of Islam itself? " 
Seeing the intelligent opposition arising from within his own supporters, which included the 
President, the head of the legislature, the head of the judiciary, the Prime Minister and his own 
son, Khomeini agreed to the appointment of a Council for Judging Expediency, which in his view 
was unnecessary, but permissible "for the sake of observing maximum caution". The Council 
was made up of six members from the Council of Guardians (of the Constitution) and seven 
members from the government, including the President, the Majles Speaker and the head of the 
legislature, the Prime Minister, the President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General. 
Khomeini also added that his son Ahmad would attend the Council so that he could be kept 
abreast of the various issues being discussed. 72 
The creation of the Expediency Council clarified to a great extent the nature and scope of 
the office of vilayat-e-faqih. As before, "all matters concerning social, economic and political 
71 Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), ME/0043, January 8,1988, pp. 1-2. 
72 The above arguments figured in the Iranian press and have been referred to in "Islamic Government and Politics", 
op. cit. Also see Kayhan International for serialised articles on the concept of vilayat. e-fagih written by Khomeini during 
the same period(1988) and translated from Persian to English. 
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life" - being within the sphere of Islamic jurisprudence - were subject to the absolute Guardian- 
ship of the Jurisconsult. "But the powers of Guardianship were themselves bound by Islamic jur- 
isprudence" and therefore could not be arbitrarily used. The debate and the subsequent formation 
of the Expediency Council hence solved to a large extent both "the theoretical problem of politi- 
cal legitimacy and the practical problem of collective leadership"73 
As mentioned before, Khomeini firmly believed that Islamic Government headed by the 
learned jurisconsult or faqih was a necessary phase before Islamic world government could be 
established by the reappearance of the Mahdi who is in occultation. Further, according to 
Khomeini, since Islamic government or the "Government of God" was realised only in Iran, it 
was only natural that it "wishes to establish divine justice in the world". 74 This Mahadistic or 
Messianic tenet had a unique impact on the foreign policy behaviour of Iran, making the export of 
the revolution a primary foreign policy objective. 
IL2 Impact of Ideological Islam on Iran's Foreign Policy 
In the words of Shireen T. Hunter, 75 Iran's foreign policy since the revolution 
"has been more deeply affected than before by ideological considerations, as a rela- 
tively well-defined set of beliefs has guided its actions. The Iranian leadership has 
been divided over the interpretation of different components of this broad ideology, 
but no key political figure has challenged the validity of the basic framework. 
Because of its principal motivations, the Islamic regime has seen itself as representing 
not just Iran's state interests but also those of a much broader Islamic movement. 
Thus, in the process, it has acted not only as a state but often as the spokesman of a 
cause. "76 
As mentioned in the concluding paragraph of the last section, Ayatollah Khomeini's world 
view consisted of establishing an Islamic World Order, the basis of which would be an integrated 
Ummah (congregation of believers). The role of Iran in this Islamic World Order is based on its 
commitment to providing the necessary material and spiritual guidance to Moslems in their strug- 
'3 Ibid. 
74 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS), South Asia, February 14,1983. 
75 Shircen T. Hunter is Deputy Director of the Middle East Programme at the Center for Strategic and International Stu- 
dies in Washington. 
76 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Bloomington and Indianapolis, India- 
na University Press, 1990, p. 36. 
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gle to replace the world imperialist governments with a just and divine government of the meek. 
Article 3, Section 16 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic states that the Islamic 
government of Iran would engage all provisions to realise the formulation of a foreign policy 
based upon "Islamic criterion, brotherly commitment to all Moslems and unqualified protection of 
all the deprived of the world. "77 
One of the direct consequences of the internal political system and the external perceptions 
and objectives of Tehran in terms of policy towards other states, especially in the region, has been 
the export of the revolution. 
The export of the revolution to other countries in the region had a two-fold purpose. To 
destabilise the political situation in those areas and create a hostile environment for Western 
interests. In addition, Iran, an Islamic revolutionary state of Shi'ite political persuasion, was pri- 
marily interested in liberating its Shi'a brethren in the Gulf States, Lebanon and Iraq, which con- 
tinue to suffer deprivation under the predominantly Sunni ruling classes. Therefore for Iran, 
Western interests which were in favour of maintaining the status quo in the name of political sta- 
bility and an uninterrupted supply of oil to the West, meant continued political deprivation and 
oppression. 
Use of terror tactics against the French and US embassies in Lebanon and the taking of hos- 
tages were also motivated by the above factors. Iranian government functionaries like Mohsen 
Rafiqdoost, Minister of the Revolutionary Guards, explained yet another socio-political dimen- 
sion of his country's involvement in Lebanon to Robin Wright, journalist and author. Rafiqdoost 
told her: "we wanted to transfer our culture to Muslims in Lebanon. I saw the corrupted culture 
there. We started to show Muslims in Lebanon our way of living and our way of fighting". When 
queried about his organisation's alleged involvement in the suicidal bombing of the American 
marine barracks and hostage-taking in Lebanon, Rafiqdoost replied; 
"We only trained the Lebanese (Shi'ites) to defend their country. When we heard 
about the bombs - which killed two hundred and forty one American troops - we were 
77 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, no date, p. 22. 
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happy. But we didn't plan it. It was their right. Ask yourself, why were the Ameri- 
cans in Lebanon? " 
Not, he implied, to help the Muslim community78 
One of the main reasons why the Iranian style of protest did not develop into a wider revo- 
lutionary movement in the region was because it was Irano-Shi'a centric. The concept of 
vilayat-e-faqih was unacceptable to Sunni religio-political thinking. Moreover the infighting 
within the clerical ranks in Iran demoted the infallible nature of the revolution into a mere politi- 
cal movement in the eyes of many Moslems. Nevertheless, the revolution still had a number of 
adherents especially among those who were disenchanted by the decadence and pro-Western ten- 
dencies of Muslim rulers. 
It is the belief of certain authors that the Iranian revolution has failed to have, or is unlikely 
to have, any long-term international impact in the same way as the American, French and Russian 
revolutions. 79 It is easier to agree with the latter part of the above opinion as it is still too early to 
measure the historical contribution made by the Iranian revolution towards the politics of the 
Middle and Near East and to the Muslim world in general. However, to argue that the revolution 
has had no international impact is difficult to accept. 
For one, "the very act of overthrowing the most powerful monarchy in the region and its 
replacement by a republican regime challenged the legitimacy of the remaining dynasties in the 
Gulf and, moreover, exposed the fragility of these regimes and the feasibility of overthrowing 
them. "80 
The export of the revolution being an integral part of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy 
necessitated the formulation of both short-term and long-term strategies by the leadership. In the 
first instance, supporters were encouraged to demonstrate against the ruling cliques which, if 
monarchical or involving hereditary succession, were condemned as being anti-Islamic and 
711 Robin Wright, "A Reporter at Large: Tehran Summer", The New Yorker, September 5,1988, p. 42- 
79 This was the opening comment of Patrick Bannerman, arguing the case against the Iranian Revolution as being a His- 
toric Revolution at a Conference convened by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on "The Iranian Revolution, Ten 
Years After", held at Chatham House, London on January 19-20,1989. 
80 Efraim Karsh, "From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism: The Islamic Republic and the Gulf" in Efraim Karsh, 
(ed), The Iran, Iraq War: Impact and Implications, London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 29. 
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invalid. Some of these protests in the Gulf countries did result in serious breaches of internal 
security and obliged governments to adopt repressive measures 81 Long-term strategies involved 
steps to radicalise the entire Muslim ummah against what was considered as their illegitimate 
governments and rulers and against Western, especially American, domination of the affairs of 
the Middle East and the Muslim World. 
For example, Khomeini argued that the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj) was not only to 
be considered as an act affirming devotion to God, but an opportunity for Muslims to demonstrate 
and rid the Muslim world of foreign domination. This would remind Muslims of their social and 
political obligations and fulfill the real purpose and spirit of the pilgrimage just as God had 
intended. Khomeini's call to use the Haj as a tool of political protest resulted in violent clashes 
between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi militia in July 1987, causing the death of several hundred pil- 
grims. On the international level this led to mutual recriminations and the cutting off of all 
diplomatic ties between the two countries 82 
In the period after the Haj tragedy, the speaker of Iranian Parliament in a speech in October 
1988 admitted that there existed serious differences among the world congregation of Muslims 
(ummah) especially along political and religious lines. This disunity was even more apparent 
among Shi'as and Sunnis, and any vision of achieving the ideal of a united ummah, Rafsanjani 
concluded, would have to be preceded by "a high mindedness (se'eh-sadr)" which does not 
exist. 83 
It is important to note that Iranian leaders themselves have recognised the failure of tactics 
used to implement their strategies connected with the export of the revolution. Rafsanjani, in 
describing Iran's revolutionary position vis-a-vis other countries in the world political arena, 
clearly states: "One of our incorrect measures was that, in the revolutionary atmosphere, we made 
enemies ... We created enemies for ourselves. Those who could have remained indifferent were 
made to transform their indifference into hostility, and we did not attempt to attract the friendship 
$1 See Keesing's, vo1. X? 11,1987, p. 35289-35291. 
92 Ibid. 
83 FBIS, South Asia, November 1,1988. 
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of those who could have been our friends. "84 
Another aspect of ideological Islam on Iran's foreign policy process was manifested in its 
allegiance to the principles of non-alignment. On the one hand revolutionary Iran remained 
within the movement, while on the other it questioned the concept of non-alignment and its func- 
tions. 
Non-alignment can be considered as a built-in component of Iran's revolutionary foreign 
policy. The Iranian revolution being primarily directed at a regime which was an active client of 
a superpower and one in which no foreign power was involved "provided tremendous confidence, 
self-righteousness, and exuberance to the new regime" 85 Non-alignment, which is generally 
understood as a positive concept based on passive resistance to superpower politics was not fully 
acceptable to the Iranian regime. Iran sought to revolutionise this philosophy and saw the move- 
ment as a platform for direct confrontation with the superpowers. 
Dr. A. H. H. Abidi of the School of International Studies, New Delhi, and a specialist on 
Iranian affairs states that "According to the Iranians, the tendency of alignment/non-alignment is 
the external manifestation of the state of mind of a given ruling elite". The Iranians argue that 
"true non-alignment is possible only when the thought process of the people and leaders are com- 
pletely emancipated from political oppression, economic exploitation, cultural manipulation, 
mental slavery, and all other causes of fear and alienation". From the Islamic perspective, this is 
possible when "one is subservient only to God and to no other power on earth". 86 In this context, 
Prime Minister Hossein Musavi has stated that many countries and peoples "regard the Islamic 
Revolution [Iranian Revolution] as a historical experience and model for revolt against the 
western and eastern imperialists" 87 
On one level Iran's stance on non-alignment was a revival of Mossadegh's "negative bal- 
ance" in the sense of following neither East nor West. Dr. Jamshid Hagoo a Deputy in the 
84 BBC, SWB, July 1988, (ME/0195/A/4). 
15 A. H. H. Abidi, "Revolutionary Iran's Perception of Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement", Non-Aligned 
World, vol. 2, no. 3,1984, p. 351. 
36 Ibid., p. 352. 
87 Kayhan International, January 16,1984. 
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Foreign Ministry during the early days of the revolution when the nationalists were still in 
government, stated that the "Neither East nor West" policy espoused by Khomeini (Na Sharki, Na 
Gharbi) did not "mean self-ostracization ... but 
independence, self-reliance, resourcefulness, as 
well as political and economic independence" 88 
On another level Iran viewed non-alignment or the neither East nor West ideal as a basis for 
conducting its foreign relations by "preserving the principle of non-compromise". Hossein 
Musavi, who can be considered as a staunch Islamist following Imam Khomeini's line, described 
the foreign policy system of the Islamic Republic as one which "negates compromise ... 
despite 
various pressures and crises imposed by imperialism ... 
"89 At the seventh non-aligned summit 
held in New Delhi, Musavi added that member governments who based their policies on non- 
alignment "cannot and shall not think of anything in the international political scene but winning 
true independence for all, and annihilating all forms of dependence on the Big Powers and politi- 
cal and economic empires which have divided God's earth into zones of influence". 90 
In practice however, maintaining the "neither east nor west" policy strictly led to certain 
ambiguities in Iran's foreign policy formulation. Take for example the following views of the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry on economic relations. In an interview, Ahmad Azizi, the undersecre- 
tary for economic affairs, stated that in establishing relations his country "would give priority to 
those who do not have ties with the superpowers" or intend to "impose their economic or political 
views on Iran". He added however, that although Iran was "constantly trying not to have any spe- 
cial tendency towards any certain blocs ... economic ties with the Eastern bloc are to the extent 
that we can call them rational and reasonable" (sic) 91 
A partial explanation of the above contradiction in terms of policy would be that, on the 
periphery of the neither East nor West posture, Iran adopts "a basically benign view of the Soviet 
88 Kayhan International, November 13,1980. 
89 Kayhan International, August 18,1981, Musavi was especially against compromising on issues which faced the 
Muslim world, like the question of Palestine and the common military and economic strategic interests of both Western Eu- 
rope and the United States towards the region. 
90 Quoted in "Revolutionary Iran's Perception on Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement", op. cit. p. 356. Em- 
phasis added. 
91 Kayhan International, August 18,1981. 
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Union, favouring close co-operation with Eastern bloc countries. "This ambiguity in the view of 
certain authors has rendered Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy both "dualistic and contrad- 
ictory" in character 92 
A lack of a proper mix of ideology and pragmatism made Iran's approach to non-alignment 
politically unviable and Khomeini's advice to the movement to revolutionalise the dominant ord- 
ers untenable for the rest of the grouping. Dr. Abidi, in presenting a non-religious analysis of 
Iran's perception of the Non-Aligned Movement, states that "the Iranians show a lack of under- 
standing of the socio-politico-dynamics of the diverse societies of the Third World". Adding that 
non-alignment "cannot be seen only in black and white terms" but within the wider context of 
"the hard realities of international politics", Dr. Abidi concludes by saying that the "basic 
difficulty in the Iranian approach is that they are not prepared to rise above religion in order to 
tackle the intricacies of politics or economics". He described their approach as "emotional, rather 
than rational" 93 
III. The Evolution of Iran's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 
Chapter Three of this thesis and Section One of this chapter demonstrate that, during the 
rule of the Pahlavi monarchy, the nature and direction of Iran's external relations underwent con- 
siderable change, reflecting both developments within Iran and events in the international arena. 
The underlying principles of Pahlavi Iran's "national independent" foreign policy as stated 
by the leadership were 
(i) adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and respect for international law; and 
(ii) establishment of friendly relations with all countries regardless of their economic and social 
system 94 
In fact, it would not be incorrect to state that without jeopardising Iran's special political and 
economic relations with the West, the former sought to maintain diplomatic and economic 
92 Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit., p. 43. 
93 "Revolutionary Iran's Perception or Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement", op. cit., p. 361. 
94 See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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relations with as many socialist, Western and Third World countries as possible. 
By the mid-1970s Iran's special relationship with its western allies suffered considerable 
setbacks due its leading role in increasing the price of oil and its rapid military build-up. This led 
the West to carefully scrutinise Iran's record on human rights which hitherto was not an issue 
governing the relationship between the two. 
In addition the military component of Iran's foreign policy caused much concern to the 
West, which felt that it directly affected the pro-Western Gulf Arab states and sought to further 
radicalise the anti-western movements in the region. 
Albeit, Iran remained firmly within the Western camp, given its deep involvement with the 
former in the economic, political and military fields. 
This situation created the impression among many that Iran was openly a pawn of the West, 
carrying out the imperialist game plan in the region Persian Gulf region. Opposition groups both 
secular and religious were against Iran's membership in CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) 
and its relations with Israel and S. Africa, which further seemed to prove their country's domina- 
tion by outside powers. 
With the advent of the revolution there was general disagreement regarding relations with 
the West. The nationalist elements favoured maintaining links with the occident and the United 
States as opposed to the demands of the left and the clerical factions who were not in favour of it. 
In order to reach a middle ground, the Shah's last government led by the late Shapour Bakhtiar 
declared it would leave CENTO and sever relations with Israel and S. Africa -a decision which 
was acceptable to all groups. 
In the period preceding the declaration of Iran as an Islamic Republic, Mehdi Bazargan's 
provisional government was not able to bring about any change in Iran's foreign policy at the 
official level. By attempting to follow a moderate policy of non-alignment, Bazargan was 
suspected of wanting to move closer to the United States by the left and the Islamists. A direct 
consequence of this was the hostage crisis, which was a move to reverse this perceived trend. 
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The hostage crisis, while successfully alienating the West from Iran, opened a new chapter 
in Iran's foreign policy and diplomacy. One which was characterised by violence and greatly 
affected by Islamic revolutionary ideas. Although the direction of post-revolutionary Iran's 
foreign policy has often been determined by the changes in the configuration of power among 
internal groups, pragmatic considerations dictated by strategic and economic necessities have 
been said to be the prime mover of Iran's foreign policy. This has urged a line of reasoning 
(much to the chagrin of Iranian Foreign Ministry officials) that the pre- and post- Shah regimes 
have maintained a degree of congruence in their foreign policy objectives, differing only in 
method. For example some analysts argue that the two regimes "share a striking similarity in 
their perception of Iran's regional role", which is motivated by the "unyielding determination to 
assert Iran's supremacy throughout the Gulf'. 95 
The above view is not subscribed to by Iranian Foreign Ministry officials, who believe that 
Iran has no desire to assert itself militarily in the Persian Gulf region. They add that one of the 
main outcomes of the "Islamic revolution" was to relinquish its role as gendarme of this region-96 
This of course leaves the question of Iran's quest for spiritual/ideological leadership in the Per- 
sian Gulf region. It has been argued that Iran's war with Iraq was a direct outcome of this quest. 
But with acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 in July 1988 it is argued that "Iran's 
world view had completed a cyclical reversal - from the revisionist dream to shape the Gulf along 
Islamic lines to acquiescence in the status quo established by the Shah in the mid-1970s. "97 
It must be mentioned at this juncture that there is a chance that the above arguments tend to 
simplify the nature and relationship between particular dimensions of pre- and post-Shah foreign 
policy. In the context of the above views, it may be said that the chances of outside mispercep- 
tions are a possibility given the deep ideological gap between the pre-revolutionary monarchic 
regime and the post-revolutionary Islamic regime. It may therefore prove much more fruitful to 
study the orientation of Iran's foreign policy through its different phases and based on its actual 
95 From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism" op. cit., p. 26. 
96 Interview with ex-deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijaani in Tehran. November 1990. 
97 "From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism", op. cit., p. 27. 
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practice, with reference to domestic determinants. 
111.1 The Orientation of Revolutionary Iran's Foreign Policy 
In an interview with Dr. Mahmood Sariolghalam, 98 he stated that, in order to understand the 
Iranian revolution and the political processes it set in motion (of which the formulations of 
foreign policy assume a crucial part), it is necessary to pose certain questions and take into 
account certain variables. For example, 
(i) Which strata of the Iranian population have become the decision- makers after the revolu- 
tion? 
(ii) What are their characteristics, what are their beliefs, thoughts and traditions? And how do 
they relate to the international system? 
Of the variables that contribute to post-Shah political development the (a) the Islamic reli- 
gion, (b) the impact of historical events and enduring perceptions of the past, and (c) the transfor- 
mation of the clergy from a potential to an actual elite group are the most significant. The last 
variable is particularly important as it was "the existence of well-established, semi-organisational, 
traditional and religious linkages in the pre-revolutionary period that provided the clergy with 
capabilities to rise above other intellectual groups and set the foundations of a new structure". 99 
In order to gain a general picture of the decision-making apparatus in post-revolutionary 
Iran and some of its characteristics, Dr. Sariolghalam points out that the Shah's regime had 
alienated "the majority of the population". This majority and the clergy, he argues, have been 
asked to become decision-makers in the new structure after the revolution. Hence in true revolu- 
tionary fashion "formerly alienated and inexperienced and presently revolutionary decision- 
makers are learning and adapting to the requirements of national statecraft. "100 Crisis manage- 
ment, trial and error and constant modification of ideas have characterised the decision-making 
" Dr. Mahmood Sariolghalam is a professor fInternational Relations at the Shaheed Beheshte University inTehran. 
99 The above has been excerpted from a paper read by Dr. Mahmood Sariolghalam at a BISA (British International Stu- 
dies Association) Conference held at the University of Kent, Canterbury in December 1989, entitled "Islamic Revolution of 
Iran: Sources of Change and Challenges for Adaptation". 
100 ibid. 
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process in the last decade. In all this the Islamic clergy performs a crucial role. Dr. Sariolghalam 
is of the view that "as the clergy develops, learns, adapts and changes, the population in turn will 
change and adapt". Portraying the clergy as a source of change in itself, he concludes by stating 
that "the conceptual, orientational and evolutionary changes within the clergy will be the major 
determinants of the trends and patterns of Iranian politics in the coming years. "101 
The question of how the Islamic government and its proponents seek to establish and struc- 
ture a religious state within a secular international system has raised considerable conceptual 
problems for Iranian decision-makers and continues to have a direct impact on the orientation of 
Iran's foreign policy. For example, while rejecting superpower politics and the concept of bal- 
ance of power in the international system on the one hand, Iran adopted the creed of violence as a 
corrective measure in its foreign policy orientation on the other. In this context Khomeini told his 
followers that, because the superpowers "are responsible for all world corruption", Muslims 
"should mobilise the oppressed and chained nations so the superpowers can be pushed out of the 
scene and the governments can be handed over to the oppressed". But this must be done in a way 
that teaches the superpowers a lesson ... "they must be slapped in the face ... Through violence the 
satanic majority will be made to submit to the righteous few. "102 
The termination of the Iran-Iraq war and the reconstruction phase which is underway in Iran 
have brought other ways of looking at the above-stated dilemma. Decision-makers and academ- 
ics believe that the conceptual task facing them is to bring into congruence "divine norms and 
laws with the conventional interpretations of nationality in the contemporary international sys- 
tem. "103 
As shown in Chapter Two of this thesis, Iran's geopolitical situation influenced its percep- 
tions of the outside world and continues to have great influence on its external relations. The 
Pahlavi regime's obsession with security arising out of the East-West ideological competition 
toi Ibid. 
102 Quoted in Martin Kramer, (ed), Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, Boulder Colorado and London. Westview Press, 
1987, p32. 
103 Mahmood Sariolghalam, op. cit. 
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over influence in the Persian Gulf region was shared by the nascent revolutionary regime. Iran's 
ex-President, Aboihassan Bani-Sadr has been quoted as saying in this context that, because Iran 
historically has found itself "between two opposing powers ... It has always been a battlefield. At 
the beginning of this century, Iran found itself wedged between Tsarist Russia and the British 
Empire. Today it is between the Soviet Union and the United States. "104 
Following from the above perception, there exists a "constant fear of disintegration and 
dismemberment ... haunting Iranians". It is the belief of many Iranians of both regimes that 
"no 
foreign power wants to see Iran strong and independent. " In the aftermath of the revolution in 
1979, new forces came into play. The Asian Republics bordering Iran being predominantly 
Muslim and the existence of oppressed Shi'a populations in the Persian Gulf states provided ade- 
quate tinder to seriously destabilise the status quo in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini, describing 
the new situation, has been quoted as saying: 
"With the victory of the Nation of Islam ... the attention of all the big powers centred 
on Iran, and their agents started conspiracy after conspiracy to prevent the realisation 
of this Islamic Republic. Because this Islamic Republic which started in Iran, and 
reached other Muslim and non-Muslim countries without doing any correct pro- 
paganda and merely by virtue of its message, is threatening those countries which are 
either under American or Soviet influence. - 105 
In 1982, Foreign Minister Velayati stressed that "creating unity among the World Muslims 
was a strategic objective" of his ministry. Dr. Velayati added that his ministry sought to create a 
"unified Islamic front against imperialism and Zionism" in which "non-Islamic countries which 
had common views with Iran ... could also co-operate" ... 
106 
To further examine Iran's quest to lead a front against the interests of the superpowers in the 
region, the following sub-section will study the domestic determinants of its foreign policy 
actions and diplomatic practice. 
104 Quoted in Shireen T. Hunter, "Iranian Perceptions and a Wider World", Political Communication and Persuasion: 
An International Journal, vol. 2, no. 4,1985, p397. 
105 Quoted in ibid., p. 398. 
106 Kayhan International, January 13,1982. 
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mi Domestic Determinants of Iran's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 
In revolutionary Iran, as in most states in the international system, the interaction between 
domestic politics and foreign policy has been of crucial importance. In the case of Iran this can 
be divided into three distinctive phases. 
Phase one of Iran's revolutionary politics began with the seizure of power by the opponents 
of the Shah's regime (11 February 1979) and ended with the fall of Bazargan's secular govern- 
ment (6 November, 1979). This period was characterised by a power-struggle between non- 
religious elements who favoured gradual change and those following Khomeini's revolutionary 
creed. The opposing factions were represented by Bazargan's Provisional Revolutionary Govern- 
ment, and the Revolutionary Council. 107 The fall of Bazargan indicated that in the future non- 
religious forces would play a diminishing role in the domestic politics of Iran; this was reflected 
for the first time in Iran's foreign policy when the issue of future relationship with the United 
States came into focus. 
The top echelon of Bazargan's Provisional Revolutionary Government especially Foreign 
Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, was prepared to maintain ties with the United States on "equal" terms. 
This was completely unacceptable to Khomeini and his followers in the Revolutionary Council 
who did not see any reason for maintaining a relationship with the United States, whom they 
referred to as the "Great Satan". 108 
Suspecting Bazargan's Foreign Minister Yazdi and the Prime Minister himself as having 
pro-American sentiments, militants calling themselves "Students and following the Imam's Line" 
seized the American Embassy on November 4,1979. The captors demanded that the United 
States hand over the Shah for trial by a revolutionary tribunal. These events put to rest any hopes 
of normalisation of Iran's relations with the United States, but more importantly brought out into 
the open the power struggle between the government and its opponents. Bazargan and Yazdi 
707 The Revolutionary Council was formed during Khomeini's final weeks of exile in France. The body consisted of 
sixteen to nineteen members comprising clerics and trusted supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
log A common justification for the Revolutionary Council stance were that any relationship with the United States 
would not transcend that which existed between a "Mostakbarin" or oppressor and "Mostazafin" or oppressed. 
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resigned after Ayatollah Khomeini endorsed the actions of the Students; this made way for the 
Revolutionary Council, whose membership had hitherto been secret, to take official control. 109 
A month later the Iranian people went to the polls and voted for an Islamic constitution; 110 
this completed the formation of Iran into an Islamic Republic. Four hundred and forty four-days 
after their capture, the hostages were finally released. 
Phase two followed from the collapse of the Provisional Revolutionary Goverment and 
lasted until the unceremonial departure of Aboihassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 111 Within eighteen months of his election as president (January 1980), Bani- 
Sadr became a victim of a power struggle in which the religious forces represented by the Islamic 
Republican Party triumphed. 112 Although during his tenure, Bani-Sadr chaired the Revolutionary 
Council and was appointed commander-in-chief of Iran's armed forces, he lacked the political 
maturity and astuteness to use his position of authority effectively. More importantly Bani-Sadr, 
who was educated in Europe and unable to establish a power base among the clergy and their sup- 
porters, found himself in opposition to the religio-political creed which had come to influence the 
political development of the country. 
During this phase there was a lull in the area of Iran's foreign policy, because of internal 
disagreements on the appointment of a Prime Minister. This prevented Bani-Sadr from forming a 
cabinet, and only eight months after his election, i. e. in August 1980, did the Iranian Majles (par- 
liament) decide to select a prime minister. The candidate who was finally chosen was Moham- 
mad Ali Rajai, who was the Islamic Republican Party's choice because of his commitment to 
ideological Islam and Khomeini. Bani-Sadr would have much preferred an experienced techno- 
crat to head the executive branch of government, but was in no position to influence the final out- 
come. 
109 For a lucid account of the events leading up to the hostage crisis see Robin Wright, op. cit., Chapter Two. 
110 "The document won 99.5% approval from almost sixteen million voters", ibid., p. 81. 
III Out of a total of eight candidates Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, a French educated economist and the son of an Ayatollah, 
captured 76% of the total voteJbid. 






Following Rajai's appointment, more disagreements arose over the selection of a cabinet. 
Finally on September 11,1980, eleven days before the Iraqi invasion, the first cabinet was 
formed, completing the first government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 113 
By not acknowledging the power the clerics represented and putting the matters of state 
above Islam, Bani-Sadr hoped gradually to wean the revolution away from installing a theocracy. 
Towards achieving this end he tried to dismantle those structures which supported ideological 
Islam like the local komitehs and Revolutionary Guards. 114 
With the onset of the war with Iraq (September 22,1980), the infighting among the different 
factions temporarily subsided, only to resurface after Iran proved it could hold out against the 
better organised and superior forces of Iraq. This was proved at Khoramshahr, where the Iraqi 
army was denied an easy victory by the ferocity with which the people of the port city fought 
under the chaotic but effective leadership of the Islamists. The high casualty level resulted in 
Bani-Sadr, who had been appointed commander-in-chief, shifting the direction of the war from 
the hands of ideologically motivated but militarily untrained Revolutionary Guards to the regular 
army. Although Bani-Sadr spent much of his time at the front in order to bring about this change, 
the deadlock on the battlefield raised the question of how the war should be conducted. Here 
again Bani-Sadr, devoid of a sufficient power base in the Majles, was forced to reckon with the 
militant clerics who believed the war should be conducted by the Revolutionary Guards. 
To prove his thesis that the war should be directed by professional soldiers, Bani-Sadr 
planned a counter-offensive using the regular army in January 1981. The operation was a com- 
plete failure and further eroded the president's position. 115 The ongoing disagreements between 
Bani-Sadr and the Islamic Republican Party reached unmanageable proportions. In March 1981, 
following Bani-Sadr's scathing public criticism of the Islamic Republican Party's tactics, which 
113 Keesing's, vol.? IXVI, 1980, pp. 30629-30630. 
114 See Bani Sadr's views on Islamic government in Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, The Fundamental Principles and Percepts 
of Islamic Government, (translated from Persian by Mohammad Ghanoonparvar). Lexington, (USA), Mazda Publishers, 
1981. 
115 Keesing's, vol. XXVII, 1981, p. 31015. See comments of Iraqi Minister of Culture in the aftermath of his country's 
military occupation of the Iranian territory of Khuzistan. 
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he equated with "the single party of the Shah's era, the Rastakhiz", the Majles in a series of 
moves curtailed his powers and cut the budget for his office. 116 Finally, in June 1981 Bani-Sadr 
was officially stripped of the title of commander-in-chief of the army by Khomeini. In the same 
month the parliament overwhelmingly voted the president out of office by declaring him politi- 
cally incompetent and an order for his arrest was issued. 
The fall of Bani-Sadr, which coincided with the release of the American embassy staff, 
reflected the overall direction of Iran's foreign policy. In the first instance, it became clear that at 
the end of almost two years of domestic power struggles the militant Muslim strata had consoli- 
dated power. This, combined with the prolonged hostage crisis, its termination and the 
overwhelming victory of conservative forces in the American election, meant that the isolation 
process of Iran in the international system and its estrangement from the West was more or less 
complete. 
The isolation of Iran, which can be said to have begun with the taking of the American 
Embassy in Tehran, was given the seal of international disapproval when, in reply to an applica- 
tion filed by the United States on November 29,1979, the International Court of Justice ruled on 
May 24,1980 that Iran "had violated in several respects ... obligations owed by it to the United 
States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as 
under long-established rules of general international law. "117 
Prior to the above judgement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 457 on December 4, 
1979, and Resolution 461 on December 31,1979 both of which "deplored the ... detention of the 
hostages and urgently called again for their immediate release. "118 It must be mentioned however 
that, in the Security Council debates, Kuwait believed that in the case of non-compliance by Iran 
"the Council should not threaten punitive measures against a party whose goodwill and co- 
operation were needed to overcome the problem". The Soviet Union, which abstained from the 
voting, felt that the dispute was bilateral and should be settled peacefully between the parties, 
116 Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit., p. 106. 
117 Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, United Nations, vol. 34,1983, p. 1121. 
118 Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, United Nations, vol. 33,1982, p. 311. 
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adding that as the dispute did not fall under Chapter VII of the Charter the application of sanc- 
tions was not justified. 119 
Other measures taken by the United States under the Carter administration and carried on by 
Ronald Reagan included a ban on US imports of Iranian oil and a freeze of Iranian assets amount- 
ing to approximately eight billion US dollars. 
The exit of Bani-Sadr ushered in the third phase in Iran's revolutionary political develop- 
ment. On the war front, the tide turned in Iran's favour. Iranian forces started off by recapturing 
some of its lost territories, finally retaking Khoramshahr in May 1982. By the end of June, Iraqi 
troops had withdrawn from most of Iranian territory. 120 On the domestic front what some authors 
refer to as the "third revolution" was taking place. The militant clergy and their supporters loyal 
only to Ayatollah Khomeini had total control of the state. 121 The theocracy which Bazargan and 
later Bani-Sadr had attempted to fight was now in place and ready to function. However Iran's 
politics during this phase was characterised by unprecedented violence on the domestic level. 
This was brought about by the willingness of both those factions which had been disinherited by 
the revolution and those in power to use extreme force. In the period following the political dem- 
ise of Bani-Sadr, several assassinations of prominent figures in government and in the Islamic 
Republican Party took place. The Islamic regime, seeing the challenge from within, responded 
with equal ferocity; public executions and arbitrary detention were the order of the day. 122 All 
this however did not deter the new elections for a president and 27 members of parliament who 
119 ibid. 
120 See Chapter Seven of this thesis for details. 
121 Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, London, Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1985, p. 183. 
122 After Mr. Bani-Sadr had been ousted, Iranian authorities launched a campaign to eradicate all opposition, notably the 
Mojahedeen, as well as left wing opposition groups. Opponents of the government circulated both within and outside Iran. 
Abroad there were anti-government demonstrations. In the country, on June 23,1981 a bomb exploded in Qom, Iran's 
main spiritual centre killing eight and wounding 50. The Mojahedeen said that since they would be risking arrest and prob- 
able execution. they would not participate in public demonstrations but would "unleash a war" against the Islamic Republi- 
can Party. On June 27,1981 Hojatolislam Seyed All Khamenei, who represented Ayatollah Khomeini on the Supreme De- 
fence Council, was wounded when a bomb planted in a tape recorder exploded in front of him while he was addressing a 
crowd in Tehran mosque. Forgan, an extreme fundamentalist group opposed to the involvement of the clergy in politics, 
was blamed for the attack. On June 28, the most serious incident at this time took place. Ayatollah Beheshti and 71 other 
leading politicians, including four cabinet ministers and six deputy ministers were killed in a single bomb explosion in 
Tehran. A total of 27 parliamentary deputies lost their lives in the blast. The Government and media initially blamed Iraq 
and the United States, discounting completely the involvement of Bani-Sadr. Two days after the blast, Ayatollah Khomeini 
accused the Mojahedeen of perpetrating the attack, paving the way for a ruthless campaign against the movement. Excerpt- 
ed from Keesing's, vol. xxviii, 1982, p. 31505. 
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had been assassinated earlier that year. Turnout at the polls was as high as 63%. 
Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Rajai was elected123 as president, and he designated 
Muhammad Javad Bahonar as Prime Minister. Less than two months after the new elections on 
August 30,1981, at the conclusion of a secret meeting of national security officers at the prem- 
iers' office, both the above men were assassinated by a bomb. 124 Two hundred government 
officials had been killed since the departure of Bani-Sadr in June. This unleashed fresh reprisals, 
and for the third time in two months Khomeini and his trusted circle had to pick new leaders. 
The voter turnout was as high as 80% and the man they chose was Ali Khamenei a former student 
of Khomeini. 125 
Iran's external policy during this period was concentrated upon gaining the upper hand in 
the war with Iraq. Turning the tide of battle by using what have commonly come to be known in 
military terms as "human wave attacks" and code-naming operations dating back to the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad, Iranian military planners made up for their lack of equipment and war 
planes. 
The sense of confidence brought about by the survival of the revolution against considerable 
odds and by the victories on the battlefield led the Islamic regime to develop new relationships on 
the international level. 126 Although most of these relationships were entered into by Iran to 
alleviate its severe liquidity problems, it nevertheless helped to break out of the state of 
diplomatic isolation. Iran's Minister of Industry, on a visit to Turkey in January 1982, signed a 
new economic and commercial protocol, which provided for the exchange of Iranian oil for Turk- 
123 Ibid., p. 31507. On July 26,1981 the state radio announced that about 14,700,000 votes had been counted 
(representing some 63% of the electorate), of which Rajai received approximately 91.0% of the vote, and the other three 
contenders the rest. 
124 Both President and Prime Minister died as a result of serious injuries inflicted by an incendiary bomb. Ibid., 
p. 31509. 
tu A day after the August 30 assassination, Khomeini stated that the preceding events would not alter the course of the 
revolution. Following the death of Rajai and Bahonar, a provisional two-man presidential council was set up comprising 
Hojatolislam Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ardabili. Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei was the first cleric to be elected to the 
presidency, and received 16,007,972 votes. Ibid., p31510. 
126 The Iranian permanent representative to the United Nations, Saed Rajai Khorasani, commenting on a similar situa- 
tion at a much later date, stated that the world community seemed to have lost hope in Saddam following Iran's victories, 
and as a result, the international media were now trying to strengthen the relations of their countries with Iran, Kayhan 
International, March 6,1986. 
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ish foodstuffs, wood, textile products and electrical equipment. 127 Iran's relationship with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also improved considerably. Apart from trade rights which 
reached a record level of 1.1 billion US dollars in 1981 between Iran and the Soviet Union, the 
Iranian Energy Minister announced in February 1982 that he had signed an economic agreement 
with the Soviet Union for the completion of two gas-powered electricity plants in Ahwaz and 
Isfahan. Towards the end of 1981, Iran and Rumania signed a protocol totalling over one billion 
US dollars in value. 128 
By spring 1983, the Iranian economy showed definite signs of recovery, and foreign 
exchange reserves which had fallen in the latter part of 1981 stabilised. In the same period, oil 
revenues increased and inflation was cut almost by half. Iran continued to seek outside assistance 
to complete a petrochemical plant in south Iran, and entered into new and improved agreements 
with countries like Brazil. 129 
Iran's relations with its neighbours in the Persian Gulf region, however remained unsatisfac- 
tory. Iranian unhappiness with the newly formed Gulf Co-operation Council130 was not new. In 
May 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini warned the members of the Council that, if continuing assistance 
was given to Saddam Hossein, the Islamic regime might become obliged to treat them "according 
to divine law. "131 During this period Iran also established and maintained relations with a number 
of African and Asian countries. Among the former, it resumed its ties with Kenya and esta- 
blished new ties with Ghana and Mozambique. In the Asian arena, it maintained cordial relation- 
ships with both Pakistan and India. 
127 Keesing's, vol. xxviii, op. cit., p. 31800-01. Despite closer trading links between the two countries, tension persisted 
over the suggestion that Iranian dissidents were operating from bases inside Turkey. Turkish officials, including the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister, vehemently denied this accusation. 
1211 mid. p, 31900. 
129 Keesing's, vol. xxix, 1983, p. 32100. Foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen as low as the equivalent of US$ 
3,000 million in September 1981, had recovered to a level of approximately US$ 15,000 million by November 1982. Oil 
revenues rose to an estimated US$ 2,000 million per month, equivalent to an output of about 2 million barrels a day. Iran's 
foreign debts which at the time of the revolution in 1979 stood at US$ 15 billion, had been reduced by the end of 1982 to 
about US$ 2 billion. The annual rate of inflation had fallen over the same period from 30% to 16%. The Iranian govern- 
ment also continued talks with a Japanese consortium on the completion of a petrochemical plant in Bandar Khomeini 
(formerly the port of Bandar Abbas). 
130 The members of the Gulf Co-operation Council were Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
131 Keesing's, op. cit., vol. xxviii, p. 31852. 
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In summation of this section it may be said that the domestic determinants of all three 
phases of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy reflect the influence of ideology on foreign policy, 
and beg the question whether this meant a more militant foreign policy in general, coupled with a 
particularly hostile attitude towards the West? 
Conclusion: The Nature of Iran's Revolutionary Foreign Policy 
The nature of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy is made easier to understand if the writings 
of Ayatollah Khomeini on Islamic Government are taken as a backdrop. Probably the best known 
of Imam Khomeini's works, the book is a collection of lectures given by Khomeini at Najaf in 
Iraq between January 21 and February 8,1970.132 The following points give some idea as to 
where and how policy - whether domestic or foreign - originated. 
(i) All political power should be subordinate to Islamic goals, precepts and criteria. 
(ii) It is the solemn duty of religious scholars to assume the political mantle. (The concept of 
Vilayat-e-Faqih described earlier on in this chapter). 
(iii) The faqih should be recognised as necessary and self-evident. 
(iv) The faqih should design the programme for the establishment of the Islamic government. 
The above, taken together with the conviction that (i) imperialists have no religious belief, 
whether Christian or Islamic, and that (ii) Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are 
committed to truth and justice and are in continual struggle against the imperialist yoke, give rise 
to what some authors have described as an orientation of contemporary Muslim thought that 
"seems to derive its main justification from the concept of Islam being belief and law (aqida wa 
shariah), religion and state (din wa dawla), and a system of values for spiritual and temporal 
affairs (din wa dunya). "133 
Following from the above Islam-centric view, the contemporary international system and its 
132 See, Islam and Revolution, op. cit., especially Chapter I on Islamic Government. 
133 All Merad, "The ideologisation of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World" in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hil- 
lal Dessouki (eds), Islam and Power, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 8. 
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institutions were regarded as suspect. The United Nations, epitomised by the politics of the Secu- 
rity Council and the existence of the veto, was considered as an instrument of American foreign 
policy and rejected. 134 The hostage crisis may be considered as a prime example, where Iran 
flouted international law on the grounds that it saw the ensuing struggle between itself and the 
United States as a war between Islam and blasphemy. At one stage, Foreign Minister Velayati 
said that his country would reconsider relations with countries which had voted against Iran on 
the issue of Human Rights adding that those countries were not in favour of Human Rights, but 
only intent on exerting political pressure on Iran. 135 
The nature of Islamic Iran's foreign policy as preceding sections demonstrate was one 
which continued to emerge from a highly centralised government that allowed its citizens 
minimal influence in deciding on policies that affected them directly. However, the revolution 
itself replaced the spiritual core which had been lost during the monarchy, and this in turn saw the 
exit of materialism as the main motor behind the formulation of policy. The example set by Aya- 
tollah Khomeini, whose frugal approach to daily living and constant urging that hardship was the 
road to piety and a test of faith, became the underlying standard for general conduct in matters of 
personal life and state. Members of society who chose not to make this a way of life believed that 
this was a way of subordinating society to the will of the mullahs (who they believed led licen- 
tious lives), on the one hand; while on the other, they believed that it formed part of a grand con- 
spiracy on the part of the United States who, in collusion with the government, preferred that the 
true potential of the Iranian people should not be realised. 136 
Myths like these are what fuelled a national consensus that America is in one way or 
another the "Great Satan" and, more selectively, that the world is divided into those who follow 
the "path of God and belief' and those who follow the "path of Satan and disbelief'. 137 
134 Commenting on a United Nations resolution condemning Iran as a violator of human rights, Prime Minister Mir 
Hossein Musavi stated that the resolution was a "US plot and we view the UN vote as a pat on Saddam's shoulder for his 
fight against our nation", Kayhan International, December 15,1985. 
135 Ibid. 
136 The above was the belief of those Iranian citizens who while not supporting the Islamic regime, had no wish to allow 
their country to come under American influence. Most of these citizens were highly nationalistic and believed that Iran 
could be among the most developed nations in the world if only allowed to develop without being dictated to. Discussions 
in Tehran, October 1990. 
137 Quoted in Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit. p. 37. 
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This polarised vision of the world includes the more universal revolutionary belief utilised 
by Ayatollah Khomeini, namely that further divisions exist between those countries and peoples 
who have the power to dominate and oppress others, namely the "Mustakbarin" and those who 
lack power and are subject to oppression, namely the "Mostazafin". 138 In addition there is 
widespread belief in Iran and among revolutionary Muslims that there is an ongoing global con- 
spiracy led by the West to plunder their wealth and weaken Islam in the process. 
It can be assumed from the above that the political psychology of those committed to the 
revolution and the direction it had taken were in no doubt that their faith was the only means of 
resisting outside forces, which were continually trying to defeat their real purpose. Iranian 
officials have described their chosen path as a "River of no return". 139 This approach to interna- 
tional politics went against an "extremely powerful and pervasive American belief system about 
the nature of foreign policy, how is it conducted and how it affects American life. This belief 
system is troublesome because of the hold it has in shaping political strategy and defining "nor- 
malcy" in foreign affairs, even when it falls far from the mark in reflecting reality. " One analyst 
concludes by stating that "At best foreign policy and military strategy based on this system of 
belief is ineffective. At worst it is detrimental to American interests. "140 
Other authors have pointed out that American labels "liberal and conservative, fanatic and 
moderate - are ill-chosen for Iranian politics ... A conservative or economic policy may 
be a radi- 
cal on social standards and ambivalent on foreign policy; " adding that, "The American view is 
contorted by emotions over Iran's revolutionary excesses and continuing confrontations. Toward 
the United States, Iran displays equal or greater ignorance, conceptual difficulties, and emotional 
obstacles. "141 
tss The concept of "Mostazafin" is widely used to mobilise the many million Iranians, especially those from the rural 
areas who had hitherto lived a life of deprivation. There is even an organisation called "Bonyad-e-Mostazafin" or "Founda- 
tion for the Oppressed" which helps people who in their view, fall into this category. It may be said that, notwithstanding 
certain cases of corruption, the foundation is one of the most successful of the revolutionary institutions in Iran. 
139 Phrase used by an Iranian diplomat to the United Nations in discussions with author. 
140 William 0. Beeman, "Double Demons: Cultural Independence in US-Iranian Understanding" in The Iranian Journal 
of International Affairs, vol. 11, nos. 2&3, Summer and Fall, 1990, p. 320. The author also describes the belief system in 
which Iranian foreign policy operates, akin to what has already been discussed in preceding sections. 
141 Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik", in Foreign Policy, no. 70, Spring 1988, p. 109. 
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As stated before in this chapter there is a belief that under the ideological garb of revolution- 
ary Iran's foreign policy lie the same geopolitical considerations which guided the Shah's foreign 
policy, albeit against an altered regional and global vista. Authors like Efraim Karsh differentiate 
between pre- and post-revolutionary Iran's quest for supremacy in the Persian Gulf region as 
between one which was restricted to political/military method during the Shah's time and one 
which made use of militant Islam in the period after that. Karsh himself said that, unlike the 
post-revolutionary situation, the Gulf states secretly endorsed Iran's role of policeman of the 
region, seeking "a free ride from Iran's power. "142 
In the post revolutionary scenario, the single-mindedness with which Iran's leaders sought 
to revolutionise the Moslem people of the Persian Gulf region came to characterise a new phase 
in international politics, that of resurgent Islam. Muslim countries which had a resident Shi'a 
population were almost immediately affected. Iraq, which actually has a majority of Shi'as, was 
soon feeling the wrath of militant Islam. The attempted assassination attempt on the life of 
foreign minister Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hossein's crackdown on the Shi'a opposition were cru- 
cial factors which led to the outbreak of the full-scale war. 143 
Lebanon, which like Iraq was linked to Iran by religion and an interconnected clerical net- 
work, was also a target. With the last vestiges of a confessional state in shambles, it provided 
Iranian militants with an opportunity to liberate their brethren who hitherto were the least emanci- 
pated among all the religious and ethnic groupings in the region. The large Western presence in 
the state was an added incentive for the newly-trained Lebanese groups who were out to prove 
their revolutionary credentials. Kidnapping and hostage-taking by the Hezbollah and Amal, both 
having their organisational and ideological roots in Iran, opened a new chapter in international 
relations and transformed the politics of the region. Towards truly revolutionising the Lebanon, 
Tehran has invested heavily in men (Revolutionary Guards), materials (arms and logistics) and 
142 'From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism: The Islamic Republic and the Gulf', op. cit., p. 28. The author here 
is referring to the situation when, although the Gulf states condemned Iranian "intervention in Oman, yet they were secretly 
relieved at Iran's assistance; to the sultanate which was under threat from the Dhofar rebels. 
143 See Chapter Seven on the events that led up to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities. 
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funds. Lastly, the geographical proximity to Israel provided these fighters in the Lebanon with 
the holiest objective of all - the liberation of Jerusalem. 
144 
Among the other Muslim countries in the region, Saudi Arabia was considered during the 
Haj pilgrimage as the ideal place to show up the incompatibility of being a true Muslim and yet 
following in the path of the Western countries; as Khomeini accused the Saud family, guardians 
of the holiest place in Islam, of doing. The active politicisation of the Haj by Iranian pilgrims 
resulted in the death of many of them at the hands of the Saudi forces in August 1987.145 political 
activism in other countries in the region, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter under 
the heading of "export of the revolution", largely lost momentum before the mid-1980s. 
Another departure from pre-revolutionary Iran's stance in international politics has been the 
overall attitude to the West, particularly the United States of America. In almost every speech of 
an official or statement from the Foreign Ministry, condemnation of the West, especially the 
United States, has been a permanent feature. The Foreign Minister in most of his speeches in 
public or conferences has gone to great lengths to show how the nexus between American imperi- 
alism and zionism conspires to destroy Islam. 146 
In conclusion it may be argued that revolutionary Iran faced some of the most powerful 
states in a modem nuclear world and given the circumstances it found itself to be in, imposed its 
dictate for what seems to be specific short-term goals, such as achieving the reputation of a 
defiant middle power finally shrugging off the yoke of centuries of foreign interference and domi- 
nation. 
The next chapter will examine revolutionary Iran's stance on various issues which may be 
considered as complementary but not crucial to her foreign policy. In addition, a brief study will 
I" By designating the last Friday in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as the Day of Qods (Jerusalem), the then Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs Mir Hossein Musavi stated "we want our foreign policy to have an unshakable connection with the 
struggle against Zionism in the region. This will be considered the main pivot of our political movements". Kayhan Inter- 
national, July 9,1981. 
145 In all 407 people were killed, a majority of them being Iranian. 
146 While addressing a ministerial meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati 
demanded Pan-Islamic sanctions, including an oil embargo against the US for aiding Israel in the invasion of Lebanon in 
1982. Kayhan International, no date. 
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be made of her membership and status in the main political organs of the UN from 1979 to 1989, 
concluding with a report which suggests a lack of participation by Iranian delegates at the United 
Nations decision-making level in the post-revolutionary period. 
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Chapter V 
Iran at the United Nations: 
Survey of Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy Issues 
Introduction 
It is safe to assume that, in the aftermath of the dismissal of the Pahlavi regime, Iran once 
again felt the insecurity of a small non-Western state, vulnerable to the strategies of the great 
imperial policies and consequently exposed to superpower competition. Iran's discomfort at 
being squeezed between the expansionist powers of the Soviet Union in the North and the Ameri- 
can presence in the Persian Gulf region is amply reflected in the study of its diplomacy and its 
policies in the United Nations. 
Although spared a colonial history Iran inherited some of the problems of post-colonial 
countries; being under the yoke of monarchy, suffering from under-development and uneven 
development, and lacking popular participation in domestic politics were of particular impor- 
tance. However, of the role this country played (and continues to play) in the region had special 
historical significance. Iran was not only an original member of the League of Nations; it was the 
only Middle Eastern state in that organisation until 1932. This and subsequent experience in 
international organisations, tempered Iranian behaviour in the UN up to the upheavals of 1979. 
In post-Shah Iran, the much-nurtured art of international relations and diplomacy, which had 
hitherto displayed a sense of pragmatism, gave way to a diplomacy which was based more on 
doctrine. The revolutionary state adopted a much more strident and emotional tone towards 
issues which were strategically and ideologically important to it. Having decided to demote its 
relationship with countries like the United Kingdom, opt out of previously formed security alli- 
ances like LENTO and severely jeopardise its relationship with the United States, Iran became an 
unpredictable force in international relations. The Islamic factor which has come to symbolise 
Iran's domestic and foreign policies has introduced a new, non-secular approach to world politics, 
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as earlier chapters of this thesis have attempted to show. 
This chapter will set out to describe Iran's position on issues which have not merited 
separate treatment elsewhere, such as human rights, the Iran-Iraq war and disarmament. Section 
One will examine certain factors which influenced Iran's foreign policy attitude towards the 
United Nations. Section Two will describe the various standing and. special committees of the 
United Nations General Assembly, in particular those to which Iran was elected. Section Three 
will, using General Assembly and affiliated committee debates, examine issues which have con- 
stantly engaged the attention of the United Nations and have also been of importance to Iran's 
foreign policy. This study will demonstrate the relationship between Iran's ideological stance on 
foreign policy issues (characterised by the heavy use of rhetoric) and the broader changes that 
have taken place in the international and regional political systems. Section Four will look at the 
membership of Iran in the various agencies of the United Nations, with particular reference to a 
brief study undertaken by a former Iranian diplomat on the question of discrimination against 
Iranian nationals in the world organisation. 
L Iran's Foreign Policy Attitudes and the United Nations 
Iran's foreign policy attitude to the United Nations has its roots in its historical experience 
in the international organisation. Being a small and weak country, used as a pawn by the great 
powers in global politics, Iran started off by putting great faith in the United Nations in order to 
protect its interests. But as the nascent world body grew to reflect the realities of global power 
politics, Iran like other small states approached the United Nations with greater realism. This 
meant that, like all other powers (large and small), Iran applied the principles enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations selectively and used the world body whenever expedient. ' This 
resulted in the United Nations becoming a mere tool for furthering the policies of member states 
and therefore an easy target of criticism. Hence, long before the advent of the Islamic revolution 
1 As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, Iran's experience at the UN ranged from using the world body to rid its territory 
of Soviet troops in 1946, to being unable to vindicate its claims against Britain over the dispute arising from the nationalisa- 
tion of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
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in Iran, the United Nations had been considerably weakened by the rift which had appeared 
between the big powers. This was especially true in the West, which complained about the so- 
called tyranny of the Third World States who were in the majority in the General Assembly. But 
the latter group of countries in turn complained of the domination, in the Security Council, by the 
Big Five and their power of veto. Nevertheless, in the pre-revolutionary period, given the Shah's 
outward-looking foreign policy, Iran made efforts to show that the principles of the UN Charter 
comprised an important part of the framework for its foreign policy. 2 
Iran's attitude to the United Nations in the post-Shah period ranged from outright rejection 
of the international body to accommodation with it, brought about by political necessity. Revolu- 
tionary policy makers in Tehran viewed the world body as part of an international order which 
they rejected on grounds that it was dominated by the "arrogant powers". The functioning and 
veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council were Iran's major criticism of the 
United Nations. In this context, Iran felt that by accepting the balance of power (cynically 
referred to as the "balance of terror" by Iran's policy-makers) in place of the rule of law as the 
governing factor in international security, the UN had set a dangerous precedent and comprom- 
ised the security of small and weak states. Following the failure of the Security Council to con- 
demn Iraq's aggression on Iranian territory and subsequent resolutions which tended to support 
Iraq, policy makers in Tehran were in no doubt that the United Nations was just another organisa- 
tion geared to promote the interests of the big powers. However, given the changing patterns in 
Iran's domestic policies a much more positive attitude towards the United Nations was now 
emerging. This was first noticeable when, following intense internal debate, the active political 
strata convinced Khomeini to use the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General to 
help facilitate an honourable peace with Iraq. This resulted in the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 598 which brought to an end one of the most destructive wars of this century. Subse- 
quently, Iran took the unprecedented step of inviting the Special Representative appointed by the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights to visit the country in 1989. His visits have now 
2 See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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become an annual feature, and the co-operation extended by the Iranian government towards the 
fulfillment of his mandate have rid Iran of much of the stigma of being one of the worst violators 
of human rights in the world. 3 
Another aspect of Iran's foreign policy. at the United Nations is its commitment to Third 
World issues. Third worldism in Iran's foreign policy is based on its wider world view of the 
international political system as being divided into two camps: that of the oppressed and that of 
the oppressor. Iran sees itself at the cutting edge which separates those two camps, and Foreign 
Minister Velayati declared that his country would be "always an enemy of the oppressor and 
always a friend of the oppressed. "4 In relating the above to the world economic system, Velayati 
stated that market price control mechanisms and inescapable economic conditions continued to 
deepen the gap between the poor and the rich. Coupled with the proliferation of arms into the 
Third World, this only served to heighten global tensions. Addressing the question of the role of 
international organisations in all this, the Iranian delegation felt that the United Nations "cannot 
protect the Third World through the establishment of a new economic order, unless these efforts 
are coupled with parallel efforts to decrease the arms race. " Calling for increased solidarity 
among countries forming the Third World, Velayati felt that progress could only be achieved by 
"the united synchronised attempts of all developing and non-aligned countries against obstacles 
created by the superpowers, '5 Although Iran has advocated reform of the international body, there 
have been no serious proposals received in this context. At the plenary sessions of the political 
forums of the UN, Iran mainly engaged in using powerful rhetoric -- especially to condemn the 
glaring inconsistencies of an unequal world. 
Despite Iran's disillusionment, it did not withdraw from the world body; on the contrary it 
used the organisation to attack the prevailing international order, advocating justice based on 
3 In behind the scenes diplomacy during the convening of the 1992 Commission for Human Rights, certain Western 
countries are reported to have put pressure on the members of the Commission to bring to an end the mandate of the Special 
Representative on the Human Rights situation in Iran. Their main argument was that the situation concerning human rights 
had improved in Iran. It was also learnt that the United States along with other Western States vehemently opposed this 
suggestion. Interview with a member of the Secretariat of the Commission forHuman Rights. March 1992. 
° United Nations General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Records (Henceforth to be cited as UNPVR), A/39/Pv. 15. 
5 UNPVR. A/40)Pv. 20. 
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Islamic principles to govern relations among nations. The United Nations was also useful in forg- 
ing new relations with a number of countries in an atmosphere where ideological differences 
often took second place to pressing issues affecting parts or the whole of the international com- 
munity. 
IL Iran's Participation in the Work of the United Nations 
This section will present the various standing, special and ad hoc committees of the United 
Nations in which Iran has served as a member, and will refer to some relevant proceedings of 
those bodies. 6 
II. 1 The International Court of Justice 
In the post-Shah period Iran has not been represented in the International Court of Justice, 
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. However, it has had its representatives in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 7 which is an institution to facilitate recourse to arbitration in 
cases of international dispute. Although candidates for membership to the International Court of 
Justice are nominated by the "national groups" in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the final 
selection takes place after the Secretary-General of the United Nations draws up a list of candi- 
dates from which the General Assembly and Security Council, voting separately, make their 
respective choices. It may be noted that an absolute majority in both the assembly and the coun- 
cil are a prerequisite for election. The members of the Court are elected for nine years and may be 
re-elected; the terms of one-third or five of the judges expire every three years. 
In this context it is necessary to mention that, pursuant to article 47 of the Hague Conven- 
tion for the pacific settlement of international disputes of 1907, the International Bureau of the 
Court had in 1981 put its offices and organisation at the disposal of the International Arbitral Tri- 
bunal, constituted by the governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of 
6 UN Handbook, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, Now Zealand, 1989. 
7 See Rapport du Conseil Administratif de la Cour Permanente D'Arbitrage, La Haye - Bureau International de 1a 
Cour Permanente D'Arbitrage, 1981, through to 1989. 
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America, and commonly known as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal .8 The Tribunal was set 
up to settle claims which were not covered by assets worth $11,100 million, exchanged after the 
prolonged negotiations which saw the release of hostages from the US embassy in January 1981. 
11.2 Non-Permanent Member of the Security Council 
After the period between 1955 and 1956, Iran was not elected to the Security Council. In 
the post-Shah era, given the animosity towards the five permanent members of the Council, Iran 
was not elected to the supreme political organ of the UN. It may be added that the ten non- 
permanent members of the Security Council are elected according to the following pattern: five 
from among African and Asian states; one from Eastern European states; two from Latin Ameri- 
can states; two from Western European and other states. 
II. 3 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
The ECOSOC is charged by its Charter with promoting in the economic and social fields: 
i) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development; 
ii) solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems, and international 
cultural and educational co- operation; and 
iii) universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The pattern for the geographical distribution of its 54 seats is as follows: 14 members from 
African states, 11 members from Asian states, 10 members from Latin American states, 13 
members from Western European and other states, 6 members from Eastern European states. 
Eighteen members of the council are elected each year. Members serve for three years, their 
term of office beginning on January 1 and ending on 31 December. 
Iran's membership expired in the first year of its revolution and Iran thereafter was not 
$ See for example Rahmatullah Khan, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Controversies, Cases and Contribution, 
New York, Kluwer Academic Pub., 1990. 
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elected until the year 1986; its re-election in 1989 will expire at the end of 1992. 
11.4 Functional Commissions 
Of the functional commissions set up by the ECOSOC to help co- ordinate the activities of 
the specialised agencies through consultation and recommendations, Iran was elected to the fol- 
lowing: 
(i) The Commission for Human Rights 
The Commission for Human Rights was established by ECOSOC Resolution 5(1) of 1946. 
The Commission was directed to prepare recommendations and reports regarding an international 
bill of rights, international declarations or conventions on civil liberties, the status of women, , 
freedom of information and similar matters, the protection of minorities, the prevention of 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, language or religion and any other matter concerning 
human rights. 
The membership was increased from 18 to 43 and members are elected by the ECOSOC, 
usually for a term of three years, with the following distribution: 11 from African states; 8 from 
Latin American states; 9 from Asian states; 10 from Western European and other states; and 5 
from Eastern European states. 
Iran's membership of the Commission expired in 1980 and thereafter it failed to be re- 
elected, until as recently as 1991 it was elected to the Commission. Its Ambassador to the United 
Nations in Geneva was elected as Vice-Chairman at the 1992 session of the Commission. 9 
(ii) Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
The Commission was established by ECOSOC Resolution 9(I) of 1946 to advise the coun- 
cil and prepare draft international agreements on all matters relating to control of narcotic drugs. 
The original 15-member commission was progressively increased to 40 and members are 
9 The author was able to attend the preparatory meetings of the Commission in Geneva as a visitor during this period. 
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elected from among the member states of the UN and members of the specialised agencies and 
the parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; this with due regard to the ade- 
quate representation of countries which are important producers of opium or coca leaves, of coun- 
tries which are important in the field of the manufacture of narcotic drugs, and of countries where 
drug addiction or the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes an important problem, also taking 
into account the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The term of office was 
lengthened from three to four years, effective from 1968. Twenty new members are elected every 
other year. 
Iran, fulfilling all the above mentioned-criteria, has been a member of the Commission for 
most of the post-Shah period, but its membership not been renewed since 1987. 
U. S Standing Committees and Expert Bodies 
Of the Standing Committees and Expert Bodies of the ECOSOC, Iran has been a member of 
the following: 
(i) Committee on Natural Resources 
By ECOSOC resolution 1535 (XLIX) of 1970, this committee was established to replace 
the former ad hoc committee on the survey programme for the development of natural resources. 
Its principal functions include assistance to the ECOSOC in the planning, implementation and 
co-ordination of activities in the UN system for the development of natural resources; the selec- 
tion and follow-up of priority questions of long-term problems and trends of world-wide 
significance in the field of natural resources; information exchange and the production of recom- 
mendations to governments and bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme on 
appropriate priorities and programme emphasis and other relevant matters concerning the explora- 
tion and exploitation of natural resources. 
The committee meets and reports to the ECOSOC at least every two years. The member- 
ship has been increased from 27 to 58 members, who are elected on the following basis: 14 from 
African states; 11 from Asian states; 10 from Latin American states; 13 from Western European 
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and other states; and 6 from Eastern European states. The term of office is four years. Iran's 
membership ended in 1982, after which it has not been re-elected. 
(ii) Commission on Transnational Corporations 
The commission was established by ECOSOC in 1974 by resolution 1913 (L VII), on the 
recommendation of a special inter-sessional committee which had considered a report by the 
Group of Eminent Persons to study the impact of Transnational Corporations on development and 
on international relations. Its functions are to act as a forum within the UN system for the 
comprehensive and indepth consideration of issues relating to transnational corporations and to 
provide recommendations as a basis for evolving a code of conduct dealing with transnational 
corporations. 
The committee meets annually and submits a report to the ECOSOC. The commission 
comprises 48 members elected by the ECOSOC on the following basis: 12 members from African 
states; 11 from the Asian states; 10 from Latin American states; 5 from Eastern Europe; and 10 
from Western Europe and other states. Elected states are to consult the president of the council 
before appointing their experts, so as to ensure a balanced representation reflecting the various 
fields of activities covered by the commission. Members are appointed for three years terms and 
are eligible for re-election. Iran has been a member for most of the post-Shah period, except for a 
brief gap of two years (1985 and 1986). Its membership lapsed in the year 1989. 
111.6 The General Assembly 
Iran was automatically represented on each of the seven main Committees of the General 
Assembly i. e. First Committee -- Political and Security; Special Political Committee -- Political 
questions not discussed by the First Committee; Second Committee -- Economic and Financial; 
Third Committee -- Social, Humanitarian and Cultural; Fourth Committee -- Trusteeship (includ- 
ing non-self governing territories); Fifth committee -- Administrative and Budgetry; Sixth Com- 
mittee -- Legal. 
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Apart from these, Iran was represented on certain subsidiary and ad hoc bodies. These were: 
11.7 Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation 
By resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, the General Assembly decided to establish 
a special committee of 17 members to examine the application of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1969), 
and to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation 
of the declaration. In 1962 the membership of the Special Committee was enlarged to 24. The 
Committee has two sub-committees. The sub-committee on Small Territories examines informa- 
tion submitted on specific territories in the Pacific and Caribbean regions. The sub-committee on 
Petitions, Information and Assistance deals with a wide range of questions including consultation 
with the specialised agencies of the United Nations and other organisations on the implementa- 
tion of resolution 1514 (XV). Iran has served continuously on the Committee since 1979. 
118 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism 
On 18 December 1972 the General Assembly adopted resolution 3034 (XXVII) entitled 
"Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or 
jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism 
and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some 
people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes. " 
Pursuant to this resolution, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of 
35 members, of whom Iran was an original member. 
The Committee submitted their observations on the issue to the Secretary-General for inclu- 
sion in an analytical study. This study included a description of the member states' observations, 
a summary of the main problems of terrorism, the international instruments already developed to 
deal with it and suggestions for the ad hoc Committee's work. The Committee was not able to 
agree on many aspects of the problem so, to help resolve these differences, three sub-committees 
were formed -- to define terrorism, to study the underlying causes, and to propose methods to 
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prevent terrorism. The work of the sub-committees was also riven with disagreement. The com- 
mittee met three times -- in 1973,1977, and 1979 -- following which discussions on the issue 
have been postponed from session to session, resulting in no work done on the issue to date. 10 
11.9 Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations on the Strengthening of the 
Role of the Organisation 
By resolution 3499 () of 15 December 1975, the General Assembly decided to recon- 
vene the ad hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations as the Special Committee on the 
Charter of the United Nations and on the strengthening of the Role of the Organisation. The tasks 
entrusted to the Committee were as follows: 
(i) to examine in detail the observations received from governments concerning: 
0 suggestions and proposals regarding the Charter of the United Nations and 
0 the strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and 
consolidation of international peace and security, the development of co-operation 
among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations 
between states; 
(ii) to consider any additional, specific proposals that governments may make with a view to 
enhancing the ability of the United Nations to achieve its purposes; and 
(iii) to list the proposals which have been made in the Committee and to identify those which 
have awakened special interest. 
Iran remains among the 47 members of the Special Committee, appointed by the President 
of the General Assembly. Some of the sessions of the special committee need special mention. 
In 1980 the Special Committee held its 5th session in Manila where it continued its work on the 
question of the peaceful settlement of disputes with a view to developing and recommending 
means of bringing the work to an appropriate conclusion. The Manila Declaration on the peaceful 
I" United Nations Yearbook, New York, United Nations, see years 1972,1977,1979, for resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly on the issue of International Terrorism. Also see Table Eight at the end of this chapter. 
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settlement of disputes was finalised and submitted to the General Assembly and adopted in Reso- 
lution 37/10 of 1982. The special committee's mandate has been renewed in successive years and 
most recently in resolution 41/83 of 1986.11 
11.10 Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 
The Committee was established, pursuant to Assembly Resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 1972, 
to study the implications of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Iran was an 
original member of the Committee, whose membership has progressively increased from 15 to 
48. 
After the committee met in New York in 1979, it was decided to undertake preparatory 
work for the convening of a conference to be held at Colombo, Sri Lanka. Efforts at reaching a 
consensus on when the conference should be held have not, however, been successful. The Gen- 
eral Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee to complete its preparatory work so as to enable 
the conference to be convened not later than 1988. Beset by the lack of consensus, the final date 
was further postponed to 1990.12 
Iran's participation in facilitating the work of the United Nations demonstrates its commit- 
ment to contributing to international relations and upkeeping the mandates of the UN Charter. In 
the ultimate analysis Iran, in spite of its posture in questioning certain aspects of the functioning 
of the UN, especially the privileges of the superpowers and the cause of the unequals among the 
equals, has made positive, inputs when it has been given the opportunity to fulfill the resolutions 
of the world body. 
IIL Issues of International Importance with Relevance to Iran's Foreign Policy 
This section will address some selected issues which have been in constant view of the 
international community, have special relevance to Iran's foreign policy, and call for UN inter- 
11 See Table Two and relevant examination of the issue of the peaceful settlement of disputes in the context of Iran's 
foreign policy in Section 3.1 of this chapter. 
12 Op. cit. 
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ventions. 
The issues of international significance mentioned in the tables (at the end of this chapter) 
were all regularly (i. e. 1979-89) discussed at the UN. General Assembly decisions and resolu- 
tions were made regarding appropriate actions to be taken. The resolutions also reflect the 
uncompromising attitude of member states to certain problems which continue to plague the 
international community. In this respect, as the overall position of votes indicates, the Third 
World states have been largely responsible for keeping the issues alive on the agenda of the 
United Nations. The nature and dimensions of the issues presented reflect divisions in the world 
organisation, and also indicate the different interests and concerns of groups within the world 
organisation, and the varied changes in the composition and nature of the responses to flux in the 
international system. However, the fact that the United Nations has been able to absorb these 
changes without any radical structural or functional transformation thus far, is a good indicator of 
its inherent flexibility and of its founders' vision in drawing up its charter. 
Third Worldism in Iran's foreign policy was not initiated during the post-Shah period. In 
Chapter three Iran's regular participation in Third World issues during the Pahlavi regime has 
been pointed out. However, non-alignment versus alignment as an instrument of foreign policy 
fallen into disuse after the dismissal of Mossadegh's nationalist government in 1953 was re- 
introduced by the Islamic government in Iran. As mentioned in section one of this chapter, Iran's 
Third World stance and its adherence to non-alignment in the post-Shah period were based on 
Khomeini's world view, which rejects the contemporary international system as being dominated 
by the "arrogant powers". This led to the emergence of a more militant foreign policy than what 
existed in the past. 
As this section proceeds with presenting Iran's position on the issues discussed in the Gen- 
eral Assembly, some inconsistencies will become apparent. These inconsistencies may be attri- 
buted to certain developments which followed the establishment of a revolutionary state. Profes- 
sor R. K. Ramazani, in analysing the inconsistency in Iran's overall foreign policy stance (which 
also may be applied to its participation in the UN), has proposed that "the vagueness of the ideo- 
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logical precepts and the lack of political cohesion, as well as the determination of revolutionary 
leaders to make a clean break with the foreign policy of the Shah" ... caused two problems: "the 
official-unofficial division in the foreign policy-making process; and the decimation of both 
skilled diplomats and the organisational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "13 So it is 
appropriate here to examine Iran's position on selected issues of significance to Iran's foreign pol- 
icy as discussed in the United Nations General Assembly, such as international peace and secu- 
rity, the Middle East question and the question of Palestine, the occupation of Lebanon, and inter- 
national subversion and terrorism. 
1111 International Peace and Security 
In the matter of maintaining and promoting peace and security, Iran's position was akin to 
that of the non-aligned group in the General Assembly. 14 While subscribing to the principle of 
"neither East nor West" and speaking out against the misuse of the UN system through being 
directed by one bloc against the other, Iran was sceptical about the scope of applying the provi- 
sions of the Charter. Citing its own experience, the Iranian delegate while addressing the First 
Committee of the General Assembly stated that his country's decision to end its role as "enforcer 
of dictated peace in the Persian Gulf region" -- by opting out of the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO) and cancelling orders for sophisticated armaments that the previous regime had placed 
with Western manufacturers -- would contribute towards "abolishing one of the causes of the 
regional arms race" and as a result would reduce overall tension. But this was not to be. Iran's 
move towards demilitarisation was taken as a sign of weakness and was exploited by others in the 
region. The delegate concluded by saying that this left his country with little choice and that 
there "was no way out except armed struggle. "15 
Following the outbreak of full-scale hostilities between Iran and Iraq, the failure of the 
13 R. K. Ramazani "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy" in Islam and Foreign Policy, (ed. ), Adeed Dawisha, 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1985, p. 29. 
14 This is made apparent from the nature of and the overall voting pattern on resolutions regarding the question of Inter- 
national Security. See Table One at the end of this chapter. 
15 UNPVR, A/C. 1/35/Pv. 52. Document pertaining to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. 
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Security Council to condemn Iraq's aggression and the failure of the international community to 
resolve the crisis were appalling lapses. Iran's delegate to the sixth committee stated that 
although the peaceful settlement of disputes was one of the cornerstones of the foundation of 
international relations (as reaffirmed in Article 33 of the UN Charter), states tended increasingly 
to resort to force to settle their disputes. In referring to the aggression committed towards her 
country, the Iranian spokeswoman felt that the Organisation had not acted adequately to preserve 
the principle of settling disputes peacefully. 16 Although most of the resolutions (see Table Two) 
dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes were adopted without a vote in the General 
Assembly, Iran (as Chapter seven of this thesis demonstrates) voted negatively on resolutions cal- 
ling for an immediate cease-fire in the war with Iraq as a preliminary step towards a peaceful set- 
tlement. 17 
Viewing putting the issue of international peace and security in the wider context of Iran's 
foreign policy orientation during the post-Shah period, two issues were critically relevant: the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasing United States naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf region. Iran's position on the first issue is clear from Table Three, 
which indicates that it favoured the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan, allowing the Afghan people to determine their own form of government. Iran con- 
demned the Soviet invasion of the "Muslim nation of Afghanistan" and argued, albeit simplisti- 
cally, that "withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan [would] not only deprive the United 
States of its pretext for justifying its presence in the region but [would] also disarm the American 
puppet regimes of the region ... taking away from them their best demagogic scenario of the 
danger of communism. " 
Like other non-aligned nations, Iran had a tendency to lean closer to the anti-imperialist 
ideals propagated by the Soviet Union. Hence it was not surprising when Foreign Minister 
Musavi, while addressing the General Assembly in 1981, stated that "if the... Soviet Union [was] 
16 UNDoc., AJC. 6/35/SR. 42. Document pertaining to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. 
17 For example, see Iran's negative vote on General Assembly Resolution 3713, adopted in 1982. 
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truly anti-imperialist, it should not deliberately facilitate the expansion of imperialism -in the 
region" by continuing its occupation of Afghanistan. 18 Certain authors state. that although Iran 
had a choice of enlisting Soviet support to balance the Western support for Iraq by remaining 
indifferent to the situation in Afghanistan this was not possible without damaging its "Islamic 
credentials" and betraying the Afghan Mujahedin. 19 In this context Foreign Minister Musavi 
stated that his government felt that only a "popular, Islamic, anti-imperialist government in 
Afghanistan" could reduce the dangerous tensions brought about by superpower competition in 
the region. 20 
The second issue, i. e. the growing presence of United States forces in the Indian Ocean and 
the Persian Gulf region during the post-Shah period can be considered as a reaction to the much- 
publicised central principle of Iran's foreign policy, viz. to defy and challenge the United States 
and its interests in the region. This led the United States to incorporate into its strategic thinking 
ways and means to counter the phenomenon of resurgent Islam so as to demonstrate its failure 
and irrelevance to other Muslim states in the region. The Iranian leadership therefore, given its 
framework of reasoning, considered the United States along with Israel (a state which occupied 
the holy places of Islam and sent its Muslim populace into exile) as the most serious impediments 
preventing the Iranian revolutionary experience from succeeding. Iran's delegate to the UN stated 
in this regard that the "conspiracies of American imperialism against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and other Moslem nations" were one and the same with the "problem of zionism in the region. " 
The Iranian spokesman added that the strategic co-operation arising from the above nexus, one 
result of which was the formation of an American multi-national rapid deployment force, affected 
the overall chances for peace and security in the region. The Iranian spokesman concluded that, 
because the Persian Gulf region was declared to be of vital interest to the United States and other 
Western countries, the pursuit of peace had become a virtual impossibility. He stated that one of 
18 UNPVR, A/36/Pv. 26. 
19 Tran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit., p. 86-87. The author asserts that Iran financed and 
armed eight Shi'a Afghan guerilla groups and played host to between two and three million Afghan refugees in the after- 
math of the Soviet occupation. 
20 UNPVR, A/36/Pv. 26. 
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the fundamental principles of his country's foreign policy was to oppose and defy "imperialist 
logic" and support "the rightful struggles of the oppressed against oppressors throughout the 
world. "21 
The determination of the United States and her Western allies to contain Iran strategically 
was not without dilemma. Policy-makers in the United States were not oblivious of the fact that, 
if they pushed too hard, Iran might enter the Soviet orbit, especially since the congruence between 
Moscow and Tehran seemed more real than apparent during this period. For example, in 1980 
the Byelorussian delegate, in his speech to the General Assembly, stated that in "the Middle-East 
the strategy of American imperialism [was] quite clear. Its intention [was] to interfere, including 
by the use of arms, whenever peoples have taken their future into their own hands, wherever 
foreign oppression and diktat have been eliminated. The right to intervention, to export counter- 
revolution, is being openly justified by the vital interests of America. "22 Appreciating the poten- 
tial of revolutionary Islam and its inherent opposition to Western capitalist ideology, the Soviet 
Union felt it was in its interests to express solidarity with the new regime. It often did this by 
echoing the beliefs of the Islamists, for example, by stating that part of the tactics of the United 
States was to set "Moslems against Moslems in order to further imperial interests. "23 The Soviet 
delegate had identified with one of the prevalent beliefs of the policy-makers in Tehran. 
By the summer of 1982 the circumstances began to change; the consolidation of the Islamic 
government in Iran, the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations and the increasing military 
successes of Iran, caused Iraq to come closer to the Persian Gulf Arab States and show itself 
accommodating towards the United States. Responding to this situation, Iran was mostly con- 
cerned about the prospects of continuing to export its oil and ensure security within her territorial 
waters. The Iranian Foreign Minister declared that his country was "responsible for the security 
of the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, " adding that "if the export of Iranian oil [was] one 
day halted" his country would take steps to ensure that "no oil [would] be exported from the 
21 Ibid. 
22 UNPVR, A/35/Pv. 70. 
23 Interview with a formerSoviet delegate in Geneva, August 1990. 
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Persian Gulf. "24 
In the area of maintenance of peace and security further afield, Iran voiced concern about 
the increased militarisation of the states in the Indian Ocean and the existence of foreign military 
bases. With a view to de-escalating the tension and denying the competing powers freedom to 
dictate what Tehran described as "the balance of terror" [power], Foreign Minister Velayati 
reiterated his country's support for the United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a 
zone of peace. During the 37th Session of the General Assembly the Iranian delegation joined 
with the consensus which adopted as a resolution the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace, albeit with reluctance. The reluctance to participate in the consensus vote stemmed from 
the fact that "the harmonization of views" called for by a few countries in the first committee had 
lost its "productive necessity" according to the Iranian delegate; he considered that these very 
same countries were responsible for the militarisation of the area, had only managed to achieve a 
consensus by threatening to withdraw if the present status-quo was altered, and therefore had no 
real interest in de-escalation in the region. 25 
In a similar context one of Iran's delegate, to the Sixth Committee (dealing with the subject 
of "Practice of the Security Council"), was of the view that the principel cause of the Security 
Council's failure in the area of maintaining peace lay in its incapacity to act "because of the veto 
of a permanent member. "26 The above statement, while reflecting Iran's own experiences with the 
Council, did not diminish what the Secretary-General himself has described as "underlying 
deficiencies of the present system" for the "maintenance of international peace and security. "27 
However, notwithstanding these shortcomings, a large majority of the members of the General 
Assembly voted for an immediate cease-fire between Iran and Iraq during the 37th session 
(October 1982). 28 Given the larger political context, which is dealt with separately in Chapter 
Seven of this thesis, Iran rejected the vote, arguing that any settlement of the dispute without the 
2" UNPVR, A/37/Pv. 27. 
u UNPVR, A/37/Pv. 101. 
26 Interview with Iranian delegate in Geneva, September 1990. 
27 United Nations General Assembly Official Records (Henceforth to be cited as UNGAOR), A/37/1. 
28 See General Assembly Resolution 37/3 adopted in 1982. 
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naming and punishment of the aggressor by the international community was unjust and hence 
unacceptable. Security Council resolutions calling upon both parties to observe a cease-fire were 
rejected outright by Iran, which argued that all such attempts were nothing more than "a vote of 
confidence [by] the United States and the Soviet Union for Saddam. "29 
In concluding this section, it must be admitted that although Iran, like other non-aligned and 
aligned countries, voted for resolutions consistent with the principles of International Peace and 
Security and peaceful settlement of disputes, its practice has not always been exemplary. For 
example, the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1980) 
despite being a major contribution of the non-aligned countries (Iran being one of them) in the 
area of conflict resolution, today seems quite superfluous given the lack of political will on the 
part of disputant states to reach a compromise. This shortcoming has also weakened Article 33 of 
the United Nations Charter, which provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
However, following the decision by Iran to accept Security Council Resolution 598, its 
policy-makers have discovered the usefulness of the world organisation as the best forum to con- 
duct multi-lateral diplomacy or, more accurately, limited membership conference diplomacy. For 
Tehran, this facility provided by the United Nations has come to be regarded as an important 
instrument in its foreign policy, in spite of its past conviction that -- most often -- national prob- 
lems have been unnecessarily internationalised by some members for the sake of exerting politi- 
cal pressure and for propogandist purposes. For example Iran considers the continuing human 
rights mandate against it as a definite form of pressure being orchestrated by the United States 
among other countries. 
III. 2 The Middle East Situation and the Question of Palestine 
The plight of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, the liberation of Jerusalem 
(because of its religio-political significance) and the politicisation of the Shi'ites in Southern 
Lebanon can be considered as the pivot of Iran's Middle East policy, at least until the demise of 
29 The above quotation has been attributed to Prime Minister Musavi, commenting on Security Council Resolution 514, 
which called for a UN supervised cease-fire. 
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Ayatollah Khomeini. As Tables Five, Six and Seven indicate, the situation in the Middle East 
was also of great concern to the majority of member states in the United Nations, who (as Table 
Five indicates) maintain that the "core of the conflict" in the Middle East is the question of Pales- 
tine. However, whereas the international community condemned Israeli practices in the occupied 
territories (Table Seven) and attempted to resolve the issue by instituting international problem- 
solving mechanisms, Iran viewed "the removal of aggression from Palestine and an absolute 
recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people [as] religious obligations. "30 It considered all 
attempts hitherto directed at solving the problem as either being "chauvinistic outbursts by Arabs" 
or mere "politicking by the West or the East". Reviving the long-subdued call for the destruction 
of the state of Israel, Iran proposed the formation of a United "Islamic front against zionism and 
imperialism. " The priority Iran accorded to remedying the situation is apparent from a comment 
made when in 1981 by Foreign Minister Musavi, that the recent Iraqi aggression against his 
country had "distracted the attention of the Moslem world from the Palestine issue ... and anti- 
zionist struggles of the Moslem nations. "31 
Iran's Middle East policy became viable after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 
Unlike Afghanistan, Iran had large numbers of followers among the Shi'a population in Lebanon. 
Groups like Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah received material and financial assistance from Tehran 
amounting to approximately $100 million a year. The commitment and loyalty of these groups to 
the religio-political teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini made them the newest and most deadly fac- 
tion in Lebanese politics. By the summer of 1983, the Hizbollah moved its forces from the train- 
ing camps situated in the Bekka Valley to the impoverished Shi'ite suburbs of West Beirut. After 
successfully challenging the established pro-Syrian Shiite group Amal. Hizbollah embarked on a 
campaign of hostage taking and bombings to further its goals in the region. 
By 1987, however, the infighting between the rival Shi'ite groups and in some cases with 
the Palestinian fighters encamped in Muslim West Beirut reached such proportions that both Iran 
30 UNPVR, A/36/Pv. 26. 
31 Ibid. 
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and Syria, who were international allies were forced to seek ways and means to establish a truce. 
This did not solve the problem for Iran since in the same period Lebanese Sunni Muslims called 
for Syrian Military intervention to end the fierce fighting on their soil. Iran's main concern in 
view of the arrival of the Syrian army was that its proxy (Hizbollah) in the area would lose con- 
trol over the hostages, disrupting the objectives for which they were kidnapped. After the Syrian 
forces entered Southern Lebanon at the end of May 1988, the political catastrophe which Iran 
feared did not materialise, as Syria did not insist on having the hostages transferred to its control. 
Iran considered the Lebanon as the springboard from which its loyal mujahids (holy warri- 
ors) would liberate Jerusalem and, more significantly, as a place where it could repeat its revolu- 
tionary experience. In this respect, any policy of seeking a negotiated settlement to the problem, 
involving Israel and her Arab neighbours, was not favourably viewed by Tehran as long as the 
question of Palestine and the occupation of Southern Lebanon by the Israeli army hung in the bal- 
ance. 
For example, all proposals attempting to address the problems arising out of Israel's occu- 
pation of Lebanon, short of those advocating eviction of the occupying forces, were seen by Iran 
as procrastination over the emancipation of the downtrodden Moslems in the region. Iran's 
Foreign Minister Velayati, addressing the 38th session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1983, stated in this regard that 
"If it had not been for Camp David, the beautiful land of Lebanon would not have 
been drenched in blood by zionist atrocities today. After all these bitter experiences, 
are we not right today to think of the acceptance of plans like the Fez Plan, the so- 
called Reagan plan or the pact between Lebanon and Israel as not only a betrayal of 
the Palestinian cause but also a betrayal of the aspirations of some one billion 
Muslims throughout the world? "32 
32 UNPVR, A/38/Pv. 13. The above statement is a harsher interpretation of provisions contained in General Assembly 
Resolution 34/658. See Table Six at the end of this chapter. A note about President Reagans Mid-East Peace Proposal: 
President Reagan communicated a Mid-East peace proposal to, Mr Begin on August 31,1982, in which he set out his 
administration's approach to a "just and lasting peace in the Middle East. " Referring to the past success of Camp David in 
settling Egyptian-Israeli problems, culminating in the signing of a peace treaty (March 1979) between the two countries, 
Reagan stated "The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for peace. " Calling upon Israel to 
recognise that security could only be achieved "through _. a peace requiring magnanimity, vision and courage, 
" upon the 
Palestinian people to recognise that their political future was bound to Israel's right to a secure future, and upon the Arab 
States to accept the reality of Israel, President Reagan however added that the United States would "oppose any proposal - 
from any party at any point in the negotiating process - that threatens the security of Israel. " Keesing's Contemporary Ar- 
chives, vol. XXDC, 1983. p. 32034-036. Almost a week after the Reagan plan was made public, King Hassan of Morocco in- 
vited a summit conference of Arab League members to Fez to formulate an agreed Arab peace plan for the Middle East. 
The Fez Plan was based on an earlier proposal put forward by Saudi Arabia in which representation of the PLO was not 
-133- 
Foreign Minister Velayati added that, since the Palestinian and Lebanese situations 
threatened international peace and security, the United Nations must take steps such as "an all-out 
military and economic embargo" against Israel, "carry out its legal obligations with regards to 
Articles 41 and 42 in Chapter VII of the Charter" and even expel Israel from the United Nations. 
Speaking of his own country's obligations towards remedying the situation, Vel'ayati stressed that 
his delegation fully supported the armed struggle of the Palestinian people, saying that "force 
does not recognise any logic but the logic of force. "33 
Although Iran rejected the proposals put forward by the Arab League (one of them being the 
Fez Plan) it did not vote negatively in the General Assembly on a Resolution which recognised 
the Fez Plan as an important contribution towards the realisation of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people (see Table Five, Resolution 41/162A). However this did not mean that Iran's 
revolutionary leadership believed that a solution could only be found through negotiation. Iran's 
revolutionary regime -- confident after its battle victories with Iraq -- felt that the most lasting 
solution lay in the destruction of Israel and armed action against Western interests in the region. 
The rift that was caused because of the opposing tactics put forward by moderate Arab States and 
the more radical plans of Iran may have been one of the factors which caused Iran to absent itself 
from voting on certain resolutions concerning the Palestinian Question, including issues arising 
out of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. As Tables Six and Seven indicate, Iran was 
absent on several occasions between 1984 and 1986, when resolutions it had previously voted for 
were tabled. From the events which occurred in the above-mentioned period, it may be gathered 
that the following factors may have contributed to Iran's conspicuous absence. 
Without making too many conjectures about Iran's absenteeism during the voting on resolu- 
tions primarily dealing with the Palestine Question, it may be remarked that the PLO-Iranian rela- 
tionship is a contributory factor. While Iran supported the Palestinian cause, it could not come to 
even mentioned; the Fez Plan in Us respect reaffirmed the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian 
people. The Fez Plan was rejected by Israel on various grounds, for example, the demand for "the establishment of an in- 
dependent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital". Mid, p. 32037. Iran considered the Fez summit as a meeting of 
anti-revolutionary states, not committed to the liberation of Palestine. 
33 UNPVR, A/38/Pv. 13. 
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terms with the PLO's support for Iraq, the PLO's financial dependency on the Persian Gulf Arab 
States. This aspect was further compounded by the Arab nationalist ethos, which ran contrary to 
Iran's pan-Islamic approach to all problems facing the Muslim world. In addition, Iran did not 
care much for the international image projected by PLO leader Yasser Arafat, preferring someone 
more radical to lead the movement. All the same, Iran still permitted the PLO to maintain its 
office in Tehran, and instituted and celebrated with great reverence Jerusalem Day. 34 In the opin- 
ion of some authors, the above observations substantiate the fact that factors like the Arab nation- 
alist ethos "have been more important in determining the state of Arab-Iranian relations than have 
Iran's position on the Palestinian issue and its ties to Israel. "35 
Another reason as to why Iran absenteed itself from voting may lie in the lack of intema- 
tional condemnation of Iraq's policy of wreaking damage on civilian areas, in some cases with 
deadly chemical weapons. It is possible that Iran -- by remaining silent on the problems and 
injustices in the occupied territories -- sought to demonstrate its willingness (especially to the 
active Arab groups and states that counted on Iranian support), to suspend the Question of Pales- 
tine from its foreign policy agenda. 
Given the abruptness with which Iran absented itself (see Tables Six and Seven) and again 
resumed voting, can also be attributed to indecision arising from "revolutionary disarray that 
underpins the official-unofficial division" of foreign policy. 36 
Lastly, given the detailed publicity that the Iran-Contra Scandal/Arms for Hostages deal has 
received in recent years, it would be fitting to include these as factors which may have contributed 
to Iran's diplomatic silence in the General Assembly. Although the possibility seems a little 
stretched that Iran received arms via Israel and in return absented itself from voting on resolutions 
which condemned Israel's actions in the occupied territories (Tables Six and Seven), the period in 
which these two foreign policy actions took place coincide and therefore merit at least a mention. 
34 Jerusalem Day or Quds Day as it is known in Iran, served to remind all revolutionary Muslims of their obligation to 
strive ceaselessly for the liberation of Jerusalem. It is celebrated on the last Friday of the Holy month of Ramadan. 
35 Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit., p. 128. 
36 Islam in Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 21. 
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Starting in mid-1984, in the view of some authors, "Iranian leaders felt that it was time to 
re-enter the world community". Following the release of United States hostage Reverend Weir in 
September 1985, an arms shipment from Israel was organised with direct American involvement. 
Due to a shortfall in the amount of weapons (in this case Hawk Missiles) and because they were 
outdated, it is reported that the Iranians were "livid" and refused to trade any hostages, demanding 
that their funds be returned and the weapon systems be taken back. After this initial deal col- 
lapsed, additional delivery and exchange deals were worked out between Colonel Oliver North, 
an Iranian middleman and certain members of the government of Iran. These deals were also 
reportedly not carried out smoothly, culminating in the exposure of the whole arrangement due to 
the division in the decision-making apparatus within the highest echelons of the Iranian govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, while the incident became a political disaster for the American administra- 
tion, the Iranian leadership turned the situation into a minor political victory. However, in the 
two years which it took to nurture the deals, Iran is reported to have received a substantial quan- 
tity of weapon systems via Israel. 37 
Conspiracy theorists may further make the claim that the admission by Israeli Defence Min- 
ister Ariel Sharon that Israel had supplied Iran with $27 million worth of weaponry in 1982 with 
the full knowledge of the US State Department38 was a pre-meditated act, in the hope of neu- 
tralising the revolutionary regime's reaction to the forthcoming invasion of Lebanon. This, how- 
ever, must have failed as a long-term strategy, because the formation of Hizbollah (Israel's pri- 
mary enemy in the Lebanon) started on June 12,1982, when Iran sent a contingent of 1,000 
Revolutionary Guards into the Bekka Valley a week after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
In conclusion, it may be mentioned that the situation in the Middle East and the Question of 
Palestine were issues where Iran's policies and remedies are too militant/revolutionary to be con- 
sidered as an alternative by the already existing anti-Israel lobby dominated by the Arab States. in 
the United Nations General Assembly. But by getting directly involved in the politics of the 
37 In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, op. cit., see Chapter Seven, for details of arms transfer, we also Chronol- 
ogy, especially the year 1986. 
38 ibid., see Chronology. Ariel Sharon made the announcement on May 27,1982. 
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region via the Lebanese Shi'ites, Iran was able to break the monopoly that Arab states had hith- 
erto exercised in confronting the problem. 39 Although Iran's ability to influence the Arab regimes 
has been limited, it enjoys quite a lot of support from Moslems in the region for its uncompromis- 
ing stance on these issues. 
111.3 International Subversion and Terrorism 
The use of violence in post-Shah diplomacy is often regarded as the most important 
development in Iran's revolutionary foreign policy. Apart from taking hostage the diplomats and 
employees of the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4,1979, Iran has been impli- 
cated in the suicide bombings of the US embassy in Beirut on April 18,1983 and of the US 
marine barracks in Beirut on October 23,1983, and in the series of kidnappings of Western 
nationals in Lebanon. With the benefit of hindsight, these actions have come to reflect the divi- 
sions in the Iranian leadership on the use of random violence as a foreign policy tool. For exam- 
ple, while the Iranian leadership has often stated that it rejected the use of subversion or terrorism 
to spread the revolutionary message, 40 there are those who question where the difference lies 
between Iran and those states who employ covert or overt means to protect and promote their 
ideals. 
In the view of some authors, Iran was unable to use subversion, for example, as a long-term 
policy tool, as its potential for and success of subversive activities were limited by the following 
factors: 
(i) Iran's Persian character has given it limited success in reaching the Arab masses. 
Iranian religious leaders miscalculated the factors of ethnicity and nationalism, and 
the power it had to oppose Islamic universalism, the often-quoted example being the 
39 For example, with regard to the Palestinian Question, the Iranian delegate to the United Nations stated that the "ethnic 
identity of Arab nationalism" would only serve to "dilute the primordial Islamic character of the issue". UNPVR, 
A/38/Pv. 82. 
40 Professor R. K. Ramazani states that Iranian leaders have gone to great lengths to stress - particularly to members of 
the Iranian Foreign Service - that export of the "Islamic Revolution" must be accomplished by example and propaganda. 
He quotes Ayatollah Khomeini in this regard as saying "It does not take swords to export this ideology. The export of ideas 
by force is no export. We shall have exported Islam only when we have helped Islam and Islamic ethics to grow in those 
countries" ... Islam in Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 19. 
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failure of Iran to mobilise the Arab Shi'a masses in Iraq. 
(ii) Iran's use of Shi'a symbols in its religio-political foreign policy objectives tended to 
polarise the greater Islamic movement, often causing orthodox Sunni groups to 
cleave closer to the ruling cliques. The Shi'a nature of the Iranian revolutionary 
creed has also limited its access to the various non-Shi'a Islamic groups in the 
Moslem world. This has led Iran to focus its attention on those societies which have 
Shi'a majorities or sizeable minorities. 
(iii) Lastly, although Iran financed Shi'a groups in Lebanon to the tune of approximately 
$100 million annually and engaged in other propaganda works, the huge cost of the 
war restrained Iran's ability to expand its subversive activities. 41 
Given the above factors, why do exaggerated views of Iran's subversive activities keep 
emerging? Shireen Hunter attributes four factors to further explain this 
(i) The phenomenon of Islamic resurgence as a factor in world politics has been attributed to 
the trend set by the revolution in Iran. Hence all Islamic movements, "even those predating 
the Iranian revolution, have become somehow identified with Iran. " 
(ii) "Iran has reaped the harvest of its self-appointed role as the leader of the Islamic world and 
its propensity to exaggerate its own influence among Islamic movements. " 
(iii) Some governments have manipulated the Iranian role in order to suppress Islamic move- 
ments calling for radical change in their own countries and "to undermine their legitimacy 
with the public, by pointing to their foreign connections". 
(iv) Finally, the "Iranian threat has been exaggerated by the West, and even by the Soviet Union, 
in order to justify certain policies, ranging from support for Iraq and arms sales to the Per- 
sian Gulf states to the pursuit of a punitive policy towards Iran. "42 
UN activities in the field of international terrorism take place within two main fora -- the 
41 Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, op. cit., pp. 178-181. 
42 Ibid., p. 181. 
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International Law Commission and the General Assembly. In this respect, Iran was shielded by 
the precedents set by the majority of members of the General Assembly with regard to the prob- 
lem of international terrorism. UN attempts to deal with the problem have mainly included 
declarations, resolutions and treaty provisions that refer to the suppression of terrorism. 
In the aftermath of the Arab attack on Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympic Games in 
1972, the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim proposed that the subject of international terrorism 
be regarded as an urgent matter. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Sixth Committee published 
a report on terrorism, which resulted in the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3034, enti- 
tled 
"Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human 
lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those 
forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and 
despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in 
an attempt to effect radical change. "43 
The resolution provided for an Ad Hoc Committee comprising 35 member states to be 
formed and, together with other states, to submit their observations on the problem to the 
Secretary-General for inclusion in an analytical study. The individual studies reflected great 
differences which slowed down the work of the Committee. To reconcile these differences, three 
sub-committees were formed, each addressing itself to defining terrorism, studying the underlying 
causes and outlining methods for prevention. This, however, did not solve the diversity in opin- 
ions. Discussions on the issue have henceforth been postponed from session to session and the 
Committee to this date remains unproductive. 
The issue itself remains highly sensitive, and the following debate in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly demonstrates the extent to which countries disagreed, although they all 
agreed that international terrorism in itself had to be prevented (Table Eight). 
In 1985, four draft resolutions on terrorism were submitted to the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly, three of them by delegations and one by the Chairman of the Sixth Commit- 
13 General Assembly Resolution 3034,2 November 1972. 
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tee. The latter was eventually accepted by the Committee, although the Chairman's draft 4 was 
adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 40/61 (Table Eight) without a vote, on the 
recommendation of the Sixth Committee. Sixth committee meetings themselves were not charac- 
tensed by consensus. Cuba, explaining its negative vote on the draft resolution, stated that the 
draft had failed to take into account state terrorism as practised, it charged, by the United States, 
Israel and South Africa. While Iran did not participate in the voting, it declared that the text had 
however rightly recognised the legitimacy of the struggle for national liberation and the right of 
self-determination. 45 
The Soviet Union, while pleased that the text did not equate national liberation movements 
with international terrorism, would have preferred an explicit condemnation of state terrorism, the 
elements of which, it believed, were included in paragraphs 1 and 6.46 The United States con- 
sidered the language used to reaffirm the principle of self-determination in the preamble of the 
resolution to be excessive, especially when it was understood that the resolution did not lay down 
a pre-condition for other actions called for in the draft. 47 
The failure of the General Assembly to reach a consensus on how to deal with a problem, 
which in the last two decades has become multi-dimensional can be attributed to the tendency to 
delay discussions and disrupt work in the various fora within which the issue has been dealt. An 
added problem may be that emphasis has been shifted from finding a remedy for the problem of 
' UNDoc., A/C. 6/40/L. 31 Document pertaining to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. See 
the same for the text of the resolution. 
45 The Iranian delegate, speaking in the Sixth Committee debate, stated that Moslem fighters in Afghanistan and South- 
em Lebanon were not terrorists but religious warriors, adding that his country "rejected all efforts to equate terrorism with 
struggle of oppressed people ... from foreign domination and occupation. UNDoc., A/C. 6/40/SR. 22. Document pertaining 
to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. 
46 Paragraph one provided for unequivocal condemnation, and as criminal, of "all acts, methods and practices of terror- 
ism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardise friendly relations among states and their secu- 
rity. " Paragraph six called upon states "to fulfill their obligations under international law to refrain from organising, insti- 
gating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other states, or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed to- 
wards the commission of such acts. " UNDoc., A/C. 6/40/L. 31. Document pertaining to the Sixth Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
47 The preambular paragraph of the resolution, which the delegate from the United States found excessive, reaffirmed 
"the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regime and other forms 
of alien domination, and upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation move- 
ments, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. " 
Ibid. 
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terrorism to the study of the background causes of terrorism. 
In 1981 when Ronald Reagan took office, international terrorism had already become an 
important part of the national foreign policy agenda. After the hostage crisis, Iran was included 
on the US State Department's list of those countries sponsoring terrorism. 48 But the differing 
nature of the Iranian leadership on matters of domestic and foreign policy has made it difficult to 
associate the government consistently with sponsoring or directly participating in terrorist or sub- 
versive acts. With the benefit of hindsight it is now known that the Iranian government has often 
been implicated in acts of terrorism and subversion, sponsored by independent factions in Iran 
who, by so acting, have hoped to influence the overall policy of the country. However, given the 
traumatic effect that terrorism has on the civilian population, the standard response of states has 
been to blame or take retaliatory measures, sometimes without prior verification. This reaction 
often fulfills the political objectives of planned terrorist acts and strengthens the resolve of the 
perpetrators. 
In concluding this section, it would be in place to note that terrorism and subversion have 
had a negative impact on Iran's relations with a number of countries, especially Muslim countries 
in the region. While the leadership has been divided on ways and means of exporting the revolu- 
tion, which it views as crucial to the survival of the revolutionary government, on issues like 
Palestine and gaining a foothold in Lebanon its approach has been united: Iran regarded Israel's 
policies in the occupied territories and in its security zone in Southern Lebanon as "morally 
wrong" and hence "impossible to live with" 49 
The unsatisfactory progress of the UN on this issue has its roots in the larger question of 
ideological and moral norms of the various member states. Given that the major part of the vot- 
ing in the UN General Assembly lies with countries who have struggled against and continue to 
oppose various forms of colonialism, it is not surprising that those countries feel it justified to 
48 In January 1988, President Reagan introduced the United States "National Security Strategy" in the form of a report 
to the United States Congress. The report, while expressing concern about radical anti-Western political and religious 
movements, emphasised that Iran posed the most serious, immediate threat to US interests in the Muslim world and that 
Iran's policies were aimed at undermining Western relationships in the Middle East. 
49 UNPVR, A/38/Pv. 82. 
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pursue their fight against colonialism and apartheid through the use of violence. In addition, the 
resurgence of Islam following the revolution in Iran has given a new dimension to the hitherto 
defunct idea of national liberation movements, especially in Moslem countries. 
IV. The Question of Discrimination against Iranian Nationals at the United Nations50 
The following study has been undertaken by Houshang Ameri in a period when the govern- 
ments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom quit the UNESCO in protest 
against "excessive politicisation" and "serious management problems" which were plaguing the 
organisation. In this context, Mr Ameri feels that none of the reasons put forward by the said 
governments for leaving UNESCO are "nearly as good as the reasons a country like Iran has for 
wanting... to pick a bone with ... not 
just certain agencies but -- the UN system as a whole. -51 
Comparing the publicity given to different kinds of discrimination, be it "against women, or 
blacks, or Third Worlders", Mr Ameri feels that discrimination against nations -- in this particular 
case his own country has "never been trumpeted". While acknowledging that Iran is not alone in 
this situation, Mr Ameri feels that, at "a time when the system of international organisations in 
general is under criticism and attack for politicisation, mismanagement, inefficiency, bias etc, " it 
might be instructive to consider the case of Iran as being "representative of a major deficiency, 
that is to say, discrimination or bias against certain states or third nationals. " 
Speaking from experience, Mr Ameri is of the view that the "discrimination against Iran 
which used to be solely of a personnel nature in the old days, has in recent years acquired a new 
dimension ... namely a political one. " Alluding to the UN's role in the Iran-Iraq war, the author 
feels that the UN "has not even tried to give a semblance of impartiality whenever the question 
has been brought up in one of its organs. "52 However, the political aspect of the question is not 
50 The following section is entirely attributed to a study undertaken by Mr Houshang Ameri, an ex-Iranian diplomat 
who is now lecturing in Geneva. With his special permission, the following information has been incorporated into this 
chapter with a view to enriching the enquiry. The study entitled "Discrimination at the UN: The Case of Iranian Nationals" 
is in the form of a monograph completed in 1986. It is available at the Library of the Graduate Institute for International 
Studies in Geneva as Brochure 2880. 
sl Ibid, p. 1. 
52 Ibid., p. 2. 
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addressed in detail, as the author is concerned mainly with a different form of discrimination: 
namely by the "leadership (or the establishment) of international secretariats against a particular 
nationality -- not injustice perpetrated by the majority against one member state". In other words, 
Mr Ameri devotes the rest of his study to examining what he describes as "an enduring systematic 
bias consistently exerted against Iranian candidates for higher positions -- positions where it 
really counts for a nation to place (to use the UN parlance) its citizens. "53 
To substantiate this charge, Mr Ameri proceeds to use or rather interpret certain relevant 
figures and statistics. Right below the Secretary-General (Peru) and the Director-General for 
Development and International Economic Co-operation (France) -- second in rank only to the 
Secretary General himself -- there are at the UN two important ranks of senior officials, namely 
Under-Secretaries -- General and Assistant Secretaries-General. 
There are 26 or so posts of Under Secretaries General with an annual net pay of $96,765 (an 
article in the 10.12.84 issue of the International Herald Tribune put the figure at $129,000). None 
has ever belonged to an Iranian national. According to a Jack Anderson article in the Washington 
Post of 10.7.84, the Assistant Secretaries-General (who take home about $85000 a year) number 
close to 150. Not a single one of them has ever gone to an Iranian either. Since the UN does not 
mention the nationality of these people in its Directory of Senior Officials, it is difficult to find 
out where each of these 170 or so people come from. But the United Nations Handbook (New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), lists 92 people under the title Under Secretaries Gen- 
eral, Assistant Secretaries General, and Officers of Equivalent Rank, (see pp. 102-105). If one 
adds the Secretary-General himself and the Director-General for Development and International 
Co-operation to that number, the total adds up to 94. 
Occupants of these posts are, of course, to be selected from among different nationalities. If 
we leave out the 5 permanent members of the Security Council which are, of course, well 
represented (especially the Western ones) the distribution of those posts at the time of writing 
looks as follows: 
53 Aid 
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Finland 4 Italy 2 Brazil 1 Jamaica 1 
India 4 Japan 2 Cameroon 1 Mali 1 
W. Germany 4 Nigeria 2 Chile 1 Netherlands 1 
Pakistan 3 Norway 2 Ecuador 1 New Zealand 1 
Sweden 3 Philippines 2 Egypt 1 Peru 1 
Argentina 2 Spain 1 Fiji 1 Poland 1 
Australia 2 Sri Lanka 2 Ghana 1 Sierra Leone 1 
Austria 2 Tunisia 2 Greece 1 Somalia 1 
Bangladesh 2 Algeria 1 Grenada 1 Syria 1 
Canada 2 Belgium 1 Indonesia 1 Upper Volta 1 
Denmark 2 Bolivia 1. Ireland 1 Yugoslavia 1 
It goes without saying that the situation of Iranians in relation to other nationalities would 
look even worse if a complete table of the senior officials, specifying their citizenship, were to be 
published by the UN and its affiliated agencies. 
Mr Ameri feels in this respect that Iran is actually "non- existent" at the "policy- 
formulating" levels of the UN, the same being true in every affiliated organisation. 
Besides the Secretariats at the Headquarters in New York and at the UN offices in Geneva 
and Vienna, the UN family is composed of 16 specialised agencies (namely: ILO, UNESCO, 
FAO, IFAD, WHO, WMO, ITU, UPU, ICAO, IMO, WIPO, UNIDO, IMF, IBRD, IDA and IFC) 
plus a large number of more or less independent or semi-independent organisations such as the 
IAEA, UNHCR, UNCTAD, UNDP, ITC, WFP, UNICEF, UNEP, WTO, INSTRAW, UNITAR, 
UNRWA, UNU, UNV, UNDRO, and UNIDIR, to mention only a few. Each of these has a 
"Chief Administrative Officer" (Secretary-General, Director-General, Executive Director, etc) and 
most have two or more officers with a rank equivalent to that of an Under Secretary-General and a 
few more with ranks equivalent to an Assistant Secretary-General's. (A typical organisation such 
as the FAO has one Deputy Director-General and 10 Assistant Directors-General. ILO, another 
typical agency, has 3 Deputy Directors-General and 8 Assistant Directors-General). The author 
notes that not a single one of all these posts has ever gone to an Iranian national either. 
With reference to the above Mr. Ameri is of the opinion that it is necessary to draw one of 
the following two conclusions. First, that there has been, as argued, an enduring and deep-seated 
bias against Iranian nationals seeking higher office at the UN and its affiliated agencies. Second, 
that no Iranian's "standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity" have been deemed sufficient 
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by the "UN Establishment" for such postsl The second conclusion in his view becomes espe- 
cially absurd when one takes into account the fact that Iran's pool of university graduates is, at 
least proportionately, higher than that of any other developing country. Especially as almost half 
of university-educated Iranians are graduates of some of the best West European and North 
American universities -- universities that are regarded highly by the UN. 
Mr Ameri acknowledges that the problem could be due to the fact that Iranian governments 
have been loath to put pressure on international organisations to appoint Iranian citizens to posts 
in international secretariats. While this may be true, he argues that this is precisely the policy that 
the UN itself has always advocated for member states to adopt. He adds that the reason for the 
UN's espousal of such an attitude is, of course, the desire to be under no pressure from member 
states, so that it may be able to select its employees on the basis of their "efficiency, competence, 
and integrity". 
In reality however, he states, the international secretariats have used this lack of pressure -- 
or interest -- on the part of Iranian governments, to by-pass well-qualified Iranians and employ in 
their stead members of other nationalities whose governments deemed it appropriate to apply the 
needed -- and indispensable -- pressure for appointment to senior, "policy-formulating" positions. 
Mr Ameri admits that the situation of Iranians within the UN family is in part a by-product 
of the fact that Iranian governments -- both in the past and in recent years -- have been unwilling 
to "place" Iranians in the secretariats of international organisations -- especially in their higher 
echelons, where it would naturally take much pressure and lobbying to succeed. But he declares it 
is quite clear that the situation is in large measure a direct result of recruitment policies and prac- 
tices that far too often result in appointments based on political expediency, favouritism and 
nepotism rather than on professional integrity, competence and efficiency. 
This according to the author is one of the many failings of the UN -- one that is not due to 
any intrinsic weakness in the system, but is rather the result of what appears to be systematic bias. 
Its importance lies in the fact that it is one of the few UN failings that have been within the power 
of the Secretariat to prevent or to put right, taking into consideration of course that it is also one 
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in whose continuation both the Secretariat and the member states have acquiesced. 
The failures and shortcomings of the UN are of course well-known. And the fact that most 
people still accept the UN for what it is, is because they rightly believe most of those shortcom- 
ings -- especially in the political field -- to be beyond the control of the Organisation. But once 
those shortcomings and failures extend to other realms, then a new dimension in failure is added. 
Most nations too, the author says, still accept the UN for what it is, in the belief that these 
shortcomings are beyond the organisation's control. Yet, when they are within the capacity of the 
world body to control but are not set right, concerned member states find it hard to continue sup- 
porting the cause of the UN system. 
States that have served notices, Mr Ameri says, have had material and abstract grievances 
and some have grown too complacent about protecting their prerogatives. However, he observes, 
Iran's complaints are less abstract and certainly more concrete and real. Mr Ameri points out that 
the UN has observed neither justice nor fairness in respect of Iran and its nationals; they have 
been the objects of bias and discrimination. The UN's treatment of the Iran-Iraq war, he says, has 
not been commensurate with its importance. UN's appointment policies with regard to Iranians 
as reflected in quoted figures appear to be anomalous and grotesque. 
Under the circumstances Mr Ameri recommends that there is a strong case for looking at 
each deficiency carefully so that action can be taken to avoid the disruption of the UN system and 
the further tarnishing of the world body's image. 
In conclusion it may be noted that while Iran's revolutionary principles based on the Qoran, 
made Islam the primary choice of conducting her international relations, the United Nations as a 
non-religious forum and being an integral part of the world political system could not be ignored 
by the policy-makers in Tehran. 
While the main complaint against the world body has been its inability to live up to the 
standards set in the UN Charter, the nascent revolutionary regime in due time learnt to apply the 
principles enshrined in the Charter selectively and replaced its high expectations with an attitude 
based on expedience. 
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The next chapter will examine the issue of human rights in Iran, with special reference to 
the areas of conflict and agreement this subject engenders when seen from the differing perspec- 
tives of the United Nations and the Islamic Republic. 
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TABLES 
Note on the Tables 
The following tables are based on information gathered from The Proceedings of the 
General Assembly. They comprise General Assembly Resolutions that reflect certain 





Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Review of the implementation of the 34/100 Yes 104-3-24 
Declaration on the Strengthening of 
International Security 
1981/82 On implementation of the Declaration on 36/102 Yes 127-0-20 
the Strengthening of International Security, 
with a view to prevent further 
aggravation of the international 
situation and disruption of the 
process of detente, and requesting 
the Security Council to consider 
ways of implementing their action. 
1981/82 With regards to non-interference in the 35/159 Yes 120-0-25 
internal affairs of states. 
1982/83 Urging all states in particular the 37/118 Yes 116-0-19 
permanent members of the Security Council 
to prevent the further deterioration of 
the international situation, especially 
on matters relating to the denuclearisation 
of Africa, the Indian Ocean as 
a Zone of Peace, the Conference in Europe, 
and the Question of Security and 
Co-operation in the Region of the 
Mediterranean. 
1983/84 Urging all states, particularly the permanent 38/190 Yes 135-0-12 
members of the Security Council, 
to take all necessary measures to 
prevent further deterioration of 
the international situation and 
calling the great powers to engage 
in constructive negotiations and 
to abandon policies of confrontation. 
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Table Two 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes/Role of the UN in IR 
Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Inviting member states to transmit 34/102 - Adopted 
to the Secretary General their without vote 
opinions, suggestions and proposals 
regarding elaboration of a 
declaration on the peaceful settlement 
of disputes between states. 
1980/81 Requesting the Special Committee 35/160 - Adopted 
on the Charter of the UN and on by consensus 
Strengthening the Role of the 
Organisation to continue the 
elaboration of the draft Manila 
Declaration on Peaceful Settlement 
of International Disputes. 
1981/82 Requesting the Special Committee 36/110 - Adopted 
to finalise the Manila Declaration without vote 
1982/83 Approving the Manila 37/10 - Adopted 
Declaration on Peaceful without vote 
Settlement of International Disputes 
1983/84 With reference to the report of the 38/131 - Adopted 
Special Committee on the Charter of without vote 
the United Nations and on the Strengthening 
of the Role of the Organisation 
to prepare a preliminary outline on 
the possible content of a handbook 
on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes between states. 
1984/85 Urges all states to observe and 39179 - Adopted 
promote in good faith the provisions without vote 
of the Manila Declaration 
on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
1985/86 Requests the Special Committee 40/68 - Adopted 
on the Charter of the UN and on without vote 
the strengthening of the role of 
the organisation to continue 
its work on the peaceful settlement 
of disputes between States. 
1986/87 Requests the Special Committee to 41/74 Adopted 
continue the consideration of without vote 
the working paper on the resort 
to a commission of good offices, 
mediation or conciliation 
within the UN ... and examine 
the progress on the preparation of 
a draft handbook on the peaceful 




Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1980/81 Calling for the immediate ES-6/2 Yes 104-18-18 
and total withdrawal of 
foreign troops ... 
1980/81 Calling for immediate withdrawal 35/37 Yes 111-22-11 
of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan ... and creation of 
conditions which would enable 
Afghan refugees to return voluntarily 
to their homes in safety and honour ... 
1981/82 Reaffirming the right of the Afghan 36/34 Yes 116-23-12 
people to determine their own form 
of government and to choose 
their economic, political 
and social system free from 
outside intervention. 
1982/83 Reiterating that the presentation 37/37 Yes 114-21-13 
of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence 
and non-aligned character of Afghanistan 
is essential for a peaceful solution 
of the problem. 
1983/84 Reiterating the call for the immediate 38/29 Yes 16-20-17 
withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Afghanistan and calling 
up all parties to work for 
achievement of a political solution. 
1984/85 Reaffirms the right of the Afghan 39/19 Yes 119-20-14 
people to determine their own 
form of government... calls 
for immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops ... and renews its appeal for humanitarian relief 
assistance to the Afghan refugees 
in co-ordination with UNHCR. 55 
55 United Nations High Conunission for Refugees. 
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1985/86 The Afghanistan situation and 40/12 Yes 122-19-12 
its implications for international 
peace and security ... calls upon 
all parties to work for the urgent 
achievement of a political solution. 
1986/87 Implications for international 41/33 Yes 122-20-11 
peace and security ... right to choose 
their economic, political and social 
system free from outside intervention, 
subversion, coercion or constraint 
of any kind whatsoever. 
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Table Four 
Non Use of Force 
Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Towards drafting at the 34/13 Yes 71-14-13 
earliest possible date, a 
world treaty on the non-use of 
force in international relations. 
1979/80 Condemning hegemonism in all 34/103 Yes 111-24-26 
its manifestations, 
declaring that no State or group 
of States shall pursue hegemony 
in international relations. 
1981/82 With regard to the export and 36/31 Yes 113-15-10 
activities of the Special Committee on 
Enhancing the effectiveness of the 
Principle of Non-Use of Force in 
International Relations. 
1982/83 Deciding that the Special Committee 37/105 Yes 119-15-8 
on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the 
Principle of Non-Use of Force in 
International Relations shall continue 
its work with the goal of drafting at the 
earliest possible date a world treaty on the 
non-use of force in international relations. 
1983/84 No direct reference - - - 
1984/85 Draft resolution on the report of the 39/81 Yes 111-15-10 
Special Committee on Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use 
of Force in International Relations. 
1985/86 Decided that work by the 40/70 Yes 119-14-12 
Special Committee on a world 
treaty on the non-use of force 
shall continue. 
1986/87 Decided that the Special Committee 41/76 - Adopted 
shall complete a draft declaration without vote 
on the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of the principle 
of non-use of force in international 
relations, including, 
as appropriate, recommendations 




Middle East Situation 
Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Condemning Israel's continued 34/70 Yes 102-17-20 
occupation of Palestinian and other Arab 
territories ... calling anew 
for a 
Peace Conference on the Middle East, 
and requesting the Security Council to 
take measures to ensure implementation 
of relevant resolutions of the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. 
1980/81 Reaffirming that the question 35/207 Yes 101-13-30 
of Palestine is at the core 
of the conflict in the Middle East ... 
1981/82 Declaring that Israel's decision to 36/226B Yes 121-2-20 
apply Israeli law to the occupied 
territories is null and void and 
has no legal validity, requesting 
the Security Council to invoke 
Chapter VII of the Charter if necessary. 
1982/83 Condemning the large scale massacre 37/123D Yes 123-0-22 
of Palestinian civilians in the and 
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps 37/123E Yes 145-0-0 
in Beruit and resolving that the 
massacre was an act of genocide, 
calling for the strict respect of 
the territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
unity and political independence of 
Lebanon. 
1983/84 Condemning collaboration between 38/180D Yes 101-18-20 
Israel and South Africa, 
especially in the economic, 
military and nuclear fields. 
1984/85 Resolution divided into 3 parts 
Part A, reaffirms that a just and 39/146A Yes 100-16-28 
comprehensive settlement of the situation 
in the Middle East cannot be achieved 
without the participation on an equal 
footing of all parties to the conflict, 
including the PLO ... Part B, calls on member states to 39/146B Yes 88-22-32 
discontinue economic, diplomatic, military 
and cultural relations with Israel. 
Part C, deplores the transfer of some 39/146C Yes - 
states diplomatic missions to Jerusalem. 
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1985/86 Resolution divided into 3 parts 
Part A, Reaffumed the conviction 40/168A Yes 98-19-31 
that the Palestine question 
is the core of the conflict 
in the Middle East ... Part B, declared that Israel's decision 40/168B Yes 137-2-10 
to impose its laws, jurisdiction 
and administration on the occupied 
Golan Heights is illegal and therefore 
null and void ... 
Part C, determined that Israel's 40/168C yes 137-2-10 
decision to impose its laws, 
jurisdiction and administration on the 
Holy city of Jerusalem is illegal 
and therefore null and void ... 
1986/87 Resolution divided into 3 parts 
Part A, ... considered the Arab 41/162A Yes 104-19-32 Peace Plan adopted unanimously 
at the 12th Arab Summit Conference, 
held at Fez, Morocco, in 1985 as 
well as relevant efforts and action 
to implement the Fez Plan, as an 
important contribution towards the 
realisation of the inalienable 
rights of the Palestinian people 
through the achievement of a 
comprehensive, just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East... 
Part B, declared Israel's continued 41/162B Yes 90-29-34 
occupation of the Golan heights and 
its policies therein as an act of 
aggression under the provisions of 
Article 39 of the Charter of the UN ... 
Part C, considers illegal, Israel's 41/162C Yes 141-3-11 
decision to impose its laws on the 




Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Condemning all partial agreements and 34/65B Yes 75-33-37 
separate treaties which constitute a 
flagrant violation of the rights of 
the Palestinian people, and declaring 
that the Camp David accords and 
other agreements have no validity 
in so far as they purport to 
determine the future of the Palestinian 
people and of the Palestinian territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967. 
1981 Reaffirming the inalienable rights of the ES-7[2 Yes 112-7-24 
Palestinian people ... and the 
right of the PLO to participate 
in deliberations on Palestine 
and the Middle East situation. 
1981/82 Demanding that Israel should fully comply 35/169A Yes 98-16-32 
with resolutions of the UN relating to 
Palestine and the historic character of the 
Holy City of Jerusalem and rejecting the 
declaration of Israel that Jerusalem is its 
capital, expressing opposition to all 
policies and plans aimed at the 
resettlement of the Palestinians 
outside their homeland. 
1981/82 Deciding to convene an International 36/120C Yes 122-4-20 
Conference on the Question of Palestine 
under UN auspices not later than 1984 ... 
1981/82 The resolution is comprised of ES-7/4 Yes 86-20-36 
five parts. The resolutions ES-7/5 Yes 127-2-0 
demanded that Israel withdraw its military ES-7/6 Yes 120-2-20 
forces from Lebanon ... calling for ES-7/7 Yes 123-2-18 humanitarian aid to the victims of the Israeli ES-7/9 yes 147-2-0 
invasion of Lebanon, requesting the 
Secretary General to arrange an enquiry 
to assess the extent of loss of human 
life 
... Condemning Israel for its non- 
compliance with Security Council 
resolutions urging the Secretary General to 
undertake measures to guarantee the safety 
and security of the Palestinian and 
Lebanese civilian population in South 
Lebanon. 
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1983/84 Calling for convening an International 38/58C Yes 124-4-15 
Peace Conference on the Middle East 
and inviting all parties to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, including the PLO 
the United States, the USSR and 
other concerned states to participate 
on an equal footing. 
1984/85 Resolution divided into 4 parts: 
Part A, takes note of the activities of 39/49A Yes 127-2-2157 
the Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People Part B, on the activities of the 39/49B Yes 130-3-17 
Division of the Palestinian Rights. 
Part C, dissemination of information 39/49C Yes 131-3-15 
on the activities of the UN system 
relating to Palestine. 
Part D, on the convening of an 39/49D Yes 121-3-23 
international peace conference on 
the Middle East. 
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1985/86 Resolution divided into 4 parts: 40/96A Absent 128-2-22 
Part A, Implementation of the 
recommendations of the Committee on 
the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People ... including representations at conferences 
and meetings and the sending of 
delegations where such activities 
would be considered appropriate ... Part B, ... requests the Secretary 40/96B Absent 129-3-20 General to provide the Division for 
Palestinian Rights with the necessary 
resources to accomplish its task and 
to expand its work programme ... Part C, requests the Department of 40/96C Absent 131-3-18 
Public Information to continue its 
special information programme on the 
question of Palestine... 
Part D, endorses the call for convening 40/96D Absent 107-3-41 
the international peace conference on the 
Middle East; calls upon the Governments 
of Israel and the United States to reconsider 
their positions towards the attainment 
of peace in the Middle East through 
convening the conference. 
1986/87 Resolution divided into 4 parts: 
Part A, Implementation of the 41/43A Yes 121-2-21 
recommendations of the Committee 
on the Exercise of inalienable Rights of 
Palestinian People 
Part B ... requests the Secretary 41/43B Yes 125-3-18 General to ensure the continued 
co-operation of the Department of 
Public Information and other units 
of the Secretariat in enabling the 
Division for Palestinian Rights to 
perform its tasks and in covering 
adequately the various aspects of the 
question of Palestine 
Part C, Dissemination of Information 41/43C Yes 124-3-19 
on the Palestine question. 
Part D, Convening of an international 41/43D Yes 123-3-19 
peace conference on the Middle East ... 
with the participation of the 
permanent members of the Council, 
to take the necessary action to 
convene the conference. 
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Table Seven 
Arab Territories Occupied by Israel 
Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 EmptiLsising d )c right of the Arab 34/136 Yes 118-2-21 
sates and peoples whose territories 
arc utxicr Israeli occupation to full 
effective permanent sovereignty ... 
1980/81 Condemning the Israeli practice of 35/122F Yes 117-2-25 
rrprcccion agirtct students and 
univcssitics in the occupied Palestinian 
tcrTitorics ... r quests 
Security Council 
to convene in order to take measures 
to crtcurr that Israel rescind the 
illegal measures taken against the 
Palestinian Mayors and te Sbariah , Judge Tamini and to facilitate 'r 
arum. 
1981/Et2 W'o'rth rrFzrtis to On report of tc 36/147 Yes 
Special Committee to investigate AtoG 
1. cli i'racticcs affecting the 
Human Rights of the Population of the 
Occupied Territories. 
1982 1mc1's decision of December 14,1981 ES9/1 Yes 86-21-34 
to impose its laws. jurisdiction and 
a ninistrttion on te occupied Syrian 
Golan Heights. was constituted as an 
act of aggression. The resolution 
called upon mcmher states to cease all 
dealings with Israel in order to 
totally isolate it in all fields. 
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Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1982183 CotxiemrtinE: I . -awl for its exploitation 37/135 Yes 124-2-20 
of the rutic tal rrsourccs of the 
cic uiicd Palestinian and other Arab 
territorics. cnip[LL%ýung effective 
pcrmancnt so' crrignty of the Arab 
pctplcs over thcir national and all 
other rcsources 
1983/l4 iii-- rrsolutiofs emanating from - - 
tl c General A-, wmbly cchood demands 
mzdc in rrrvious years. 
19F. 4183 The resolution adopted in this year 
wac divided into eight pans: 
The fin i pan (A) demanded the 39/95A Absent 120-2-15 
rclca c of all prisoners- 
Pan (13) called on Israel to comply 39/95B Yes 140-1-3 
with t h, - provisions of the Geneva 
cnnvcnnon relative to protection of 
civilian pe one in time of war ... 
Part C demanded that Israel desist from 39/95C Absent 143-1-1 
titan ing the legal status, geographical 
tuturc or demographic composition of the 
Palemntan and other temtories. 
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1984/MS Part D. deplored the continued refusal 39/95D Absent 115-2-28 
of Isr: l to allow the Special Committee 
to invcstipatc Israeli Practices Affecting 
the Human Rights of the Population of the 
Occupied Tcrntories. 
Part E. demanded that Israel 39/95E Absent 143-1-1 
immediately facilitate murrt of 
cxpcllcii Palestinian leaders. 
Part F, condemned Israel for 39/95F Absent 141-1-3 
trfusinc, to comply with General Assembly 
rtsnlutionc on the imposition of 
Israeli laws in the occupied Golan 
Heights. 
Part G. condemned Israeli practices 39/95G Absent 117-2-26 
and policies against Palestinian 
students, universities and other 
educational institutions. 
Patt 11. demanded that Israel 39/95H Absent 143-2-0 
inform the Secretary General of the 
results of the investigation and 
prosecution relative to as tssinat on 
attempts against the mayors of 
Nablus. Rarnallah and Al Binch 
1985186 The resolution adopted in this 
year iw as divided into Seven parts 
Part A. deplored the Israeli 40/161A Absent 95-2-37 
arbitrary detention of Palestinians 
and demanded their immediate release ... 
Part B. Applicability of the Geneva 40/161B Absent 137-1-6 
convention relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in tints of war 
to the orupicd territories 
Pan C. Israeli measures threatening 40/161C Absent 138-1-6 
the legal status, geographical stature 
and demographic composition of tc 
occupied territories 
Part D sonde nnation of violation 40/161D Yes 109-2-34 
of the Human Rights of the civilian 
population of the tcmtorics occupied 
by kr: acl. 
Pan E. callcd for the return of 40/161E Yes 126-1-19 
cxpc1lcd Palestinian leaders and 
crane forthwith further csrutsion. 
Pan F. condemns Israel for imposition 40/161F Yes 136-1-10 
eýf Israeli ta« c on Syrian Golan Heights 
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1985/86 Part G. conicnins Brach policies 40/161G yes 112-2-32 
asaintt Palestinian educational 
in. stf tutic'ns. 
17 The Resolution concerning Israeli 
prcticrs affecting the Human Rights 
of the population of the Occupied 
tcniºoncs was divided into 7 parts 
Part A. was concur d with the 41/63A Yes 108-2-34 
Atbitrarv detention of Palestinians 
in the occupied territories. 
Pitt 13. was cmxrncd with 41/63B Yes 145-1-6 
Applicability of the Gcncwa Convention 
reactive to i b. - Protection of Civilian 
Pcrscuts in time of wan. 
Pan C. Israeli measurrs threatening 41/63C Yes 145-1-5 
the legal status. geographical 
naturr and demographic composition 
of the c upicd territories. 
Part D. Violation of te human rights 41/63D Yes 114-2-36 
of the civili n population of the 
tcmtoncc occupied by Israel. 
Part E. was con rncd with expelled 41/63E Yes 131-1-21 
Palcsttnian leaders. 
Pan F. condenmcd Israel for the 41/63F Yes 142-1-11 
it pociticxt of I<ncli laus on the 
Golan heights. 
Pan G. con emned Israel's policies 41/63G Yes 119-2-32 
with regard to Palestinian 
educational itxctitution. 
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Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Sub im of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/80 Aicacurrs of cc-operation for the 34/145 Yes 118-0-22 
sj--ccdy elimination of the problem of 
i: ucr'nationai tcrror cm ... 
1981/82 Re-ct daring the recommendations 36/109 - Adopted 
submitted to the General Assembly relating without vote 
to practical mcisurrs of co-operation 
for the speedy dimension of the 
problem of international terrorism. 
1982183 No dirrct rrfcrrn r - 
1983/84 Call: nr upon all states to observe 38/130 - Adopted 
and implcmcn the rrconimcndations without vote 
submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee 
on intcmational terrorism to tax. 
General Assembly at its 34th session. 
1984/15 A resolution was adopted under 39/159 Yes 117-0-30 
the title of Policy of State Terrorinn 
tc resolution dcmandcd that mates 
take no action aimed at military 
inicr. mtion and occupation. 
1985196 Uncguivocal comIcntnation, 40/61 Adopted 
criminal. all acts. methods and without vote 
practices of terrorism. methods and 
practices of terrorism ... calls upon 
all states to fulfill their obligations 
Under ttlterutiomul law to refrain 
from organ sing. instigating. assisting 
or pzrticipating in tcrroricm acts 
in Diaei states. 
19h6/K7 No dirrct rrfcrcncc in 




Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subj: cs of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-too-abstain 
1979/RD Mcacurrs of cnonration for the 34/145 Yes 118-0-22 
. cpccdy climinaation of the problem of 
II1tcmatiotul tennorism ... 
Rc-cndorcing thc recommendations 36/109 Adopted 
submitted to the General Assembly without vote 
trlatin, to practical measures of cooperation 
cooperation for d r- speedy elimination 
of tja: problem of international terrorism. 
1982183 No dirrct reference - - - 
1983/84 Callen f upon all states to observe 38/130 Adopted 
and implement On r commendations without vote 
sclhmincd by tllr Ad Hoc Committee 
on Intemationll Terrorism to the 
General Assembly at its 34th session. 
1984185 A rrsolutlon was adopted under 39/159 Yes 117-0-30 
the title of Policy of State 
Terrorism -tc resolution demanded 
that States take no action aimed 
at military intervention and occupation. 
1985/96 Uncquivocal condemnation. as 40/61 - Adopted 
criminal, all acct, nmcthods and without vote 
practices of terrorism ... calls upon 
all states to fulfill their obligations 
utuicr intcltutienal lair to refrain 
frr n (Its snisin£, in, Cli ating. 
x, mtstlnr or participating in terrorist 
acts in otli:! states. 
19fi&/87 tso three reference in - - - 
Gcneral A sembly resolutions 
I 
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Table Nine 
Colonial Countries 
Resolution Voting position Overall voting 
Year Subject of Resolution Number of Iran Position 
yes-no-abstain 
1979/90 Con icmninr. all activities of foreign 34/41 Yes 88-15-33 
cconcxnic uni other ifflerc-sus operating in 
Namibia. Southern Rhodcsia and South 
Africa ... 
1980/81 On implementation of the Dcclar ttion 35/29 Yes 141-0-8 
on the Colonial Countries and Peoples by 
tc,, TcciaIiscd: q-cncics arid 
inicmatic'n_d institutions associated 
with the UN. 
1981/82 On implementation of the Declaration 36/52 Yes 124-6-23 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countncs and Peoples by the specialised 
afcncics and the intcrnational 
iacutution. S. ccociatcd with the UN, 
and cpccifically cxpressing regret that 
the World Bank and ItiiF continue 
to maintain links with te racist 
rrfiimc of South Africa. 
1982183 Mal: mg spccitic rrcomnundations 37/32 Yes 128-4-20 
ret-anitnF the rdationsiiip between 
South Africa and tc International 
'onetmv Fund. 
1983/84 The various resolution emanating, from - - - 
the Gcncral , 'ýcýrmhl dealt with the 
1(lC S of liccolonisation in many 
parts of t h-- wti orld and the role 
of intc:. gov'crrinmcnt. Zi organisations. 
(roo numcrous to include). 
. 165- 








1914/96 Dccsiens on military activities 39/412 Yes 118-10-15 
and aminccntcnts by colonial powers 
in tcrntorics utxicr their 
n finis ration %zhiclt might be 
impeding thc intplcmcntation of 
the Dcci cation on the Granting 
of lt kpcnn: icnce to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 
1985/86 Cond. -ma tc ce \Vcstcrn and all other 40/52 Yes 125-9-16 
countries, as well as tc transnational 
corporations. %%hich continue their 
im-es mcnts in. and supply of 
armailcnts and oil and nuclear 
technology to South Africa ... 
calls upon oil producing and oil 
cxpo nF countries to take 
cftcctivc measures against the 
oil ccm; aloes in violation of 
. an. tic .: so as to tcrrninatC tile 
tupply of crude oil and petroleum 
products to Swcuth Africa. 
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Chapter VI 
The United Nations and the Question of 
Human Rights in Iran: 1979-1989 
Introduction 
The yucttion of human rights in Iran has been of considerable interest to the international 
community in the pcriod More and after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Not unlike 
in other countries, the issue of human rights has been used by interested parties to pressurise Iran 
into complying with certain "international nouns". In the area of human rights many of these 
norm% arc containcd within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was framed in 
1948. The opening sc tions of this chapter will examine the development of human rights instru- 
ments at the United Nations and the scope of their application. 
It has been observed that "the idea of human rights is one of the most prominent in Western 
political rhetoric loda). -. The equation which follows seems to be quite simple i. e. "A regime 
which protects human rights is good. One which violates them, or worse still, does not ack- 
nowledge them at all, is had-. 1 Whatever the basis for such rhetoric may be, human rights has 
come to occupy an important place in world politics, particularly in the area of foreign policy. 
But this relatively new component in the foreign policy processes of many countries is not 
without dilemma. If the n instay of the international legal/political order is the principle of non- 
intervention. then it is not surprising that some states are highly sensitive to international human 
rights. Which they view "... either the most blatant kind of imperialism - everyone ought to be 
a citizen of Rome t+ ause the civilisation of Rome is superior- or an attempt to disguise imperi- 
alism by pretending that there are universal values. "2 
"The innp. ° t of human rights on contemporary international politics, then, can be rendered 
A. ) h9. >Yd. 1r+r. lfwýs* P, rwfa t1h ersirv. An Essay in the Philosophy Of Hunan Rights, London. Macmil- 
týa, 
1fJ. ý'ý_+ ýt `lip=aca it a rawi 1 ýge+ i'ýý1+i )'. Awst. alian Outtocuk, vol. 36. no. 3, I ccmb r 198:, p. 1. 
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partly in terms of the advance of cosmopolitan values on the redoubt of state sovereignty, and 
partly in terms of the attempt by some powers to gain ideological advantage at the expense of oth- 
ers". -; Some countries like the United States have sought to domestically justify human rights in 
national feign policy. on the idealistic grounds that "... its revolution was the beginning of 
emancipation fox all human kind. "" However, when this attitude is carried abroad it receives stiff 
opposition from states who have had a long tradition in developing human rights. 
lium rights in Iran has played a pivotal role in the external and internal policy formula- 
Lion of that country and continues to have an impact on its international relations. In post- 
revolution Iran. the question of human rights as stipulated in the Universal Declaration came to be 
viewed a prolilcmatiquc. Much of this is due to certain basic conflicts existing between secular 
and lsl iinic intcrprctations of what human rights entail. The insistence on the supremacy of 
Islamic law to intcrn flional law and the oneness of the affairs of church and state in Islam have 
creased further rroblcros for the advocates of international human rights. Inside Iran there is a 
firm belief among the leadership that some of the foremost advocates of international human 
rights in the world are also foremost violators. 
izan's position on human rights issues have been considered by some as a challenge to inter- 
national law and by othcrs as an outright assault on its principles. The United Nations at the 
insistcncc of sonne of its tnclntxrs havc singled out the Islamic Republic of Iran for special treat- 
tncnt. This ihrs entailed the appointment of a special representative to study the situation of 
human rights abusc-s irr Iran and report back to the Commission on Human Rights and General 
AsscrtmNNy annually. 11 c concluding sections of this chapter will study the United Nations role in 
cxaininin£ the human rights situation and the attitude and response of Iran. Special emphasis will 
he laid on tic analysis of the rcports of the Special Representative and reference will be made to 
inforinationn fztlhcscd during a brief internship at the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in 
Ge4xva. 
Rj. viwont. `!, F I,;, r, ý! I "'J'a X -I the ihit d WotUd to the United States Human Rights Diplomacy', in David 
D. `: r- (r. 4u. l. Tý"J!., ;" . =t . ýli. -ti, M jR#s4U. 
Univcr%ity rrtms for America, l9ß6, p32. 
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Given the longer aims of this thesis. this chapter will also attempt to examine the question 
of human rights in the internal politics of post-revolutionary Iran, and the extent to which it 
necessitated the scrutiny of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In addition, an 
: analysis will the m: idc of how the Iranian government viewed the question of human rights and the 
ipparcrrt effects this attitude had on its international relations. 
I. The United Nations and the Development and Scope of Human Rights 
in the prcamhic of the US charter, it is mentioned that the peoples represented at the United 
Nations (a) reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person. in the equal rights of men and women and of the nations large and small, and (b) promise 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. In Article 13, which 
deals with the purposes of the United Nations, reference is made to the United Nations' resolve to 
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cul- 
tur l or humanitarian cliar. ictcr, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundatncat: 3l freedoms far all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Under Arti- 
cle 13. the Gcncnl Assembly is required to initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
Article 55 rrcluires that the United Nations should act with a view to creating "conditions of 
stability and svcll"t'cing which are ticccssary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, 
lmsccl on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Article 56 
Furt er c ourn, zcs Mcmtvr States to take individual and joint action in cooperation with the 
organisation for te achievement of the objectives set forth in Article 55. 
TT Economic and Sckial Council (ECOSOC), under Article 62, is to make recommenda- 
tions for the upkotc of promoting respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. for isl. end Ufliic: Article 68. is required to set up a Commission for the promotion of 
Human Rights. 
Thus it would appear from the aforesaid provisions contained in the Charier of the United 
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Nations, that a grcat dcal of cmphasis has been laid upon the desirability of showing international 
concern for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the emphasis on this aspect 
of international activity by the United Nations seems all the more impressive if compared to the 
pre-Chartcr era. when the human rights component in the theory and practice of international law 
and politics was absent. 
It is a wcll"acknowicdgcd fact that the preliminary work that had gone into the preparation 
of the provisions of the Charter. especially in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 1944, practically 
ignored the rights of minorities 5 With the exception of sketchy references made in the ninth 
Chapter of the proposals concerning respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms. The 
Big Powers during that period hardly showed any genuine desire to accord international protec- 
tion to liurnan rights or fundamcntal freedoms of individuals .6 It was only at San Francisco, at the 
insistence of scvcral sm3tlcr countries and NGOs that the original proposals were altered to pro- 
vide international recognition and protection of human rights. 
It is possible that. because of this forced entry of human rights into the arena of international 
tarp a nd politics, the provisions of the Ch arter do not impose upon the members any binding obli- 
gation to rccncnitc and protect those human rights and freedoms mentioned in the Preamble or in 
the teat of the Chancr. However. the treatment of human rights at the United Nations has 
C11111gCd r111rl: cdly from slic early yc: trs. Across the UN system as a whole, there is a persistent 
but fragile effort to increase the Organisation's role in the supervision of national human rights 
policies. This chance can be sti ibutcd to (i) the foreign policies of member states, (ii) the grow- 
ing role of the NC Os. (iii) the influence of Secretariat officials, (iv) the assertiveness of certain 
pre-cinifucnt irldiviciu ts, (v) and lastly the effect of the World Campaign for Human Rights. The 
+c. ritcnticmcd factors have brought about great changes in the organs of the United Nations, 
1 'itx Mr. E. oe. n 0.14 rc. ;.. at, t. Y a Un, tr3 ti ati., ns Oq snitstion, pttpared in 1944 by the four victorious allies, very 
rwwly t. "e as bvm+., nj? +t '.. Ir r Pa-vif rcfcrcn t'. )ohn P. iiumphrey, "The UN Charter and the Universal Declara- 
t, rn ('(I ivman it, ýtr,. ", kn Tai 1ý . *tia aý Pnvn tý. n, tlwtan Rights, (od. ), Evan Luard, London, Thames and Hudson. 
1! x#7,1719. c. +rý , &: }r p h. 1 
" Dvr=nt t. '. f tr.: rr'. u yf s. ý t. Sc c. $i to . nt human riFhtt activity was being undenaken by the League of Nations' 
Mrn, KIt ... ', vn. 4t Ir,, r Cis-l Jr.. tia :: ns' M, n'n: iit: An lns rnational Problom. Cambridge, Harvard University 
1'rr, &. 19 J. 
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like the latcs cstablishinetxt of the Human Rights Committee, the Human Rights Commission and 
Sub-Commission. and even in the ECOSOC and Third Committee of the General Assembly. 
However. the si nific mcc brought about by all this activity and change has first of all no direct 
impact on the condition of human rights in the world, and secondly, it is difficult to assess given 
the extent to which human rights has been politicised. 
The most important stitcncntc concerning the norms of international human rights are con- 
tined in the Univcr. al Dcclaratic of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948 by the 
United Nations Gcncral Assembly. On December 16,1966, three international instruments were 
adopted by the Gcncnl Assembly in further reinforcing international concern for the protection of 
human rights freedom: 
(a) Covcnant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
(b) Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights; and 
(c) tional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights. 
The first two covcnants wcrc adopted by a unanimous vote and the third by a majority vote 
in the Gcncnl Assctuhty. The above instruments came into force in 1970 The rights proclaimed 
in the Univc . 
Dcclarati are divided into civil and political rights and economic, social, and 
cultural rights. Thcsc rights : trc not absolute and are in each case subject to limitations. The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in particular defines the admissible restrictions on the 
rights it sets forth. In gc crtl the Covcnant provides that the rights and freedoms with which it 
deals should not he , ubjcct to any restrictions except those which are necessary to protect national 
security. public onlcr. public thcatth or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. 8 
Listed tbciow it the further classification of rights as contained in the articles of the Univer- 
sal Decimation of Ilumian Rights: 
7 SKr (:. ýr+., 'rý. a. ", fi.,:: s rh,. u _ 17A (tlI) ant 2,: tx) (XXI). Tasse texts art widely reprinted, for example in Louis 
11. :, 4. n . '. } tc. f. A liape D,, -,.. -tenu on tffcrnetional Protection of Human Rights, Indianapolis, 
(4ý. 1 . '. Irrrrl, 1(I, ý. 
" In t;. re c Kr. "; :.. - Q, e C.. ms. ýn*n cý Uutnsn I: ifha e ipha i. cd, in CHR Rc. roh. tian 23 (DOM) of 29 Fehr: ay 
Jt"s: -'. i? a f. '( IN, ý. .?. -111- . "n1h to +u: h Itrnitation% a% wcre determined in the Charter of the United Nations,, the 
l r, r. cr.. t I? 1.:, .. c! I1¢. - >":,; '.: s atJ U tmrtnatior! Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant instruments. 
(J- ,,,! t a; ", ,iAv., -- ,, 4 skr 1 . ": #. -; atf. ". zat Fi; tý u. Ncw Yorl, United Nations, 1985, p. 35. paragraphs 44 and 45. 
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1. Personal rights, including rights to life, nationality, recognition before the law; protection 
against cruel. degrading. or inhumane treatment or punishment; and protection against 
racial. et hic, sexual or religious discrimination. (Articles 2-7,15 of the Universal Declara- 
ticm of human Rights). 
2. Legal rights. entailing access to remedies for violations of basic rights; the presumption of 
innocence; the guarantee of fair and impartial public trials; prohibition against ex post facto 
laws; and protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, and arbitrary interference 
with ore's family. home or reputation. (Articles 8-12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights). 
3. Civil li iess. especially rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; opinion and 
cxrcxse ; movcnunt and residence: and peaceful assembly and association. (Articles 13, 
18-20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
4. Subsistcncc rights. particularly the rights to food and a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of oneself and one's family. (Articles 25 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights). 
5. Economic rights, including princi . ally the rights to work, rest and leisure, and social secu- 
rity. (Ankles 22.24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
6. Social and cultural rights. especially rights to education and to participate in the cultural life 
of the community. (Articles 26.27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
7. Political rights. principally the right to take part in government with periodic and genuine 
univ ) and cqu: el suffrage (Article 21). in addition to the political aspects which accom- 
pally other civil libccriic; c. 
Sincc thc adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the General 
Asscis Wy his adoptcd nunzcrous declarations on conventions concentrating on human rights. 
7hcy dcal inter alia with -gc ; toeia , racial discrimination, apartheid, stateless persons, the rights of 
womcJ1, toilurc, youth, ilicns. 'Nddopmctut and social progre S9 The standard practice of states is 
" Ill h? i / r+, vA CC"-ý, burro-cnu. New Yott, Unittd Nuiona, 1988. his book comprdien- 
a1ycarft%Q', cOt-tu,! IcfF,, r A,. ý+i1", L; rnanIIghtsinitsmostup-to-&tcforn. 
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to treat the norms of the Universal Decl tion, the Covenants and recent instruments as interna- 
tional norms. but with self-selected national exemptions. "Adherence to these norms and charges 
of failure to live up to them are regular features of contemporary international politics ... Each 
state ... retains almost complete autonomy in implementing these norms at the national level ,., "lo 
Moreover. since the language of the Universal Declaration is open to interpretation, it is quite 
ambiguous. This however is considered by some as not being a defect. "Partial agreement and a 
partial advance is better than no advance at all. ' It 
Before examining the scope of international human rights and some of the problems facing 
its implementation. it would be in place to describe briefly some salient organs of the United 
Nations' human rights machinery and their functions. 
(a) Economic and Social Council 
As rncnticrncd cartics on in this paper, the ECOSOC is empowered by Articles 62 and 68 
(among othcr rcfcrcnccs) to encourage the promotion and protection of human rights within the 
international community. 
The ECOSOC, which is composed of 54 members, normally holds an organisational session 
and two regular scssions every yew. Human rights items are usually referred to the first (Spring) 
session of the Council's Second (Social) Committee, a "sessional" committee on which the 54 
nicnihars (9 the Council are represented, although some items are dealt with in plenary meetings 
without reference to a committee. T1ie reports of the Social Committee, which contain draft reso- 
lutions and draft decisions. arc submitted to the Council for consideration and final action in 
plcnary mcetings. 
To assist it in dc. iting with items relating to human rights, the Council has established the 
Commission on human Rights and the Commission on Human Rights in turn has established the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
y"D Jac) D, %vrvA., liuman Rifliu: o Ren Ansl}nia', tri rrnationalOrganisaron, vol. 40. no. 3. Summa 
ia, p ttýF. 
tt n, i, $j pn rf ri, ", a1..; wl v Mr haV. V fk n t,: n. iry attsch, ad to the Centre for t'Iranian Rights in Geneva in June. 
M9. 
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From time to time the Council has set up ad hoc committees composed of representatives of 
member states. experts nominated by their governments, or outstanding personalities serving in 
their personal cap:: ity. The Council has also, on occasion, appointed or authorised the 
Secrct: uy. Ger i to appoint special ra rporteurs or committees of experts to prepare reports on 
technical sub}ects. 1'- 
(b) Commission on 11111 min Rights 
The Commission was set up by the Economic and Social Council in 1946, and has met 
annually since that time. It is the main body dealing with human rights issues, since it may deal 
with any mattcr relating to human rights. 
The Commission cs studies, prepares recommendations and drafts international instru- 
ments relating to human rights. It also undertakes special tasks assigned to it by the General 
Assembly or the ECOSOC. including the investigation of allegations concerning violation of 
human rights and the handling of communications relating to such violations. It cooperates 
closely with all other United Nations bodies having competence in the field of human rights. 
The C is. sion. originally made up of 18 members who were responsible for the task of 
drafting the International Bill of Human Rights, is now composed of the representatives of 43 
member stairs elected for duve-year terms. It meets each year for a period of six weeks and 
opcratcs undcr the rules laid down by the ECOSOC. Only members of the Commission, or their 
alternates. have the right to vote. Although most Commission members are relatively non- 
ideological (whcn compared to their counterparts in the General Assembly), they are still 
instructed political dclcgatcs. Strict criteria of admissibility limit the cases considered; the Com- 
mission ttlay. lrnwcvcr. invite any state to participate in its deliberations or for that matter any 
national lihcr:, tion movctncnt on issues of particular concern to them. Specialised agencies, 
inter. govcminctntll orcanis tions and non-governmental organisations in consultative status with 
the ECOSOC may dcsicnatc authorised representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of 
11 Xt. -i« J+ :i dl, *. + ". Y. t'k t'`-rat r 1. (kmvk United Nati , October 1988, pp. 5-6. 
-174- 
the Commission. 
To assist in its work, the Commission has established a number of subsidiary bodies, 
including the Sufi-Conunission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In 
recent years. the Commission has set up organisations to investigate problems in specific coun- 
tries and territories as well as on thematic situations. In addition, the Commission has a variety of 
methods for dealing with violations of human rights. These include fact-finding by experts con- 
sisting of s vial ra eurs. representatives or other designees appointed by the Commission to 
study the situation of human rights in specific countries such as Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador, 
Guatcrosl t and the Islamic Republic of Irin, or on thematic situations such as Summary or Arbi- 
trary Executions. Religious Intolerance, Massive Exoduses and Mercenaries. 13 
Lastly, hut most importantly it should be noted that the Commission's strongest powers rest 
on ECOSOC resolution 1503 (XLVTII) (1970), which authorises the Commission to investigate 
communications (complaints) that "appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights". 14 Before the 1503 procedure was established, the Commis- 
sion - which had been authorised since 1948 to "receive" communications - however could not 
act on this "power" and hence was of no practical significance. 
(c) Sub"Connnlis' ion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
At its first session, in 1947. the Commission on Human Rights established the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (a) to undertake stu- 
dies, particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to make recom- 
mendations to the Commission concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating 
to human riFZ1ti and fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, religious and linguistic 
millontics: and (b) to perform any other functions entrusted to it by the ECOSOC or by the Com- 
mission. 
11 jud. (., 1. 
14 Str llc-ºr, S 1'c4k). -tic Cwxc&kd Crx1, in the Cis-dc*l: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
Re. jvý. c to C. ýW<rs. s1 Gennlcn+: ationý', lt+. M: h RiShu Qi rterly. no. 6, November 1984, pp. 460-62. 
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The Sub-Commission is composed of 26 experts elected by the Commission to serve, as of 
1988. for four-ycar periods. Although nominated by governments, these experts act in their per- 
sonal capacity and not as the representatives of States. 15 
The Sufi-Commission has established three working groups which meet regularly before 
each of its annual sessions to assist it with certain tasks: the Working Group on Communications, 
which examines allegations of violations, especially those which appear to reveal a consistent pat- 
tern of gross and reliably-attested violations of human rights; the Working Group on Slavery; and 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The Sub-Commission may establish sessional 
Working Groups like the one on the Rights of Persons Detained or Imprisoned. Each of the 
working groups submits its reports to the Sub-Commission for consideration and adopts its own 
resolutions and decisions, which may also be presented to the Commission and the ECOSOC. 
(d) human Rights, Committee 
This Committce was established in 1977 in accordance with article 28 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The signatories of the Covenant elect an 18-member 
Co aimittee to review state reports and to hear individual petitions from persons whose state has 
acccptcd the "optional protocoi". 16 The Committee is autonomous, as it does not take instructions 
from UN bodies, but reports directly to the General Assembly and interacts with the UN secre- 
ttuxat. This relative freedom has made the Committee an assertive and energetic group which has 
its own review methods. while at the same time maintaining a cooperative attitude towards 
states. 17 
Tbc Committee normally holds three sessions a year; at each session it examines reports 
front statc partics to the Covenant on the progress made in the promotion, protection and 
IS r_ SubC mn, nti n a, of 1ý? t) ha. incrca+n! its mcmhcrabip. A majority of these members have been selected from 
71W Wc, 1 tr-u;, ux-. ? T. i, m, -c ha+ thron cnt>tn+cd by some developed countries who believe that it could have an ad- 
versa e fire t Rn the ter. t>. ý nF C-1 01c ýu! -. Mnmi.. i m and on international protection of human rights. 
tt The OiAoi l l'rýu. J ta the Inter t or. a1 Cmcnant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signs- 
ture, n(ýuf, <Mion an.! wccý. nm 1" Gst. ru/, lsrcrnhlr retolurion 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. But it only came into 
force on :.. 1 M. rnh IQ, (,, Tlxe 0; -ix-n. l i'rot, ý: ol provided an international machinery for dealing with communications 
from Emir, .. iß. 1, (t,: r,: n; t_, tr of violation% of any of dte rights r. ct forthin the above mentioned Covenant. 
tt Dar's I). Ura3er the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human 
Rights C<*nmituc", A#- 'err. }-t J'-- ,f i'orrn.,:; n. t1 Grw, vol. 1, no. 76, January 1982, pp. 142-153. 
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difficulties faced in the implementation of human rights. 
By the end of 1987, there were 87 states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 39 of which had also ratified or acceded to the Optional Protocol, and 21 states 
which had made the declaration under article 41 of the Covenant recognising the competence of 
the Committee to consider communications relating to inter-State disputes. 
(e) Centre for Human Rights 
A number of United Nations bodies are concerned with human rights from time to time and 
in varying degrees. 18 The Centre for Human Rights, located in the United Nations Office at 
Geneva, is the Secretariat unit of the UN mostly concerned with human rights questions. The 
Centre, headed by the Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights who is also Director-General 
of the United Nations Office at Geneva - is made up of the office of the Under-Secretary-General 
and six main sections. The Centre maintains an office in New York at the UN headquarters. 
The office of the Under-Secretary-General, (at the time of writing Mr. Jan Martenson), is 
composed of (a) an Administrative Support Unit, which maintains liaison with organisational 
units providing the administrative, financial and personnel support services to the Centre. (b) the 
New York Office, which provides information and assistance to the office of the Secretary- 
General, and assists in coordinating the activities of the Centre with those of other Secretariat 
units at headquarters. (c) the Secretariat of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, which deals with urgent communications addressed to the Working Group and 
assists the group in taking urgent action in cases of disappearances. 
The six main sections are as follows: (i) an International Instruments Section, which carries 
out functions and responsibilities relating to the implementation of international human rights 
treaties. (ii) a Communications Section; which processes communications concerning allegations 
of violations of human rights under existing confidential procedures, such as the procedure 
18 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the four specialised agencies of the United Na- 
tions system have also a special interest in human rights matters. 
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governed by ECOSOC resolution 728F (XXVIII) and 1503 (XLVM); the Optional Protocol; arti- 
cle 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination; 
and article 22 of the Convention against Torture. (iii) a Special Procedures Section provides sub- 
stantive services to ad hoc or extra-conventional activities decided upon by the General Assem- 
bly, the ECOSOC and the Commission. This includes assistance to special or ad hoc working 
groups and/or special rapporteurs and representatives mandated in regard to situations of human 
rights in particular countries. 19 (iv) a Research, Studies and Prevention of Discrimination Section 
prepares studies and reports on the promotion and protection of human rights requested by human 
rights organs; assists in the drafting of international instruments on human rights being discussed 
by human rights organs. 20 (v) an Advisory Services Section administers the programme of 
advisory services and technical assistance in the field of human rights. (vi) an External Relations, 
Publications and Documentation Section, responsible for ensuring the effective functioning of the 
external relations aspects of United Nations human rights programmes and policies. 
Some thinkers advocate that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should not be 
viewed as a "static document" as this would see it end up as "unenforceable and unrealistic". It is 
the degree of unity which subsists in the minds of the readers which alone can give to it a mean- 
ingful content ... "And as that unity grows it can be given a more concrete shape - as, for exam- 
ple, has already been done in the case of the two Covenants on Human Rights and the Optional 
Protocol. "21 It would be fitting to consider in the same light the basic ideological differences 
which seem to have sharpened in the last decade. In addition to the great power ideologies, Islam 
has presented itself as an alternative to almost a billion people globally. Is it therefore possible 
considering those cleavages to secure an agreement between these rival ideologies/civilisations on 
a practical programme of implementing the rights and freedoms that have been set forth by the 
Universal Declaration? Furthermore, is it possible to resolve the problem of designing 
19 The author spent aperiod of one month (June to July, 1990) directly assisting the Chief of this Section, but more im- 
portantly Mr. Galindo Pohl the special representative on Iran appointed by the Commission to study the reported violations 
of human rights in that country. 
2e The author spent the first month of internship (May to June, 1990) assisting the Chief of the Section to prepare a 
travail preparatoire on the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
21 A. F. Brohi, "United Nations and Human Rights - II", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XLU, no. 5, January 1989, p. 46-47. 
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international machinery and procedures for the implementation of human rights? 
As referred to earlier on in this chapter, the procedural and implementation part of contem- 
porary international human rights is largely restricted to national jurisdiction. The Universal 
Declaration, though "widely accepted", 22 is only a stage in the achievement of international 
human rights; each state retains full sovereignty to determine the adequacy of its achievements. 
The Covenants do impose strict legal obligations on those who accept them by becoming parties 
to the treaties, but in the light of what was briefly mentioned earlier on cleavages in rival 
ideologies/civilisations, national performance cannot be fully subject to international supervision. 
Before the onset of Islamic revivalism -a phenomenon of which one of the end products 
was the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran - there was a more or less secular attitude among 
Muslim nations, which showed a willingness and desire to use the United Nations, especially the 
Commission on Human Rights, to create and elaborate human rights norms. With the consolida- 
tion of the Islamic government in revolutionary Iran, the Muslim nations of the world were 
imbued with a desire to interpret the provisions laid down in the Quran with regard to their 
human rights. This became a rallying point for Muslim populations to question the social policies 
of their ruling elites. 
In parallel, the UN system has also been through a struggle in the last decade. Two 
conflicting trends need to be elaborated. Firstly moves to internationalise norm creation and to 
extend the specificity and acceptance of international human rights are on the increase. There are 
certain groups, among them legal experts who believe that no development has been more 
significant for the development of human rights than the trend towards internationalisation. 23 
Secondly, there are widespread, vociferous, and usually effective claims of national 
sovereignty which counter any efforts to internationalise the scope of application of human rights 
norms. This is revealing of a general weakness which characterises what Donnelly refers to as the 
22 Measured by the number of State Parties who have ratified or acceded, the Universal Declaration may plausibly be 
judged to have attained the status of customary international law. 
23 See for example H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, Hamden, Connecticut, Shoe String Press, 
1968. 'The Intemationalisation of Human Rights", Proceedings of the General Education Seminar, vol. 6, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1977. 
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United Nations-centred "human rights regime". 24 
II. The Problematique of International Human Rights 
It remains extremely difficult to accept the concept of international human rights, let alone 
implement them universally, especially when international human rights are essentially viewed as 
a purely Western construct generated by political thinkers from England, France and the United 
States. 25 
The San Francisco Conference which laid the. foundations of the United Nations in 1945 
was convened and hence controlled by Western countries, and the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in December 1948 was the product of 
the legal and political thought which had developed in Europe and America from the seventeenth 
to the twentieth century. 26 Thus, to believe and accept that it was a universal declaration is in 
many ways to contradict the facts of modern history. 
Apart from the many non-Western states who had yet to gain independence in 1948, not all 
countries supported the Universal Declaration. The USSR, South Africa and Saudi Arabia 
abstained from voting, they had their own ideological systems to interpret and support human 
rights. 
In 1948, many Muslim nations objected to the inclusion of Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration which states that individuals have the freedom to change their religion. Saudi Arabia 
in particular attempted to have this article deleted, 27 because the Quran explicitly prohibits the 
renunciation of Islam by a Muslim. In this respect, according to some academics, the Universal 
Declaration which is now in force seems to be "predictated on the assumption that Western values 
24 "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis", op. cit., p. 609. 
u See Adamantia Pollis and P. Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western Construct with limited applicability" in A. Pollis 
(ed. ), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp. 1-18. 
26 The ideas of thinkers like Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson and Mills during the seventeenth to the eighteenth 
century were already incorporated in such political instruments as the English Petition of Rights (1627), The Habeas Corpus 
Act (1679), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the United States Constitution (1727), the American Bill of 
Rights (1791) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens (1789). Based on discussion with Raymond 
Kelly, (PhD student of political philosophy, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1989). 
27 Human Rights Documents, 98th Congress, Ist Session, 1983, Committee Print, p. 66. 
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are paramount and ought to be extended to the non-Western world. "28 Such values are either not 
acceptable or are meaningless in non-Western societies. 29 For instance, the socio-political and 
cultural systems prevailing in the Western world lay emphasis on the individual. It is believed in 
some non-Western countries that "the individual is an integral part of the greater whole, of a 
group within which one has a defined role and status. The basic unit of traditional society has 
varied - the kinship system, the clan, the tribal, the local community but not the individual. "30 
In Islam, human rights are conferred upon the individual by God and not by any human 
authority or legislative body. This of course is the ideal: where the rights of the individual cannot 
be subject to any modification and are binding on every Muslim, every Muslim Society and every 
Muslim state. 31 In reality most Muslim nations today are subject to a dual set of rules which is a 
hybrid between the secular civil code and the Islamic code. Thus when a state attempts to organ- 
ise itself along Islamic lines i. e. a strict implementation of provisions as laid down in the Quran, 
there arise instances where there may be a disagreement with codified international human rights 
law. 32 However as the preceeding footnote suggests, the basic rights due to individuals in Muslim 
societies are not very different from those set down in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Albeit tolerance for different belief systems have to be accompanied by an awareness of 
the more blatant violations, such as mistreatment of prisoners and political opponents. 
Taking into account the ideological dilemmas which exists in the interpretation of "interna- 
tional human rights", this chapter will move on to examine the nature of human rights in Iran. 
23 Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, op. cit., p. 8. 
29 References and arguments made by the Islamic Republic of Iran in this context will be discussed in succeeding sec- 
tion. 
30 Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological perspectives, op. cit., p. 8. 
31 Some of the most important human rights sanctioned by the Quran are the right to life (5: 32); the right to safety of life 
(5: 32); the right to a basic standard of life (51: 12); the right to equality of human beings (49: 13); the right to social justice 
(5: 3,5: 8,4: 135); the protection of honour (49: 11-12); the sanctity and security of private life (49: 12,24: 27); the protection 
from arbitrary imprisonment (6: 114); freedom of expression (9: 71,22: 41) and the right to cooperat or not to cooperate (5: 2). 
(First number in bracket, for example S in (5: 32) signifies the Chapter number, second number signifies the verse number). 
32 For example the provisions laid down in the Quran with regard to justice and punishment differ vastly from the Inter- 
national Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. 
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M. The Political and Legal Nature of the Human Rights Situation in Iran 
Human rights in Iran can be viewed from several different perspectives. Given the aims set 
out at the beginning, it becomes necessary to examine the political dimensions of human rights in 
pre-revolutionary Iran in relation to legal provisions and their implementation. Reference will 
also be made to President Carter's emphasis on a more morally oriented foreign policy and the 
extent to which this had an effect on the Shah's handling of human rights in Iran. 
Iran was one of the 44 states which voted in favour of the adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948, and in 
April 1968 the Shah spoke in support of the declaration when opening the International Confer- 
ence on Human Rights in Tehran. 33 Furthermore, Iran has ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Iran, however, has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, which would per- 
mit individuals to have complaints regarding violations of their human rights examined by the 
Human Rights Committee. 
In October 1976, the Shah himself, when asked about the total number of political prisoners 
in his country, stated that there were perhaps 3,000.34 The deputy director of SAVAK, Parviz 
Sabeti, stated in an interview in September 1976 that there were 3200 political prisoners. 35 Esti- 
mates made by foreign journalists and exile groups ranged from 25,000 to 100,000.36 These 
discrepencies in figures based on the lack of information and the propaganda efforts of opposition 
members makes a real evaluation difficult to this day. 37 Moreover during the reign of the Shah, 
NGOs like Amnesty International were never given an opportunity to visit Iran. Hence most of 
the information was provided by former prisoners and the families of prisoners, usually living in 
33 For details on the International Year for Human Rights we Keesing's, vo1. XVI, 1968, p. 22545. For Proclamation of 
the Tehran Conference on Human Rights see Keesing's, vo1. XVU, 1969, pp. 23193-23195. 
34 Le Monde, 1 October, 1976. 
33 Washington Post, 3 September 1976. 
36 Amnesty International Monograph entitled 'IRAN', Amnesty International Briefing Papers, November 1976, p. 6. 
37 During my internship at the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva, I came across the names of a number of persons on 
lists compiled by opposition groups which had appeared in lists prepared in previous years. One of my jobs was to cross 
check these names before preparing a final list for the attention of the Iranian Government. 
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the West. Before examining the more contemporary nature of the Human Rights situation in 
Post-Shah Iran it would help to briefly examine the same in Pahlavi Iran. This would identify the 
areas of continuity and change in human rights policy in Iran. 
(i) The Political Context 
The suppression of political opposition in Pahlavi Iran was carried out by SAVAK. 
SAVAK'S activities extended beyond Iran to all countries which had sizeable Iranian communi- 
ties. In particular, Iranian students abroad were subject to added surveillance. There have been 
numerous reports of the activities of SAVAK officials attached to Iranian embassies and in 
August 1976 the Swiss government expelled an Iranian diplomat accredited to the United Nations 
in Geneva because he was involved in "prohibited intelligence activities. "38 
Political repression increased in 1975 when the token opposition Mardom Party was abol- 
ished and the one-party system - with the formation of Rastakhiz (National Resurgence) Party 
was introduced - when announcing the formation of the Rastakhiz, the Shah declared that those 
who refused to support it could either leave the country or go to prison. 39 
(ii) Legal Situation 
(a) Among the numerous articles of the Iranian Penal Code and the Military Penal Code and 
Procedures under which political prisoners were held, those listed below were the most com- 
monly used. 
Iranian Penal Code: Articles 1-7 of the Act for the punishment of persons acting against the 
security and independence of the state provide for the punishment of persons "forming or belong- 
ing to organisations opposed to the monarchy, or having a collectivist ideology"; "working for the 
separation of part of the State"; "taking armed action against the government"; "making pro- 
paganda inside Iran on behalf of people committing the above crimes or acting against the 
33 International Herald Tribune, 31 August 1976.1 was told of this incident by an Iranian who was a student in Geneva 
during this time and allegedly also under surveillance. 
39 International Herald Tribune, 4 March 1975. 
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constitutional monarchy outside Iran". Sentences under these articles ranged from three years 
imprisonment to death 40 
Articles 61,62 and 63 of the Iranian Penal Code provided sentences from two years to death 
for anyone who "assists a foreign state to attack or enter Iranian territory or who has communica- 
Lion with an enemy of Iran which benefits the enemy politically and militarily. " 
Articles 64,65 and 66 deal with espionage offences, all punishable by a mandatory death sen- 
tence. 
Military Penal Code and Procedures. Articles 316-320 provide for the trial and punishment of 
those "participating in, or plotting, the assassination of the Shah or Crown Prince". 
(a) Arrest and Detention Procedures 
There existed a difference between the legal provisions concerning detention and actual 
practice. Although SAVAK was responsible for the internal security of the state, the Military 
Justice and Penal Review of 193841 provided that where the investigator orders an arrest, the 
agreement of the Office of the Military Prosecution (an entity independent of SAVAK) must be 
secured within 24 hours. However, in practice SAVAK conducted the entire investigation and the 
suspects reportedly did not have access to a lawyer and were often held incommunicado until 
brought to trial or released. 42 
(b) Conduct of Trials 
All trials of political prisoners were held before military tribunals, with attendant military 
counsel for the prosecution and the defence. Upon completion of the SAVAK investigation, the 
accused was allowed access to a defence counsel 10 days before the trial. The counsels for 
defence were usually retired army officers with no knowledge of law. Proceedings were usually 
40 A report in one of Tehran's largest daily newspapers stated that penalties for some of the above offences were to be 




held in camera. The court was composed of four serving officers, sitting without a jury. 
The prosecution was not required to produce evidence in court if the case originated from 
SAVAK files, and the defence was not allowed to introduce evidence to support the case other 
than the testimony of the defendant. In practice the defendant was presumed guilty and those 
who recanted before the court received shorter sentences 43 
(c) Allegations of Torture 
The codified law in pre-revolutionary and post-Shah Iran expressly prohibits the use of tor- 
ture and the practice of holding prisoners incommunicado for long periods before the trial, as the 
latter invariably leads to torture during the period between arrest and trial. Allegations of deaths 
under torture were, however, not uncommon. 
The Shah, in an interview with a French daily, never denied that torture existed in Iran. 
"Why should we not employ the same methods as you Europeans? We have learned sophisticated 
methods of torture from you. You use psychological methods to extract the truth: we do the 
same. "44 
(d) Capital Punishment 
According to Amnesty International reports judicial executions were common in Iran. 
Since the beginning of 1972 [report published in 1976] well over 300 executions of people tried 
by military tribunals had taken place. In July 1974 the Iranian government announced that 239 
drug smugglers or pedlars had been executed since 1972. But owing to insufficient information 
and the summary nature of trial procedures, NGOs and human rights bodies regard the official 
description of such executions with reservation. 45 This was also a feature which characterised 
executions of persons in 1988/1989. 
43 These observations of the trial procedure were confirmed by a political refugee who has been living in Europe since 
1975 and who is a lawyer by profession. In his own case he was detained without charges and had his sentence reduced on 
appeal. Discussions held in Geneva, 1990. 
'M See Le Monde, 1 October 1976. 
45 Amnesty International Briefing Papers, November 1976, op. cit., p. 9. 
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The Shah's government forces killed many political activists in the streets or during police 
raids, the worst of which took place in 1978.46 It was during this period that President Carter 
insisted that human rights should start playing an important role in US foreign policy, and this 
sparked off a debate in his administration. 47 This debate may have altered the policies of the Car- 
ter presidency towards strategically less important regimes in Latin America. But the national 
interests of the US in Iran could not be jeopardised on grounds of human rights. President 
Carter's visit to Iran in 1977 confirmed this and helped in a way to legitimise the actions of the 
Shah's regime. ̀  According to some authors "when human rights are stressed today it is usually 
as a radical manifestation of some more vital strategic interest" 49 
On the other hand, the Carter administrations reference to human rights in foreign policy did 
have an effect on the movement opposed to the Shah within Iran. Individuals and groups began 
to explore the boundaries of political activity hitherto denied to them. In order to appease the 
Carter administration, the Shah attempted to accommodate political opposition, which only 
encouraged open and hostile activities. The Shah reacted with brutal repressive measures, often 
followed by concessions, a pattern which was interpreted as a sign of weakness 50 However, 
when President Carter arrived in Tehran in December 1977, he described Iran as an `island of sta- 
bility' and the Shah as a popular statesman. In the following year - particularly on September 8 
1978 commonly known as "Black Friday" - many unarmed demonstrators were killed. President 
Carter took time out from his Camp David discussions and assured the Shah over the phone of 
46 "Most reliable estimates are that between 20,000 and 65,000 Khomeini supporters were killed in the streets during 
1978". See Richard Falk, "Human Rights in a Revolutionary Situation: Preliminary Observations on the Iranian Case", 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 10, no. 2,1979, p. 179. 
47 There were two schools of thought, one of which supported 'a more moral foreign policy' and "another which sup- 
ported human rights values (along with an increased mobilisation of military power) as an element in a renewed ideological 
offensive against the Soviet Union". Marshall D. Shulman, "On learning to live with Authoritarian Regimes", Foreign Af- 
fairs, vol. 55, no. 2, January 1977, p. 325. 
48 Lynne Shivers, 'Inside the Iranian Revolution', in D. H. Albert (ed. ), Tell the American People: Perspectives of the 
Iranian Revolution, Philadelphia, Movement for a New Society, 1980, p. 79. 
49 Richard W. Cottam, 'Comment: Human Rights in Iran Under the Shah', Case Western Reserve Journal of Interna- 
tional law, vol. 12, no. 1, winter 1980. p. 132. Prof. Cottam adds: 'Pointing to Soviet violation of human rights for example 
is an exercise likely to be indulged in most enthusiastically by the very elements in the American government that were 
most protective of the Shah'. 
So In my discussions with certain Iranians in Tehran, there was a belief that the Shah was actually too magnanimous and 
was not prepared to resort to unlimited levels of violence against his people. It was also their opinion that, had he done so, 
the revolution might never have come to pass. 
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continuing support. For an opposition responding to the Carter administration's call for human 
rights in foreign policy since early 1977, there was no longer any doubt. They saw Carter as a 
hypocrite, confused in the area of human rights. 5' 
Some authors argue that Carter's human rights policy in Iran was a "doctrine without a stra- 
tegy". 52 Policy-makers in Iran under the Shah attributed President Carter's preoccupation with 
human rights to his religious background. In the opinion of Stanley Hoffman the subject of 
human rights is by definition confrontationl and can be a dangerous issue, inevitably increasing 
tensions with our enemies. If pursued very avidly, it reduces potential cooperation on a number 
of other world issues. The same author adds that a human rights based policy is almost always 
complicated by the problem of consistency and thereby treating human rights separately from all 
other issues may distort foreign policy. 53 It may be said that this analysis explains to a consider- 
able extent US-Iran relations in the period leading up to the demise of the Pahlavi regime. 
IV. Human Rights and the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
This section will address some of the myriad of issues regarding the human rights situation 
in post-revolutionary Iran. How did it evolve? How did the United Nations come to regard it as a 
situation which merited an individual mandate? What were the political and humanitarian causes 
which resulted in the Human Rights Commission appointing a special rapporteur to study the 
question of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran? Finally, consideration will be given to 
the impact the human rights question continues to have on Iran's international relations and pol- 
icy formulation. 
During the last stage of the revolutionary struggle - that is between the time that the Shah 
left on January 16,1979 and the surrender of the armed forces on February 11 - there was a proli- 
feration of arms into the movement. The immediate aim was to gain total control over the state, 
particularly the military bureaucracy. The dissident elements in the armed forces and the guerrilla 
51 Kayhan International, January 7,1978. 
52 "Comment Human Rights in Iran under the Shah", op. cit., p. 321. 
53 Stanley Hoffman, "No Choice, No Illusions", Foreign Polity, no. 25, Winter 1976-1977, especially pp. 126-128. 
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groups (People's Fedayeen and Mojahedin) carried the conflict to unmanageable proportions 
(with what was left of the Shah's army and police) before securing a complete surrender of the 
imperial forces. 
It was in the wake of this struggle that the circumstances were created for retribution. 
Although the morale of the armed forces was at its lowest, there nevertheless remained the old 
leadership which not only posed a threat to the revolution but in the minds of many needed to be 
brought to justice. This resulted in a wave of summary executions which, according to certain 
members of the revolutionary high command were unavoidable because a more orderly process 
might have exposed the country to an anti-revolutionary coup 54 The threat within the revolution- 
ary movement became apparent in the forming of various factions in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Pahlavi regime. The left was a major contender for power in the post-revolutionary phase, 
while the various militant groups who had lost a number of their guerrillas over the years wanted 
their share of credit for the victory. And the main ethnic minorities accounting for almost half of 
the country's population urgently pressed for autonomy and hitherto suppressed rights. These 
myriad demands posed a challenge to the revolutionary leadership, and were seen by them as 
prime targets for outside forces who may have wanted to weaken the new government in Iran. 55 It 
is against this background that human rights in Iran should be examined. 
Special courts, known as Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals, were established in Iran after 
February 1979. These tribunals had full authority of the Komitehs (or religious revolutionary 
councils) to see that "revolutionary justice" was meted out. Executions were mainly directed 
against those loyal to the Shah, including leaders of the armed forces, and those who were felt to 
be associated with the SAVAK and a number of ordinary criminals. 56 The arbitrariness of the 
54 Based on discussions in Geneva, June 15 1990. 
55 Iranian memories and fears of a US-sponsored coup in 1953 which toppled Mossadegh's government added to the 
general xenophobic feeling. This was apparent in the hostile opposition to Bazargan's cabinet which struggled to preserve 
the secular and technocratic legacy of the Pahlavi regime. 
56 "To have occupied a position of responsibility within the Imperial Army [was] held to be maintaining the Shah's rule 
over a defenceless people" and "Participation in strengthening the colonialist hold", these have been among the changes 
which have resulted in arbitrarily execution. All those charged and convicted of the above offences were declared to be 
"corrupt on earth" (Mofsed-c-Fel'Ayz). Executions also took place for counter-revolutionary offences and abroad category 
of both violent and sexual crimes". Sea "Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran", (a report covering events 
within the seven month period following the Revolution of February 1979), Al Index: MDE 13103/80, February 1980, p. 7. 
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trials violated certain rights of the accused, but must be seen in the light of the revolutionary tur- 
moil and the fear of outside intervention. 
Mr. Mehdi Bazargan assumed office as head of a "Provisional Revolutionary Government". 
It resigned on 6 November 1979 and the Islamic Revolutionary Council assumed full responsibil- 
ity for the affairs of state. During the brief period in which the Provisional Government was in 
office it had no control over the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals; they were completely indepen- 
dent bodies 57 Earlier that year, in April 1979, during a session of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee the Iranian delegate, Mr. Shemiraini, said that Iran, "as a state party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, would in due course submit a report to the 
Human Rights Committee in conformity with Article 40 of the Covenant". 58 
In the confusion which took place in the aftermath of the fall of the Shah's forces, a host of 
human rights stood to be violated. Both secular and religious leaders were engaged in efforts to 
restore some semblance of order. Public appeals for calm were continuously being broadcasted 
on "Voice of the Revolution" radio. In the first two weeks of the victory, Tehran's main prisons 
were full of persons arrested by the revolutionary militia, mainly comprising "SAVAK" agents 
and "counter-revolutionaries". Those arrested were handed over to the Komitehs, whose function 
was to restore order to their locality and promote the message of the Islamic Revolution. Arrests 
without proper authorisation or by persons unconnected with either the militia or the Komitehs 
were common. 59 
Local revolutionary Komitehs were created and assumed certain responsibilities in the wake 
of the revolution's success. This consisted of groups of people who took over jurisdiction in local 
quarters. Komitehs were primarily formed to perform a security function, for example, patrolling 
37 This is clearly indicated in an excerpt from an interview with Mr. Mehdi Bazargan published in the International 
Herald Tribune on 31 October 1979 in which he said - "I have already explained to you that the revolutionary tribunals are 
not subject to the government, they do not act in accordance with the government, they are completely outside my control". 
58 "Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran", p. 6, paragraph 28. 
59 One of the earliest indications of the existence of arbitrary arrest procedures, undertaken without proper authorisation 
is reflected in a statement made by Ayatollah Khomeini. This statement forbade the public to enter private houses or to 
make arrests without authorisation. "You must identify the criminals to the provisional Islamic government so that steps 
can be taken for their arrest and trial. This is an Islamic order and acting contrary to it is not permissible". Quoted in ibid., 
p. 18. 
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the streets during the night. The Komitehs were quite autonomous, owing their allegiance only to 
the leaders of the revolution. Since the Komitehs operated outside the preview of the Govern- 
ment and lacked any unified command structure, they were the most likely to exercise their 
authority without any restraint. 
The undisciplined nature of the Komitehs behaviour was regularly reprimanded by the reli- 
gious leaders of the revolution. Ayatollah Shariat-Madari issued a communique in which he said, 
"It is repeatedly heard that armed ... individuals 
forcefully enter houses to arrest what 
they call the criminals of the former regime thus causing fright and inconvenience 
among the families. Such individuals are warned once again that the majority of the 
former government's employees are decent citizens and that the punishment of those 
responsible for the past crimes ... 
falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provi- 
sional Islamic government ... Such actions otherwise would be illegal and would be 
regarded as an anti-revolutionary act. "60 
In order to curb the excesses of the Komitehs, which seemed to seriously undermine the 
credibility of the revolution, Mohammad Riza Mahdavi-Kani, Chief of the Central Provisional 
Komiteh for the Islamic Revolution, issued a set of regulations setting out the functions and 
activities of all Komitehs. The situation did not improve immediately and unlawful arrests con- 
tinued. The command staff of the Corps of Islamic Revolutionary Guards61 or Pasdaran issued a 
statement saying that it expected "all our dear compatriots to continue, as before, to cooperate 
with the responsible authorities and with the Komitehs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in 
furthering the aims of the revolution by informing on counter revolutionary elements and by 
uncovering and neutralising their plots and treacherous anti-popular actions ... "62 
The situation with regard to the Komiteh began to deteriorate at such a speed, that the Revo- 
lutionary Prosecutor-General issued a statement withdrawing all powers which were hitherto 
exercised by the Revolutionary Komitehs. A statement by Revolutionary Prosecutor-General 
Mehdi Hadavi addressed to, "All the revolution prosecution departments, the revolution Komitehs 
and the revolution grounds throughout the country [ordered] that all warrants issued for the deten- 
tion of persons or property ... for the search of houses up to the present date by the Revolution 
60 PARS News Agency "Daily News" (in English), Tehran, 24 February 1979, p. 3. 
61 The full title of this corps in Persian reads "Setad Farmandahiyek Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Engelab-e Islami". 
62 BBC summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 23 March 1979, (MW6074/A/16). 
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Public Prosecutor are repealed and invalid ... violators of any rank or office related to any political 
or military organisation shall be prosecuted ... [and] dismissed from revolutionary organisations 
and severely punished. "63 
This was followed by a circular addressed to the Central Komiteh from the Tehran Prosecu- 
tor Abolfazl Shahshahani, explaining that the Tehran Police were ready to exercise law and order 
functions and that the prosecutors in Tehran and its suburbs would only accept files if they were 
accompanied by reports from police stations. M 
All these efforts however, did not manage to correct the situation especially with regard to 
unlawful arrests and forced entry into homes. In Khuzestan for example, a province experiencing 
armed conflict between the Arab and Persian groups, Ayatollah Shaikh Mohammad Taher al 
Shabbir Khaqani said that "irresponsible people enter the homes of people and create havoc 
among them. "65 There were further attempts made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards corps 
who, in a public statement, warned against those who posed as Guardsmen and entered homes to 
steal. The statement also explained that no revolutionary guard was allowed entry into private 
homes without a valid warrant from the Public Prosecutor and a personal identification card. 66 
Continued illegal arrests, confiscation of private property, extra judicial punishments etc, 
were seriously threatening the internal cohesion of the country. Most precarious was the position 
of the revolution itself vis-a-vis the people. There was wide-scale dissatisfaction with the security 
organs of the revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini was well aware of the situation and this is reflected 
in some of the speeches he made during that period. 
"We are at present on the borders of being in great danger, which is worse than the 
danger of the previous regime ... when a man, after 
finding himself free, after he has 
seen the walls of despotism broken, after emerging from the prison of 35 million peo- 
ple, breaks the bridle, and does whatever he likes ... "67 
63 BBC SWB, 17 April 1979, (ME/6093/A/6). Announcement by the Revolutionary Prosecutor-General Mehdi-Hadani. 
66 BBC SWB, 24 April 1979, (ME/6099/A/9 and M$/6099/A/10). Circular issued by the office of Tehran Prosecutor 
Abolfazl Shahshahani. The prosecutors circular made it clear that ... "the central police department of the country, the 
Tehran police and subsidiary police units and personnel with full equipment, [were] ready to preserve security and public 
order". 
65 Quoted in "Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran", op. cit., p. 24. 
66 BBC SWB (MW6111/A/9) 9 May 1979. 
67 Excerpted from a speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom in the month of June 1979. Quoted in "Law and Hu- 
man Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran", op. cit., p. 29. 
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In unequivocal terms he admonished the Päsdaran (Revolutionary Guards) for not respect- 
ing Islamic principles while exercising their powers. "Are you only a Pasdar [Revolutionary 
Guard] and possess a rifle and power to enter into houses and trample on the self-respect of peo- 
ple? Is this the training of Islam, or is this anarchy? "68 
In order to diffuse an anarchic situation from developing, due to the rivalries which existed 
within the revolutionary bodies responsible for justice and internal security, 69 Ayatollah 
Khomeini announced a general amnesty. 
"All those accused of certain criminal acts under the former regime are to be pardoned, 
with the exception of those who have committed murders or have issued orders for 
such acts ... To identify such crimes, a 
body faithful to the Islamic revolution shall be 
responsible 70 He further added, with regard to the Shah's armed forces, "... the three 
branches of the forces are being pardoned, and I and the noble people forgive them ... 
(with the exception of those accused of murder, torture or connected with ordering 
such actions against the people. ) However, until such time when their guilt is proven 
within the context of the religious law, no-one has the right to cause them any trou- 
ble. "71 
The above statements reflect a genuine concern felt by the leaders of the revolution espe- 
cially with regard to the limits of revolutionary justice. All the same, non-governmental organisa- 
tions like Amnesty International started an awareness campaign of the abuse of human rights in 
Iran. The campaign was hugely successful because "... powerful outside interests were aligned 
with the policies of the old order in Iran, an enormous incentive exist[ed] to discredit the new 
order. The most prevalent way to achieve this result was to point up human rights abuses that 
support a most malicious falsehood: namely, that what has happened in Iran is that one tyranny 
has been replaced by another. "72 This belief was however reinforced with the taking hostage of 
American diplomatic personnel in Tehran in 1979. 
68 AM 
69 According to discussions held in Tehran, one of the largest prisons (Qasr) had been taken over by elements who re- 
fused to accept the authority of the Tehran Public Prosecutor. These people were apparently using the prison since the revo- 
lution to hold counter-revolutionary elements. This led the Public Prosecutor to issue strict orders to the competent authori- 
ties not to make further arrests (for fear of overcrowding other prisons) till Qasr had been handed back to his office. 
70 BBC. SWB, 10 July 1979 (ME/6163/A/7). 
71 BBC, SWB, 10 July 1979 (MF16163/A/8). 
72 Richard Falk, "Human Rights in a Revolutionary Situation: Preliminary Observations on the Iranian Case", Bulletin 
of Peace Proposals, vol. 10, no. 2,1979, p. 181. 
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IV. 1 The United Nations and Human Rights in Iran 
The mood in the United Nations during this period was predictable. Only the year before, 
following a General Assembly resolution, the drafting of a Convention against the Taking of Hos- 
tages was underway. The Convention demanded of state parties to help promote the maintenance 
of international peace and security and to respect the right to life, liberty and security of person, 
as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Iran did not take part in the deliberations and failed to vote in finalising the 
text of the Resolution 73 
On 4 November 1979. a group of Iranian students occupied the American Embassy in 
Tehran and held its staff hostage. A little more than a month later, the International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages opened for signature. Almost pre-empting what was to follow for 
some states, the Gcncral Assembly in its 1979 session re-opened a proposal going back to 1972 
and 1976 - i. e. measures to outlaw international terrorism. An ad hoc committee was established 
which met in New York from 19 March to 6 April 1979. The committee's debate centred on a 
working paper jointly submitted by Iran among other countries 74 The paper presented a list of 
socio-political and economic causes, and stated that it was in the nature of some states to dom- 
inate, exploit and c pand. Colonialism, imperialism, racial discrimination, interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries also figured as prominent causes. The debate in the General 
Assembly was marked by considerable disagreement regarding the definition of international ter- 
rorism. While some states felt it amounted to hijackings and the taking of hostages, others felt 
that it was a deliberate choice of states to further their foreign policy objectives. It was decided to 
put off discussions till the thirty-sixth session. 75 
In the light of the continuing crisis, Khomeini announced that, unless the United States 
r-11- i-; vpCelle ralAxir, ý. 'yXeiat, s; on33/19of 29November 1978, the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committer 
on the D'' ,r ef a't lurn+ati.. zt Ct'. ". v, rio' Ataihrt Uu Taking of Hostages held its third cession at Geneva from 19 
aaswuiry to 161 41 vVyy 1979. 
"O het -rauics Ftrr Alprn&. rub"-s, India. Nigeria, Panama, the Syrian Arab Republic. Tunisia, Venezuela. Yu- 
two, It, i. ue a 7,. rnb%a Yrs. t "k of dw UnitrJNatinns, New York. United Nations. vol33.1979, p. 1146.1150. 
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delivered the Shah to iran. there could be no release of hostages. Efforts were also made by 
several Western personalities including the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's spokesman to 
the United Nations to secure their release. 76 This period marked the beginning of the formation of 
an international opinion detrimental to Iran. On the urging of the United States, the matter was 
taken up by the Security Council where a number of countries voiced their desire to take part in 
the discussions. The general view of the Council was that Iran's taking of hostages violated the 
fundamental principles of international law and diplomatic practice. Among the non-members of 
the Council. Egypt stated that the ongoing situation was contrary to Islam, others called upon Iran 
to release all hostages immediately and fulfill its obligations to international law, whatever 
grievances it had against the United States. After consultations with the permanent and non- 
permanent members of the Security Council and at the proposal of the United States Secretary of 
State. Secrctary-General Kurt Waldheim made preparations to visit Iran to seek the release of hos- 
tagen 7 
Dr Waldheim visited Tehran from January 1 to 4,1980 with the threefold purpose of finding 
solutions to the continuing crisis which was openly referred to as the US-Iranian crisis by the 
Soviets: the case of the personnel of the United States embassy; and the grievances of the Iranian 
people in relation to the previous regime. Events on the second day of his stay in Tehran 
prompted one journalist to comment "Dr Waldheim recognised that we would not shift from the 
position we had taken. When he faced the thousands in front of the embassy asking for the Shah 
to be repatriated and met those tortured in the Shah's prisons he promised to carry our problems 
to the United Nations" 7s On returning to the US the Secretary General proposed that an interna- 
tional inquiry In held into Iran's allegations of United States' involvement in the Shah's regime, 
especially with regard to widespread human rights abuses 79 President Carter, however, insisted 
7* SetKrel; rtp"t. voi\. XVl. 19$O. pp. 30., OS"6. 
Tr At the is tr: Totu the rgvr. tntztt+V» of Au%tr I* Auattia. Belgium. Canada. Egypt, the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
C eetct. lisr. Ita1). Ju . Lt. tris. *1, la.. i Mauritius. the Netherlands. Panama, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, 
Yugoslavia 
and Urc w rm in., ud to putýapattc in S,. cu. ýiana The Security Council met for the first time over five days 
from 27 No- 
vemlVr to 1 Dc«ml. er 19'9. 
T° The weed, of a' jamArnahat in Teissan. who during the upheavals had just completed his military service in the Imperial 
Army. (u 31+t 19' Cä. Tu3rau. 
' 1u: -na1 Urrmfd i. A )anuary. 19th. 
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that there could be no preconditions for the release of the hostages and the United Nations Secu- 
rity Council should impose sanctions without any delay. 80 
Apart from the hostage crisis there was a combination of factors that led the United Nations 
to show continued interest in the situation of human rights in Iran. Measures taken to secure the 
revolution from within and to enforce Islamic law, especially in large urban centres resulted in 
drawing the attention of non-governmental human rights agencies. The findings of these agencies 
were widely used by governments in whose interest it was to exert pressure on Iran. Political 
opposition groups like the People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI) came to wield a lot of influence on 
the UN Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. The PMOI, which is based in Paris, kept the Centre 
flooded with information on the Human Rights situation in Iran. They provided lists of names of 
persons who had disappeared and were alleged to have been executed. A majority of the cases 
provided by the PMOI lacked basic information and hence could not be treated as authentic. 
Nevertheless, the sheer number of cases provided by the PMOI ensured that at least some would 
be included in the Centre's memorandums to the Iranian Government. 81 
However, the single most influential factor which got a number of Western Governments to 
put additional pressure on the Centre to reprimand Iran in the harshest terms, was the latter's 
alleged treatment of a religious minority (whom the Constitution of Iran does not recognise as 
such) called the Baha'is. After the hostage crisis had come to an end, the reported ill-treatment of 
the Iiaha'is in Iran became the cause celehre of many governments in their relentless pursuit of 
implementing international human rights. During the 1981 session of the Commission on Human 
Rights. the situation of B 'is was on the agenda of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereby to be referred to as the Sub-Commission). 
" On 31 ikccmlcr 1970. the Security Council ad*iftd resolution 461 (meeting 2184) by 11 votes to 0 and 4 absten- 
tion* 11. njl«k. la C rcl, .. lav. ti ia, 1i uasit and the USSR). The resolution called for effective measures to betaken under 
Articlss 39 And 41 cd tc Chance in cam of non. coenfrliance by Iran. The Soviet Union felt that since the issue was between 
Iran and 0- Un; kd Sisteti it s old be settled bilaterally and hence did not fall under Chapter VII of the Charter or merit 
the use of t. tier,.. 1v fvil teat of the rtaolutions s SJINFIJS Resoluriotu and Decisions of the Security Council, 1979. 
p. 24. 
" M- 6 my ýr krr,. ý p at the Ce=ntre fee Human Rights in Geneva, one of my tasks was to cross-check the names of 
pcrnc, fss duirlr uc. f rar stiegrsil y h5J ! esse executed. On one such occasion I came across a number of names provided by 
the I'MOl "N. ch hsJ tern ': mired of where the surname of one person had been substituted for the forename and vice- 
fcna. 
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C da$' and Australia" circulated notes verbales drawing the attention of the Secretary-General 
to the fact that the situation of Baha'is had been discussed in their respective national parliaments. 
In this light it was requested that the issue should be discussed in the forthcoming session of the 
Sub-Commission. During the thirty-eighth session of the Sub-Commission, the situation con- 
cerning the Baha'i community was discussed and a resolution adopted. The resolution, while cal- 
ling for protection of the rights and freedoms of the Baha'is, implied the conviction that the 
Iranian Government desired to eliminate the Baha'i Faith from the land of its birth. 84 
Hitherto silent. Iran in a note verbale informed the Secretary-General that "human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual are enshrined in the Constitution", which provides that 
'Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians shall be the sole recognised religious minorities". 
Quoting Ayatollah MSoussavi Ardebili, President of the Supreme Court, the note added, "The 
rights of Ron-Muslim Iranians are protected in the same way as those of Muslim Iranians ... it 
should be noted that there are numerous Iranian Baha'is living in complete security in Iran ... The 
only ones who are prosecuted and sentenced are those who have been involved in acts of 
espionage and often activities contrary to the higher interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran" 85 
In conclusion, it was also nicntioncd that the issue of the maltreatment of the Baha'is was part of 
a campaign to discredit the Islamic Revolution. 86 
Resolution 8 ()=TV) of 13 August 1981 resulted in the Secretary-General beginning 
direct talks with the Iranian government. It also marked the beginning of the United Nations 
involvemcni in studying the human rights situation in Iran. On 3 November 1981, the Secretary- 
General in a no: verbale drew the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran to the 
Commission's concern about the 'perilous situation faced by the Baha'i Community', and 
"ac Uws. JN. s: «r+, Docowat (huak+y referred to as UNDoc) FJCN. 411476. 
Sre USM. c.. l. V A/)47S. 
71K,, trat cf f: c. -letn"tt $ (NC-CM) of de Sub-Commission can be found in UNDoc. E CN. 4/1517. The resolution 
V, a% ºd CJ t" 19 tcu. to 0. M, L't 3 at-utui n. Ac<cwding to a UN functionary connected with the organisation of the 
Snl. "C. Knnaý.. rýat te Rt2, a', +"crc  4 e l. ýhsi+ts thin the Commission and Sub-Commission and were able to convince 
tnrmhrrº of the u he l. t f that t, ic Itanian Fmcsmxni's treatment of their community was tantamount to genocide. 
VVj%r. I1116 fL'Cti. ýSub: ýtT3. 
i2 
.Te li aru an wcrc.! etcd to Ow UN have always maintained that they consider all questions related to 
hu- 
nten ri h as t. r u. 4 1 .. me atly r" i+atnl and heck e equivalent to an interference in the internal affairs of their country. 
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requested further ijiformation. 87 
In a reply, the Iranian government maintained that measures were taken against only those 
Baha'is who were involved in spying and other acts of treason ̀ in the interest of foreigners'. 88 
The reply of the Iranian government failed to satisfy the Sub-Commission and, in his report 
to the Commission at its 1981 session, and the Secretary-General listed his own initiatives. In 
conjunction with operative paragraph 4 of resolution 8 (XX IV), notes were sent to the following 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 'requesting information about the treatment of Baha'is 
in Iran': the Council of Europe, Amnesty International, the World Council of Churches, the Inter- 
national Federation of Human Rights, the International League for Human Rights, the Interna- 
tional Commission of Jurists, Pax Romana, the World Moslem Congress, the Islamic Conference 
and the Baha'i International Community. s9 This formidable array of NGOs explored every chan- 
nel to gather information, thus widening the issue and setting the precedent for future NGO 
involvement. Many of the above mentioned NGOs were funded by powerful governments, but 
conclusive proof of this is beyond the scope of discussion here. 
The Council of Europe took a unified stance, its Committee of Ministers deplored the fact 
that the fundamental rights of the Baha'is were not safeguarded in Iran and supported the 
Secretary-Gencrtl of the United Nations in the execution of the mission entrusted to him by the 
Sub-Commission. 90 The old and influential Baha'i International Community, which is a category 
I NGO with consultative status to the ECOSOC, provided a report listing the alleged systematic 
persecution of Baha'is in Iran. 91 During the last decade and in particular after the appointment of 
the Special Rapporteur, the plight of the Baha'is has received continuous attention. Their situa- 
tion seemed suddenly to change for the better in the late 1980s, aspects of which will be discussed 
later on in the charter. 
tlsn, r., Nc tt r. CL'SO J4 (23 }. 
'tl. c Ii, nisn gn+trnnxnt hat m3r aincd all along that the Baha'is in Iran have close links with the Israeli state. This 
bist arc (id, nt to ehe It. -1a'is 1* bawd on the fact dw one of the main shrines at which they congregate 
is in Haifa, Israel. 
" tt1 Drr., I t . 1/1317. a° 1W. 
"1 lbij M-e SC4 rttlry-Gcr. ct. I's tcpwt cc' taim a summary report of the Baha'i International Community's findings. 
The Nil t+s rt is 6Sn! %'th the S"wtcretarist 
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If analysts attribute 'direct and indirect complicity of western governments, particularly the 
United States and Israel, in co tructing the Shah's instruments for administering terror' 92 one 
may ask to what end? The answer may be found in a document to the House of Representatives 
prepared by the United States Department of State, which lists the following reasons: 
(1) Iran's defence of its long border with the Soviet Union; 
(2) the transportation and communications bridge between Europe and Asian countries to the 
cast; 
(3) Iran's interest in assuming major Persian Gulf security responsibilities previously carried 
out by the British; 
(4) Iran's willinrncss to serve as a reliable source of critical amounts of oil for the United 
States. Israel, our European allies and Japan; and 
(5) Iran's activities as a politically stabilising force throughout that important region from Tur- 
key to the lndiin sub-continent' 93 
To bolster this strategic role envisaged by the United States for Iran, the former sold it arms, 
turned a blind cyc to its hunian rights record. With the advent of the revolution, apart from Iran's 
animosity towards conimuni 94 the rest of the United States strategic concerns in the area 
sccmcd to be in jeopardy. Fearing that the US may use covert means to re-establish the status 
quo the revolutionary leadership took every measure to secure the state from within. In an early 
move made in order to neutralise opposition forces comprising nationalistic and non-Islamic pol- 
itical groupings, the Islamic Revolutionary Council headed by Ayatollah Khomeini called for a 
referendum on the country's future constitution 95 The wording of the referendum question was 
Wand even boycotted by some political groups. 
'C-nn tr .. Ham= R##; ti in ban under the Shah-, op. cit., p. 121. 
N1 &n rn Z ,- -11 . ,., i: i is sni Amcrwsn foreign Policy: 
The Case of Iran', in Toward a Humanitarian Diploma- 
A iýnnr r f,.. p,.; T, (r. f. ). Turn 1. Fsrer, New Verl. University press, New York, 1980, p. 159. 
f"' 7T+r l'l. m c ,. rmnxnt hay ah sys ! ten oýý3cd to Marxism. On March 5 1979 the then deputy Prime Minister Dr. 
fl' ImyK. "11 aý; f' we are *, t . +knu _ Mar i, m bsacd on dialectical materialism, 
is fundamentally opposed to the Islamic 
vi. inn _' Xrf%ol_LZZ t. 1950. r-30141. 
TTr ? I1-l wn %at l, rL! on Mmrxh 30-31.1979. All Iranians above the age of 16 years were asked to vote either in 
favwt d sty fluty:: lirl« t ct £ ;u .t it. 
°° 11, e <tucsüM the K(crtrrluni *ded was, 'Am you for the rrlaccment of the monarchy by an Islamic republic, the 
C4'n. 1-Ln of %L h+; U be 'trine.! - yea of no? The Mojahrdin Khaki Organisation and the Fedayen-el-Khalgmove- 
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Among those who called for a boycott of the referendum were seven Kurdish left-wing 
groups 97 Between the announcement of the referendum and after the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in April 1979, the major internal security problem faced by the government was 
the Kurdish separatist campaign. In August-September 1979 the Iranian government took serious 
retaliatory measures gaining control of many Kurdish command centers. The government 
accused the Soviet Union, without directly naming it, as the principal suppliers to Kurdish separa- 
tists. In the ensuing confrontations there were casualties in civilian areas and some Kurds were 
executed. The Kurds. just as in the reign of the Shah, were regarded by the leadership as com- 
munist agents. However, given the seriousness of the confrontations, the Iranian leadership 
attempted in late 1979 to open negotiations dealing with autonomy for Kurdish and other regions. 
But by early 1980 clashes renewed, by which time the conflict had further splintered to one 
between rebel and pro-government Kurds. As a result of the escalation of the conflict, heavier 
weapons came into use which began to take higher civilian tolls 98 The motives of the Iranian 
lcadcrship's treatment of the Kurds and other ethnic minorities were summed up in a statment by 
Dr. Mehdi 13arargan in September 1979, as one (i) of showing all minority groups the "futility of 
insurrection"; (ii) to boost the morale and stiffen the backbone of the badly demoralised armed 
forces; (iii) to deny the left-wing opposition in the country a rallying point i. e. the cause of the 
Kurds. 9 
In the aftermath of the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini 
made numerous references to the question of human rights in his speeches. It was his interpreta- 
tion which alarmed the proponents of the Universal Declaration. "Does the Human Rights 
Society not conceive of the fact that the guilty must be executed in order to protect human rights 
... our belief is that an obviously guilty person does not have a trial. " 
100 
turnt, c<. n. kreurJ Cr , n:: nt of tse qur. ci x,. The National Democratic Front. formed by the grandson of Dr. Mohammed 
' 1r eý. Sry Sit. it$wx Dah. n +r.. *Iw aFain. t the rcf+c aduna. ! t'easing':, vol. XXVI, 1980. p. 30143. 
Tn Fr.,,. .. h. ch %cn nx,. t wti, wrrc the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran led by Mr. Abdel Rahaman Qasemtu 
ad tlxý. e kl by SAsslh L r. lin 1L . cirri, i} i. f, 
`" Sýz i rýnet'a.. ol \\VL 19s0 "0ul1.3030& The natura of Amnesty International's toporting of the Kurdish ei- 
11t5t in 191.: to alckhy c-. to$ to a tali of rotate information. Sec Amnesty International 'Human Rights Violations in 
ttan'. AI M4r:: 1. (1>r 1t t- Q. s, uJ 7 5crtrr1, c: 1992, p. 14. 
tl° Rapofu'l in TAP Gwr, lwR, 10 . cj'tcmt. ar 1979. 
to' 'The Dqmved will Dommatt C, c uff' Imam Khomeini in a radio and television announcement, April 3 1979. 
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It was this early portrayal of human rights by the leadership which urged Iranian diplomats 
and delegations to the United Nations to seek a position which would be less vulnerable to the 
onslaught of certain governments. Some international lawyers are of the view that Iranian 
diplomats achieved this by insisting that Islamic law was superior to international human rights 
law. Furthermore. failure to abide by the letter of the multilateral human rights treaties entered 
into by the previous government was construed by some as a contravention by Iran of its interna- 
tional obligations. 101 
In 1981, Ambassador Kltorasani made amply clear the Iranian position in the General 
Assembly's Third Committee. He said that since the United Nations was a secular body, and the 
Universal Declaration a secular instrument, it was only natural that vagueness and ambiguity 
characterissed the concept of religion in the International Covenant on Civil and Poltical Rights. 
This in his opinion nude secular bodies (such as the UN Commission on Human Rights) 
unqualified to dcal with religious matters and requested that such bodies not address connected 
issues like human rights. Ambassador Khorasani added that if the UN persisted in its enquiries in 
this area and if the "results of such efforts were contrary to Islamic laws, they would be precluded 
under [Iranian) Constitution from being practised in Iran. "t° 
Similarly. while Iran's report was being discussed by the Human Rights Committee, one 
member ventured to ask whether a study had been made between the provisions laid down in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the laws of Iran. 103 The Iranian 
representative reclicd "... if the intention was that [international human rights instruments] should 
complement and add to the isIarnic laws with a view to harmonising them in a single legal sys- 
tem, then his Govcrnmcnt would have to respond negatively ... 
if, however, it was intended that 
international instruments on human rights and Islamic laws should be taken together in an effort 
in 5alrýrrJ Afrisatri ant Srrr: Art iyf+ at Kh.. nriai. The Ministry of National Guidance. Tchran. The 
Handami Founda- 
u c. n 19 K). 1,. 7. 
u"t e -"it h.. Y uF +r. f ehu w,, r the Iranian to. csnment does not dispute the multilateral treaties signed under the 
Shah it ºut , sek sIl? º «. i aw Cxns Sea Paul D. Allen. Tol aho'is of Iran: A Proposal for Enforcement of Intetnation- 
ºI )Ium, n ?. ht.. Sr. rS, nS. ", C. -,, fu f,. em i;., ijL ow Journal, vo420, no. 2, summer 1987, pp. 347-350. 
Ua, rrdl ;,. vGrMrýt. firm, ýh(, -,, -ialRetvrdr(herebytobecitedasUNGAOR), ANC3/36/SR. 29. 
t°t UNCAOR. Su erýra r i. /37{10, p. 66. 
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to achieve mutual undcrstanding and to explore what they had in common, then such an 
endeavour would be accepted with pleasure". 104 
Some diplomats viewed the Iranian reply as an evasive ploy to avoid the demands made of 
them by the Univemal Declaration of Human Rights and the two human rights covenants. This 
attitude towards United Nations Human Rights law was largely responsible for the ever increas- 
ing pressure brought to bear upon Iran, which culminated in the appointment of a special 
representative to study the situation of human rights in Iran. 
Preceding this appointment. the United Nations Commission on Human Rights initiated the 
appointmcnt of a Special Rapponeur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 105 The first special 
rapporteur was Mr. Amos Wako of Kenya, though his mandate clearly instructed him not to 
'respond effectively' but only to gather information, examine the question and report to the Com- 
mission. 106 He went on to identify 37 governments that were allegedly responsible for Summary 
and arbitrary cxccutions. He then sent a memorandum containing the allegations to the concerned 
govcnimcros and received a response from 16 of them, one of which was the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. 107 
The allegations made against Iran were based upon information received from governments, 
in tional organisations and NGOs in consultative status with the ECOSOC. 108 The allega- 
tions detailed summary executicnns of 'opponents of the Government', 'persons involved with 
drug smuggling and selling'. 'persons accused of sexual and moral offences', 'ethnic groups such 
as Kurds and Turk omans', 'members of religious groups such as Jews and Baha'is'. Particular 
Tefcrcnee Was made to the alleged 'systematic elimination of members of the Baha'i faith' and 
mc"Ibcrs and supporters of organisations such as the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran 
tl« d P-72. 
The rrwoJ, w r4 tie a;. c al ra,, rýracw Mu baud upon the 1980 resolution that established the working group on 
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-201. 
(PMOI)'. The report added that the `estimates of executions' varied `from between 4,500 and 
20,000'. Most cases allegedly were carried out without a trial and even when trials were held by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals, procedural safeguards'... were totally lacking'. 109 
The government of Iran responded both orally by meeting the special rapporteur in Geneva 
and by handing him a written reply. The opening paragraph of the reply accused the "West" of 
manipulating the `delicate structure of social heterogeneity of Iran to impede the achievement of 
complete solidarity'. In this respect it was `certainly not a coincidence that all communications 
regarding "human rights" problems in Iran came from either the United States, Britain or France', 
the three main countries which offered political asylum to people affiliated to groups ranging 
from `rightist monarchists to leftist terrorists'. The reply went on to refute the claims made by the 
militant wing of the PMOI - the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation, and made lengthy references to 
the structure and provisions of the Iranian judicial system. It also added a list of the alleged acts 
of terrorism committed by opposition groups within Iran. 110 
Mr. Amos Wako's initiative shown in his first report was criticized by members of the 
Commission, particularly by representatives of those governments that had been discussed. In the 
following year he was again reminded that his mandate forbade him to `respond effectively', 
which resulted in the second and third reports omitting most references to countries. 111 Compli- 
ance led to his mandate being renewed with greater consensus in the following years. 112 
By 1983-84, due to steps taken by the Iranian government towards internal security, a 
109 Ibid., p. 31. In discussions with a UN functionary who assisted Mr. Amos Wako in the preparation of his reports and 
had access to the information files, it becomes apparent that the huge quantity of information supplied by the Baha'i Inter- 
national Community and the PMOI did shape the outcome of the first and subsequent reports, with regard to Iran. This was 
the case with other countries too, where opposition groups had set up quasi-non-governmental organisations to further their 
cause. It is no secret that these organisations receive funds from governments and corporations who have a vested interest. 
As mentioned before this kind of explanation does not cover up or justify the miscarriage of justice or the abuse of human 
rights in these countries. 
110 The replies are contained in the form of two notes; both are annexed to UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1983/16, (Annex IX), 
pp. 12-30. The Mojahedin Khalq Organisation does not seem very popular in Iran. In Tehran the people detest them for 
their terrorist attacks on civilian targets and the role they played in aiding the Iraqi army. In Tehran their leader Massoud 
Rajavi is often referred to as the, 'revolutionary of the bridal chamber' because of his various marriages over the past de- 
cade. 
III See UNDocs., E/CN. 4/1984/29 and WCN. 4/1985/17. These reports reprinted telex messages Mr. Wako sent to 
governments, without clear authority, to avert much publicised cases of persons facing execution. 
112 See CHR Resolution 1984/30, and UNDoc.. BJCN. 4/1984/77, paragraphs 8-9 and 85. And CHR Resolution 
1985/37, and UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1985/66, paragraphs 3-5 and 79. 
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number of international human rights were seen to be violated. The dissolution of the Iranian 
Communist Party, TUDEH and the arrest of its leadership, the alleged detention and execution of 
members of the Baha'i faith, and clashes with Kurdish and Mojahedin insurgents received wide 
publicity. 113 On the external front, Iran came to be associated with international terrorism. The 
bombing of the United States Embassy in West Beirut on April 18 1983 was undertaken by the 
Islamic Jihad. 114 It is believed by Western intelligence that this group was made up of Shi'ite 
extremists, having ties with the Hizbollah or Party of God, and was directly aided by Iranian, 
Revolutionary Guards based in Lebanon and Syria. In the aftermath of the pounding of Lebanon 
by the USS Virginia, on October 23,1983, another suicide bomber struck at a building claiming 
the lives of 241 American Marine and Navy personnel. 115 Throughout 1983, American interests 
in the Middle East came under attack; however it was always extremely difficult to establish 
direct links between these incidents and Iran. 116 
With the elimination of non-Islamic political opposition in 1983 within Iran, accompanied 
by the limited successes of one of the many Iranian `final offensives' against Iraq, there was much 
cause for alarm among those nations in whose interest it was to see Iran well and truly contained. 
This fear may have accounted for the relative reluctance on the part of the United Nations to con- 
demn Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Iranians. 117 The representatives of some Arab 
countries felt that Iran "had it coming" and should have grabbed the earlier chances of a 
ceasefire. 118 However, the early and mid-1980s saw renewed attempts by the United Nations to 
promote international human rights. Proposals for a "new international humanitarian order" and 
113 See Keesing's, vol. XXX, 1984, pp. 32690-32692. 
114 Rescuers retrieved parts of sixty-three American and Lebanese bodies. Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The 
Khomeini Decade, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 1 17. 
Its Ibid., the author claims that in her interview with the Iranian Minister for the Revolutionary Guard, the latter admit- 
ted having trained the people who drove the truck, but denied having planned the attack on the Americans, p. 120. 
116 Aid, pp. 121-122. 
117 The resolution adopted by the First Committee with reference to the Prohibition of Chemical and Bacteriological 
Weapons during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, failed to address the fact that chemical weapons had 
been used by Iraq. See General Assembly Resolution 381187 of 20 December 1983. In order to prove the use of chemical 
weapons, Iran hosted a conference in Tehran in late November. The Guardian of November 25 1983 and The Times of De- 
cember 1,1983, reported that British doctors could confirm the use of nitrogen mustard gas, which caused blistering of the 
skin. 
21$ Discussions with the Arab delegates from the Persian Gulf region, who were referring to a letter from President Sad- 
dam Hussein of Iran to the people of Iran, proposing a temporary cessation of hostilities in June 1983, see UNGAOR 
A/38/268 and UNDoc., S/15825. 
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"regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights" received overwhelming 
support. 119 
IV. 2 The United Nations Mandate on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran 
Against the above background, the Iranian government's response to the United Nations' 
continuing interest in the situation of human rights went through a series of fluctuations. The 
pressure mounted by the Commission had begun to take on a clear pattern. Commission resolu- 
tions reminded Iran of its obligations, especially under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The treatment of the Baha'is also became a regular feature, but most dreaded of 
all was a paragraph which stated that the Commission had decided to continue its scrutiny of the 
situation. 
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, continued to promise cooperation 
with the Commission, even agreeing to receive an envoy of the Secretary-General to study the 
situation at first hand. 120 Before this could materialise, the Secretary-General compiled a detailed 
report in accordance with an earlier Commission resolution. The report contained information 
from different sources, including Iranian opposition groups in exile. 121 
In many ways, 1983 saw the end of Iran's cooperation with the UN Human Rights Commis- 
sion. The reasons for this are displayed in the debate122 which followed the Secretary-General's 
report to the thirty-ninth session of the Commission. Of the eight member delegations which 
made statements, 123 only the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya `commended the good intentions' showed 
by Iran by agreeing to cooperate. The other seven delegations referred to the lack of `full respect 
119 See General Assembly Resolution 38/125 of 16 December 1983 concerning the new international humanitarian ord- 
er, and General Assembly Resolution 38/97 of 10 December 1983 in connection with regional arrangements for the protec- 
tion of human rights. 
120 See paragraphs 4-8 of UNDoc., WCN. 4/1983/52. 
121 The Secretary-General's report to the thirty-ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights with regard to the si- 
tuation in the Islamic Republic of Iran is contained in UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1983/19. The report contained information from the 
(i) Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (ii) Amnesty International, London (iii) Baha'i International Community, 
(iv) International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, (v) Movement de la Resistance nationale Iranienne, or National Resis- 
tance Council led by Mr. Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, and (vi) People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran also known as the Mu- 
jahedia Khalq Organisation led by Mr. Massoud Rajavi. 
122 Unofficial copy of the summary of the debate - provided by United Nations functionary. 
123 Canada, Ireland, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United States of America. 
-204- 
for the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' and unanimous 
concern for the plight of the Baha'i community in Iran. 
During the early part of the debate, the Iranian delegation attempted to address several 
issues; significantly, the shortcomings of the Secretary-General's recent report. The Iranian dele- 
gation felt that the report had failed to show the `effects of foreign intervention, military aggres- 
sion and economic sanctions'. 124 The Iranian representative "deplored" that the Secretary-General 
had based a number of his observations on reports by Amnesty International. As the representa- 
tive of the Secretary-General had been invited to visit Iranian prisons, the credibility of Amnesty 
International would be undermined. In reference to the allegations made by the Baha'i Interna- 
tional Community, the representative was of the opinion that `humanitarian problems must not be 
used to hide political motivation'. Lastly, the Iranian representative informed the members that 
even in war, Iranian troops do not open fire on Iraqi villages in the line of fire. 125 
It becomes obvious from the Iranian representative's statements that by showing the Com- 
mission its awareness of the human rights problem and reminding those concerned of its willing- 
ness to cooperate, the Iranian delegation hoped to ease some of the pressure. 
In the latter half of the debate, the representative of Iran tried to demonstrate to the Com- 
mission that it was inappropriate for some delegations (Netherlands) to suggest keeping the situa- 
tion in Iran under review because Iran was not abiding by the provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, when they (the Dutch) were not even signatories to that 
instrument. The Iranian delegation reminded the Commission that any abuse of the Iranian 
Government's goodwill could have negative repercussions on the visit of the Secretary General's 
representative. 
124 During this period there were approximately 1.5 million Afghan refugees and 3.5 million Iraqi refugees fleeing the 
war, including Kurds. According to a journalist with Kayhan International in Tehran, many of these refugees had access to 
arms and were politically motivated. This put additional pressure on the Iranian security apparatus and often resulted in fric- 
tion. 
lzs Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader, pledged that Iran would never carry out attacks against Iraqi civilians, and 
he urged Army commanders to "ensure that not even one bullet is fired at Iraqi towns". Reported on Iranian radio. Kees- 
ings, vol. XXXC, 1984, p. 32689. 
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Following contributions from NGOs like the Minority Rights Group and the Baha'i Interna- 
tional Community, the Commission decided to implement the Dutch representatives proposal for 
a draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iran. Following the presentation of the draft 
resolution, the Iranian delegation alluded to the fact that if it was adopted the mission of the 
representative might not occur. 126 
The resolution was adopted on 8th March 1983, by a roll-call vote of 17 to 6, with 19 
abstentions. 127 The statement of the Iranian representative following the adoption, characterised 
what was to become Iran's position on the question of human rights up until 1988-89. 
"A whole year's work and cooperation with the Commission on the part of the Iranian 
Delegation has been no reward, and this failure confirms once more my previous con- 
viction that the presence of the so-called Human Rights violations in Iran in the deli- 
berations of this Commission is a purely political nature and has no relevance whatso- 
ever to realities ... Those who voted 
in favour of the resolution should know that the 
revolution is a river of no return. "128 
In the same year (1983), the Secretary-General communicated to the Permanent Representa- 
tive of Iran his intention to appoint a special representative. Iran's permanent representative 
replied that certain Commission members, disregarding Iran's invitation to a fact-finding mission, 
had "decided to manipulate the Commission for their own illegitimate interests by taking sheer 
allegations for objective facts". 129 
The Iranian delegation doubted the validity of the UN human rights bodies decision to 
appoint a special representative, because of the low percentage of countries voting in favour of 
such resolutions. For example, the ECOSOC resolution that was endorsed by the Second Com- 
mittee in connection with a closer scrutiny of human rights in Iran was adopted by a minority 
126 The draft resolution contained in UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1983/L. 70/Rev. 1 was presented at the 52nd meeting of the Com- 
mission of 8 March 1983. The resolution expressed "profound concern" at the "continuing grave violations" of human 
rights in Iran and requested the Secretary-General or his representative to submit to the Commission at its next session a de- 
tailed report, since it had decided to continue its "consideration" of the human rights situation in Iran. The situation of the 
Baha'is was also mentioned with regard to religious intolerance and persecution. 
127 See CHR Resolution 1983/34, and UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1983/13. The voting was as follows; in favour. Australia, Ca- 
nada. Costa Rica, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Rwan- 
da, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, ad United States of America. Against-, Bangladesh, Cuba, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, Tanzania. Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Gambia, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zimbabwe. 
128 The representative of Pakistan requested that the draft resolution be reconsidered. CHR Resolution 1983/34, howev- 
er, was the result of that reconsideration. Quoted from unofficial minutes of the debate. 
129 Quoted from a letter dated 17 August 1983, annexed to Secretary-General's report UNDoc., E/CNA/1983/. 
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vote. 130 
Reference was made again to Iran and human rights, when in 1983 the General Assembly 
unanimously voted for drawing up a Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Sub- 
Commission in a recommendation to the Commission for adoption of a draft resolution on child 
labour, asked that the Commission call on the Government of Iran to "cease immediately the use 
of children in its armed forces ... " and arrange to 
"offer all possible aid to children prisoners of 
war in Iraq". 131 During the next year, (1984) the Commission adopted a resolution (1984/39) 
without a vote calling upon Iran to stop using children in its armed forces. Nine countries stated 
that had there been a vote they would have abstained in view of the lack of evidence. 132 
The years 1984 to 1986 were eventful in so far as the Commission appointed Mr. Andres 
Aguilar (Venezuela) as special representative to study the situation in Iran. At the beginning of 
1986, however, Mr. Aguilar informed the Commission of his resignation. 133 In 1984, the 
Secretary-General appraised the Commission of the situation on human rights in Iran, in two 
reports. 134 The first report reproduced communications of previous years with Iran concerning the 
possibility of cooperation; but added that Iran was sceptical of the constructive consequences of 
any sincere fact-finding mission. The second report presented information on alleged violations 
specifically those pertaining to the rights of life, to physical integrity and freedom from torture, to 
fair trial and to freedom of conscience and opinion. In conclusion, the report observed that, in the 
four years since the Sub-Commission was first seized of the situation of the Baha'is in Iran, there 
had been no evidence of improvement. 
There was a marked difference in the report presented by Mr. Aguilar to the Secretary- 
General's reports over the past four years to the Commission. For the first time it was ack- 
130 ECOSOC Decision 1983/147 was adopted by a recorded vote of 19 in favour, 3 against and 28 abstaining. Year- 
book of the United Nations , New York, United Nations, vol. 37,1983, p. 880. 
131 See CHR Resolution 1983/11, UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1984/3. The Resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 6 
abstentions. 
132 The countries were as follows Argentina, Bangladesh, Senegal, Pakistan, China, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, India, 
Nicaragua and Tanzania. See UN Chronicle, volume XXI, no. 5,1984, p. 59. 
133 See UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1986125. 
134 See UNDoe., E/CN. 4/1984j32 and E/CN. 4/1984/28. 
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nowledged that Iran had passed through a "difficult period" and that in "a revolutionary or post- 
revolutionary situation there are understandably debates about the philosophies, principles and 
doctrines which should guide the reconstruction of society in a spirit of justice and equity. " He 
also reminded the government of Iran, that the "community of nations cannot accept that one 
State should isolate itself' by disregarding "a system of law which had developed through univer- 
sal acceptance". He concluded by saying that he had not received any reply to his letters from the 
Iranian Government and appealed for cooperation in good faith. 135 
Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (El Salvador) who succeeded Mr. Andres Aguilar was also 
inclined to make references to possible areas of cooperation in international human rights law and 
Islam. This was a chosen way to widen the scope of dialogue, which certain members of the 
Commission acknowledged they had, by their previous actions, helped to close. 
If the campaign to draw world-wide attention to the situation of human rights in Iran among 
other countries was incomplete in any way, this shortcoming was rectified when the Commission 
appointed two additional special rapporteurs. The Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1985136 and 
the Special Rapporteur on Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief in 1986.137 
The Special Rapporteur on Torture transmitted allegations of torture to 33 governments 
based on material received from governments, the Organisation of American States and NGOs 
like Amnesty International. However, in order to "avoid angering these governments unneces- 
sarily in his initial report", the Special Rapporteur identified "only those nations which were 
already on the Commission's agenda, that is, Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
I. an"". 138 
13$ See UNDoc., F, /CN. 4/1985/20, paragraph 20. Iran, however told the Commission that "two years ago, it had invited 
the Secretary General's representative to visit Iran on condition that the Commission should not make any judgement 
without positive proof. The Commission had ignored that condition and had adopted resolution after resolution against 
Iran". UN Chronicle, vol. XXII, no. 3, March 1985, p. 47. 
136 The Commission gives authority to the Special Rapporteur to "respond effectively to credible and reliable informa- 
tion" or torture. CHR Resolution 1985133 and UNDoc., F, /CN. 4/1985/66, paragraph 71. 
137 See CHR Resolution 1986120 and UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1986165, paragraph 66. 
1311 See David Weissbrodt, "The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights", in 
Current Developments, The American Journal of International law, vol. 80, no. 3, July 1986, p. 693. These are some of the 
very real constraints faced by professional trouble shooters called in on special missions within the UN; while appeasing 
certain quarters it sets disadvantageous precedents for others. 
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The United States had much interest in pushing through a resolution which would establish 
a special rapporteur on religious intolerance, despite the fact that there was already a rapporteur 
under the aegis of the Sub-Commission studying the subject. Countries like the "Soviet Union 
and its allies in particular suspected that the special rapporteur might be used to criticize them". 
Due to extensive lobbying by the United States "that included appeals by US embassy staffs to 
the foreign ministries of the governments that sit on the Human Rights Commission", the resolu- 
tion was finally adopted, establishing a special rapporteur on religious intolerance. 139 
After the resignation of Mr. Andres Aguilar in January 1986, the Commission did not waste 
time in the appointment of a new special representative. In March 1986, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo 
Pohl (El Salvador) took up the mandate, which by now had fallen into two main parts: 
(i) "The contacts the Special Representative should try to establish with the Government of 
Iran" and 
(ii) "the preparation of a thorough study on the human rights situation in Iran". 140 
The resolutions emanating from the human rights bodies of the UN from 1986 onwards, laid 
special emphasis on the importance of a visit by the special representative to Iran. 141 Earlier men- 
tions of such a visit contained in previous reports of the Secretary-General and the erstwhile spe- 
cial representative were brought to the forefront. To those working with the mandate on Iran, this 
seemed to be a new strategy, to elicit a response from the Iranian Government and thereby satisfy 
certain pressure groups operating within and outside the Commission. The second part of the 
mandate was to serve the same purpose; obliquely indicating to the Iranian government that in the 
absence of a visit, the Commission would take into full consideration the reports based on secon- 
dary sources. 
With reference to the above, Mr. Pohl addressed a total of four letters, two to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Iran and two to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Iran to the 
139 ]bid, pp. 695-697, the author gives a concise account of the evolution and final adoption of the US sponsored resolu- 
tion on the establishment of a special rapporteur. 
140 See interim report prepared by Mr. Pohl contained in UNGAOR A1411787 of 3 November 1986. 
141 The visit was specifically mentioned for example in CHR Resolution 1986/41. 
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United Nations Office at Geneva. In all the letters, he mentioned the utmost importance of a 
meeting to discuss the situation and arrange a visit - to this extent he gave possible dates for 
meetings under the auspices of the Center for Human Rights in Geneva. There was no formal 
reply at the end of 1986.142 However, in an informal meeting held in November 1986 at the 
United Nations Headquarters with Mr. Pohl, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations dis- 
cussed many aspects of the mandate, including the politicisation of the issue. The talks also 
weighed the possibility of a visit to the country. 143 
Certain methods adopted by Mr. Pohl in the compilation of his reports to the General 
Assembly and the Commission secured the Iranian government's cooperation. In most cases 
these involved taking on board the salient points of contention and re-interpreting them in a 
manner acceptable to all; (especially to the Iranian Government, whose cooperation if no-one 
else, Mr. Pohl sought in the fulfillment of his mandate). 
Towards this end, Mr. Pohl first set out to establish the universality of international law and 
the trends in it to "increase the rights and freedoms under international protection". In this respect 
he spoke on behalf of "scholars and politicians" in Islamic countries, as those who have not advo- 
cated the change or the rejection of the provisions of the Universal Declaration, but have simply 
pointed out the problems that some countries confront in respect of certain international instru- 
ments. 1' In addition, by stating that "organised or semi-organized political groups, particularly 
those engaged in insurgency or insurrection, may be responsible for violations of human rights ... 
mainly the right to life ... 
", Mr. Pohl vindicated the Iranian Government's position on militant 
groups like the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation operating within Iran. 145 The Government in Iran 
had made many attempts to get the activities of militant opposition groups condemned as being 
criminal. Which had been ignored, on the grounds that it would justify the governments treat- 
ment of political opposition. Moreover, those responsible for producing the draft reports on the 
142 For a summary of the letters sent and the new special representatives observations see UNGAOR, A/411787. 
143 See UNDoc.. E/CN. 4/1987/23. 
I" See UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1987/23, paragraphs 23-25. 
143 Summary Record of this meeting is contained in UNDoc., CCPR/C/SR149. 
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situation in Iran, relied heavily on information supplied by some of these opposition groups. 
Mr. Pohl's renewed efforts saw the mandate making progress by 1987; on June 9, the per- 
manent mission of Iran to the United Nations addressed a note verbale and two documents to the 
Under-Secretary General for Human Rights. The note verbale suggested that after the special 
representative had examined the documents and expressed his opinion, a meeting could be 
arranged between officials of the Iranian government and the special representative to discuss 
ways to remove present difficulties for effective cooperation. 146 Mr. Pohl's reply to the Govern- 
ment noted that there were a "number of positive and encouraging elements" and that, "instead of 
formalising positions on paper, a more flexible approach could be to engage in a constructive and 
fruitful dialogue". In the ensuing meeting held at the permanent mission of Iran in Geneva, Mr. 
Sirous Nasseri, (Director of International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran) attri- 
buted his government's silence in the past to the "politically biased" nature of Commission reso- 
lutions. Mr. Nassen also stated that his government considered allegations from certain terrorist 
groups and the reference to the Baha'is as a religious minority. Mr. Pohl voiced his concern about 
the "protection of individual human beings" regardless of their political or religious connections, 
thus explaining the "motivations of the actions he had taken". 
Mr. Pohl's reports targeted the Iranian government on cases concerning specific individuals 
and groups whose rights had been violated. He did this by grouping the alleged violation into 
five principal sections, in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
These being 
(i) the right to life; 
(ii) the right to freedom from torture; 
(iii) the right to a fair trial; 
(iv) the right to liberty and security of person; and 
146 The note and documents are contained in UNDocs., E/CN. 4/1988/12 and E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1987/35. 
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(v) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and to freedom of expression. 147 
This method called for a more accurate processing of the allegations levelled at the government 
and obliged the government to respond more effectively. By the end of 1987 the special 
representative had managed to reopen dialogue, according to some observers in a most 
comprehensive way, i. e. by eliciting detailed responses from the government to allegations of 
human rights violations; 148 and by establishing that any conflict between international law and 
Islamic law "should be studied in the light of concrete situations and cases ... in such a way that 
the international instruments on human rights would remain untouched ... 
"149 
If there was any elation at re-opening communications with Iran or indications that the "fre- 
quency and number of allegations during the recent past [had] somewhat diminished", 150 it 
wasn't reflected in the resolutions emanating from the Commission. In the words of Iran's 
representative to the United Nations, "for a peculiar reason, as the situation in the view of the 
Special Representative is improving, the resolutions become lengthier, harsher in tone and 
language ... 
"151 ale keeping the level of politicisation of this particular mandate in mind, it is 
possible there existed other reasons for the continuing hard time the Iranian delegation com- 
plained of receiving from certain quarters of the Commission. 
It is believed that certain members of the Commission were unhappy with the way Mr. Pohl 
was taking on board the Iranian legal arguments in his reports. For example, by acknowledging 
the importance of "the clarification of the question of compatibility of international law with 
Islamic law" and the possibility of a `working arrangement', 152 Mr. Pohl was seen as compromis- 
ing international human rights law. It may or may not be a coincidence that Resolution 1988/69 
147 The information used in this respect was collected during the course of informal bearings conducted with various in- 
dividuals and groups by Mr. Pohl. This was then reproduced under the above mentioned sections. See UNDoc., 
E/CN. 4/1987f23, paragraphs 41-62. Also see UNGAOR A/42/648, paragraphs 11-41, for an example of the method Mr. 
Pohl used to present allegations based on oral and written information to the Government of Iran. 
148 See note verbale dated 30 July 1987 contained in UNDoc.. E/CN. 4/1988/12 (Annex II), which is a response to issues 
brought us by the special representative in UNDoc., FJCN. 4/1977/23. 
149 See UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1987/23, paragraph S. 
150 UNGAOR A/42/648, paragraph 76. 
151 Quoted from a statement made by Mr. Mohammad Jafaar Mahalati, Director-General of International Affairs of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before The Third Committee of the 42nd Session of the General 
Assembly. Dated 25 November 1987. Unofficial copy. 
152 UNDoc.. F/CN. 4/198/24, p. 17. 
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adopted by the Commission re-states the order of the above relationship - i. e. the "compatibility 
of Islamic law with international law". Further, in order to invalidate any debate which may have 
arisen from the special representatives' observation that the Iranian Government's ... 
" initial posi- 
tions and theses with respect to the international protection of human rights" are "deeply 
enshrined in its cultural life and its current national movement", 153 the Commission while 
reiterating Mr. Pohl's conclusion that Iran had international obligations as a member of the 
United Nations and as a party to the covenants, added that it does "not admit exceptions on 
account of constitutional problems, rules and regulations of municipal law, or cultural or histori- 
cal background. " 154 Much of the tension which existed between Mr. Pohl and the Commission 
was because the former felt that "polemical approaches and divergence of views" were compati- 
ble" with "positive and constructive dialogue". In the absence of which, "the dialogue would 
become devoid of substance and would turn into a merely formal exercise". 155 
By the middle of 1988 a series of events ensured that winds of change would soon blow 
over the Iranian political scene. The wide-spread use of chemical weapons by Iraq forced a 
number of military set-backs for Iran in the war, most important being the loss of control over the 
Majnun Islands. The newly formed National Liberation Army of the Mojahedin Khalq Organisa- 
tion began fighting alongside the Iraqis, which alienated them from the Iranian population. Iran's 
military position was rapidly deteriorating to a point where an alternative solution had to be 
found. Moreover, with the arrival of American warships in the Gulf and the downing of an 
Iranian passenger plane, Iranian politicians and military commands realized the futility of carry- 
ing on the military option. After much heated debate, the Majles (Iranian parliament) decided to 
allows speaker Rafsanjani and President Khamenei to take the issue up with Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Presented with the facts Khomeini supported the decision to bring the war to a close by accepting 
UN resolution 598.156 
153 /bid. 
154 UNDoc., W1988/12, E/GN. 4/1988/88, p. 146. 
155 See UNGAOR A/43f705, paragraph 58. 
156 An English daily published in Tehran reported that "The Islamic Republic of Iran accepted the UN resolution earlier 
this month for the cause of peace and stability in the region and in a goodwill move to prevent further loss of human lives" 
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The new period of peace was characterised by efforts to re- establish diplomatic relation- 
ships with certain countries and a number of countries responded positively, especially in the area 
of the reconstruction of Iran's economy. 157 Certain poignant questions were raised, primarily 
those concerned with relations with the United States, which caused deep divisions and separating 
clearly for the first time the "hardliners", from the "moderates". In this respect the latter felt that 
Iran would base any future relationship with Washington on "a certain set of fixed principles", 
keeping the "interest of the revolution and Islam on top" and expected the United States to 
"change their policy and act with mutual respect and refrain from interfering in [Iran's] 
affairs". 158 The hardliners on the other hand were against the re-opening of relations with the US. 
During and after the Majles's vote of confidence in the fall of 1988, in which it rejected 
hard-line members or approved them by the narrowest of margins, there was a fear from certain 
quarters that outside elements may take advantage of the ongoing power struggle. This resulted in 
arrests and in some cases executions. NGOs like Amnesty International reported that the "new 
wave of political executions" was "believed to be the largest since the early 1980's". 159 Accord- 
ing to information received by the special representative "most of those allegedly executed during 
the months of July, August and early September 1988 were reported to be members of the 
People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI). In this connection, Mr. Pohl's report quoted 
the Iranian Chief Justice as declaring, "the Judiciary is under very strong pressure from public 
opinion asking why we even put them (members of the PMOI) on trial ... and why all are not exe- 
cuted. "160 
In reply to the above allegations contained in Mr. Pohl's report to the General Assembly, 
the permanent representative of Iran to the UN stated that, the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation 
[affiliated to the PMO1] according to earlier reports in the International Herald Tribune of 8 
157 Commenting on Iran's relations with "Western countries and the Soviet Union", Iran's deputy foreign minister for 
Euro-American affairs, Muhammad Javad Larijani, said that the "process had started long before Iran accepted the resolu- 
tion in July". Any delay in this process he added was based on "a sort of fear of the Iranian revolution in some capitals". 
Kayhan International, September 11,1988. 
135 Ibid. 
159 Amnesty International, "Iran: Political Executions", Al index: MDE 13/29/88, December 1988. 
160 UNGAOR A/43f105, paragraphs 47-49. 
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December 1987 had "affirmed having killed several thousand Iranian soldiers and taken hundreds 
of prisoners". The special representative stressed that members of all organisations, including 
those engaged in violent crime ... were entitled to the enjoyment of human rights". 
161 Mr. Pohl 
added that "collection of first-hand information" continued to present certain difficulties and 
although "the state of full cooperation has not yet been achieved ... the Iranian Government con- 
tinued to indicate its willingness" to increase its cooperation with the United Nations. References 
were also made of alleged torture, violations of freedom of thought and the situation of the Baha'i 
community against whom harassment had diminished in recent months. 162 
The spurt of alleged violations towards the latter half of 1988 had repercussions within 
Iran's political elite. Ayatollah Montazeri, the designated leader of the revolution, after Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in an open letter to Khomeini asked, "for what valid reasons ... has our judiciary 
approved these executions, which can result in nothing but damaging the face of our revolution 
and the system? "" There was no formal reply, and execution of more PMOI members who were 
captured in battle or those imprisoned on earlier occasions continued. 163 
As mentioned earlier, it was part of Iran's foreign policy objective to use all diplomatic 
means possible to reduce the severity of Commission resolutions attributed to its treatment of 
human rights. Following from which, all efforts were made to stop the individual scrutiny of the 
Commission altogether. Iran was confident that by allowing the special representative to visit the 
country, this objective could be made more feasible. 
Early in 1989 amidst the growing allegations of increased summary executions reported in 
the international press, the permanent representative of Iran to the United Nations reiterated his 
Government's position that the wording of resolutions emanating from the Commission, was "the 
major obstacle" to full cooperation between his government and the special representative. The 
permanent representative suggested that in the forthcoming session of the Commission, Mr. Pohl 
might "engage in some kind of dialogue" with both the "Iranian government and the sponsors of a 
161 Ibid,. paragraphs 59-60. 
162 Ibid., pp. 19-22. 
163 Op. cit., In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, p. 196. 
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possible resolution, in order to achieve a compromise that could be acceptable to all parties". The 
special representative in his reply indicated that it would be "very useful" if "ways and means" 
could be discussed for "furthering such cooperation in concrete terms". 164 
The above communication is one indication as to the overt politicisation of human rights 
and its value as an instrument of foreign policy. The fact that the Iranians chose to expose the 
ways and means of ensuring further cooperation in the matter, is in itself indicative of the status 
of international human rights. However, recognising the difficulty of influencing members of the 
Commission who sponsored resolutions regarding Iran, Mr. Pohl suggested that the only solution 
for the government of Iran, was to take certain measures and ensure full cooperation with his 
office. 165 
Resolution 1989/66 of the Commission on Human Rights, adopted at its forty-fifth session, 
decided to extend the mandate of the special representative. The rationale of the Commission to 
extend the mandate, was to keep the question under consideration on the basis of additional infor- 
mation. 1e The bulk of "additional information" taken into consideration by the Commission and 
to a lesser extent by the special representative in the preparation of reports to the UN human 
rights bodies, was from sources considered illegitimate by the Iranian government. 167 Neverthe- 
less it was a method which pointed out to the Iranian government the hazards of not cooperating 
directly and kept the issue alive on the Commission's agenda. 168 In communications from the 
Iranian government during the closing months of 1989, a last effort was made to point out what 
had always seemed to them a series of politically motivated irregularities concerning the mandate. 
164 UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1989%26, pp. 5-6. Report of Mr. Pohl to the Commission in Human Rights during its forty-fifth 
session. 
165 mId, paragraph 77. The special representative suggested to the Iranian government (a) to investigate all allegations 
of human rights violations and to report in detail on the result of such investigations; (b) to take legislative and administra- 
tive steps to ensure fair trials; (c) to ensure that prison regime conforms to international standards. 
166 In compliance with paragraph 14 of CHR Resolution 1989/66. 
167 Co-operation between the special representative and Iranian government, according to the latter, remained obstructed 
for two reasons (i) language of the resolutions concerning the human rights situation (ii) and the sources of information used 
for the preparation of reports. See for example UNGAOR A/43/705 paragraph 59 and UNDoc., B/CN. 4/1989126 paragraph 
61. 
168 For example, Mr. Pohl in his communications to the Iranian government would make it a point to mention that in 
keeping with Commission resolutions he aimed to conduct informal hearings with persons who claim to have first-hand 
knowledge and experience of various aspects of the human rights situation in Iran. 
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Nevertheless, the government expressed views on the suggestions made by Mr. Pohl (see supra- 
note 177). 169 In, addition the Iranian government presented to the special representative, the rela- 
tives of the victims of terrorist attacks in Iran. This was firstly to counterbalance the huge number 
of exiled Iranians, on whose testimonies (written and oral) much of the `factual section' of Mr. 
Pohl's reports was based. Secondly, it was to discredit the sources (especially the PMOI) of infor- 
mation with which the Centre for Human Rights was inundated. Thirdly, it has been speculated, 
that it was a last ditch effort to put off the visit of the special representative to Iran. 170 
IV. 3 The Visit of the Special Representative to Iran 
Mr. Pohl's report to General Assembly in 1989 was officially considered as his penultimate 
report on the situation of human rights in Iran. Although it was understood by the members and 
particularly by the Iranian government that anything short of a visit by Mr. Pohl to the country 
would call for a definite renewal of the mandate and even the appointment of a new special 
representative. Considering these consequences and responding to the possibility of bringing the 
mandate to a close - Iran invited the special representative to visit the country in November, 
1989. 
The special representative made it clear that all guarantees and facilities accorded to fact- 
finding missions should be given to him as well as the United Nations staff accompanying him. 
This included 
(i) freedom of movement in the whole country and transport, in particular to restricted areas. 
(ii) Freedom of inquiry - access to prisons, centres of detention; contacts with witnesses and 
representatives of non-governmental organisations, with central and local authorities of all 
branches of government. 
(iii) Assurances by the government that no persons, official or private, who have been in contact 
with the special representative, will suffer threats, harassment, punishment or judicial 
169 Aid, pp. 5-8. 
»° Lists of over a thousand people who were allegedly killed by terrorist groups, particularly the PMOI were communi- 
cated by the Iranian government to the special representative. 
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proceedings. 
(iv) Appropriate security arrangements, without restricting freedom of movement and inquiry. 
(v) Before, during and after the visit, the staff assisting the special representative must be given 
the same guarantees. 
Apart from adjusting the dates of the visit by a few days, because of the unavailability of a 
particular Iranian official who was to be interviewed, everything else was agreed to in full by the 
Iranian government. 171 
Before leaving for Iran, the special representative gathered additional information, orally 
from witnesses and in the form of written statements. He also took into consideration informa- 
tion from the Iranian and international press. Lists of arrested and executed persons were handed 
to Mr. Pohl from Iranian Organisations in exile. The special representative also met with the 
Secretary-General of the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) and a representative of 
the National Council of the Resistance in Switzerland, who gave him a number of documents. In 
addition, information was also provided by the Iranian government and from the Baha'i commun- 
it 172 
The special representative began his visit in Iran by conducting a set of interviews with 
representatives of the Iranian executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government. 
Three important matters were discussed: 
(i) detailed replies to the cases the special representative has submitted and will continue to 
submit; 
(ii) the place of Iran in the international community; 
(iii) and Islamic values. 
In this connection the Deputy Minister for International Affairs stated that replies to all 
171 Confidential Sources. 
172 When the news of the visit to Iran was made public the special representative began to receive a wave of correspon- 
dence from varied sources, from Nobel Prize Winners to Western parliamentarians. Some of them gave suggestions on how 
the visit should be conducted. 
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cases will be made and that Iran "intended to take its rightful place in the international commun- 
ity". He drew attention to the importance of the invitation extended to the special representative, 
the clemency measures adopted and of a solution to problems relating to the implementation of 
human rights in accordance with international instruments. With regard to Islamic values, their 
meaning and significance for society and government, Mr. Pohl declared that he fully respected 
Islamic values and certain adjustments might be necessary to bring them into line with interna- 
tional standards in the area of human rights, while keeping in mind sensitive issues. 
In the following days, the special representative met with high officials of the judiciary and 
attended a weekly plenary session of the Supreme Court. Mr. Pohl also attended the public trial 
of five persons accused of murder. The Minister of the Interior told the special representative that 
heavy casualties suffered on the battlefield by the members of the Mojahedin in July 1988 were 
being portrayed abroad as the en masse execution of invaders taken prisoners. 173 In the meeting 
with the Special Prosecutor for Drug Trafficking, Mr. Pohl raised the question of a large number 
of persons sentenced to death for drug trafficking. In this context, the prosecutor denied allega- 
tions that political prisoners were being executed in the place of drug traffickers. 174 
On the last leg of his visit, Mr. Pohl met with the Director- General of prisons and visited 
Evin prison. In Evin prison, the special representative met three former members of the Iranian 
communist party, TUDEH - Mr. Kianouri, its former Secretary-General, another high ranking 
member and a grass roots member. Mr. Kianouri in the presence of prison officials denied having 
spied for a foreign power and said that he had been tortured, showing Mr. Pohl his partly 
paralysed hands and crushed fingers. During his visit to the women's section, Mr. Pohl saw a 
seven or eight year old child and tried to determine what she was doing there, assuming she might 
be the child who according to a statement he had received in Geneva, was still in prison because 
her mother had escaped. According to explanations given, the child lived with her family, but had 
173 UNDoc., $/CN. 4/1990124, pp. 20-27. Excerpted from the report of the Special Representative. 
174 According to an Iranian newspaper, published in English, 14,000 drug traffickers were under arrest and about 900 
awaited execution. Tehran Times, 7 December 1989. The special representatives report quotes the same newspaper in this 
context. 
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come to visit her mother, who was serving her sentence. While visiting the cells, the special 
representative asked for permission to see Mr. Roger Cooper. This request was turned down by 
the Director of Evin prison on the grounds that Mr. Cooper was a self-confessed spy, whose sen- 
tence had been handed down one month earlier. The Director was however unable to specify the 
length of the sentence. 175 Mr. Pohl also attended a session of parliament and participated at a 
round table at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In reply to a question on the role of international 
law, Ayatollah Jennati, a member of the Council of Guardians and chairman of the round table 
said, "any rule of international law that is not contrary to Islamic principles can be accepted, but a 
rule which flagrantly violates those principles will have to be rejected". 176 Ayatollah Jennati 
added that a draft declaration on human rights had recently prepared by experts meeting in 
Tehran. 177 
In accordance with previous practice, Mr. Pohl received oral testimonies from persons 
claiming to have "first hand experience" of the human rights situation in Iran. Here again, Mr. 
Kianouri of the TUDEH party "denounced the execution of thousands of young people when he 
considered totally innocent" and "considered himself exclusively responsible for any crimes 
ascribed to the Party". Some persons reported executions of relatives and friends and in most 
cases requested that their names be kept confidential. A large number of people testified against 
the acts of terrorism perpetuated by the Mojahedin, although there was at least one witness who 
stated that he was severely tortured for aiding Mojahedin activities inside Iran. Mr. Tavassoli, a 
former mayor of Tehran and a member of the Movement for Freedom, related his experience of 
having to spend a long period in solitary confinement and being "beaten, insulted" and "intimi- 
dated". Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi, former Foreign Minister in the first provisional government after the 
revolution, referred to cases in which "persons had not been released at the end of their prison 
sentences; some had been retried, some executed ... others simply kept in detention". He men- 
tioned the case of his nephew Hassan Zadiri who was arrested instead of his brother, who had 
275 UNDoc., E/CN. 4.1990/24, pp. 31-33. 
176 bid., paragraph 161. 
177 See AnnexI pertaining to Chapter VI of this thesis. 
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absconded. After being tried after three years of detention and sentenced to another seven years, 
last year his parents were informed that he had committed suicide. The special representative 
interviewed a number of other victims while in Tehran and categorised their testimonies underthe 
following headings: 
(i) Torture 
(ii) Administration of Justice 
(iii) Right to leave the country 
(iv) Right of peaceful assembly and association 
(v) Right to legal counsel 
(vi) Situation of the Baha'i community 
(vii) Situation of the Armenian minorities. 
In addition, during his visit to Iran, Mr. Pohl received hundreds of letters and other written 
communications. 178 
In what was supposed to be his final report to the Commission, the special representative 
stated that his visit to Iran marked a major development in the fulfilment of the mandate entrusted 
to him and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Commission on Human 
Rights. He observed that as a result of the revolution there was a deep split in Iranian society, in 
which terrorism played a part and had devastating effects on the people of that country. In this 
regard, Mr. Pohl observed that "insurgent groups should also respect human rights. While inves- 
tigating the allegation that political prisoners had been executed under false charges of drug 
trafficking, the special representative ruled out any speculation, unless specific proof is submitted 
to him. In concluding his report Mr. Pohl noted that Iran had been "receptive to some criticisms 
made in earlier reports, for example, about public and mass executions of drug traffickers" and 
incorporating the time already served by prisoners into penalties, when their sentences are handed 
down. During Mr. Pohl's visit the following suggestion were, in principle, favourably received: 
173 UNDoc., EJCN. 4/1990124, pp. 37-51. 
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(i) regular visits by International Committee of the Red Cross to prisons throughout the coun- 
try to ascertain conditions; 
(ii) the possibility of the UN Centre for Human Rights providing technical assistance to the 
Government of Iran in matters pertaining to human rights; 
(iii) the acceptance of a programme to identify clashes or inconsistencies between Islamic law 
and international human rights law with a view to make it easier for the Iranian Government 
to bring its system into line with international standards; 
(iv) and consideration of requests the special representative may transmit on purely humani- 
tarian grounds. 
In conclusion Mr. Pohl, recommended that the Commission should continue to monitor the 
human rights situation in Iran and a further visit was desirable and even necessary ... 
"to broaden 
the study with many cases which it was not possible to collect". 179 
After Mr. Galindo Pohl left Iran, a major Iranian daily in English published an article titled 
"UN man `satisfied' with human rights record in Iran". The author cited several instances of 
cooperation between the government and the special representative and quoted sources saying Mr. 
Pohl had expressed "his entire satisfaction" with the visit. 180 This mood of elation, however, trig- 
gered negative reactions from various quarters. Hardly 24 hours after the departure of the special 
representative (January 28,1990) the UNDP office in Tehran received threatening phone calls 
accusing UNDP staff of collaborating with the Mojahedin. The callers on one occasion even 
issued a death threat to the staff. On contacting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Min- 
ister for International Affairs assured the safety of all UNDP staff and stated that the callers were 
themselves part of the Mojahedin organisation set to destroy all that had been achieved. 181 
179 Ibid., pp. 51-55. 
180 Tehran Times, 31 January 1990. 
131 Confidential Sources. 
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IV. 4 Reaction to the Special Representative's Report 
on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran 
The Deputy Minister's speculation gradually proved to be true in the early months of 1990. 
In an UPI report filed in Geneva, "Mojahedin opposition movements charged that Pohl had seen 
prisoners and other people planted by the authorities" and even alleged that he had made "a 
behind the scenes deal" with Tehran. Mr. Pohl vehemently rejected the accusation calling it `a lie' 
at a news conference. 182 The negative reaction of the Mojahedin Organisation, [in the words of 
one senior official of the UN who accompanied Mr. Pohl to Iran] "unfortunately found some echo 
in the international press". 183 The criticism accorded by the Western press to Mr. Pohl's report, in 
the words of one senior international civil servant, based in the United Kingdom, claimed to have 
caused widespread negative reaction in that country. He stated that he was receiving communica- 
tions in writing and a number of telephone calls expressing amazement and utter indignation that 
Mr. Pohl could have accepted official assurances that there have been no executions for five 
months184 given the evidence to the contrary. The only logical explanation to this "whitewash" 
of the Iranian authorities, he added, might be a deal regarding the hostages in Lebanon. In direct 
reply to these allegations of a hidden agenda a senior official of the United Nations stated that the 
negative reaction to Mr. Pohl's report was initiated by the Mojahedin Organisation, who prior to 
the Special Representatives visit lobbied for various unrealistic demands such as the inclusion of 
one of their representatives as part of the United Nations delegation to Teheran. He added that 
there was definitely no deal on the hostage issue and that he did not share the opinion of the 
report published in The Independent. 185 
182 The report was widely syndicated and appeared in Kayhan International, February 28,1990. 
tss The senior international civil servant was alluding to an article which appeared in The Independent on 28 February 
1990, tided "UN investigation denies doing deal over Iran atrocities". 
tsa This is in reference to a part of 'The special representatives' report which read "certainly the deterrent character of 
the executions has disappeared because there have been none in public for five months, but many persons, probably hun- 
dreds, are still awaiting executions". As he was leaving the country, Mr. Pohl presented a request for clemency in this re- 
gard. See UNDoc., WCN. 4/1990/24, paragraph 244. The period mentioned by Mr. Pohl i. e. "five months", in all probabili- 
ty was an oversight, but judging from the rest of paragraph 224 and the report as a whole it cannot be disputed that he was 
very much aware of the existence of executions. 
tss Confidential Sources. 
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In the meanwhile, in Iran, the new leader Ali Khamenei approved an amnesty proposal put 
forward by the judiciary chief applicable to ä11 convicts found guilty by public, military or revolu- 
tionary courts before February 11,1990 (Revolutions Victory Day). According to the proposal: 
(i) Convicts with 3 month prison terms will be set free with no regard to their previous 
records; 
(ii) prison terms of convicts with up to five year imprisonment will be reduced by two 
thirds; 
(iii) prison terms of those sentenced to up to twenty years will be reduced by three 
fourths; 
(iv) prison terms of these sentenced with higher or life imprisonment will be reduced to 
15 years; 
(v) the exile terms of convicts who are in prison due to inability to pay fines will be 
reduced by two thirds. 
Exceptions to the above provisions are for convicts who are found guilty of: 
(i) Hoarding 
(ii) Embezzlement of more than 500,000 rials (7,200 U$) 
(iii) Receiving bribes of more than 50,000 rials (720 U$) 
(iv) Illegal seizure and plundering of public funds. 
(v) Armed and highway robbery. 
(vi) More than one offence of burglary. 
(vii) Sexual offences. 
(viii) Antagonizing God or membership in misleading grouplets or espionage. 
(ix) Supplying, producing, purchasing of and dealing in more than five grams of heroin or 
over fifty grams of other drugs. 186 
126 Tehran Times, 13 February 1990. 
- 224 - 
The forty-sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights considered Mr. Pohl's report 
and extended his mandate for another year and welcomed the invitation of the Iranian government 
for a further visit. 187 The special representative rejected charges that he had been "indulgent" in 
his report so as to make another visit. Mr. Pohl said Tehran authorities were willing to let him 
stay longer but he had to return to Geneva to report before the Commission. Officials had made 
no mention of a second visit and Mr. Pohl stated the first trip was "allowed only after six years of 
pressure". 188 
Opposition movements like the People's Mojahedin of Iran were none too happy with the 
efforts of the special representative. A testimony of where they thought Mr. Pohl had failed was 
presented in a document prior to the special representative's second visit to Iran in 1990.189 
NGOs like Amnesty International detailed continuing violations within Iran. 190 
In concluding this section, it would not be out of place to quote an Iranian daily which 
observed that, "however humanistic and sublime the Human Rights Charter may seem, in practice 
and in the hands of governments with a swaying power of the UN, the document has turned 
against itself and is being used as a bludgeon to hit oppressed peoples throughout the world". 191 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of World War 11192 and the exposure of human rights abuses by the Nazis, 
there was a period of action. This included the Nuremberg trials, the framing and adoption of the 
1948 Universal Declaration, followed the next year by the Convention on Genocide. 193 In the fol- 
lowing period, during which the Western countries dominated the decision-making process in the 
UN resolutions like 1503 took nearly twenty years to be formed. It was almost another ten years 
187 CHR Resolution 1990/79. 
188 Kayhan International, February 28,1990. 
189 Confidential Sources. 
190 See UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1990/NGO/35. 
191 Kayhan International, December 5,1989. 
192 See John P. Humphrey's memoirs Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, New York, Dabbs 
Ferry Transnational, 1984. Especially chapter two titled wrhe Catalyst of the Second World War". 
193 According to some authors, "it was relatively easy to reach general agreement on a set of international principles 
against gross and persistent systematic violations of basic rights ... to the extent that the international human rights regime 
arose from post war frustration, guilt, or unease", "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis", op. cit., p. 615. 
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before the promotion and monitoring procedures of the Covenants came into effect. Spread over 
this period was when a majority of colonial countries gained their independence often at great 
human and material cost. Following the decolonisation process, the question of international 
human rights hitherto dormant, grew rapidly to become an important aspect of world politics. In 
countries like Iran, newly prosperous with oil wealth, human rights were vested in the policies 
deemed fit by governments for their people. Leaders, like the Shah of Iran, seemed ill at ease 
with the notion of international human rights and in this respect maintained a normative position 
not completely different from that taken by the revolutionary government. The Shah maintained 
that his government was "completely in favour of defending human rights. But if this carries us 
towards the law of the jungle and defeat, then it can no longer be called human rights". 194 The 
revolutionary leadership also viewed human rights as a sphere in which they would have the ulti- 
mate say. It knew full well the responsibilities it would entail; after all the revolution was based 
on liberating the masses from tyrannical rule. In this respect, then, where does the area of change 
lie between pre and post revolutionary Iran's treatment of human rights? The answer may be 
traced back to Ayatollah Khomeini's anti-Pahlavi postures, which were based not so much on the 
political and economic imbalances, as much as his deep rooted dislike for the consequences of 
Westernisation on Iran's culture and religion. This led the revolutionary leadership to purge 
Iranian society of "negative" Western influence and at the same time conduct the affairs of the 
State along Islamic lines. As a result of over-zealous individuals entrusted with this job at vari- 
ous stages in the last ten years of the revolution, the sanctity of personal freedoms and rights as 
set down in the Iranian constitution stood to be violated. According to some diplomats in the 
United Nations, it was not that the nature or extent of the violations happening in Iran were so 
totally new and horrifying to the international community that it led to a campaign to isolate Iran. 
It was rather a campaign undertaken with the intention of checking the effect the revolution may 
have had on neighbouring countries. 195 Unaware of the totality of the human rights situation in 
Iran, the UN machinery entrusted with the task of alerting the Iranian government on violations, 
19" The Shah at a news conference, r ported by Kayhan International Weekly, June 25,1977. 
195 Discussions held in Geneva, April 1990. 
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came to adopt certain methods which were not fully acceptable. For example, memorandums and 
reports came to rely heavily on information provided by the Mojahedin, while their political 
interest in the matter was common knowledge. The reason given was that these groups were the 
only ones with possible access to inside information, and presented their allegations in an orderly 
way. 196 
This among other actions, made the Iranian government treat the question of human rights 
as a matter of international politics. It came to view the international human rights campaign 
against it as an extension of the policies designed by countries supporting Iraq in its war effort. 
The Iranian government believed, given the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf, "it has been 
useful for the American Government to ask its protdgd in the region, namely Iraq, to invade Iran 
... " because this 
"first phase of the plan ... has failed, attention 
is now being concentrated on a 
campaign of propoganda. "197 President Ronald Reagan's personal appeal to Ayatollah Knomeini 
to "spare the lives of 22 Baha'is reportedly sentenced to death" was seen as a part of this Western 
propaganda effort. An Iranian government spokesman dismissed the appeal as "an interference in 
the internal affairs of Iran and as such without value". 198 Iran, however, showed readiness to ack- 
nowledge `any form of support' it received in the area of human rights. When Britain criticised 
the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja, Iran's deputy foreign minister 
lauded the British government for its "logical and moderate" stance and said it was a major factor 
contributing to improvement of relations between the two countries. 199 
In 1988, against a background of Iranian-aided release of hostages in Lebabon, a long 
awaited acceptance of a cease-fire to the eight year war, and the reopening of foreign embassies in 
Tehran; Amnesty International published its most scathing attack on the Iranian government 
accusing it of arbitrarily executing thousands of political prisoners, (allegedly captured Iranian 
196 Confidential discussions with international civil servant attached to the Center for Human Rights in Geneva. 
197 UNDoc., E/CN. 4/1983/19, (Annex 1), p. 1. 
198 See Keesing's, vol. xxx, February 1984, p. 32690-32691. The "US administration officials subsequently said that the 
appeal had been prompted by a number of recent congressional resolutions expressing concern over the fate of 300,000 
strong Bahai community in Iran (a estimated 100,000 Bahai's being resident in the USA)", p. 32690. See for example, 'Re- 
ligious Persecution of the Baha'is in Iran', United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Human 
Rights and International Organisations, series: 98th Congress, 2nd session, Hearing May 2 1984. 
199 Kayhan International, June 20,1988. 
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insurgents aligned to the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation). The reaction of the Iranian charge 
d'affaires in London was significant in so far as it considered Amnesty International's allegations 
as `having a negative impact on Iran's genuine efforts to establish peace and tranquility in the 
Persian Gulf region". 200 With reference to the shooting down of the Iranian Air-bus, a tragedy 
which claimed the lives of some 290 Iranian civilians, it felt the international community, particu- 
larly the UN Security Council, had acted inadequately. The Foreign Ministry on this occasion 
commented that the "unanimous resolution adopted [by] the Security Council failed to condemn 
the United States for shooting down" the Iranian airliner. This, it stated, proved that the "Security 
Council, due to the presence of ... the US ... is even unable to explicitly acknowledge such a 
human and international right. "201 Seizing the opportunity to establish goodwill with the interna- 
tional community, the official position in Iran in the aftermath of the tragedy came to be that there 
would be no retaliation. 
Lastly, the Iranian government among other developing countries believe that "In contem- 
porary international politics the making of diplomatic points about human rights is most closely 
associated with the foreign policy of the United States". How has Iran among other developing 
countries reacted to what it sees as what some authors perceive as tantamount to "cultural imperi- 
alism" lying behind the mask of human rights? ". 202 At a time when much needed cooperation 
between the Commission and the government was non-existent, Prime Minister Musavi stated 
"we should not count too much on the rulings of international powers ... such forums are usually 
dominated by the international policies of the few big powers of the world". He added that biased 
resolutions emanating from the Commission would "serve to further radicalise ... [presumably 
Iranian] policies with respect to major world issues". 203 It is very likely that harsh resolutions 
adopted by the Commission were serving the purpose of their sponsors, i. e. to drive Iran into a 
diplomatic cul-de-sac. But on the other hand, they also brought into question the capability of the 
200 Kayhan International, December 15,1988. 
201 Kayhan International, July 23,1988. 
2D2 RJ. Vincent, "The Response of Europe and the Third World to United States Human Rights Diplomacy" in The Di- 
plomacy of Human Rights (ed. ), David D. Newson, London, University Press for America, 1986, p. 31. 
2 Kayhan International, December 17,1985. 
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The Iran-Iraq War and the United Nations: 
A Quest for Justice and Peace 
Introduction 
The Iran-Iraq war is commonly understood to have its roots in the religio-political differ- 
ences between the ruling elites of both countries. Numerous explanations have been given for the 
causes of this conflict (starting in September 1980), and most of them fall into one of the follow- 
ing two categories: factors arising primarily from territorial disputes, most prominent being the 
question of boundaries between the two countries, formed by the Shatt al-Arab Waterway 
(referred to in Iran as the Arvand-Rood); or factors arising from a general hostility between the 
two sides, particularly Iraq's Ba'ath Party's fears that the revolutionary power of Khomeini's 
Islamic Government would stir up the Shiite majority in southern Iraq. 
Given the context within which this chapter will examine the conflict, i. e. the practice of 
Iranian foreign policy in the United Nations, it will be necessary to divide the process of enquiry 
into four major sections. Section one will provide an account of the events that led up to the 
fighting. *Section two will examine the mandate of the Security Council and the relative posi- 
tions adopted by its members vis-a-vis the war. **Section three will focus on the elements which 
caused the Iranian delegation's dissatisfaction with the Security Councils handling of the dispute. 
Section four will examine the shift of mediation activities to the office of the Secretary-General, 
summing up the process which was developed over almost a decade by the UN to end the war, 
and the events which led up to the implementation of Resolution 598. 
The war with Iraq was the major pre-occupation of Iranian diplomacy during the 1980s. 
Apart from demonstrating the long but successful role of the UN, this chapter will be able to 
throw some light on post-revolutionary Iranian diplomacy at the UN and its attitude towards the 
* **, The structure and format of sections two and three have drawn extensively upon the study by Ralph P. H. King, The 
United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1986, New York, Ford Foundation, 1987. 
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main political origins of the UN, in matters crucial to its national foreign policy and international 
relations. 
This chapter will also show how the Security Council in particular was far from even 
handed in dealing with the two parties involved in the Iran-Iraq War, and consistently preferred to 
listen to Baghdad's version of events rather than Tehran's. The Council also consistently 
declined, in the face of all the evidence, to point the finger of blame at Iraq for starting the war by 
invading Iranian territory. This biased attitude on the part of the UN was subsequently to 
undergo a complete volte-face when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. 
L Events Leading up to the Iraq-Iran War: October 1979 - September 1980 
By the end of 1979, Iraq's attitude toward the Iranian revolution - which was sympathetic 
during Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government - gradually shifted. The first signs of official 
Iraqi dissatisfaction with the Islamic government in Iran were noticed in October 1979 when Mr. 
Abdel Hussein Moslem Hassan, the Iraqi ambassador in Beirut (Lebanon), in an official declara- 
tion demanded the following from Iran: 
(i) the abrogation of the 1975 "reconciliation" treaty and the restoration to Iraq of its former 
rights (concerning the Shatt al-Arab river), 
(ii) the evacuation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands in the Strait of Hormuz (occupied by the 
Shah's armed forces in 1975), and 
(iii) the granting of autonomy to the Baluchis, Kurds and Arabs in Iran. 1 
The Iranian government rejected these demands on November 1,1979, as constituting 
interference in Iran's internal affairs? Starting in November 1979, there were a number of 
incidents which clearly reflected the state of rapidly deteriorating relations between the two coun- 
tries. Of these the most important were the expelling of ambassadors, initiated by Iran in March 
1980 and followed by Iraq. 3 In the same month, the then President Bani-Sadr (with reference to 
I Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XXVII, 1981, p. 31005. (Henceforth to be cited as Keesing's). 
2 Ibid. 
3 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 10,1980, (MP16366/A17) and March 11,1980, (ME/6367/A/5). (Hen- 
ceforth to be cited as BBC/SWB). 
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the second demand made by the Iraqis) was reported to have said that certain Arab states (mean- 
ing Iraq) were "not fully independent" and were "subservient to the United States", and that if Iran 
relinquished control over the three islands to the Arabs, they would turn them over to the United 
States, because they lay on the vital oil route controlled by the latter. 4 
This led to Iraq's Foreign Minister sending a message in April 1980 to Dr. Kurt Waldheim 
(then UN Secretary-General), which was reported to have called for the immediate withdrawal of 
Iranian troops from the three Gulf islands, and to have accused the Iranians of pursuing an 
"aggressive and expansionist" policy in the Gulf region. The Iranian Foreign Minister stated, on 
the same day, that his country's "differences with Iraq went beyond the disputed Islands", and 
that the Iraqi Government was "under the control of Zionists and Imperialists". 5 
On April 7,1980, Iran placed its army on full alert along the frontier with Iraq. The next 
day Ayatollah Khomeini called for the removal of President Saddam Hussein, whom he described 
as "an enemy of Islam and Moslems" and urged the "Iraqi armed forces to desert" .6 
In the same month, the attempted assassination of Tareq Aziz, Iraq's deputy Prime Minister, 
while he was visiting Mustansirriyya University was blamed on Iranian zealots. This event led to 
the large-scale expulsions of Shi'a-Moslems and people of Iranian origin from Iraq to Iran.? 
Further violent incidents continued along the Iraq-Iran border. 
In the neighbouring Gulf states, these incidents were interpreted as Baghdad's ploy to 
recover the Shatt al-Arab River and Gulf Islands by force, which in all probability would mean 
war. 8 
On April 16,1980, the Supreme Command of the Iranian armed forces announced in a 
broadcast the formation of a "Revolutionary Islamic Army for the Liberation of Iraq". At the 
same time Tehran radio called for "a holy war" (jihad) against the Ba'ath regime. 9 In Iraq, 
4 Keesing's, op. cit., vo1. XXVU, 1987, p. 31005. 
s Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 BBCISWB, April 3,1980, (ME/6387/A/3-4). 
See, for example, Financial Times, (London), April 9,1980. 
9 Keesing's, op. cit., vo1. XXV11, p. 31006. 
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President Hussein declared that given the present state of affairs, war was not a remote possibility 
and was a "national duty". He also demanded general recognition of the Arab nature of the south- 
ern oil-rich province of Khuzestan (called Arabistan in Iraq) in Iran, as being part of Iraq. 10 
The months of May to August were full of reports of border skirmishes and diplomatic 
expulsions. In those months Iraqi aircraft were said to have attacked towns in north-western Iran, 
striking at oil installations 30 miles south of Qasr-e-Shirin (the principal border crossing point 
between Iraq and Iran north-east of Baghdad. " 
On August 27,1980, however, the Iranian Pars News Agency announced that for the first 
time the Iranian Army had used ground-to-ground missiles to repel "Iraqi aggressors" in the 
Qasr-e-Shirin area after clashes had extended "to all the border posts-. 12 The situation grew 
rapidly out of control. On September 10,1980, both President Saddam Hussein and Al Thawra 
(the Iraqi Ba'ath Party's official organ), stated that the clashes had to do with the territorial 
claims, and that Iraqi forces had seized Zayn al-Qaws and other territory that Iran ought to have 
returned under the provisions of the 1975 Treaty. 13 The Iraqi President said on this occasion that 
Iraq did not want a war, but would nevertheless resort to it if its territorial integrity was infringed 
upon. 
Assessing the comments of both sides over the incident (the seizure of the Zayn al-Qaws), it 
seems that the two countries clearly did not wish to go to war at that stage. But all hopes of a de- 
escalation of the crisis were lost when President Saddam Hussein announced to the Parliament in 
Baghdad on September 17,1980, that the Government of Iraq had formally and unilaterally abro- 
gated the "reconciliation" treaty of June 13,1975, and that it had restored its full sovereignty over 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway. 14 President Hussein added that by resuming its aid to the Kurdish 
10 Ibid. 
What started off as small sorties by the Iraqi Air Force along the Iraq-Iran border escalated into attacks against Iranian 
oil installations in mid-July. For earlier examples see International Herald Tribune, May 31 - June 1,1980. 
12 Keesing's, op. cit., vol. XXVU, p. 31006. See also a report published in the International Herald Tribune, August 28, 
1980. 
13 Ibid., The Foreign Ministry in Iran, however, denied this, stating that the zone had been restored to Iraq under the 
provisions of the 1975 agreement. Also see BBC/SWB, September 12,1980, (ME/6521/A/9) and September 17,1980, 
(MBJ6525/A/3). 
14 BBC/SWB, September 19,1980, (MF/6257/A/1-7). See also Keesing's, op. cit., vol. XXVII, p. 31006. 
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insurgents, 15 Iran had violated one part of the 1975 agreement which, according to Article 4, ren- 
dered the whole agreement void. This development was also conveyed in a letter to the 
Secretary-General on September 21,1980.16 Although in a later correspondence (dated 25 
November, 1980) Iraq denied the Iranian charge that it "unilaterally abrogated" the agreement, 
since it had already been violated by Iran and hence should be considered void. 17 
In the same month and a few days before full-scale fighting broke out, Baghdad announced 
that ships passing through the Shatt al-Arab must pay dues and fly the Iraqi flag. 18 On September 
21 Iraq launched a major offensive and full-scale war broke out along the Iran-Iraq border. Iraqi 
troops occupied the port of Khomamshahr and almost completely surrounded Abadan. Although 
the initial stages of the battle exacted heavy damage, by 1981 the war had entered a stalemate not 
promising victory to either side. 19 
While reviewing the events preceding the outbreak of full-scale hostilities it would be 
appropriate at this point to briefly analyse whether Iraq qualifies to be named as the initiator of 
the Iraq-Iran war. This exercise is not to oversimplify the deeper reasons, motives and cir- 
cumstances that underpinned the Iraq-Iran conflict, but rather an examination of the rationale 
behind the whole conflict itself from the available data. 
The fact that the outbreak of hostilities (dated by the international community as September 
22,1980) between Iraq and Iran followed so closely to the former's "unilateral abrogation" of the 
1975 reconciliation treaty, has made this act the raison d'e'tre of the entire conflict. Statements 
and actions provide further justification. To begin with, one must ask the question "How did Sad- 
dam Hussein seek to justify the Iraqi decision to abrogate the 1975 reconciliation treaty (1975 
agreement, Algiers agreement)? Apart from the explanation offered earlier in this paper, 
15 In April 1980, Mr. Masoud Barzani, one of the leaders of a faction of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran 
(DPKI), declared his allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and President Bani- Sadr. See Keesing's, op. cit., vol. X}NII, 
p. 31005. 
16 UNGAOR A1351483, and UNDoc., S/14192. 
17 Moe, S/14272. 
1s BBC/SWB, September 20,1980, (M$/6528/A/2-3). The announcement was made on September 18,1980. See also 
Chapter III of this dissertation. 
19 For details on the strategic balances of both parties and the extent of damage in the first 30 days of battle, see 
Keesing's, op. cit., vol. XXVII, pp. 31006-31009. 
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President Saddam Hussein, in his address to an extraordinary session of the Iraqi National Assem- 
bly, said: 
Since the rulers of Iran have violated this agreement as of their own by blatantly and 
deliberately intervening in Iraq's domestic affairs by backing and financing, as did the 
Shah before them, the leaders of the mutiny [Kurdish rebel leaders], which is backed 
by America and Zionism, and by refusing to return the Iraqi territories which we were 
compelled to liberate by force [the Zayn al-Qaws seizure on September 10,1980], I 
announce before you that we consider the 6 March 1975 agreement as abrogated from 
our side also. The RCC [Revolutionary Command Council] has made a decision to 
this effect. 
Thus, the legal relationship concerning Shatt al-Arab should return to what it was 
before March 6,1975. This Shatt shall again be, as it has been throughout history, 
Iraqi and Arab in name and reality, with all rights of full sovereignty over it 20 
The territorial issue which seems to be at the centre of Iraq's reason for resorting to hostili- 
ties was not new. The above statement of President Saddam Hussein suggests that, even before 
the revolutionary regime took power in Iran, the land and insurgent problem had not been 
resolved, even though the situation had apparently not disturbed Iraq for almost 18 months after 
the Shah's departure. 
Furthermore, the above statement (made four days before the war) suggests that Iraq had 
already recovered the territories by force. In fact, General Adnan Khyrallah had declared "On 7 
September, 21 we began to regain the first area, called Zayn al-Qaws. On 10th September, we 
regained the second area, that of Sayf Sa'd". The General added, "I believe that on 12 and 13 
September we regained five border posts which had been trespassed upon. Thus we have 
regained all the land areas which have been trespassed upon by the Iranian side and have settled 
our dispute with Iran concerning the land differences" . 
22 If this statement holds true, then Iraq's 
territorial claim, as a bona fide reason to abrogate the Algiers agreement four days later, stands 
invalid. More importantly it is in complete contradiction to Iraq's full-scale attack on Iran on 
September 21,1980. 
20 Foreign Broadcast Irrformation Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, September 18,1980, vol. 5, no. 186. 
(Henceforth to be cited as FBIS/ME&A). 
21 There is a discrepancy of three days between Keesing's, which dates the Iraqi admission to seizing the disputed zone 
as being on September 10,1980, and that of the records of FBIS/ME&A, which dates it three days earlier. 
22 See FBISIME&A, September 26,1980, vol. 5, no. 189. Emphasis added. 
- 235 - 
The above deduction seems to indicate that, since the abrogation of the treaty by Iraq was 
not based on solid grounds, the whole act was an excuse to launch a full-scale attack against Iran. 
It was believed in Arab diplomatic circles that Iraq had been planning the attack some six months 
previously, as it had mobilised troops to the frontier for this purpose. 23 With the abrogation of the 
treaty, it was believed that war was almost unavoidable, since Iraq continued to seize land it 
claimed as its own. 24 
Moreover, given the facts that the revolutionary purges had left the Iranian armed forces 
weakened and had made inroads into Iranian military equipment, the odds seemed to favour 
Iraq. 25 In fact on September 21, one day after the mobilisation of Iranian forces had begun, Iraqi 
deputy Prime 'Minister Tareq Aziz had left on an unscheduled visit to Moscow, where he was 
reportedly to have requested military aid26 
The above evidence does indicate that, in theory at least, neither President Hussein nor his 
officials could make any diplomatic justification for the abrogation of the treaty, much less for the 
invasion of Iran. Though it is not within the scope of this chapter to argue in detail what other 
causes might have contributed to the conflict, it is nevertheless appropriate to look briefly at some 
of the regional political developments following the Iranian revolution, which may be taken as 
causal factors. 
Professor R. K. Ramazani is of the opinion that "The Iraq-Iran war began as Iraq's response 
to the perceived threat of the contagion of the Khomeini brand of Islamic fundamentalism. But it 
also reflected the ambition for power of Saddam Hussein". 27 
With transfer of power to the more militant clerics in Iran after the replacement of the 
Bazargan government, relations between Tehran and Baghdad deteriorated rapidly. In a reprisal 
for the assassination attempt on Iraq's deputy Prime Minister in April 1980, reportedly by Iranian 
23 Discussions with Arab diplomat in Geneva, August 1989. 
24 The Times, (London), September 21,1980. 
25 Patrick Scale in a report for the Observer notes that Saddam Hussein was clearly not in a mood for negotiation, but 
wished to capitalise on his "advantage". Observer, (London), September 21,1980. 
26 The Sunday Times, (London), September 21,1980; The Times, (London), September 22,1980. 
27 RK. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle-East, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univer- 
sity Press, 1986, p. 57. 
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extremists, the Iraqi government rounded up all those it suspected of having links with Tehran, 
especially those who were members of the Da'awa party. 28 This wave of repression culminated in 
the execution of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980.29 
These executions caused Shi'as to emigrate in large numbers from the Gulf to Iran. 
The Baghdad regime viewed Khomeini's ideology as a basic threat to its own political sta- 
bility in at least two ways. Firstly, Khomeini's call for an export of the Islamic revolution on the 
Iranian model and his religious concept of an Islamic world order were not compatible with the 
socialist secularist and Pan-Arab tenets of Ba'ath ideology. Secondly, Islamic Iran's security role 
in the Persian Gulf had changed since the departure of the Shah. This collided with the Iraqi's 
notion of regional security, which was based on "Pan-Arab" supremacy in the Persian Gulf and 
the protection of Iraqi interests in the Shatt al-Arab. Misconceptions on the part of many 
observers regarding this were largely based on declarations made by many revolutionary policy- 
makers in the aftermath of the Shah's departure who declared that Iran would no longer play the 
role of the Gulf "policeman". This statement, given the fact that Iran still has not relinquished its 
hold on the islands in the Gulf, for example, could only have meant that the revolutionary forces, 
while declining to be an American policeman, did not cease to see itself as a, if not the major, 
power in the Gulf region. 30 
This is also reflected in Iranian Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech with regards to secu- 
rity in the Persian Gulf. "We declared once again that the security of the Persian Gulf is more 
important to us than any other party [state], and we will strive to maintain the Gulfs [security] as 
much as we can". 31 This statement represents one of the major areas of continuity in Iran's 
foreign policy towards the region. 
28 The Da'awa party was formed by Iraqi Shi'a revolutionaries after the revolution of 1958, which destroyed the monar- 
chy in Iraq. The main objective of the party is to establish an Islamic state. See Hans, Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a 
Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects", Middle East Journal, vol. 35, no. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 578-94. 
29 Ayatollah al-Sadr was said to have close links with Ayatollah Khomeini and was the undisputed leader of Iraqi Shi'a 
Muslims. Ibid.. 
30 Discussions with a Professor of International Relations in Tehran, November, 1990. 
31 FBIS/SA, [South Asia], October 24,1893, vo1.8, no. 206. 
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In concluding this section, it would be timely to outline the clash of Iraqi Ba'athist ideals 
with that of the Iranian revolution. It is not uncommon to hear that one of the major causes of the 
Iraq-Iran war was a clash of personalities between Khomeini32 and Saddam Hussein. Ideologi- 
cally, Saddam considered himself to be an heir to ideologue Michel Aflaq's Ba'athism; this made 
his views more secular, socialist and basically Arabist with respect to his foreign policy towards 
the region. Saddam Hussein strove to show the Arab world that he shouldered a Pan-Arab 
responsibility. For example, by making it a condition that Iran relinquish the islands of Abu 
Musa and the two Tunbs, he appointed himself as the spokesman of the Arab nation. This is also 
evident in his self-appointed role as liberator of the Arabic-speaking Iranian minority of Khuzis- 
tan (or Arabistan as it is known in Iraq) living in the oil-rich provinces of Southern Iran. Further, 
Saddam's Ba'athism and Arabism opposed Iranian nationalism, which he characterised as racist 
and imperialist. He described his war with Iran as the second battle of Qadisiyah, or "Saddam's 
Qadisiyah" (historical reference to the first battle fought by the Arabs against the Persians in AD 
637). 33 Hussein's Ba'athism also challenged Khomeini's Pan-Islamic ideals by the superior Arab 
claim to Islam itself, based on the Arabness of the Prophet Mohammad, the Arabic language of 
the Qoran and the location of Islam's most holy places in Arab lands. 
The above factors, when set in the context of the power vacuum which had developed in the 
Persian Gulf region at the end of 1979 and the fact that the Arab world lacked leadership, espe- 
cially after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 34 add to the difficulties of isolating the specific 
causes that underpinned the Iraq-Iran war. 
32 Khomeini characterised Saddam Hussein as an "infidel" who "is fighting to destroy Islam". See The New York Times, 
1 October 1980. 
33 In a speech to the Iraqi people on September 28,1980, President Saddam Hussein said "We had to unsheath the 
swords of 'Ali, Sa'd and Al'Qä qa' [Muslim warriors who fought the Romans and Persians earlier in Islamic history] in 
order to strike this tyrannical clique [Khomeini's Islamic government] and teach it a new historical lesson like that of the 
glorious A1-Qadisiyah battle which destroyed Khosrou's arrogance, raised the banners of Islam and eliminated infidelity, ig- 
norance and aggression in the region. This was also done by our brave army in Zayn al-Qaws and Sayf Sa'd". FBIS/ME, 
September 29,1980, vo1S, no. 190. 
34 In March 1979, Iraq hosted an Arab foreign minister's conference in Baghdad in order to increase its prestige in the 
region, having found favour with Saudi Arabia by effectively mediating the border dispute between North and South Ye- 
men. The more hard-line members, namely the PLO, Syria and Libya, went along with Baghdad in condemning the Egyp- 
tian leadership for compromising with the "Zionists". Saddam Hussein, who was vice-president of the Conference, told the 
members "anyone who collaborates with Sadat is a collaborator with the Zionist enemy". See Washington Post, March 28, 
1979. 
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IL Early Efforts at Mediation 
At the outbreak of full-scale hostilities between Iran and Iraq, a number of third parties 
made attempts to mediate. Among these groups were the Islamic Conference Organisation, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, the governments of Algeria and Cuba, as well as the Palestinian Libera- 
tion Organisation. However the efforts of the United Nations can be considered as being the most 
significant, reflecting on the one hand a need to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute and on 
the other the inaction of the Security Council, riven with superpower politics. 
On September 23,1980, one day after the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, the 
President of the Security Council, Mr. Taieb Slim (permanent representative of Tunisia), appealed 
to both countries to settle their dispute by peaceful means. 35 Thereafter, between September 26 
and October 24 1980, the Security Council met on six occasions to discuss the Iran-Iraq war. At 
the second meeting (September 28,1980), after President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan reported that 
Iran was not ready for conciliation or mediation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 479. 
The resolution called upon the two countries "to settle their dispute by peaceful means and 
in conformity with principles of justice and international law" and "to accept any appropriate 
offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peace- 
ful means of their own choice". It also called upon "all other states to exercise the utmost res- 
traint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the 
Conflict". 36 
The resolution contained no reference to Iraqi aggression, nor did it call for the withdrawal 
of forces to internationally recognised frontiers. This led Iran to reject the resolution and the 
President of Iran informed the Secretary-General on October 1,1980, that his country saw "no use 
in any discussion [on the war], directly or indirectly" while Iraqi forces remained on Iranian 
soi1.37 The Iraqi government, recognising its territorial gain, announced that its forces were ready 
to observe a cease-fire from October 5, if Iran did the same. 38 The offer of course elicited no 
35 UNDoc., S/14190. 
36 Security Council Resolution 479, See Annex I pertaining to Chapter VII of this thesis. 
37 UNDoc., S/14206. 
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response from Iran. 
Iran's boycott of the Security Council since the hostage crisis in November 1979, and its 
refusal to settle the dispute on the offered terms, further alienated it from the permanent members 
and their allies. Seizing the opportunity at the next Council meeting (October 17,1980) the 
Iranian Prime Minister (Mr. Rajai), accused the superpowers, in particular the United States, of 
attempting to "destroy the Islamic revolution in Iran, via Iraq" and imposing "a new Israel on the 
Middle East". He declared that whatever decision the Council might take would change nothing 
for Iran, which would continue to fight. 39 
The Iraqi representative to the UN (Dr. Saadoun Hammadi) said that his country had tried 
all possible peaceful means to resolve the territorial problems and was faced with no alternative 
but to "exercise self-determination to recover authority over the whole of its territory". He added 
that "Iraq had no territorial claim on Iran" but only on "our territorial integrity on our land and our 
waterway" 40 The debate which followed failed to reach any conclusion due to the divisions 
between the members of the Security Council. A draft resolution tabled by seven developing 
countries, including China, which sought to bring Iran and Iraq into a negotiating process was not 
supported by the other members 41 This led the Council to ask the Secretary-General (Dr. 
Waldheim) to send a special envoy to the area to explore the possibilities of ending the war. 
On November 11,1980, Dr. Waldheim announced that he had appointed Mr. Olaf Palme, 
the former Prime Minister of Sweden as his envoy; 42 both Iran and Iraq agreed to receive him. 
On the first of his visits to Tehran, MVlr. Palme met both the President and Prime Minister of 
the Islamic Republic. He regarded the talks as "informative, constructive and useful" 43 But the 
question of a peace proposal was remote, given the conditions set by the Iranian leaders. It is 
interesting to note, especially in the context of the events surrounding the recent Gulf War (1990- 
38 UNDoc., S/14210. 
39 Keesing's, op. cit., volXXVII, p. 31013. 
40 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
42 UNDoc., S/14251. 
43 United Nations Press Release, Office of Public Information, Press Section, UN, New York, IR/22, November 21, 
1980. (Henceforth to be cited as UNPR). 
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91), that the Iranian President is reported to have told Mr. Palme (in 1980) that "Iran was seeking 
not only the military defeat of Iraq but also the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein, who 
" should be tried before a world court". 
After Mr. Palme's visit to Baghdad, he was of the opinion that there was no hope of any 
early end to the war, he feared that the war might spread to other regions of the Gulf and could 
even involve the great powers 45 At the end of the first phase of his mission, Mr. Palme stated 
that the aim of his trip had been to "learn and clarify the position of each Government". Though 
this aim had been fulfilled, "nobody should expect rapid results" 46 
Subsequent visits by Mr. Palme to both countries yielded little by way of ending the 
conflict. The level of conflict was such that even the 63 merchant vessels trapped in the Shatt al- 
Arab could not be guaranteed safe passage. In the end, however, the crews of the trapped ships 
were freed. 47 
By the middle of 1983, the role of the United Nations in the Gulf War changed. This 
change can be attributed to the appointment of Javier Perez de Cuellar as the new UN Secretary- 
General, and to the fact that emphasis was now being laid not so much on bringing the war to an 
end as on limiting the damage done to civilian and non-military areas. This new role of the 
United Nations was made possible by the Iranian government, who directly requested the 
Secretary-General to send a mission to visit civilian areas in Iran which had suffered war damage. 
On being informed of this proposal, the Iraqi government requested a similar mission to visit its 
civilian areas 48 
The visits of UN missions and their strict mandate (as fact-finding teams) ensured continu- 
ous UN involvement throughout the war, and acted as a conduit for regular information to the 
Security Council via the Secretary-General's office. The Iranian Foreign Minister believed that 
44 Keesing's, op. cit., vo1JXCVU, p. 31014. 
45 Ibid. 
46 UNPR, 1R123, November 24,1980. 
47 UNPR, IR/34, March 16,1981. See also Keesing's, op. cit., vo1. XXVII, p. 31014; UNDoc., S/14216 and UNDoc., 
S/14221. 
43 UNPR, 1Rß9, May 18,1983. This particular press release is a good example of the itinerary and composition of 
fact-finding missions to the two countries. 
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the "report handed to the UN Secretary-General on the war-devastated civilian areas would help 
to demonstrate Iran's true claims to the world public opinion". In an interview with the Islamic 
Republic News Agency, the Foreign Minister said: "This may be the first time an international 
organisation has performed in a relatively fair manner" 49 Both statements seem to indicate a 
new-found confidence in the role of the Organisation; much of this has been attributed to the 
efforts and personality of Perez de Cuellar. 50 Throughout 1984 and 1985, the UN continued to 
dispatch missions to both countries to investigate issues ranging from the prisoner-of-war situa- 
tion to the possibility of a moratorium on attacks on civilian areas. Both countries preferred to 
use the UN as investigator/mediator in the above cases, rather than resorting to specialised agen- 
cies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 51 
From the mid-eighties up until the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 
[1988], which formally brought the Iran-Iraq war to a close, a number of issues were brought by 
the two parties to the UN. Of these the most pertinent was the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. 
Given the importance of this issue to Iranian diplomacy at the UN, it will be dealt with separately 
in Chapter 8. At this juncture it would not be out of place to examine the Iran-Iraq war in relation 
to the mandate of the Security Council, and more importantly the degree to which it was able to 
fulfill that mandate. Section V1.2 will also examine the Iranian government's reaction to the poli- 
tics of the Security Council, a body which it believed was being used to prevent it from prosecut- 
ing the war successfully on the political front. 
III. The War and the Mandate of the Security Council 
In the words of Brian Urquhart, "The Security Council's performance at the outset of the 
Iraq-Iran War was a pale shadow of the possibilities that the United Nations Charter gives the 
Council for dealing with precisely this kind of situation". 52 The author goes on to refer to the US 
49 Kayhan International, June 29,1983. 
50 Discussions with Iranian diplomat in Tehran, October 1990. 
51 Before UN fact-finding missions left for the area, they met the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and 
the delegates from both countries separately. The scope and method of the work was always decided by the mission itself. 
See for example, UNPR, SGI/SM/3645, IR/43, January 7,1985. The additional reference number (i. e. SG1/SM/3645) 
identifies statements (press releases) made by a spokesman for the Secretary-General. 
52 Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Iran War", in SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disar- 
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Ambassador Donald McHenry, who reminded the Security Council less than a week from the out- 
break of full-scale hostilities that, under Article 24 of the Charter, the United Nations is entrusted 
with "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and order". However, 
the Charter also requires that member states "settle international disputes by peaceful means" 
[Article 2(3)] and that they refrain from the threat of use of force. Article 33(1) states that "the 
parties to any dispute shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation ... or 
other peaceful means of their own choice". Should the parties fail to resolve the dispute peace- 
fully, "they shall refer it to the Security Council" [Article 37(l)]. 53 
Ralph KingM in a study prepared for the Ford Foundation, attempts to bring out the subtle 
difference between the Council's power to act granted under the UN Charter and its practice. As 
regards referring a dispute to the Security Council, a situation might arise, when 
"either or both parties may be unwilling to follow this procedure for various political 
reasons, one of which might be a desire to settle a grievance by force. In such a case, 
the onus would fall upon the Council, as outlined in Article 24, '. 55 
Further, 
"if the parties to a dispute cannot or will not settle it by negotiation, the Council may 
intervene under the provisions of Article 37(2) to take action set out in Article 36, or 
to recommend appropriate methods or terms of settlement. Finally, the Council may 
theoretically have recourse to the provisions of Chapter VII: that is, it may apply 
economic and other sanctions [Article 41] or take the necessary military actions [Arti- 
cle 42]. "56 
In practice, however, 
"the prevailing view of the Council's procedure holds that it can act on a matter only if 
it has been brought to its attention by a member state, as provided for in Article 35, or 
by the Secretary-General, with the authority conferred by Article 99. "57 
Thus it is argued that since the 
mament. p. 507. 
53 ibid 
54 Ralph King is presently employed by the Australian Government. Between the years 1985 and 1986, he was a 
research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
55 The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1986, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. The author here is referring to the work of Louis B. Sohn in "The Security-Council's Role in the Settlement of 
International Disputes", American Journal of International Law, vol. 78, no. 2, April 1984, pp. 402-04. 
-243- 
"provisions of Chapter VI relating to the duties of states to submit disputes to the 
Council [Article 33(1)] or to the Council's powers of investigation [Article 34] are 
almost never invoked, and then only in discussion ... evidence for ... the application of 
those articles in the working of the Security Council has continued to be scant. "58 
Lastly, the provisions of Chapter VII are invoked only in the most exceptional circumstances, as 
for example in the sanctions against Iraq in the recent Gulf War. 
Any failure on the part of Iran to abide by the above-mentioned provisions in the Charter for 
resolving disputes was based not so much on the mechanics as on the wording and the interpreta- 
tion of the title of the first and subsequent Security Council resolutions. According to some 
observers, these "deliberately failed to either call for the withdrawal of forces or to determine 
responsibility for the hostility". Secondly, the title of the first Security Council Resolution was 
considered misleading. Resolution 479 referred to the severe confrontation of land, sea and air 
forces of both countries as merely "the situation between Iran and Iraq". In the opinion of a 
senior Iranian academic, 
"by referring to the conflict as a situation rather than a war, the Security Council 
shrewdly evaded any resort to Articles 30-50 of the UN Charter and the recognition of 
war as a threat to peace, and/or an act of aggression. Instead, recalling its responsibil- 
ity under Article 24, the Council backed the peaceful settlement of disputes by virtue 
of Articles 33-38 of the UN Charter. Hence, Iran had no alternative other than opting 
for its right to self-defence conferred by Article 51 of the UN Charter. "59 
Due to this attitude of the Security Council, Iran's Permanent Representative rarely attended 
UN Security Council meetings. Iran's Premier, the late Mohammad Ali Rajai, took part in Coun- 
cil sessions on October 15 and 17,1980. At that time Dr. Kurt Waldheim reportedly told Rajai in 
a private meeting, 
"I believe you are making a strong case. Iraq's military invasion of your country is a 
fact and I think the UN and the Security Council are the appropriate fora where your 
country's positions can be presented. You will see your just grievances both heard 
and accepted and the proper position will be taken. "60 
ss ]bid. The author here is referring to the opinion cited in the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Sup- 
plement 1969-71, United Nations, p. 192. 
59 The quote is taken from a speech made by Abbas Maleki, (Editor-in-Chief of the Iranian Journal of International Af- 
fairs, Tehran) at a conference on Iran After Cease-Fire, held at Munich, October 23-24,1989. In my brief discussions with 
the author, I was referred to this piece as a summary of his views on the subject. Emphasis added. 
60 Ibid. 
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However, with the adoption of Resolution 479 and the deadlock between both parties, the Secu- 
rity Council ceased deliberations on the subject for almost the next two years. 
Before Council discussions on the war were suspended, British Ambassador Sir Anthony 
Parsons, Security Council President for November 1980, defended the relative lethargy with 
which the Council was moving on the issue by saying: 
"I don't believe that it is anything really shameful for the Security Council not to be 
able to bring about an instant cessation of hostilities ... Our consultations take a long 
time ... I think the consensus of the 
Council is that, if and when the Council acts, it 
should do so effectively. "61 
Questioned about members of the Security Council supplying arms to the combatants, Parsons 
said the matter had not been discussed but that "maybe this is something we should take up". 62 
In the light of the above, it was not surprising that the Soviet Union, along with the United 
States, effectively blocked any amendment of the UN Charter to increase the number of Security 
Council seats from 15 to 21. General Assembly President, Baron Ruediger Von Rechman, 
indefinitely postponed a vote on an enabling resolution sponsored by members of the Non- 
Aligned bloc. US Ambassador Donald McHenry told the General Assembly that 15 Council 
seats "is already a large number in terms of rapid decision-making ... "63 
Before moving on to examine the nature of the Security Council resolutions and the causes 
of Iran's dissatisfaction with the way it perceived the Security Council was handling the dispute, 
this section may be concluded with a discussion of the political atmosphere which existed among 
members of the Security Council. 
III. 1 The Security Council's Permanent Members and the War 
To understand almost a decade of UN diplomacy vis-d-vis the Iran-Iraq War it is necessary 
to outline the larger political agenda of the permanent members of the Security Council, notably 
61 Kayhan International, November 6,1980. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Africa, Asia and Latin America would have gained in regional representation under the proposed scheme. The reso- 
lution was spearheaded by India and co-sponsorcd by Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Grenada, Iraq, the Libyan 
Jamahiriyah, Nepal, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Zambia. Kayhan International, December 7,1980. 
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the Soviet Union and the United States. 
At the outset of the war between Iraq and Iran, the permanent members, though pledging 
non-interference in the conflict, nevertheless chose to take up positions that were critical of each 
other. 
China's official News Service accused the Soviet Union of attempting to "exploit the 
fighting between Iran and Iraq, and charged that the Russians coveted the Gulf region ... fish[ing] 
in troubled water[s] ". The United States, which at that time, had diplomatic relations with neither 
Iran nor Iraq, was joined by its Western allies in insisting on keeping navigation in the Gulf open. 
Towards this end, high level discussions were going on with regard to deploying a joint task 
force, if a problem threatening the free flow of oil should arise. M 
Given that US personnel were still being held in their embassy in Tehran, Washington was 
very "concerned about Iranian charges that it was involved on the Iraqi side". The State Depart- 
ment sent a message through the Swiss government to Tehran making it clear that the "US had 
played no part in Iraq's action". However, from Edmund Muskie's speech to the UN General 
Assembly it was evident that the US was "deeply concerned that the fighting between Iran and 
Iraq could lead to the further fragmentation of Iran and create increased opportunities for Soviet 
encroachment in the Persian Gulf region". 65 More importantly, following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, President Carter, in January 1980, declared that any threat to the Persian Gulf by an 
outside power would be equated to an assault on America's "vital interests" and would be 
repulsed by all means, including military force. The Iranian daily, Kayhan International, carried 
an article during this period which quoted a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) diplomat 
who was of the opinion that 
"Washington cannot neglect Iran, not only because of the threat of a Soviet thrust from 
Afghanistan toward the [Persian] Gulf, but because without Iran as an ally, as it was 
under the deposed Shah, it is very difficult to defend Saudi Arabia and the region's oil 
wells. "66 
64 The New York Times, September 25,1980. 
65 The New York Times, September 23,1980. 
66 Kayhan International, January 8,1981. 
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The Arab diplomats at the UN (notably from the Gulf region and Middle East) hoped that Iraq 
would be able to "destroy the myth of the Iranian revolution" and show that the "Khomeini revo- 
lution [was] not the French Revolution which terrified the European monarchies". In their view, 
Iraq was the "lesser evil because at least the Iraqis [did not] claim constituencies in the Gulf'. 67 
However, there was some Arab opinion which held that "US military bases to protect the vital oil 
routes to the West ... could create a political 
issue [that could be] described as explosive". Senior 
officials in Bahrain were of the opinion that "Persian Gulf nations [were] exploring a do-it- 
yourself security system for policing the narrow 900 kilometre-long waterway that leads to the 
Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean". These sources also expressed doubt over whether such a pact 
could even be formalised, even though Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait had all suggested various 
68 plans. 
Apart from France and to a lesser extent Great Britain, the majority of Council members 
had no deep interest in the situation. France enjoyed a close relationship with Iraq throughout the 
war, mainly as an alternative supplier of high-tech weaponry, and also sought to develop closer 
commercial links with other Persian Gulf states. 
The Soviet perspective on both the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the Iran-Iraq conflict was 
conditioned by a number of factors. The Islamic revolution in Iran, however threatening to Soviet 
domestic cohesion in its predominantly Muslim areas, nevertheless held out the possibility of 
improved ties. This prospect was especially attractive since Iran, hitherto a main pillar of US 
strategic policy in the Middle East was now violently anti-American. Unlike the Carter adminis- 
tration, the Soviets did not mention possible actions if the West were to intervene in Iran, but the 
Soviet press repeatedly quoted Mr. Brezhnev's statement, which stated in part that "The Soviet 
Union, which maintains traditional good-neighbourly relations with Iran, emphatically declares 
that it is against outside interference in Iran's internal affairs by anyone, in any form and under 
any pretext". 
67 The New York Times, September 25,1980. 
68 Kayhan International, January 13, 
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Some authors have sought to prove that the Brezhnev statement was interpreted in the West 
as a "serious warning" to the United States 69 The US decision to send AWACS aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia was "strongly denounced by Moscow", where the official news agency Tass stated that 
neither Iran nor Iraq was a threat to Saudi Arabia, and that Zbigniew Brzezinski's (President 
Carter's national security adviser) warning to the Soviet Union to stay out of the conflict was a 
"hypocritical and demagogic utterance" as US servicemen and military aircraft were being sent to 
Saudi Arabia. 70 
On the other hand, the USSR was a party to a treaty of friendship with Iraq and was unwil- 
ling to jeopardise this relationship in spite of the latter's increasing dependence on certain 
Western countries for sophisticated arms and technology. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
conflict, Moscow found itself in a delicate position vis-d-vis the two countries and showed its 
displeasure at Iraq's action by suspending all major arms supplies to it for more than one year. 
This decision on the part of Moscow was based upon its belief that instability in Iran brought 
about by Iraq's attack on Iran's Islamic government might lead to repercussions along the Soviet 
Union's southern borders, and could provide the West with an opportunity to reassert itself in an 
area where it had lost access. According to Tehran Radio on October 5,1981, the Soviet Ambas- 
sador to Iran had told the Iranian Prime Minister the previous day that the Soviet Union had 
"ceased to supply Iraq with weapons and that it was ready to give Iran help as regards military 
armaments, seeing that the USSR was, like Iran, fighting `American imperialism', shared foreign 
policy viewpoints with Iran and respected the Iranian revolution". In Moscow, a Foreign Minis- 
try spokesman dismissed the Tehran report as being "slanderous and false". 71 However, the 
Soviet and East German representatives in the Security Council maintained a neutral stance and 
blamed "imperialist interests" for fuelling a war in which nobody was going to benefit. 72 
69 Howard M. Hensel, "Moscow's Perspective on the Fall of the Iranian Monarchy", Asian Affairs, vol. XIV, Part III, 
October 1983, p. 297. 
70 Keesing's, op. cit., vol. XXVII, p. 31012. 
71 ibid. 
72 UNDoc., S/PV. 2248. 
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Less than a week after the beginning of the war, when Iraq was occupying large parts of 
Iranian territory, the Security Council led by the United States and other Western countries tried 
to call for an immediate cease-fire. General Zia, President of Pakistan, who was in Tehran at that 
time trying to arrange a settlement, asked the Security Council to postpone the call for an 
immediate cease-fire which, if implemented, would have been to the disadvantage of Iran. The 
US Ambassador at this juncture described President Zia's move as a ploy to "connect diplomacy 
with military strategy". He added that if agreement to stop the war immediately was not reached, 
it would make the Third World members look as if they supported Iraq's actions in the Gulf. 73 By 
highlighting the possible nexus between diplomacy at the UN and military strategy, the United 
States pre-suggested what was to become the single biggest factor which during the course of the 
war alienated Iran from the Security Council. The reference to the inaction of the non-permanent 
members of the Security Council can be said to be reflective of the extent to which Iran was 
beginning to be isolated in the international community. 
In the view of Iranian academics and diplomats, Iran's image in the Security Council suf- 
fered due to its involvement in the hostage crisis and its dissolution of the TUDEH party (the 
Iranian Communist Party). Apart from this, domestic policies and ideological firmness were rea- 
sons which diverted Iranian officials from "pursuing an active diplomacy at the UN". Abbas 
Maleki, an Iranian academic and policy analyst, has also commented that "though aware of Iraq's 
fallacious rationalisations, the permanent members did not have access to first-hand and reliable 
information on the situation of the fronts and the enormity of the Iraqi aggression". This, coupled 
with Iran's international image and the Council's reluctant attitude in the first days of the war, 
allowed Iraq to use its superior diplomatic skills to gather all the support it could get. 74 
In concluding this section a few observations may be made which will link the approach of 
the Security Council to the conflict and the possible causes for dissatisfaction experienced by the 
Iranian delegation. At the very least it can be said that the Security Council was very slow to 
73 The New York Times, September 28,1980. 
74 Abbas Maleki op. cit., these views are expressed in his speech at Munich, and also in the course of discussions con- 
ducted in Tehran. 
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react to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities. In this respect the Iranian envoy is reported to have 
expressed his views to the First Committee of the UN with regard to international security by say- 
ing: "Although the representatives of the member countries of the United Nations consider Inter- 
national Security to be in the interest of the world, still, they do not take it seriously". The envoy 
then proceeded to mention that the "main reason for the destruction of security ... is the utilisation 
of force and threats, and the frequent use of them in international relations". 75 This disillusion- 
ment was in part attributable to Security Council Resolution 479 which was "to all intents and 
purposes, free of any condemnation of Iraq's having resorted to force". 76 Some of the reasons for 
this inaction have been mentioned in this section. However, two reasons are of particular impor- 
tance. First, Iran's Islamic government had alienated world public opinion, and it was the earnest 
hope of many member states that Iraq would contain the Iranian revolutionary forces. Secondly, 
following from this, most observers expected that Iraq would claim a quick military victory; but 
by the time the international community realised that the conflict would be a prolonged one, it 
was too late. 
It was indeed too late, as the succeeding section will demonstrate, because the Council in its 
statements and in the wording of Resolution 479 omitted to take a firm stand on Iraqi "aggres- 
sion" in the context of the provisions laid down in the UN Charter, and failed to call for a with- 
drawal of forces to internationally recognised frontiers. Both these omissions convinced Iran to 
consider all discussion on the matter useless?? The Council's refusal to condemn Iran has been 
argued by some observers as 
due to the members' prejudice against Iran. At the very least, they were prepared to 
give Iraq more leeway than might otherwise be expected. The United States was in a 
particularly difficult position, anxious not to impede negotiations over the hostages 
and concerned about the possibility of Iran's dismemberment, yet resentful of Iran's 
behaviour. 78 
75 Kayhan International, December 5,1980. 
76 The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1986, op. cit., p. 15. 
77 UNDoc., S/14206. In the first six months of the war, Iran's President Bani-Sadr in a letter to the UN Secretary- 
General considered any discussion on the war useless as long as Iraqi forces remained on Iranian soil. 
73 The United Nations and the Iran Iraq War, 1980-1986, op. cit., p. 16. 
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On the other hand, Iraq was able to benefit from the Council's lackadaisical approach. The 
response to the Norwegian representative's call for an internationally supervised withdrawal of 
forces, the Iraqi representative was quick to note that the proposal represented a pre-condition and 
did not conform with the provisions contained in Resolution 479, which first demanded a cease- 
fire. 79 As a matter of interest, Norway was one of the drafters of Resolution 479. In the light of 
recent events, i. e. the 1990-91 Gulf War, and the more or less concerted effort of the Council to 
decisively permit Allied troops to be actively deployed in the Gulf in order to maintain interna- 
tional peace and security, the relative indecision and silence on the part of the Council in a similar 
situation a decade ago seem to indicate inconsistency and even betray a degree of tilt towards 
Iraq. 
DL2 Iran's Dissatisfaction with the Security Council 
In the course of the eight-year-long war with Iraq, Iran had made no attempt to hide its dis- 
like for or mistrust of the Security Council. This mistrust of the premier political body of the 
United Nations stemmed from the Council's failure to condemn Iraq as an aggressor, and from 
the veto power of its permanent members. In his address to the 37th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Foreign Minister Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, commenting on the veto 
rights of the superpowers, said that, "the veto right of a few members [had] hindered the effective- 
ness of the UN in its dealings with world causes". Later, when the Security Council called for all 
forces to withdraw to internationally recognised boundaries in the form of Resolution 514 of July 
12,1982, when Iranian forces had entered Iraqi territory, Dr. Velayati asked where were these 
"so-called peace-lovers, when the rights of Iranian people were trampled upon by the Iraqi aggres- 
sors in the past two years? "80 The question of Iraqi aggression and the reluctance of the Security 
Council to determine its existence, though an indication of gross negligence in Iran's view, was 
quite normal to Council politics and procedure. 
79 UNDoc., S/PV. 2252. 
80 A report on Dr. Volayati's speech to the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly was printed in Kayhan Interna- 
tional, October 14,1982. 
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Sydney Bailey, who has researched the working of the Security Council in depth brings out 
an obvious ambiguity at the beginning of his book. The UN Charter, while asserting the equality 
of states in both its Preamble and Article 2, paragraph 1, simultaneously confers on five member 
states "the right to veto substantive proposals in the Security Council and amendments to the 
Charter [Articles 27(3) and 108)". 81 Arthur Lall, a former Indian Ambassador to the United 
Nations, in challenging what he called the "facile view" that military and economic power alone 
determined the capacity to make decisions in international affairs, believed that the Council was 
increasingly unable to discharge its Charter functions. He ascribed this incapacity to the "struc- 
ture of the Council" and in particular to the self-interests of the "Inner Circle" of permanent 
members. Not unlike the case of the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Council in previous situations of crisis 
like Cyprus, the Middle East, India-Pakistan and Korea had failed to convene timely meetings. 82 
Lall has pointed out that the five permanent members "are incapable ... of interesting themselves 
fully in disruptive and peace-endangering situations" and that other member states are deprived, 
mainly because of lack of status and authority, from playing a significant and effective role. He is 
of the opinion that a wider diffusion of decision-making power in the Security Council would be 
a possible solution which would make the Council more "representative" of the various regions. 83 
In revolutionary Iran, the nature of Security Council decision-making and particularly of the 
power of veto has been likened to the "law of the jungle", presumably where the fittest (i. e. 
economically and military) survive. 84 
Returning to the question of aggression, Iran's unchanging condition up to the implementa- 
tion of Security Council Resolution 598 was that Iraq be identified as the aggressor by the inter- 
national community and appropriate measures be taken against it. The biased nature of Security 
Council resolutions adopted over the span of almost a decade of full-scale war and the failure of 
the Council to identify the aggressor as a minimum measure towards securing peace indicate that 
$t Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure of the Security Council, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 7. 
' Arthur Lall, The Security Council in a Universal United Nations, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1971, pp. 3,18,19,4-11,36,42. 
t3 Ibid., pp. 10-11,21,23,30,35,39. 
84 The words "UN Veto = Law of the Jungle" were painted on the compound wall of the former US Embassy during my 
visit to Tehran between October and November 1990. 
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there existed a link between the legal and political nature of the Security Council's role in the 
maintenance of international peace and the non-determination of aggression by that same body. 85 
The principle of collective security, provided in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter, is 
further expanded in Chapter VII entitled threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression. Chapter VII of the UN Charter opens with an article which states 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. " 
Application of collective measures provided in Article 41 and 42 of the Charter is, according to 
Article 39, the responsibility of the Security Council. Therefore the important decision of the 
Security Council on determination of the existence of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression is the main prerequisite for enforcement measures. The Council has not, usually 
for political reasons, been inclined to make decisions in accordance with Article 39 and, for eva- 
sion or determination of the existence of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres- 
sion, has mostly resorted to Article 40 of the Charter. This Article in effect relates to cases where 
the Security Council is not able to decide on measures to be taken against the culprit state 
promptly. 86 According to this Article, the Council may, before determination of the nature of the 
dispute under its consideration, call upon the parties concerned to comply with provisional meas- 
ures without prejudicing their rights or claims. Measures that the parties to the dispute are asked 
to comply with are generally of a recommendatory nature, unless the Security Council stipulates 
that in case of failure to comply it would resort to enforcement measures. 
However, resort to Article 40 does not diminish the responsibility of the Security Council to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, par- 
15 The following analysis was put forward by Dr. Nasrin Mossafa, a member of the Faculty of Law and Political Sci- 
ence at Tehran University, Tehran. Sentences in quotes are directly attributable to her. 
as Article 40 of the UN Charter states that provides as follows: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the 
Security Council may, before making a recommendation or deciding upon measures provided for in Article 39, call upon 
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional meas- 
ures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or the position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall 
duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures". 
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ticularly since the General Assembly - with a view to helping the Security Council to determine 
the existence of an act of aggression - adopted Resolution 3314 in 1974, which defined aggres- 
sion with a consensus opinion. 87 Despite the existence of a Definition of Aggression, in most 
cases the Security Council has been reluctant to determine aggression, particularly in cases entail- 
ing the identification and punishment of the aggressor. "The reason for this reluctance on the part 
of the Security Council is because the Council is basically a political organ and not a legal 
organ". This does not mean that the legal role of the Council which is defined by numerous pro- 
visions in the Charter, is non-existent but rather that a "political organ decides on ways of resolv- 
ing disputes according to international law. Therefore, the functions of the Security Council are 
of a political-legal nature". 
In a publication of the Center for Advanced International Studies, Tehran, it was the joint 
opinion of certain Iranian academics that since the "determination of the aggressor and its punish- 
ment is a legal process, [it] should be handled by the International Court of Justice, but due to 
political considerations it has been referred to the Security Council". The authors were also of the 
view that the Security Council tended to use international law only as "a secondary instrument" 
for its decision-making. They attributed this to the precedent given to the general policy orienta- 
tions of the members of the Council, particularly the permanent members, and hoped that in the 
future international law would play a more determinative role 88 In the view of some Western 
observers this show of allegiance to international law seemed ironical, because in other areas, 
such as human rights, Iran was unwilling to abide by international treaties, especially when inter- 
national law came into conflict with the principles of Islam 89 In the same context, US Ambassa- 
dor to the UN, Donald McHenry, indicated that since Iran had not complied fully with interna- 
tional norms and Council resolutions on the hostages, it could not afford to complain about the 
lacklustre response of the Council to the war. 90 
n See Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, United Nations, vol. 28,1974, pp. 840-848. Especially pp. 847-8 for 
the definition of aggression. 
Ss Nasrin Mossafa, Masoud Tarem Sari, Abdolrahman Alern, Bahrain Mostaghimi, "Iraq's Aggression against Iran and 
the United Nations' Position", a Publication of the Center for Advanced International Studies, School of Law and Political 
Science, Tehran, 1987, p. 76. 
89 Discussions with a member of Human Rights NGO in Geneva, June 1990. 
90 UNDoc., S/PV. 2251. 
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By 1982, the procedure of the Security Council with regard to the conflict had assumed a 
standard approach, which as succeeding sections will illustrate was against the interests of Iran. 
The overwhelming feeling among policy-makers in Iran during this period was that it was "futile 
to rely on international organisations". Foreign Minister Velayati stated "If we disregarded our 
just positions (concerning the Iraqi-imposed war) and put our hopes on international organisations 
to gain our rights, we would certainly reach nowhere". 91 Nevertheless, the integral part the Secu- 
rity Council had come to play in the conflict made it the only top-level forum for negotiations. 
G. R. Berridge attributes the institutionalisation of "informal consultations" as the most 
important "procedural innovation over the last few decades", which has enabled the Security 
Council to involve itself in recent crises. By holding "informal private meetings" the Security 
Council has managed to transcend from being "little more than a platform for hostile exchanges 
in the East-West propaganda war". Although he has argued that informal consultations encourage 
members to "engage in genuine diplomacy on a broad and continuing inter-caucus basis" this is 
nevertheless devoid of the media exposure accorded to sensitive issues being discussed in public 
meetings of the Security Council. Until the latter half of the 1980s, the very reason which Ber- 
ridge gives for informal consultations (i. e. "the same reason that usually produces diplomacy is in 
the end the development of a balance of power")92 was considered anathema to revolutionary 
Iran's perspective of how international politics/diplomacy should be conducted. 93 Unlike formal 
public meetings there is no circulation of an agenda, no record or minutes of discussions held, the 
Secretary-General is not required to issue a communiqud at their conclusion, and the "ultimate 
sign of informality - they are given no number by the Secretariat. In short, informal private meet- 
ings of the Security Council do not officially exist! "94 
91 Kayhan International, October 4,1982. 
92 See Chapter One entitled, 'he Security Council and Secret Diplomacy", in G. R. Berridge, Return to the UN: UN 
Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, London, Macmillan, 1991. 
93 The following is a statement by Iran's former Foreign Minister, Mir Hussein Musavi, contained in his speech to the 
36th session of the United Nations General Assembly. "In our opinion, these international organisations, instead of serving 
as means of combat against tyranny and oppression or as media for establishing peace and justice in the world, have mainly 
turned into centres for 'give and take' between the superpowers and a cover for the implementation of their policies". Quot- 
ed from Kayhan International, October 14,1981. 
94 Return to the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, op. cit., p. 5. 
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The Iranian delegation probably was unable or unwilling to explore the limits of informal 
consultancy, mainly because of the strict ideological lines along which they conducted their 
affairs at the UN, as elsewhere. More importantly, informal consultancy in the Security Council 
almost always entailed behind-the-scenes negotiation with the permanent members, who may 
have demanded that Iran soften its stance on the conditions set by it to bring the war to a close. 
Given the grass roots support Iran needed to prosecute the war on both the ideological and mili- 
tary front, it did not see it as prudent to be involved in any kind of deal-making, particularly with 
the five permanent members. 
Moreover, a very senior member of the Iranian Foreign Ministry let it be known that, only 
after seeing the escalation of the war to include direct US naval involvement and the shooting 
down of an Iranian civil airliner, "Iran decided to play the game" 95 This presumably meant 
extensive informal consultations, at least with the members of the Secretariat and some of the per- 
manent members, on ways and means to bring about a cease-fire. In this respect Iran's main link 
to the Council was in the person of Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar who, in the words of Syd- 
ney Bailey, was "an exceptionally perceptive diplomat, who did not seek the limelight and ... was 
able to maintain reasonably good relations with all the main groups and blocs" 96 Before examin- 
ing the shift of mediation activities to the Secretariat, a study of the approach of the Security 
Council to the conflict with regard to the nature of the resolutions adopted by it is necessary. This 
will throw light on the extent to which the Council was able to discharge its functions as an 
impartial peace-keeping body. 
III. 3 The Nature of Security Council Resolutions on the Conflict 
Iraq began a full-scale war on September 22,1980, and occupied large parts of the southern 
and western regions of Iran. 97 On the following day the Security Council issued a statement after 
holding informal discussions. The second paragraph of this statement notes that the members of 
95 Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Larijani in Tehran, November 1990. 
96 The Procedure of the Security Council, op. cit., p. 95. 
97 See for example, Keesing's, vol. XXVII, pp31006 08. 
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the Security Council were deeply concerned that the conflict may gradually worsen, leading to a 
serious threat to the peace. The failure of the Security Council to consider Iraq's all-out attack as 
aggression, a breach of the peace or even a threat to the peace has led certain Iranian diplomats to 
observe that the Council was only of the "narrow view" that the conflict might gradually worsen 
and become a threat to international peace and security. Following from this, it can be argued 
that, since the contents of this first statement provided a basis for the first Security Council Reso- 
lution, it neither reflected the gravity of the situation nor - more importantly - recorded the fact 
that Iraq was the aggressor. 98 
Security Council Resolution 479 adopted on September 28,1980, was the beginning of a 
series of decisions on the Iran-Iraq war. The issues deliberated upon in the Security Council are 
sometimes so sensitive that even the title of a particular resolution can have immediate repercus- 
sions. For example, the use of the term "situation" to describe the conflict between Iraq and Iran 
in the title of Resolution 479 was construed by the Iranians as evidence of a lack of careful atten- 
tion on the part of the Council to the Charter. As mentioned earlier, by labelling the Iran-Iraq war 
as a "situation", it was felt that the Security Council regarded the war as a situation which might 
lead to international friction rather than as a situation in which international friction or a dispute 
already existed, thus partially absolving itself of the necessity to act accordingly. 
Ironically, the similar question was raised by certain Council members during the Soviet 
occupation of Azerbaijan in 1946 (The Iranian Question of 1946, see Chapter II of this disserta- 
tion). In a discussion reviewing the Soviet request to take the Iranian item off the agenda, the cru- 
cial consideration was whether the Iranian item was a dispute or a situation. A dispute, they held, 
was a subjective matter, "a conflict between two or more States, which exists only by virtue of the 
opposition between two interested parties". A situation on the other hand has "a clearly objective 
character" 99 However, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on Namibia in 
1971, stated that for a matter to be considered as a dispute under Article 27(3) of the Charter, 
98 Discussions with Mr. Ali Ashraf Shahbestari (First Secretary to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of ! ran 1979-1987. United Nations, New York), October 1990 in Tehran. 
99 Security Council Official Records, Ist year, Ist series, Supplement no. 2, p. 47. 
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there must have been a "prior determination by the Security Council that a dispute exists". 100 
After almost two years of silence after the adoption of Resolution 479, the Security Council 
under totally different circumstances adopted Resolution 514 on July 12,1982.101 During 1982 
there was a substantial reversal in the positions of the combatants in the Gulf War, and many 
observers who at the outset of the war who had anticipated a speedy victory for Iraq now judged 
that Iran might be able to impose a decisive defeat on its neighbours. Iran's most successful mili- 
tary campaign during this period was code-named Operation Jerusalem. It was successful in driv- 
ing the Iraqi forces out of their last major stronghold in Iranian territory - areas of southern 
Khuzestan and the city of Khoramshahr. At the end of the operation, the city was left in ruins, 
with large areas covered by Iraqi minefields and abandoned trenches. 102 
However, what was more disturbing to many Western political and military observers dur- 
ing 1982 was the Iranian move into Iraq, under the name Operation Ramadan, which began on the 
night of July 13,1982. The Iranian Defence Minister, Col. Mohammad Salimi, was reported as 
having said that "despite the superpowers' opposition, a push into Iraq territory has become inev- 
itable". 103 On the same day as Operation Ramadan was launched, US officials stated that their 
government would "use whatever influence it had to try to discourage the Iranians from invading 
Iraq". Alexander Haig, Secretary for State, added that "although the US was neutral in the 
Iranian-Iraqi conflict, it was not indifferent to the outcome", and that the US was "committed to 
defending [its] vital interests in the area". 104 The New York Times reported that "because of this 
ominous intelligence information", the UN Security Council voted for a cease-fire and withdrawal 
of all forces to internationally recognised frontiers. 105 The resolution was rejected by Iran, who 
felt it was legitimate to liberate large parts of its occupied territories, and questioned why the 
Security Council felt that international peace and security were threatened only with the entry of 
100 International Court of. lustice Reports, 1971, paras. 24 and 26. 
101 See Annex I pertaining to Chapter VII, of this thesis, for the texts of Security Council resolutions on the Iran-Iraq 
War. 
102 Keesing's, voL)CCVII1,1982, p. 31849. 
103 Ibid., p. 31850. 
104 The New York Times, July 13,1982. 
105 Ibid. 
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Iranian forces into Iraqi territory and not vice-versa. 106 
In the wake of military victories over Iraq between June and November 1982, Iran's much- 
publicised war aims resulted in the adoption of an additional resolution by the Security Council. 
After the successful Fatah (victory) offensive which resulted in the capture of Khoramshahr, the 
Iranians demanded that Iraq (i) surrender unconditionally; (ii) pay reparations to Iran of 150 bil- 
lion US dollars; (iii) agree to the establishment of a committee to determine responsibility for the 
outbreak of the war; and (iv) take back the thousands of Iraqi Shi'ites expelled to Iran. During 
this period Iraq repeatedly called for a cease-fire and, for instance, though not agreeing to the full 
amount of reparations, offered to establish a joint fund for post-war reconstruction. However, 
other Iranian demands, such as the replacement of the regime of President Saddam Hussein, his 
trial by an international court and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iraq'07 ensured that 
no progress was made towards bringing the war to an end. 
The motivation of the Security Council in adopting Resolution 522 on October 4,1982 can 
be found in a report preceding Resolution 522 in The New York Times, which reported that 
observers in the West were worried about the "major offensive" the Iranians were mounting along 
the Iraqi border. '08 Iran boycotted the Council session and the Iraqi representative took the 
opportunity of pointing out that Iran was "defying the chief peace-keeping body of the UN". The 
resolution took note of this, and welcomed Iraq's expression of readiness to co-operate in the 
implementation of Resolution 514, while "urging the other to do likewise". 109 
Iran absented itself from the Council discussions, because during that time Jordan was 
presiding over the business. In its view "the Security Council, especially when headed by the Jor- 
danian representative whose country was actively co-operating with Iraq ... was not the institution 
to establish justice". 110 Another factor which influenced Iran's decision to boycott the Council 
106 prevailing view among academics and practitioners in Tehran, October 1990. 
107 Keesing's, op. cit., vol. XXVII1, p. 31852. 
108 The New York Times, October 2,1982. 
109 Ibid., October 4,1982. 
210 The above statement was made by Dr. Saed Rajaie Khorassani and was reported in Kayhan International, October 8, 
1982. 
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meeting was its belief that the "Jordanian representative, under the pretext of holding the session 
to be informed of the two parties' views, intended to bring the Iranian envoy to the negotiations 
table and then impose the pre-arranged resolution prepared by Iraq in the This view 
can be considered as reflecting how the Iranians reacted to behind-the-scenes or informal consul- 
tations in a body as sensitive as the UN Security Council. 
In the same period (1982), Iranian policy-makers were well aware of the overwhelming sup- 
port Iraq enjoyed in the Security Council. Intelligence sources analysing the conflict at that time 
say Iran may have decided to fight a war of attrition along Iraq's borders to wear down the Iraqi 
Army which continues to be the mainstay of President Saddam Hussein's government. If this 
was to be avoided, Iraq had to obtain trained infantry and artillery units from outside. A British 
source was of the opinion that "Jordan [was] ... the best source of trained reinforcements". Senior 
American officers, however, believed that Iraq's superior air force "could force Iran to reconsider 
a strategy of attrition" and "repeated successful attacks on Iran's oil export positions [would] 
damage Iran's economy, forcing it to withdraw". 112 
The relative level of isolation which Iran suffered was not confined to the Security Council. 
The prolongation of the conflict and the outcome on the military front in favour of Iran persuaded 
Iraq to request the General Assembly to include the question of the conflict on its agenda at its 
37th Session. The General Assembly adopted Resolution 37/3 on October 22,1982, which called 
for an immediate cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to find a 
peaceful settlement. 113 In the view of Iranian analysts, "the General Assembly [did] not have any- 
thing different from the resolutions and statements of the Security Council", apart from the intro- 
ductory part of the resolution, which states that the territory of a state shall not be occupied by use 
of force and such territories shall be returned, and that no acts of aggression shall take place 
against another state. 114 The Iranian press quoted the permanent representative to the UN as 
III Ibid. 
132 The New York Times, October 6,1982. 
113 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3713. The resolution was adopted with 119 in favour, 15 abstain- 
ing, 20 absent (Albania and Sweden announced that they would not participate in voting) and I against, (Iran). 
114 "Iraq's Aggression against Iran and the United Nation's Position", op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
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saying that recent Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian residential areas, which took place a few days 
after the adoption of the Iraqi-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution (37/3), indicated "a 
propaganda plot to conceal Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's crimes". 115 
Parallel to the above-mentioned developments in the UN, attempts at mediation were under- 
taken by the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and 
members of the Algerian Government. Referring to the efforts of the Islamic Conference, Iran's 
i 
representative to the UN, Dr. Khorassani said: "Iran was seeking peace but the mission did not 
bring any new point with itself ... [and] that Iran's proclaimed 
four conditions should be accepted 
all at the same time ... it was not rational to accept cease-fire first and let the enemy reinforce its 
. myn. 116 
Almost a full year later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 540 on October 31,1983. 
In the introductory paragraph of the resolution, the Council accepted the occurrence of a war 
between Iran and Iraq. 117 Observers in Tehran were quick to note that, since wars usually result 
from an act of aggression by one party, how could the Security Council confirm the existence of a 
war without referring to aggression? 118 This line of reasoning was concomitant with one of the 
four conditions set by Iran for negotiating a peace; i. e. identification and punishment of the 
aggressor. 
Not in discordance with the pattern which had set in, Security Council Resolution 540 
called for an immediate cease-fire. Reports from intelligence analysts in Washington and at 
NATO in Brussels were now of the view that "from an economic standpoint Iran seems to be 
better able than Iraq to fight such a war". 119 The vote on Resolution 540 however was not unani- 
mous. It was adopted by 12 in favour, 0 against, with Nicaragua, Pakistan and Malta abstaining. 
An Iranian delegate aired his frustration at a news conference during this period by declaring that 
115 Kayhan International, October 31.1982. 
116 Ibid. A similar argument was cogently put forward by the Allied commanders in the recent Gulf War (1990-91), 
when asked to consider a respite (cease-fire) in their bombardment of Iraq. 
117 See Annex I of Chapter VII of this thesis for the text of this resolution. 
tts Discussions with academics at Tehran University, October 1990. 
119 The New York Times, October 23,1983. 
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the Council was seized by a "Satanic spirit" that had rendered it incapable of resolving the dispute 
fairly. Pakistan's representative explained his country's abstention on the vote as being in protest 
at the Council's "failure to respond adequately to the fears and concerns of Iran about the 
Council's impartiality and effectiveness as a peacemaker". 120 
In 1983, the ferocity with which the Iranian armed forces carried out various phases of the 
Al Fajr (Dawn) offensives resulted in a nine to twelve mile penetration into Iraq. Towards the 
end of 1983, in an interview published in the French newspaper Le Matin, President Saddam 
Hussein confirmed earlier rumours that five Super Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet mis- 
siles had arrived in Iraq. Earlier that year, Iraq's Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz stated that his 
country was "determined to threaten Iranian economic and petroleum interests in the Gulf'. The 
Iranians responded with a threat "to destroy the security of the Gulf' if Iraq used Exocet mis- 
siles. 121 Under pressure in the land war, Iraq initiated a war on commercial shipping in the Gulf. 
This phase in the Iran-Iraq War, commonly known as the "Tanker War" period, lasted up to the 
period before the adoption of Resolution 598. 
11L4 The "Tanker War" and the Internationalisation of the Conflict 
From the end of 1983 up until the eraly months of 1984 saw Iran launching a series of 
offensives; some of the attacks "inflicted heavy casualties on Iraqi troops". 122 The first half of 
that year also witnessed an increase in Iraqi attacks on tankers and merchant shipping calling at 
Iranian ports. Iran responded to this "new development" by attacking tankers belonging to 
Kuwait (Iraq's principal backer). This in turn led to intervention by the Saudi Air Force. 123 In 
the same period a French government loan of about half a billion US dollars was given to Iraq 
"designed to help the war-torn country to finance civil debt repayments in 1984". 124 
120 Ibid., November 1,1983. 
121 Keesing's, vo1. X}IL, 1983, p. 32595- 
122 The Times, (London), March 2,1984. 
123 Keesing's, vol. }, 1984, p. 33056. 
124 The Times, (London), March 2,1984. 
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Retaliatory attacks by Iran on Kuwait and Saudi tankers prompted the Foreign Ministers of 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) to petition the UN Security Council in mid-May 1984. 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 552 on June 1,1984, after it had completed its debate 
over the issue. The resolution called upon all states to respect freedom of navigation in the Gulf, 
and condemned the attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi shipping. The resolution did not mention Iran 
specifically. The Iranian representative to the UN said 
"We strongly support freedom of navigation; the Gulf should remain a zone of peace 
and security for all. But we cannot permit anyone to use the Gulf against us; it will 
either remain free and open to all of us, or nobody will be allowed to use it. - 125 
The Iranian Foreign Minister said that his country had expected 
"the United Nations to take a more responsible stance, considering the sensitive and 
significant role of the Persian Gulf... But regrettably, the United Nation, influenced by 
petro-dollars and the superpowers, has ... adopt[ed] a one-sided stance. 
" 
This note of pessimism stemmed from the fact that a couple of days after the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 522, Iraq hit and damaged a Turkish tanker in Iranian territorial water. 126 
At this juncture it must be mentioned that almost a week before the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 552, the Foreign Ministry of Iran issued a statement (reprinted in Tehran's 
English daily Kayhan International) which reflects on the one hand its disillusionment with the 
role of the Security Council and on the other its perception of security in the Persian Gulf. Point 
one in the statement clearly acknowledges the tanker war as "the new situation" in the conflict and 
rightly concludes that it was "Iraq's intention to create disruption in free shipping in order to 
internationalise the war". It further stated that any stance taken by the Security Council without 
consideration of the above would further prove that the Council remained under the domination 
of the superpowers and hence "lacked the necessary qualifications to look into such important 
affairs". 127 
Point two stated that if Council resolutions failed to condemn (and punish) Iraq's newest 
'u Keesing's, vol. }XL, op. cit., p. 33058. 
126 Kayhan International, June 9,1984. 
127 Kayhan International, May 26,1984. 
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violation of international law, it would be "creating the grounds for superpower intervention and 
eventually aggression against the rights of all countries in the region". The Iranian Foreign Min- 
istry laid the blame on a number of states (Shiekhdoms) "south of the Persian Gulf' for not men- 
tioning Iraq's share in the crisis. 
The third point emphasised that, contrary to measures outlined in previous Security Council 
resolutions, there was full-scale political, economic and military support for the "Iraqi regime and 
especially those powers which have supplied the latest weapons enabling Iraq to attack the tank- 
ers". 128 
After attacks on Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers in May 1984, the US State Department seeing 
the situation as "a dangerous escalation", confirmed that the US had supplied airborne warning 
and control systems (AWACS) aircraft "to warn Saudi forces of any approaching aircraft". After 
further attacks by Iranian aircraft, the US administration announced on May 29 that Saudi Arabia 
would be supplied with 400 shoulder-launched Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and one KC-10 in- 
flight refuelling aircraft. "The supply was made under a presidential emergency powers order, 
thereby obviating the need for approval by Congress". Four days after the adoption of Council 
Resolution 522, "F-15 fighter aircraft of the Saudi Air Force intercepted and shot down one 
Iranian F-4 fighter". 129 
Recognising the pace at which the war was becoming internationalised, especially with the 
direct military aid from the US and her allies in the region, the Iranian speaker of the Majles (Par- 
liament) was reported as saying that "his country did not want to see a catastrophe in the area and 
was anxious to settle its disputes by diplomacy rather than war". In a prayer meeting, the speaker 
reiterated that Iran would resort to "appropriate talks and meetings ... provided that it did not jeo- 
pardise the honour and spirit of our revolution". 130 In the opinion of some observers, 
"Fully aware of the rationale behind the new Iraqi strategy, Iran did its best to keep the 
great powers out of the Gulf ... it went to great lengths to keep its responses to the lowest level possible, avoiding public acknowledgement of attacks on civilian 
123 Ibid. 
229 Keesing's, vol. ) , op. cit., pp. 
33058-9. 
130 The Times, (London), June 2,1984. 
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shipping and taking much care to alleviate international fears of the possible closure of 
the Strait of Hormuz. "131 
The Iranian army launched several offensives towards the end of 1984. The main offensive 
code-named "Badr" was carried out in March 1985, but suffered serious setbacks. The main 
objective of this offensive was to cut off the strategic Baghdad-Basra highway, and involved an 
estimated 100,000 men. From the outset of the offensive, Iran accused Iraq of employing chemi- 
cal weapons. Doctors treating injured Iranian soldiers in West Germany, Belgium and Britain 
confirmed that many of the-wounded "were suffering from symptoms identical to those caused by 
mustard gas". 132 Coupled with this, the arms embargo code-named "Operation Staunch", orches- 
trated by the US, had begun to affect Iran's battlefield performance. 133 The Security Council 
remained silent over the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. However the President of the Council 
issued a formal statement strongly condemning the use of chemical weapons. 
Though there were some efforts at mediation by the Islamic Conference Organisation and 
the late ex-Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, the overwhelming foreign support was for Iraq. 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the war must continue until the aggressor was punished. Not- 
able opposition leaders inside Iran, like Mehdi Bazargan drew the attention of the government to 
the futility of the war in June 1985 and called for a referendum on the question. Towards the end 
of 1985, it was reported that the French had supplied advanced Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft, armed 
with Exocet missiles, to Iraq. 
The second phase of the tanker war started in 1986, and culminated in the re-flagging of 
Kuwaiti oil tankers by the United States. In the second week of February, 1986 Iranian forces 
managed to breach Iraqi defences around the port and former oil terminal of Al Fao. In pursuing 
131 Efraim Karsh, "From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism: The Islamic Republic and the Gulf", in Efraim Karsh 
(ed. ), The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, London, Macmillan, 1987, p. 37. Iranian policy makers were cognizant 
of the fact that any disruption of supplies to Western oil consumers by the closing of the Straits would leave them (and 
especially the US) with no other alternative but to intervene with military force. 
132 The CIA claimed that a pesticides manufacturing plant which had been supplied to Iraq by the Federal Republic of 
Germany in December 1983 could be used to produce chemical weapons. The West German government announced in Au- 
gust 1985 that it would tighten controls on the export of all chemical manufacturing equipment. See Keesing's, vol. XXX1, 
1985, pp. 33560-62. 
133 Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-1897: Strategic Implications and Policy Op- 
tions, London, Jane's Publishing Company Ltd., 1987, p. 79. 
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an earlier objective, Iranian troops advanced and captured the town of Umm al Rassas, opposite 
the strategic port city of Basra. It was reported that "the elite Iraqi Republican Guard ... suffered 
at least 10,000 casualties" in trying to keep the Iranians outside the city of Al Fao. 134 Some 
authors have described the capture of Al Fao as "one of the most stunning moments of the entire 
war ... Iran was on the offensive, aggressively moving 
into Iraq". 135 United States intelligence 
was unable to provide the regular satellite information to the Iraqi field commanders because of 
bad weather conditions and failed to report this to the strategists in Baghdad. 136 In the same 
period, foreign ministers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and North Yemen 
joined with Iraq in requesting a meeting of the UN Security Council to condemn the "Iranian 
aggression". A week after making this request, an Iranian civilian aircraft on a domestic flight 
was shot down by the Iraqi Air Force (February 20,1986). The incident claimed the lives of 
senior government officials and deputies of the Majles (Parliament). 137 
On February 26,1986, the Security Council adopted Resolution 582, its sixth resolution on 
the Iran-Iraq war. Resolution 582 voiced concern over the use of chemical weapons, and called 
on both parties to observe a cease-fire and withdraw their forces to the internationally recognised 
boundaries, and to exchange prisoners of war without delay. The question of POWs was raised 
for the first time. There was however no condemnation of Iraq for the violation of the Geneva 
Protocol of 1921. After the adoption of Resolution 582, the Iranian forces launched further 
attacks against Iraqi positions. Both sides claimed success, which were difficult to verify. During 
this period, Kayhan International quoted Prime Minister Hussein Musavi who, in analysing rela- 
tions between Iran and the world forums, said: 
"Whenever the Islamic Republic starts to move in retaliation ... international circles 
make a fuss ... But whenever the Iraqi regime 
is in danger, there start discussions on 
the alleged threat to the world peace". 38 
134 Keesing's, vo1.7XXII, 1986, p. 34517. 
135 Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 142. 
136 The Iran-Iraq war and Western Security 1984-1987, op. cit., pp. 92-96. The author observes that American intelli- 
gence suggested to Iraqi strategists that the Iranian offensive would take place north of Basra. What they failed to report 
was that monsoon clouds had prevented the satellite from taking photographs of the area south of Basra - where the attack 
ultimately came from. 
137 Keesing's, volXXXII, op. cit, p. 34516. 
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Nevertheless, after considering the report of UN specialists appointed to verify whether 
Iranian soldiers had been exposed to a toxic agent attack, the President of the Security Council 
issued a statement strongly condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. After the widening 
of attacks on merchant shipping and civilian targets, the Secretary-General in a statement to the 
Security Council stressed the necessity for the Council to establish a basis for negotiation accept- 
able to both parties. On October 8,1986 the Security Council adopted Resolution 588, express- 
ing deep alarm over the prolongation and escalation of the war and requested the Secretary- 
General to intensify his efforts to negotiate a peace and report to the Council. In spite of interna- 
tional agreement that the war had gone on for too long, 
"Around the world strategists shared the Iranian assessment, ... the more successes the Iranians achieved, the more the outside powers were inclined to help Iraq ... A con- 
sensus was gradually emerging that Iran could not be allowed to win ... so ... the 
Americans began passing on to Iraq intelligence from their satellite pictures ... [and] 
the Russians were soon back in their old role as Iraq's main supplier". 139 
IV. The Shift of Mediation to the Secretariat 
The role of the Secretariat and more importantly of the Secretary- General has been 
paramount in the Iran-Iraq conflict. The office and personage of the Secretary-General and his 
representatives have continuously been involved since the outbreak of hostilities in 1980, but it 
was only in 1988 under the supervision of Javier Perez de Cuellar that the United Nations was 
able to convert the opportunities presented to it into a proposal, bringing both parties to negotiate 
a peace. More pertinently, for Iran, its disillusionment with and boycott of the Security Council 
meant that the office of the Secretary-General was the only recourse to an internationally overseen 
cease-fire. Although it was Security Council Resolution 598 which became the basis of ending 
the war between Iran and Iraq, it will become clear in this section that, without the availability of 
the good offices of the Secretary-General and Perez de Cuellar's diligence and diplomatic style, 
this peace may not have been possible. 
139 John Bullock and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: its Origins, History and Consequences, London, Methuen, 1989, 
pp. 158-9. 
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On September 22,1980 Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, appealed to Iran and 
Iraq to find a peaceful solution to their dispute and to this end offered his good offices. At his 
urging, the President of the Security Council issued a statement supporting the Secretary- 
General's offer and soon afterwards the Security Council adopted Resolution 479. This first reso- 
lution failed to call for a withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries and became the 
basis of Iran's estrangement from the Security Council. It is interesting to note that in Kurt 
Waldheim's memoirs he puts forward what G. R. Berridge called the "fantastic argument"140 that 
for the Security Council to have insisted on a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognised 
boundaries would be tantamount to taking "a position on the substance of the dispute" at a very 
early stage, thus violating the neutrality of that body. 141 As the preceding sections have shown it 
was not until Iranian forces were poised for an invasion of Iraq, starting in 1982, that the Security 
Council decided to call for an end to the war. This alienated Iran from the Council and caused 
Tehran to reject all of its resolutions. After the appointment of Perez de Cuellar as Secretary- 
General, Iran was able to resume its links with the world body and continue to press forward its 
conditions for a cease-fire. 
In the early stages of the conflict, Iran's total mistrust of the Security Council meant that 
any mediatory role that the UN might play would have to be played by the Secretary-General. As 
mentioned earlier (Footnote 147), Waldheim's association with the monarchy made him an 
unsuitable candidate with the Iranian government (as was proven by his aborted efforts to resolve 
the hostage crisis). Nevertheless, he was astute enough to ensure continuous UN participation by 
choosing to appoint Olaf Palme, ex-Prime Minister of Sweden, as his representative. Mr. Palme 
of course had impeccable qualifications for the job and was readily acceptable by both Iran and 
Iraq. However, by 1982, Mr. Palme had to call off his peace-seeking missions to both countries 
because of insufficient support from the permanent members of the Security Council. 142 
140 Return to the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, op. cit., p. 49. In his explanation as to the reasons why the 
United Nations was unable to prevent the outbreak of war or act sufficiently to stop it for many years, G. R. Berridge indi- 
cates that Kurt Waldheim's proximity to the Shah alienated him from the revolutionary government and made him appear 
as an agent of the United States, especially during the period of the hostage crises. 
141 Kurt Waldheim, In the Eye of the Storm: The Memoirs of Kurt Waldheim, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, 
p. 172. 
142 For the sequence of events during the period and their implications we Sections II and III of this chapter. 
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Perez de Cuellar's first successes came in 1984 when he managed to arrange a temporary 
truce in the ongoing "War of the Cities" and attacks on international shipping. In mid-1984 the 
attacks on cities and on tankers in the Gulf were escalating; the Secretary-General urged the 
Presidents of Iran and Iraq to refrain from deliberately attacking civilian centres and targets. 143 
Both sides accepted this and a moratorium on attacks on civilian areas came into play in June, 
1984. United Nations observer teams were sent to both belligerent capitals to monitor the 
truce. 144 Compliance with the agreement to refrain form attacks on civilian areas however ended 
nine months later, when in March 1985 Iranian gunners retaliated against Iraqi air raids in the 
Southern cities of Bushire and Ahvaz by shelling Basra. 145 
Earlier that year, towards the end of February, despite Iraqi denials, Iran reported large-scale 
use of chemical weapons against its civilians and troops. In March 1984 the Secretary-General 
decided to send a fact-finding mission under his own authority to investigate the allegations. The 
report of the mission, which was submitted to the Security Council, verified the use of chemical 
weapons on Iranian territory, but declined to mention which party had actually used them. 146 
However, with the arrival of Iranian victims of chemical warfare in European hospitals, the Secu- 
rity Council issued a stronger statement, condemning the use of all weapons banned by the 1925 
Geneva Protocol. Finally, following the findings of the UN missions in 1986 and 1987, which 
concluded that Iraq had indeed deployed chemical weapons against Iranian forces, the President 
of the Security Council for the first time condemned Iraq for this practice. 147 
Given the high propensity of negotiations being bogged down because of the inflexibility of 
both parties, Perez de Cuellar attempted to avoid stalemate situations by concentrating on particu- 
lar issues in the larger conflict. For a week in March 1985, the Secretary-General met with the 
deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and the Foreign Minister of Iraq in New York and presented them 
with an eight-point proposal to seek an end to the conflict. 148 The proposal was incrementally 
143 See Annex IIpertaining to Chapter VI of this thesis, especially June 9,1984. 
'" Ibid., June 21 and June 26,1984. 
145 Keesing's, voLXXX1, op. cit., pp. 33560-61. 
146 Keesing's vo1.7XX, op. cit., p. 33058. 
147 See Chapter VIII of this dissertation. 
148 See Annex II to Chapter VII of this thesis. 
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designed to culminate in a negotiated settlement, acceptable to both sides. This step-by-step 
agreement was to be made up of certain crucial elements such as an end to attacks on population 
centres, civil aviation, merchant shipping and on ports and oil facilities, a total ban on the deploy- 
ment of chemical weapons, and an exchange of prisoners of war, culminating in a cease-fire and a 
withdrawal of forces to internationally recognised boundaries and the beginning of peace talks. 149 
In the first week of April 1985, the Secretary-General visited Tehran and Baghdad, and on 
his return reported to the Security Council "that both Governments desired peace, had confidence 
in his efforts and were agreed that his proposals presented to them in March could serve as a basis 
for further discussion". 150 The peace proposal ran aground because Iraq wanted an immediate 
cease-fire as outlined in Resolution 582 (1986) of the Security Council, and Iran on the other 
hand saw the Secretary-General's proposal only as a basis for future talks. Iran also refused to 
entertain the possibility of having any kind of negotiations while Saddam's government remained 
in power in Iraq. In 1986, the Iranian forces launched a massive assault into Iraqi territory, the 
ensuing land battles, air attacks and attacks on oil installations and shipping complicated the 
existing military situation. The retaliatory use of chemical weapons seemed to indicate the 
desperate straits in which Iraq found itself. 151 
During the above period, the Secretary-General had come to be accepted by both sides and 
thus became the central figure with a possibility of playing a direct role in future negotiations. 
Much of this can be attributed to Perez de Cuellar's strong belief in a negotiated settlement. 
Speaking in Paris, he stated that he had "not lost hope" and more importantly was "convinced 
[that] the search for a solution [could not] advance until there [was] a new debate in the Security 
Council". He expressed the hope that Iran and Iraq would attend this debate. An Iranian daily, 
reported that the Secretary-General had told the French daily Le Monde that Iran believed the UN 
Security Council decisions were always pro-Iraq. 152 This observation was nothing new, but 
tag The eight-point proposal was not given any detailed publicity. The above information was related to the author by 
Mr. Shahbestari who served as the assistant to the permanent representative of Iran to the United Nations during this period 
ibid., for the events and diplomacy preceding the eight-point proposals in the year 1985. 
1S° ]bid. 
tst For details of the war during this period see Keesing's, vol. XXXII, op. cit., pp. 34514-16. 
152 Kayhan International, April 25,1985. 
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coming from the Secretary-General himself it increased the faith of the Iranians in the Secretary- 
General as someone who was willing to recognise the nature of the Council. 153 
In spite of recognising the absence of any change in the positions of either Iran or Iraq, 
Perez de Cuellar told a news conference a day after returning from the belligerent capitals that he 
did "not intend to give up ... He listed three 
important things: that both sides want[ed] peace, both 
want[ed] him to continue his contacts and that both have confidence in the Secretary-General". 154 
The former First Secretary of the Iranian permanent mission to the United Nations in New York 
between the years 1979-87 described the Secretary-General as "someone who is very sensitive 
about war and human life ... and someone who is very human". 
155 He then went on to add that 
this was one of the reasons which enabled his delegation to work with the office of the Secretary- 
General but not with the Security Council. 156 Apparently, during informal sessions of the Secu- 
rity Council some members were unhappy with the stance the Secretary-General was taking vis- 
d-vis the conflict, because the latter, while not supporting Iran "a hundred percent" chose to 
remain "in the middle" and not "a hundred percent on the other side" (meaning on the side of 
Iraq). The former Iranian First Secretary cited this as another reason why the Secretary-General 
was able to "build ... confidence" and continue to have dialogue with 
his country's delegation. 157 
In January 1987, the Secretary-General called upon the permanent members of the Security 
Council to undertake a fresh initiative to seek peace in the Gulf, making certain specific recom- 
mendations about the steps to be taken. First, the Secretary-General called for a discussion of the 
Gulf War by the Security Council at foreign ministry level. Secondly, he proposed that an impar- 
tial body be set up to investigate and identify who was responsible for the conflict. 158 This initia- 
tss First Secretary Shahbestari agreed with the above view, adding that though it angered some members of the Security 
Council that Iran was beginning to develop a close working relationship with the office of the Secretary-General, it was 
only because the Secretary-General "was trying to be with the party which was just". Interview at the Institute of Political 
and International Studies in Tehran, October 16,1990. 
1-54 Kayhan International, April 13,1985. 
tss To prove his point about Perez de Cuellar sensitivity the ex-Iranian First Secretary said that the Secretary-General 
had once told him that had his career not developed as a diplomat he would have become a pianist. Interview with First 
Secretary, Shahbestari in Tehran, October 16,1990. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
158 UN Chronicle, May 1987, p. 12. 
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tive taken by Perez de Cuellar was timely, because it coincided with a major Iranian ground 
offensive (Karbala - 5) launched against Iraqi lines east of Basra in an attempt to either "occupy 
or to encircle the city, and thereby to precipitate the downfall of President Saddam Hussein ... " 
After six weeks of heavy fighting, "Karbala - 5" was called off. 
159 By mid-1987, the war 
escalated with the involvement of the navies of the United States and the Soviet Union, reportedly 
there to protect shipping in the Gulf. The increased risks of an international conflict gave fresh 
momentum to finding ways to end the war. 
V. Security Council Resolution 598 and the Iran-Iraq War Cease-fire 
It is agreed that the diplomatic work behind Security Council resolution 598 was initiated 
by the French and later on taken and developed by the British. By remaining in direct contact and 
taking care that the wording of the resolution would not drive the Iranians away from the negotia- 
tion table, the British were able to become the main conduit through which Iran was able to 
approach the Security Council. The timing with which Resolution 598 was drafted and adopted 
was dictated by particular political and military developments which are discussed below. How- 
ever, it was the first time that Iran did not reject a decision emanating from the Security Council, 
but chose to consider it, subject to certain reservations. 
In the first week of June, the New York Times reported that Iran had purchased an estimated 
20 Chinese-made Silkworm missiles capable of hitting ships passing through the Straits of Hor- 
muz. This alarmed American officials and raised the hopes of Iraq, among other states in the 
region, that "the superpowers [would intervene and] bring the seven year conflict to an end". 160 
By mid-July it was announced that Kuwait's request for American protection of its oil shipments 
from the Gulf would be met, and "American warships were getting ready to escort Kuwaiti tank- 
ers". The same day that the New York Times reported a gathering of a "formidable US Fleet... " in 
the Persian Gulf, Iran announced that it was going to begin military manoeuvres in the region 
involving its ground, sea and air forces. 161 It should be mentioned that almost a month prior to 
159 Keesing's, vol. XXXffl. 1987, pp. 35158-60. 
160 The New York Times, June 4,1987. 
161 The New York Times, July 19,1987. 
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the above developments, i. e. mid-June 1987, a draft resolution had been accepted by the per- 
manent members of the Security Council and was being mooted to the remaining members. 
Towards the end of June, the United States Ambassador to the UN visited Moscow and this was 
followed by further talks between America and the Soviet Union in Geneva in early July. 162 
On July 20,1987, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 598 calling for 
an immediate cease-fire and an end to the war. Paragraph one of the resolution demanded an 
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces to international boundaries even before any nego- 
tiations of issues between the belligerents could be considered. 163 
Resolution 598 was viewed by many as being both fair and comprehensive compared to 
other Security Council resolutions. The American Secretary of State, George Shultz, remarked 
that the resolution was "scrupulously evenhanded". 164 Neither Iran nor Iraq rejected the resolu- 
tion, 165 though Iran did not accept it outright. Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations, Saed 
Rajai Khorassani, called the resolution "a vicious American diplomatic manoeuvre" but said his 
government would study the document and await the "package" offered to Iran by the United 
Nations and Secretary-General before deciding on a response. 166 Observers like Gary Sick com- 
mented, "It was an open secret in the UN that the resolution was intended to lend support to Iraq 
and to punish Iran". 167 Resolution 598 was "taken in a week that American warships were to 
begin escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz". 168 In this connexion, Ambas- 
sador Khorassani remarked that the vagueness of resolution was proved even more "worthless" by 
the presence of US frigates in the Persian Gulf, in an open violation of paragraph five which 
called upon outside powers to refrain from any provocative acts which would widen the 
162 The Economist, August 22,1987. 
163 See Annex III for the full text of Resolution 598 and the reply of Iran to the same is to be found in Annex IV pertain- 
ing to Chapter WI of this thesis. 
164 Excerpts from George Schultz's statement to the Security Council reproduced in The New York Times, July 21, 
1987. 
165 See Annex IV and V of Chapter WI for the replies of the governments of Iran and Iraq to Security Council Resolu- 
tion 598. 
166 The New York Times, July 22,1987. 
167 Gary Sick, "The United States and the Persian Gulf", in Hanns W. Mault and Otto Pick (eds. ), The Gulf War: Re- 
gional and International Dimensions, London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 133. 
168 The New York Times, op. cit., July 21. 
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COII$ict. 169 
At the time Resolution 598 was adopted, Iran was in possession of the Fao peninsula (cap- 
tured in February 1986), and so it was expected that rather than giving up this strategic piece of 
land, Iran would reject the resolution, which in turn would justify America's proposal to impose a 
second resolution calling for sanctions - consisting of an arms embargo. Iran's attitude of "not 
accepting, not rejecting" put to rest this strategy which anyway was not very popular with either 
the Soviet Union or China. 170 Iran initially responded to Resolution 598 by concentrating on 
paragraph six, which called for an impartial body to determine who started the war. Iraq, on the 
other hand, welcomed the resolution and was willing to implement it on the condition that Iran 
showed readiness to accept it without conditions. 
In his first letter to the Secretary-General after Resolution 598 (July 24,1987), the Iranian 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said that the "resolution ... [was being] carefully considered" 
and the position of Iran would be declared in detail. In the same letter, Velayati stated that the 
Security Council should call on the United States to withdraw its "military presence" from the 
Gulf and cease to protect Kuwait's oil shipments, whose proceeds were being used to finance 
Iraq. 171 In a second letter (August 10,1987), Foreign Minister Velayati asked why the Security 
Council continued to be silent and inactive in the aftermath of a chemical attack on the Iranian 
city of Sardasht? He added that the response of the United Nations to this and other issues would 
help his country's "evaluation of the role of the ... Security Council vis-d-vis the war and its vari- 
ous dimensions". 172 
A letter dated August 11,1987, from Velayati to the Secretary-General reflects in part 
Tehran's difficulties in accepting Resolution 598 and its absolute mistrust in the Security Council. 
The letter said that Resolution 598 was based on an "Iraqi formula for the resolution of the 
169 Kayhan International, July 23,1987. 
no An arms embargo was not well-supported by the Soviet Union or China, who felt their influence in the area would 
wane. During a Security Council debate, the "Chinese delegate appeared to signal his country's reluctance to approve a 
second resolution that would impose an arms embargo". New York Times, op. cit., July 21. 
171 UNDoc., S/19883. 
172 Ibid. This and the above letter were two preliminary letters preceding Iran's detailed response to Security Council 
Resolution 598. 
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conflict-173 and that Iran had not been consulted during the drafting process. Because of this and 
an American bias in favour of Iraq, the resolution could not be considered "balanced, impartial, 
comprehensive and practical". Using a much-favoured argument by Tehran, the letter asked that, 
even before identifying the "aggressor" nation, how could the Security Council have "recourse to 
Article 39 of the Charter" and end the war because it constituted "a breach of the peace"? Iran felt 
that by overlooking Iraq as the initiator of the war and its opening actions as a breach of the 
peace, the Security Council had become "a party to the conflict... and [would] not be able to play 
a positive and constructive role". 
August 1987 was the period when Iran was preparing itself for a direct confrontation with 
the American forces in the Gulf. In this connexion, Velayati said that the American presence in 
the Persian Gulf was in "clear violation of paragraph 5 of the resolution", which discourages any 
actions that might exacerbate the conflict. Lastly the letter said that the eight-point proposal put 
forward by the Secretary-General in March 1985 seemed to be the only viable plan which 
addressed the different aspects of the war and provided a "suitable ground for future efforts of the 
Secretary-General". It is important to note that, while Iran did not reject the resolution, it felt that 
as "the victim of aggression" - it should be instrumental in determining "how the war can be ter- 
minated, [and that no change was possible] in the course of the war as long as the conditions of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran [were] not met". 174 
Iran's non-rejection of Resolution 598 was considered positively by some members as a 
sign of flexibility in future dealings. But what Iran was seeking to achieve was a modification of 
the terms contained in Resolution 598 which would lead to a cease-fire. In an anticipatory move, 
Iraq's Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary-General making it clear that his country was fully 
satisfied with the text of the resolution and claiming that Iran's response of August 11,1987 con- 
stituted a "form of selective approach" and was a way of continuing the war. 175 
173 It was reported in the American press that Iraqi officials had said during the period in which Resolution 598 was be- 
ing drafted that "economic sanctions and a military embargo against Iran would bring Tehran to the peace table". The New 
York Times, June 4,1987. 
174 UNDoc., S/19031. The conditions included the naming of Iraq as the aggressor and the payment of war reparations. 
175 UNDoc., S/19045 and S/19049. 
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In order to establish its credentials with the Security Council, Tehran engaged in a series of 
diplomatic moves which began with the visit of Iran's deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammad 
Javad Larijani, to New York to discuss Resolution 598 with Perez de Cuellar, who by now was 
the established link between the belligerents and the Security Council. Recalling this period, 
Larijani said that "It [did] not make sense that the Iraqis being the aggressor, [should] carry the 
flag of peace. We are defending peace so the flag should be in our hands". 176 While in New York 
Larijani also met with the President of the Security Council and with the deputy Foreign Minister 
of the Soviet Union. With the latter he discussed issues related to disarmament and the increased 
foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf region. 177 In the view of the Iranian deputy Foreign 
Minister Larijani, Security Council Resolution 598 was a "focal turning point for Iran, from dis- 
carding the UN to coming into it and trying to be part of the game". 
Describing the role of the Secretary-General, he said "Mistrust in the UN was not mistrust 
in the Secretary-General, because he used his personal good offices rather than the general struc- 
ture of the United Nations". In acknowledging the timely intervention of Perez de Cuellar, Lari- 
jani using a metaphor said "the fruit was ripe at the moment when the Secretary-General acted. 
The Secretary-General's role was to prepare a basket, so that when the fruit falls it would not fall 
on the ground". 178 
On September 4,1987, in what was construed as an Iranian effort to gain the confidence of 
the international community, Iran presented Perez de Cuellar with a written invitation to visit 
Tehran to discuss the scope of Resolution 598 as a forerunner for peace. The Council gave the 
Secretary-General the go-ahead to visit the area. A day earlier Iran's permanent representative to 
the UN stated that, in the opinion of Tehran, "the UN chief is a competent person" and that his 
country was not buying time with regards to Resolution 598 but "wanting to speak to the UN 
chief honestly". 179 
16 Interview with deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, held at the Institute for Theoretical Physics 
and Mathematics, November 1990. 
177 Kayhan International, August 26,1987. 
178 Interview with Dr. Larijani. 
279 Kayhan International, September 3,1987. 
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The Secretary-General visited Tehran and Baghdad between September 11-14,1987 and 
focused his talks on an outline plan for the implementation of Resolution 598. The Secretary- 
General's plan, which concentrated on achieving a cease-fire on a specific date, withdrawal of 
forces to internationally recognised boundaries, exchange of prisoners of war and the institution 
of an impartial body to determine the aggressor, was conditionally accepted by Iran. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Larijani described the initiative as "Not perfect in the eyes of everybody but ... 
definitely better than any other piece of document ... until that time". 
180 In his report to the Secu- 
rity Council, Perez de Cuellar stated that Iran had agreed to an informal cease-fire, i. e. "an unde- 
clared cessation of hostilities", 181 which was not to become "a public cease-fire"182 until an 
impartial tribunal declared Iraq as the initiator of hostilities. Iraq, on the other hand, repeated its 
full acceptance of Resolution 598 and was not prepared to accept that an international body to 
determine the aggressor should precede the declaration of a formal cease-fire. Iraq also rejected 
the notion of an undeclared cease-fire, and emphasised that the cease-fire must be followed by 
withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognised boundaries. In the opinion of some com- 
mentators, the Iranian stance "would reserve the option to Iran to resume the fighting by rejecting 
the commission's [body set up to determine the aggressor] finding as flawed". 183 
The slow but steady process to achieve a cessation of hostilities suffered a serious setback 
one day before President Khomeini was to address the United Nations General Assembly, on Sep- 
tember 22,1987. On the previous day an American reconnaissance helicopter was reported to 
have spotted an Iranian landing craft sowing mines in the waters in the area north-east of Bahrain. 
United States helicopter gunships opened fire on the craft with no warning, killing three Iranian 
crew members and setting it on fire. In addition American navy commandos seized the ship and 
gathered 26 crew members from their life rafts. 184 Those who had waited earnestly for President 
180 Interview with Dr. Larijani. 
tst "The United Nations and the Iraq-Iran War", op. cit., p. 512. 
182 Return to the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts. op. cit., p. 53. 
183 Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, New York, Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1988, p. 171. 
184 For the American position see UNDoc., S/19149. For the Iranian response see UNDoc., S/19153 and UNDoc., 
S/19161. 
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Khomeini's speech to the General Assembly to contain some fresh perspective on Iran's position 
on Resolution 598 were disappointed. The Iranian President denounced the United States of 
America for its intervention in the Persian Gulf region and criticised the Security Council's 
failure to condemn Iraq for its responsibility in starting the conflict. 185 
On the same day, however, the Secretary-General held meetings with President Khamenei 
and deputy Foreign Minister Larijani to discuss certain points of Resolution 598.186 In the mean- 
time the confrontation between the United States and Iran, though confined to minor incidents, 
contributed significantly to the overall military and political situation in the area. Two days after 
the United States Navy destroyed a non-operational oil-rig which was being used by the Revolu- 
tionary Guard as a monitoring and docking station off the Iranian coast, the acting Foreign Minis- 
ter Ali Mohammad Besharati told the Islamic Republic News Agency that, while "Iran has never 
ruled out political solutions to end the war ... the US and all its allies should know that as their 
crimes mount, Iran's conditions for ending the war will become stricter". 187 The United States 
meanwhile maintained with regard to the above situation that it had "exercised its inherent right 
of self-defence under international law". 188 
Iran's ambivalent attitude towards Resolution 598 coupled with the possibility of further 
escalation in the Persian Gulf involving the United States and the Soviet Union, resulted in a 
private meeting between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. 189 Although the permanent members regarded the implementa- 
tion of Resolution 598 as the "sole basis for a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable settle- 
ment of the conflict", 190 there nevertheless remained certain conflicts of interests. The Anglo- 
American stance was to combine the intensive mediation efforts by Perez de Cuellar (the mandate 
entrusted to the Secretary-General under paragraph 8 of Resolution 598) with the threat of an 
las UNGAOR A/42/W. 6. 
186 Annex II of Chapter VII of this thesis. 
187 Kayhan International, October 19,1987. 
tss UNDoc., S/19149. 
189 Annex 17 of Chapter VII of this thesis. The meeting was convened under what is referred to as the "Secretary- 
General's Working Lunch" with Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members. 
190 UN Chronicle, vol. XX V, no. 4, November 1987, p. 17. 
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imminent arms embargo against Iran. 191 The Soviet Union also believed that unless Iran was 
warned it might jeopardise its own withdrawal from Afghanistan, posing a problem for the pro- 
Moscow regime of President Najibullah who was to take over the running of the country. China 
from the very beginning believed that the conflict could only be solved by reconciliation, and 
expected that the "major Powers in particular would exercise restraint". France's position was 
akin to China's, i. e. "a political solution, without victor and without vanquished". 192 
Unable to get Iran to comply with the existing provisions of Resolution 598 and following a 
resumption of the "War of the Cities", the United States Ambassador to the UN (in an interview 
with the Voice of America) reportedly stated that under Article 7 of the UN Charter the use of 
military force Against any country which refuses to abide by the binding resolution of the Security 
Council was a possibility. Addressing the issue of the divided Council, the American envoy said 
that the most important thing was to "maintain the unity of the five members who [could] apply 
the biggest pressures on Iran to halt the war". 193 
The stalemate with regard to Resolution 598 slowly began to dissolve by early spring 1988. 
Iraq had managed to extend the range of her Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles to reach twice their 
normal range of approximately 300 miles. This brought Tehran well within range and in the view 
of many observers changed the whole nature of the conflict. A journalist described the Scud 
attacks on Tehran as the biggest dent on the hitherto insulated regime, forcing it to reconsider the 
cost-benefit ratio of continuing the war. 194 The use by Iraq of poison gas against the Kurdish 
town of Halabjah, whose residents had openly sided with Iran, claimed the lives of at least 5,000 
people. Though the "balance of international sympathy" had turned in favour of Iran, 195 both the 
above developments spelled the end of Iran's six-year domination of the war. 
191 House of Commons Debate, Sixth Series, vol. 120, October 21,1987, col. 723. 
192 UN Chronicle, vol. X}CIV, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
193 Kayhan International, November 1,1987. The above statements were made in the aftermath of the destruction of 
the Iraqi Air Force headquarters in Baghdad by an Iranian surface-to-surface missile. 
194 Discussions with Iranian journalist living and working in Tehran during this period. Tehran, October 1991. Also 
Robin Wright mentions in her book that between February and April 1988 a total of 140 missiles hit the city; though the at- 
tacks did not result in many deaths, "psychologically it was devastating". In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, 
op. cit., p. 174. 
193 Return to the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, op. cit., p. 55. 
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Iraq carried out air raids on Iranian economic and military targets, widely using chemical 
weapons. As a result, on April 18,1988, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula. A combination of 
military and diplomatic pressure was put on Iran during this period. For example, on the same 
day that the Fao was taken back by the Iraqi army deploying chemical weapons, the United States 
Navy intervened directly after an alleged Iranian mine blew a hole in an American frigate in the 
Gulf. Robin Wright is of the view that what followed can be considered as one of the biggest US 
military engagements since the Vietnam War: the US Navy "destroyed two Iranian oil platforms, 
sank a patrol boat and a frigate, and badly damaged a second frigate and three smaller craft". 196 
On the diplomatic front the Security Council adopted yet another resolution (612) on May 
9,1988, which condemned the use of chemical weapons but did not specifically name Iraq. In a 
letter to the Secretary-General, Iran requested that the Security Council take "immediate measures 
to force Baghdad to stop its use of chemical weapons... " and dispatch teams of chemical experts 
for further investigation. 197 Describing the general environment, deputy Foreign Minister Larijani 
commented that the "Iraqis were successful in generating some kind of international pressure 
against Iran, partly because of Iran, partly because of outside reasons". 198 
Prior to the recapture of the Fao peninsula, Larijani had held talks with the Secretary- 
General on the scope of Resolution 598, with particular reference to the renewed use of chemical 
weapons and the attacks on civilian areas. In the view of Larijani, "from the beginning of the 
revolution to this moment" there existed a mistrust between the UN and Iran. Recognising that 
the Charter not even being used as the basis for action of the UN and in view of the existence of 
Power-Politics in the Security Council and Secretariat, Iran deliberately decided that - instead of 
abandoning such a body - it "must play in it and use it for [its] national This period 
(May, June 1988) was one of the most trying periods for Iranian policy-makers and was reflected 
both in the internal as well as external spheres. 
196 In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, op. cit., p. 176. 
197 Kayhan International, May 18,1988. The UN responded by sending experts to Tehran between July 1-4,1988. 
198 Interview with Dr. Larijani. 
199 Ibid. 
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On the national front, Mehdi Bazargan, the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister 
addressed an open letter to Ayatollah Khomeini asking him to stop the war immediately. 200 This 
protest was accompanied by anti-war demonstrations all over Iran, the situation has been attri- 
buted to flagging public morale combined with the rapid decline of public amenities and the rise 
in the cost of living. 
Internationally, Iran was attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the 
United States vis-d-vis any settlement of the conflict and the future security of the region. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Larijani, while on the one hand discussing ways and means of removing "obsta- 
cles in the way of Resolution 598" with Perez de Cuellar, criticised the "Soviet Union's weak 
reaction to the US naval attack on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf'. Describing 
"Moscow's policy towards the US in the world [as] passive", Larijani added that the "US aggres- 
sion was not only against Iran ... [but] was a threat to the security of the 
Soviet Union" 201 It was 
no secret that, though Iran deplored the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was willing to employ 
all its efforts to help the Soviet withdrawal "so that an American-inspired regime would not come 
to power in Afghanistan". 202 In the UN, Iran was following a vigorous routine with a view to 
making real headway in the implementation of Resolution 598. This included a proposal to set up 
working committees to decide the agenda and issues to be discussed with regard to achieving a 
cease-fire and even re-sequencing the provisions set forth in Resolution 598. Deputy Foreign 
Minister Larijani described his country's efforts as "an offensive, but for peace" 203 
During the first week of July, preceding the Iran Air tragedy, Speaker Rafsanjani indicated 
on national television that Iran must be ready to accept a political solution to the war, since the 
situation on the battle front was proving to be inconclusive. On July 3,1988, USS Vincennes 
shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, claiming the lives of 290 passengers aboard, including 66 
200 Bazargan's letter was not published in Iran, but was distributed manually. The letter also found its way to foreign 
press agencies. 
201 Kayhan International, May 2,1988. 
202 The above statement was made by acting Foreign Minister, Ali Mohammad Besharati, in answer to whether he had 
discussed any plan with the visiting Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky, regarding withdrawal. Kayhan 
International, February 16,1988. 
203 Interview with Dr. Larijani. See also Kayhan International, May 30,1988. 
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children. It was observed with a certain irony that this incident presented the government in 
Tehran with a pretext to decide to end the war and brought Iran back to the table in the Council 
Chamber which it had boycotted for almost eight years. 204 
At the urgent request of Iran, the Security Council convened special meetings to discuss the 
shooting down of the Iranian airliner. At one such meeting (July 17,1988), which was attended 
by the American Vice-President, George Bush, and Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, it 
was announced that Iran's President Ali Khamenei had written to inform Secretary-General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar of his country's decision to accept Security Council Resolution 598. Iran said it 
accepted the resolution "because of the importance it attached to saving the lives of human 
beings, and the establishment of justice and regional and international peace and security". Iran 
said the "fire of war" which Iraq had started on September 22,1980 had "gained unprecedented 
dimensions", bringing other countries into the war. 205 Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani sup- 
ported this view, saying that because "the situation was volatile in the region, it was enough, we 
pulled out and we did that". He also added that due to the presence of the "foreign armada - we 
decided this was the time to end the hostilities"? 06 
On July 19, Iraq's deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz said, in a statement made available to 
the UN, "that while his country was wary of Iran's intentions, nevertheless it approached the new 
development with open minds". The letter emphasised that Iraq would not agree to "any partial 
measures that do not lead surely, and within a clear, sound and agreed plan, to a comprehensive 
and lasting peace", adding that the implementation of Resolution 598 should be in accordance 
"with the sequence of its operative paragraphs" 207 The Vice-President of the United States, 
George Bush, referring to the shooting down of the Iranian airbus, said the "tragic accident" had 
occurred "against a backdrop of repeated, unjustified, unprovoked and unlawful Iranian attacks 
204 This view was common to both Iranian and Western observers, who generally believed the war had gone on for 
much too long. See for example Shahram Chubin, "The last phase of the Iran-Iraq War. from stalemate to cease-fire", in 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 2, April 1989, pp. 13-14. 
205 UN Chronicle, vol.? IXV, no. 4, December 1988, p. 22. 
206 Interview with Dr. Larijani. 
207 UN Chronicle, vo1.7IXV, op. cit., p. 22. 
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against United States merchant shipping and armed forces ... and Iran must bear a substantial 
measure of responsibility for what happened". The above statement was made in reply to a state- 
ment made by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, who characterised the incident as 
a "dastardly attack ... by a reckless and 
incompetent naval force led by aggressive and expansion- 
ist policy-makers". 2OS 
On July 18,1988, after Iran's formal acceptance of Resolution 598, Perez de Cuellar 
presented the Iranian and Iraqi delegation with a modified proposal for implementing cease-fire 
based on the text of Resolution 598 on and his initial plan of October 15,1987. 
The proposal contained the following salient points which were to be followed after a 
cease-fire date (D-day): 
(i) Three days after D-day, the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces will begin withdrawing to 
the internationally recognised boundaries (as stipulated in the 1975 Algiers Accord). 
Withdrawals will be completed 13 days after D-day (D+13). 
(ii) On D-day, the parties will co-operate with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and facilitate the registration of Prisoners of War (POWs). The regis- 
tration will be completed 21 days after D-day (D+21). Repatriation of the POWs 
will start 21 days after D-day (D+21) and end 81 days after D-day (D+81). 
(iii) On D-day, the Secretary-General will announce that, under his auspices, the two 
sides will conduct negotiations on all outstanding issues, to reach a just, honourable, 
and acceptable settlement. 
(iv) On D-day, the Secretary-General will announce that he is arranging for the designa- 
tion of an impartial body to determine the responsibility for the hostilities. The 
impartial body will be drawn from Justice X of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) as President, Mr. Y and Mr. Z. It will start its work no later than 21 days after 
D-day (D+21), complete its work no later than 90 days after D-day (D+90), and 
208 Ibid., p. 27. 
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report to the Secretary-General. 
(v) On D-day, the Secretary-General will arrange the set-up and the dispatch of a team of 
UN specialists to inquire into and study the question of national reconstruction. It is 
understood that this team will submit its report to the Secretary-General 90 days after 
D-day (D+90)? 09 
Before the date of the cease-fire was announced, Iraq stated that it wished to conduct direct 
talks with Iran. This was seen by the Iranians as a ploy to scuttle the peace-resolution. 210 Sources 
close to the negotiations said that to avert the possibility of a deadlock, the Secretary-General 
prepared a three-point formula. Firstly, Perez de Cuellar urged both sides to "pledge their 
assurances that they are in favour of the implementation of all the constituent parts of Resolution 
598 without exception". Secondly, it urged the parties to guarantee that they would agree to 
"direct negotiations in the final stage of the conflict resolution following the cease-fire". Lastly, 
the Secretary-General sought separate guarantees from the two countries that "what they pledge 
before the cease-fire is put into effect". There was no immediate reaction to this formula from 
either party. 211 
Iran's opposition to direct talks was based on the premise that both Resolution 598 and the 
Secretary-General's implementation plan already provided a suitable agenda. However, on 
August 8,1988 the Secretary-General announced to the Security Council that from August 20, 
1988, a cease-fire would be observed by both parties, and the deployment of United Nations 
observers and beginning of direct talks between Iran and Iraq would start on August 25,1988.212 
V. 1 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 
One day after announcing the date of the cease-fire, the Security Council adopted Resolu- 
Lion 619, which called for the immediate setting up of a United Nations Iran-Iraq Military 
209 Quoted from Abbas Maleki's discussion paper on Iran After Cease-Fire., op. cit. 
210 Interview with Dr. Larijani. 
211 Kayhan International, August 7,1988. Iran accepted this formula in principle, according to diplomats in Tehran. 
212 See Annex II pertaining to Chapter VII of this thesis for chronology of efforts by the Secretary-General leading to 
this stage. 
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Observer Group (UNIMOG) for a period of six months. 213 
A serious obstacle in the path of implementing Resolution 598 was the continuing use of 
chemical weapons by Iraq. In order to placate Iran and proceed with the peace negotiations, the 
President of the Security Council on July 26,1988 in a meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
made it known that the "members of the Council are united in vigorously condemning the use of 
chemical weapons" 214 The following day, without condemning Iraq directly, the President of the 
Council called upon the Iraqi Foreign Minister to ensure a "maximum restraint in military activi- 
ties", and conveyed to him that the Council members were "firmly united" against the use of 
chemical weapons. 215 
On the same day the first elements of the UNIMOG advance parties arrived in Tehran and 
Baghdad to meet with the authorities, and the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a mission to 
investigate Iran's allegations of further use of chemical weapons by Iraq. The mission was to 
spend two to three days in the area and thereafter return to Geneva to prepare the report. 216 A 
week after the date of the cease-fire was announced by the Secretary-General, the Security Coun- 
cil adopted Resolution 620, condemning the use of chemical weapons. The resolution - while not 
mentioning any country - "encouraged" the Secretary-General to investigate any alleged usage of 
chemical weapons. 217 The United States along with its key allies, Britain, West Germany and 
Japan also requested the Secretary-General to "dispatch investigators to northern Iraq to look for 
evidence of chemical warfare in the mountainous Kurdish regions". Significantly Iraq's acting 
Foreign Minister Sadoun Hammadi, while on a visit to Washington, was "careful not to reject the 
possibility of outside investigators visiting his country", but simultaneously added that "military 
operations inside Iraq would have to be completed before such an investigative team would be 
allowed in ...... 
218 
213 Ibid., The ground work for UNIMOG was prepared between July 25 and August 2 by the visit of a technical team 
headed by Lt. Gen. Martin Vadset (Norway) to Iran and Iraq, see ibid., p. 10. See also Kayhan International, August 17, 
1988. 
214 UNPR, IR/50, SC/5028. 
215 Ibid., X51, SC/5029. 
216 See UNPR, SG/SM/4176, IR/52, UNPR, SG/SM/4177, IR/53. 
217 See Annex II pertaining to Chapter VII of this thesis. 
21$ This report was originally filed by UPI in Washington on September 13,1988 and appeared in the Iranian daily 
-285- 
At this juncture it would be in place to examine the progress made in fulfilling Resolution 
598, in the light of the obstacles in the path of the Secretary-General's substantive proposals for a 
negotiated settlement and - most importantly - of Iran's growing concern to see the terms of the 
peace resolution fully complied with. 
After Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 (July 17,1988) up to August. 1988, the Foreign 
Minister of Iran had nine substantive rounds of consultations with the Secretary-General and 
accepted the time-tables presented by the latter for the implementing all provisions of the resolu- 
tion. Iraq, which hitherto had accepted Resolution 598, had begun to employ certain delaying 
tactics. The Foreign Minister of Iraq's talks with the Secretary-General centered around the pos- 
sibility of conducting direct talks with Iran and not, as expected, around the time-table presented 
by Perez de Cuellar. At the same time Iraq intensified its military activities, resorting to chemical 
warfare in the hope of altering the post-cease-fire status quo in its favour. Iraq based its refusal to 
accept the procedure presented by the Secretary-General on the belief that Iran was attempting "to 
deal with the resolution selectively-. 219 This line of argument was also used by Iraq to block the 
four-point plan of the Secretary-General presented on October 1,1988. The plan called for a with- 
drawal of forces, the repatriation of POWs, freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and early 
consideration of the cleaning up of the Shall al-Arab waterway of war debris22o 
Following from this, Iraq insisted the Resolution 598 was "a peace plan which should be 
implemented by mutual agreement ..: 
', and brought in other elements, such as the clearing up of 
the waterway as a necessary pre-condition for a cease-fire. Iraq viewed its position as being 
closest to implementing Resolution 598 as a "package deal without fragmentation"221 
The Iranian, Foreign Ministry argued that such an approach contradicted the mandatory 
nature of the Security Council resolution, and that Iraq was trying to "open negotiations on the 
resolution itself ... In order to incorporate extraneous elements and derail the resolution 
from its 
Kayhan International one day later. 
219 UNDoc, St20373. 
220 Mic Iranian Foreign Ministry, in a statement reprinted in Kayhan International, July 20,1989, announced that it had 
accepted the Secretary-General's plan. 
221 UNDoc., S/20373. 
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main course". 222 To establish the fact that Iraq was not ready to enter into substantive discussions 
on implementing Resolution 598, the Iranian Foreign Ministry said that the Secretary-General, in 
inviting both Iran and Iraq to direct talks had assured Iran that with the "exception of negotiations 
called for under paragraph 4 of the resolution, [direct talks] would be limited to comments on 
dates and procedures suggested by the Secretary-General for the implementation of the provisions 
of the resolution other than cease-fire". 223 Paying no attention to this incremental method 
prescribed by the Secretary-General, Iraq called for the "necessity of reaching a common under- 
standing with regard to the cease-fire itself and used this pretext to introduce extraneous elements 
which by no extension of logic could be considered as a part of regulations for cease-fire". 224 
The "extraneous element" which figured most prominently in the negotiations between Iran 
and Iraq was the question of dredging and cleaning the waterway separating the two countries, 
commonly known as the Shatt al-Arab and referred to in Iran as the Arvand Rood river. Another 
issue which Iraq introduced as an element of the cease-fire during the first round of direct talks 
was unimpeded passage for Iraqi vessels in the Persian Gulf, and reportedly even through Iranian 
territorial water. 225 
In spite of Iran's opposition to including the question of cleaning the waterway within the 
scope of the agenda of direct talks, the Secretary-General considered the Iraqi concern as legiti- 
mate and placed it within the frame-work of paragraph 4, both in his July and August time-table 
and subsequently in the four-point plan of October 1,1988. During the first face-to-face talks 
between Iran and Iraq, the latter demanded the clearance of the waterway to allow free movement 
of its ships and a guarantee against any Iranian interference with its craft. The talks became 
deadlocked because Iran stated that it reserved the right to stop and search Iraqi vessels as long as 
peaceful relations between the two countries were not established. 226 
222 Kayhan International, July 20,1989. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. Since most of these talks were confidential, the above points of contention are based on the information 
released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
223 See Keesing's, vo1. XXXV, 1989, p. 36569. 
226 Ibid., The first round of face-to-face talks began in Geneva on August 25,1988. 
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Recognising the fact that the Iraqi army occupied approximately 2000 square kilometres of 
Iranian territory, the UN attempted to forge a compromise, by which Iran would allow free pas- 
sage to Iraq along the waterway and permit a feasibility study on the clearing operations, while in 
return Iraq would pull its troops back to internationally recognised boundaries. The offer was 
rejected. On October 9,1988, the Foreign Minister of Iran announced that his country had come 
to an "agreement in principle" with Iraq by which Iran would guarantee not to search Iraqi 
vessels, while Iraq would withdraw its forces to the international border, followed by a mutual 
exchange of prisoners. Iraq, however, claimed that such an accord did not exist 227 
The first round of face-to-face talks in Geneva during 1988 was followed by a second round 
in October in New York, and a third round in November again in Geneva. 228 At the beginning of 
February 1989, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 631, calling for a renewal 
of the UNIMOG mandate and upon Iran and Iraq to waste no time in implementing Resolution 
598. By early March 1989, ministerial level delegations from both Iran and Iraq arrived in New 
York on the invitation of the UN and held preparatory talks with Jan K. Eliasson, the Secretary- 
General's personal representative. Eliasson met the delegations separately and conducted detailed 
discussion so as to address as many issues as possible before the forthcoming joint ministerial 
meeting. On March 10,1989, Eliasson said that he had discussed the agenda and procedure of 
the forthcoming meetings and also other questions of substance. 
Towards the end of March, further preparatory talks were held for the joint ministerial meet- 
ing in New York. The Iraqi delegation was led by the permanent representative to the UN, the 
Secretary-General of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and the Ambassador of Iraq to the United States. 
In the early weeks of April similar talks were held with the Iranian delegation, which was headed 
by Iran's deputy Foreign Minister. 229 
227 Ibid. 
22s Ironically, the Iraqis stated their preference that all meetings be bold in Geneva because of security reasons, and re- 
portedly claimed that anti-Arab sentiment in New York could alter the outcome of negotiations. Iran on the other hand ex- 
pressed a preference for New York as a permanent site. 
229 See UN Chronicle, vol. XXVI, no. 2,1989, pp. 23-25. 
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Between April 20 and 23,1989, the Secretary-General met three times with Iranian Foreign 
Minister Velayati and his Iraqi counterpart Tareq Aziz together, after conducting separate meet- 
ings with each party. The next day, Perez de Cuellar announced that both countries were commit- 
ted to upholding the cease-fire and implementing fully Resolution 598. At this fifth round of 
direct talks, the Secretary-General observed with much satisfaction that the "two Ministers had 
spoken with restraint, using non-controversial statements". 230 In response to President Saddam 
Hussein's earlier statement of March 5,1989, announcing that Iraq was prepared for an immedi- 
ate exchange of all war prisoners "without regard for the final results of the negotiations and the 
different stages on the way to global and lasting peace", 231 Iran released 66 Iraqi prisoners of war 
to the International Committee of the Red Cross for repatriation. Following this, Iran also 
released 15 non-Iraqi prisoners. 
Given the sluggish rate of progress in implementing Resolution 598, the Secretary-General, 
after his sixth and seventh rounds of talks between July and September 1989, announced that Iran 
and Iraq had agreed to a round of "shuttle negotiations" to be carried out by Eliasson commencing 
towards the end of October. Praising the role of the UNIMOG, Perez de Cuellar said that during 
the past year the former had "helped save countless lives and reduced tension in the region". He 
added that there was "no reason for complacency, for the silencing of guns does not mean the res- 
toration of security and stability in the region". 232 
On the first anniversary of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, the "no war no peace" situa- 
tion and Iraq's refusal to withdraw to internationally recognised boundaries was blamed by Iran 
on what it considered "the irresponsible attitude of the Security Council". An English-language 
daily in Tehran recalled that throughout the war the Western bloc labelled Iran as a "war-monger 
and offending party" which rejected international appeals to stop the fighting. The article went on 
to describe the West's support for Iraq as a way of "forcing Iran to embrace the world order and 
seriously tone down its revolutionary and Islamic calls". Recognising the Iranian leadership's 
230 UN Chronicle, vol. XXVI, no. 3, September 1989, p. 21. 
231 UN Chronicle, vol. XXVI, op. cit., p. 25. 
232 Ibid, p. 23. 
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determination that Tehran's willingness to comply with Resolution 598 would not "change, 
hinder or curtail the staunchly anti-Western path of the Islamic Revolution", the Security Council 
"failed to criticise Iraq for its procrastination". In conclusion the article praised the good-will 
shown by the UN Secretary-General in his "search for real peace", and admonished those 
members of the Security Council who, being confused, were incapable of "comprehending the 
implications of their behind-the-scenes understanding with Iraq". It added that at stake was the 
future of the entire region and it was possible that "new political developments in this part of the 
world [would] soon give Resolution 598 its deserved meaning". 233 
In Tehran, Saddam Hussein's obduracy was considered as the main stumbling block to 
fulfilling Resolution 598 in its entirety. Iraq's occupation of almost 2,600 square kilometres of 
Iranian land in particular was regarded as the foremost cause for the continuing insecurity in the 
region. In this respect, deputy Foreign Minister Larijani was of the view that the problems of 
peace and security in the region were beyond Resolution 598, while added to this was the whole 
problem of implementation as well. Speaking of the UN and its role in this particular scenario, he 
said that his country could not depend on the UN, but just had to bank on its own capability and 
rights. 234 Addressing the future plans of the Baghdad regime, Larijani said it was unlikely Iraq 
would resume hostilities against Iran, arguing that it was the war "that turned the rich Iraqi state 
into a ruined and indebted country ... 
". He added that there had never been "such a good oppor- 
tunity to attain peace as there is now". 235 
To facilitate this peace Mr. Eliasson visited the two countries between October 31 and 
November 17,1989, shuttling between the two capitals in the UN plane. After meeting the 
leaders and Foreign Ministers of the two countries, it was reported that the Special Representative 
had sought to end the state of "no war no peace" and implement Resolution 598. With regard to 
233 Kayhan International, July 20,1989. The journalist who wrote this particular piece told me in Tehran, that it was 
not at all uncommon for people to speculate on Iraq's next military adventure following its cease-fire with Iran. This specu- 
lation, l was given to understand, was based on the common belief that the survival of Saddam Hussein`s regime depended 
largely on his capability to assume leadership in the Arab world by asserting himself militarily. In this respect the conclud- 
ing part of the above quoted article does in fact foresee to a certain extent the "Invasion of Kuwait" by Iraq in 1990, a move 
which among certain Iranian journalists was referred to as "phase-two of the Gulf War". Emphasis added. 
23't Discussions with Larijani, outside the interview. 
235 Kayhan International, September 9,1989. 
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the UNIMOG and its activities, Mr. Eliasson said the 15-month-old cease-fire was "holding well" 
and that there existed "understanding and co-operation" between the two parties and UNIMOG 
personnel on both sides. Before the Secretary-General met both Foreign Ministers separately in 
New York in December 1989,236 Iran tabled a proposition in November to carry out simultaneous 
troop withdrawals and exchanges of POWs in a move to end the existing deadlock. The offer was 
rejected in Baghdad. 237 
It is common knowledge that, in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, all outstanding claims between the two countries were settled, including Iraq's withdrawal 
from Iranian territory. This was largely due to the fact that, under the new circumstances which it 
had created, Iraq could not afford to be hemmed in along its longest frontier by a power which 
was unfriendly to it. It is much beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this latter stage of 
"phase-two" of the Gulf War; it would be preferable therefore to conclude by dwelling on some 
strategic and security issues which faced Iranian policy-makers vis-d-vis the Persian Gulf region 
in the last decade. 
Conclusion: Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf Region 
The Islamic revolution in Iran called for a reassessment of Western security policy in the 
Persian Gulf region and, as an initiative of the United States, Central Command or CENTCOM 
was officially formed on January 1,1983. CENTCOM was based on the security arrangement 
created under the Presidency of Jimmy Carter known as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. 
CENTCOM is composed of 400,000 military personnel from all four US services under a unified 
command, and is designed for quick strike action in emergency situations in South-West Asia. 238 
At the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, though the US and the Soviet Union declared neutrality, 
both parties not only added to the militarisation of the Persian Gulf, but actually profited from sel- 
ling weaponry to both parties and also to their clients in the region. 239 Although Moscow tilted 
296 UN Chronicle, vol. JGCVU, no. 1, March 1990, p. 69. 
237 Kayhan International, December 23,1989. 
239 See Charles A. Kupcham, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security, Maryland, Allen and Unwin, 
1987, pp. 99-124. 
239 See Stephanie 0. Newman, Military Assistance in Recent War: The Dominance of the Superpowers, New York, 
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towards Baghdad in varying degrees throughout the eight-year-old war, the United States - given 
its affiliations with the past regime and its propensity to affect the balance of power decisively in 
the region - remained Iran's number one enemy. After 1982, when the first signs of 
Washington's tilt towards Baghdad became apparent, the leadership in Iran was certain that the 
"big powers" were opposed to seeing Islam "enter directly in the political and social affairs of 
nations" in the regions 240 Ayatollah Khomeini, in a message to the Iranian people, said that sev- 
erance of relations with the United States was a "good omen" as it proved once and for all that the 
"US government was losing hope vis-d-vis Iran" 241 The above developments coupled with the 
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan starting in December 1979, ensured that "the 
major pillar of the surrogate strategy" stood weakened. This gave sustenance to the idea mooted 
by some policy-makers in Washington that a "direct US military presence in the area is a sine qua 
non for safeguarding Western, especially American, interests in the Gulf '. 242 
Although the Shah had been interested in assuming the role of the gendarme in the Persian 
Gulf, the prospect had proved shortlived. The main reason for this was that he had tended to view 
matters of external security separately from the state of domestic cohesion. Contrary to the 
presumptions of policy-makers on Capitol Hill, all the billions of dollars worth of arms sales 
could not save the Shah once his subjects embarked on the path to dismantle the monarchy. 
Hence one must conclude that external security and domestic strength are complementary to each 
other. In this regard Ayatollah Khomeini's decision to accept Resolution 598, in his own words, 
was "deemed appropriate ... being 
in the interest of the revolution and state". 243 
However, in the post cease-fire period, Khomeini's decision, which was largely taken in the 
interest of the survival of the Islamic government, served to heighten the interest of the super- 
Praeger, 1986, pp. 43-46. 
240 "Highlights of Imam's Speeches", reprinted in Kayhan International, June 10,1989. The above is taken from a 
speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini on July 25,1982. 
ui Ibid. Extract taken from a speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini on April 9,1983, the "third anniversary of the US 
severing relations with the Islamic Republic". 
242 Nader Entessar, "Superpowers and Persian Gulf Security: The Iranian Perspective", Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, 
no. 4, October 1988, p. 1431. 
2*3 "Highlights of Imam's Speeches", op. cit., extract taken from Khomeini's speech clarifying Iran's position on the ac- 
ceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, made on July 20,1988. 
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powers in the region. Knowing that Iraq had not been able to replace the Islamic regime in Iran, 
they believed that security and stability in the region could only be enforced by strengthening the 
hands of their local clients and maintaining a military presence in the area. 
Given Iran's unfavoured status vis-d-vis the superpowers, in particular the United States, 
Iranian policy-makers came to rely on the simple logic that security in the region would be avail- 
able to everybody or to none. 
Having distanced itself from the policeman's role ascribed to it during the latter years of the 
monarchy, Iran maintains that the region does not need a gendarme. In the immediate aftermath 
of its acceptance of the UN-sponsored cease-fire, one of the principal security concerns for Iran 
was whether, with outside aid, a new gendarme would emerge to enforce stability in the region. 
Up until the period before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, it was believed in Tehran 
that such a role might be given to Iraq. 
In December 1989, after Iraq claimed to have launched a satellite-carrying rocket into space, 
thus attempting to serve notice that it had made advances in the field of missile technology, ex- 
deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Larijani - who had recently been appointed as an advisor to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs - commented, "If Islamic Iran were to give in to missile claims, it 
would have given in to the masters of Iraq who have a lot more destructive weapons and mis- 
siles". He added that "Iraq must bear in mind that it will never become the gendarme of the 
region" as it was beyond the capacity of Iraq to be "consistent with such a role"? U 
Iran does not espouse the concept of a single "custodian of security being played by a 
regional actor either alone or along with its ally/allies". 245 Instead it believes in a regional collec- 
tive security arrangement devoid of outside participation or interference. Policy-makers in 
Tehran, particularly in the post-cease-fire period, blame the lack of such co-operation on the stra- 
tegy of the "acting-powers" who in their opinion have created an atmosphere of suspicion among 
244 Kayhan International, December 16,1989. 
245 This was mentioned as one of general security scenarios by Dr. Seyyed Farooq Hasnat of Punjab University Pakis- 
tan, in a paper entitled "Collective Security in the Persian Gulf Region: an analysis of various options", presented at the 
International Conference on the Persian Gulf, Tehran, November 20-22,1989. 
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regional states 246 Before the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the aim was to create a fear of 
Iran in other countries of the region; this prevented Iran from establishing a full working relation- 
ship with its neighbours and assuming its rightful place in the overall developments in the region. 
It must be mentioned that this "fear" felt by neighbouring countries of Iran can mainly be 
attributed to Iran's determination to conduct its relations, diplomatic and otherwise, without 
compromising on the principles of the Islamic revolution. For example, in this context sources 
close to President Rafsanjani did not hesitate to say "The moment we realise that the Saudi 
regime is on the line of true Islam ... the very next moment the Saudi flag can be seen hoisted 
over the horizon of Iran". 247 This ideological connection of the efficacy of politics and diplomacy 
carried out along Islamic lines continues to be the main pillar of post-revolutionary foreign pol- 
icy. Even prior to the cease-fire, Ayatollah Khomeini in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, while 
praising him for ushering in a "new era ... after 70 years of suppression", asked him to seriously 
consider Islam as a substitute for the Marxist system. This statement was, of course, made in 
reference to the 60 million Muslims who reside in the Soviet Union. 248 
At present, the lowering of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States has 
considerably changed the factors now influencing security in the Persian Gulf region. Hence, it 
would not be wrong to say that the cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq has not signalled 
a return to the status quo. However, following the invasion of Kuwait, bilateral relations between 
Iran and Iraq seem to have assumed dimensions that existed before the Iran-Iraq war. Iran's deci- 
sion to remain neutral in the recent Gulf War was based on its commitment to the policy of non- 
intervention and respect for territorial integrity of all states. This stance had not only ensured it 
an active role in the future political dynamics of the region, but also considerably improved its 
position with the extra-regional powers 249 Though the general level of tension in the Gulf has 
246 Interview with Dr. Larijani. The deputy Foreign Minister said that he "hated" the word superpower and much pre- 
ferred to use the word "acting-powers". 
247 Kayhan International, September 2,1989. 
21 Kayhan International, April 22,1986. 
19 While the UN brokered cease-fire brought peace to the region and helped Iran to regain some of its lost prestige in 
the international community, it also instilled new confidence in the Gulf States in their dealings with Tehran. However as 
recently as September 21,1992 this feeling has grown into one of concern, following Iran's alleged annexation of the small 
but strategic island of Abu Musa (see Chapter III of this thesis for ban's historical claim) which it controlled jointly with 
the United Arab Emirates. 
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been capped, largely because of the overwhelming show and use of military power by the Allied 
forces in the recent war, it still remains to be seen how the Islamic government will react to cer- 
tain continuing features of Western policy towards the numerous Sheikdoms which make up the 
regions. The most crucial of these policies seem to be the sales of, sophisticated weapon systems 
and the future provisions for security conducted by extra-regional forces, namely the United 
States. 
At the time of conducting research in Tehran, it was widely believed among Iranian 
diplomats and academics that the United States based its security policy in the Gulf on the prem- 
ise that a military presence backed by strategic co-operation would always be acceptable to the 
regional leaders. The former however believe that, once the people of the region replace the 
Sheikhs and their families with a more representative form of government, it would become 
extremely difficult for the US to operate. However, the onset of the Gulf War brought about by 
the invasion of Kuwait increased the dependence of the Gulf states on the US and its allies to pro- 
vide a security umbrella, and created new opportunities for Western powers to involve themselves 
directly in the regional dynamics. However, certain developments, such as Arab-nationalism and 
religio-political movements (for want of a more accurate term than Islamic fundamentalism) 
being intrinsic to the region, are latent factors which seek to threaten Western interests in the long 
run. 
Talks in Tehran have not yet produced any results, undermining the raproachment process between Iran and the six-nation 
Gulf Co-operation Council. In this respect, the assistant Secretary-General of the Council has said that "such irresponsible 
behaviour is likely to reflect itself very negatively on council - Iran ties and creates an atmosphere of lack of confidence and 
tension". 
Western military experts are concerned that if Iran is permitted to "swallow Abu Musa, it may not be long before its ap- 
petite is switched to other chunks of territory in the region. " The Times, (London), September 21,1992. 
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Chapter VIII 
Iran at the United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament 
Introduction 
The role of Iran in the area of Disarmament, whether in the field of conventional or nuclear 
weapons, has to be seen in the light of two parallel, but conflicting trends in world politics. The 
first of these trends is characterised by the relationship which exists between achieving political 
goals of a state or regime and the use of force. The second is the continuous effort made by the 
United Nations to dispense with force in favour of dialogue and cooperation as the main goal of 
modem politics. Running between these two conflicting trends is a whole gamut of issues which 
arise as and when states interact in the global arena. Each of these issues, whether between two 
states or between more than two, is governed sometimes by a certain utilitarianism - i. e. the 
cost-benefit ratio of achieving political goals through the use of force. 
In this respect it may be asked to what extent the disarmament machinery installed by the 
United Nations is actually useful in promoting the principle of the non-use of force in intema- 
tional relations? In the case of Iran, the disarmament machinery has not only proved useful in 
helping the leadership to take a decision to end the war with Iraq but has also provided a conduit 
by which Iran - at the height of its international isolation - could participate in matters of global 
significance by virtue of its permanent membership in the United Nations Conference on Disar- 
mament. 
Successive sections in this chapter will demonstrate how Iran, thanks to its membership in 
the group of 21 (non-aligned nations) and its individual contributions to the ongoing discussions 
on the agenda adopted by the Conference on Disarmament (CD), was able to conduct its foreign 
policy and diplomacy normally. The chapter will first examine various aspects of global disarma- 
ment and its impact on Iran's post-Shah foreign policy perspective. Section One will describe the 
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evolution and activities of the Conference on Disarmament, with reference to the UN's agenda for 
multilateral disarmament and its potential and limitations. Section Two will address certain 
aspects of conflict in the Third World and their impact on international security, with particular 
emphasis on bran and the question of disarmament. And Section Three will discuss the usage and 
proliferation of chemical weapons in the bran-Iraq war and their impact on Iran's foreign policy 
during that period; Iran's stance on this issue in the CD will also be covered. 
L The Evolution and Activities of the Conference on Disarmament 
Probably the most profound ideal which guided the founding members of the United 
Nations was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Since then the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security has remained one of the major objectives of the World 
Organisation. As this chapter will focus on the activities and diplomacy carried on within one 
specific body devoted to the disarmament issue, namely the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it 
would be in place to examine those processes initiated by the world organisation which resulted 
in the formation of that body. 
Ll The United Nation's Agenda on Multilateral Disarmament 
In 1978 and again in 1982, the General Assembly of the United Nations held special ses- 
sions on disarmament. Those sessions were aimed at bringing about "a more peaceful and stable 
world order, through a balanced and verifiable reduction of national armaments, by agreement and 
mutual agreement". 1 Although the outcome of both the special sessions was viewed differently by 
various parties, its overall utility in the area of arms reductions both in the nuclear and conven- 
tional fields cannot be denied. In this context, the remarks of Javier Perez de Cuellar at the open- 
ing meeting of the second special session on disarmament on June 7 1982, put the problem into 
its global perspective: 
I Alessandro Corradini, "National Arms Policies and the Message of the 1978 and 1982 Special'Sessions on Disarma- 
ment", in Ron Huzzard and Christopher Meredith (eds. ), World Disarmament: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Notting- 
ham, England, Spokesman, 1985, p. 83. 
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"The search for security through strength is as old and as deeply rooted in life of 
nations as the desire to live in peace. But what puts the present arms race in an alto- 
gether different and still more dangerous category are two of its basic characteristics: 
first, it derives its momentum, not so much from well-considered security goals as 
from the inexorable advance of military technology and, secondly, it is a pursuit 
whose consequences do not accord with its assumed aims. This holds true, in one 
degree or another, in the fields of both nuclear and conventional weapons. 
"Unless it is restrained by political decisions backed by a moral will, the advance of 
military technology is a process that, by its very nature, can never exhaust itself. At 
present, it is always creating new possibilities, new breakthroughs leading to new 
applications, strategies and doctrines, paving the way to the point of no return". 2 
The first special session on disarmament, held in 1978, addressed itself to the pressing ques- 
tion before the international community - i. e. means to stop the arms race and work towards 
achieving arms reduction and complete disarmament in the interest of both national and interna- 
tional security. Towards this end, the Conference on Disarmament was formed following the 
deliberations which took place at the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I). 
The Final Document emanating from SSOD-I designated the Conference as the "single mul- 
tilateral disarmament negotiating body"3 of the international community. Its membership of 40 
includes all five nuclear weapon states and thirty-five other states .4 The membership of non- 
nuclear states is reviewed at regular intervals. It carries forward the negotiating efforts of its 
predecessors, namely the Conference of the Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament 
(1962-1968) and the Conference of the Ten-Nations Committee on Disarmament (1959-1962). 
From 1979 to 1983 the Conference on Disarmament was known as the Committee on Disarma- 
ment. (In this chapter "Conference" will be used to denote the multilateral body). 
During the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the ques- 
tion of revitalising the machinery for disarmament negotiations was considered and section IV of 
its Final Document dealt thoroughly with that question. Paragraph 120 welcomed the agreement 
2 Full text of speech reprinted at the beginning of the issue of Disarmament: a periodic review of the United Nations, 
vol. 5, no. 2, New York, United Nations, November 1982. 
3 See Annex 1 pertaining to Chapter VIII for the final document of SSOD-I. 
A The members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Bur- 
ma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, The Nether- 
lands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia and Zaire. 
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reached during the session that the Conference on Disarmament would be convened at Geneva 
not later than January 1979 and that it would: 
(a) Conduct its work by consensus; 
(b) Adopt its own rules of procedure; 
(c) Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the 
Conference on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary of the Conference, who shall also act 
as his personal representative, to assist the Conference and its Chairman in organising the 
business and time tables of the Conference; 
(d) Rotate the Chairmanship of the Conference among all its members on a monthly basis; 
(e) Adopt its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General 
Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Conference; 
(f) Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and 
provide its formal and other relevant documents to member states of the United Nations on 
a regular basis; 
(g) Make arrangements for interested states, not members of the Conference, to submit to the 
Conference written proposals on working documents on measures of disarmaments that are 
the subject of negotiation in the Conference and to participate in the discussion of the 
subject-matter of such proposals or working documents; 
(h) Invite states not members of the Conference, upon their request, to express views in the 
Committee when the particular concerns of those states are under discussions; 
(i) Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided. 5 
The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship to the UN. It defines its own 
rules of procedure and sets its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. The budget for the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and it 
s The above has been taken from "Organisation of the work in the Committee on Disarmament", in Disarmament: A 
periodic review by the United Nations, vol. 2, no. 2, October 1979, p. 1. 
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holds its meeting at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The work of the Conference is conducted 
in plenary meetings or by any arrangements agreed upon by the Conference. In 1979, the Confer- 
ence on Disarmament agreed on a permanent agenda of ten items: 
(1) nuclear weapons in all aspects; 
(2) chemical weapons; 
(3) other weapons, of mass destruction; 
(4) conventional weapons; 
(5) reduction of military budgets; 
(6) reduction of military forces; 
(7) disarmament and development; 
(8) disarmament and international security; 
(9) collateral measures including confidence-building measures and effective verification 
methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures acceptable to all parties con- 
cerned; 
(10) comprehensive programmes of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control. 
The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held in 
New York from 7 June to 10 July 1982. During this period the Iran-Iraq war was in its second 
year, and permanent members of the Security Council -a body charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining peace and security - failed to condemn Iraq's aggression against Iran. As Chapter 
VII of this thesis has suggested this inaction on the part of the permanent members of the Security 
Council was a deliberate foreign policy choice based on larger geo-strategic and political factors. 
The failure of the Security Council becomes even more ironical considering that President 
Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly noted that "lawless acts" were 
increasingly going unpunished, that the United Nations Charter required member-states to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any State, and that 
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aggression must be condemned. 6 
Apart from reaffirming the validity of the 1978 Final Document which emanated from the 
First Special Session, and agreeing to launch a World Disarmament Campaign and continue and 
expand the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, the Second Special Ses- 
sion was not able to cover ground on any substantial disarmament issues. The session was 
unable, for example, to complete "in spite of many concessions on the part of the non-aligned 
countries, the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose elaboration had 
been underway for three years, pursuant to a decision contained in the 1978 Final Document" 7 
The accusatory stance taken by the United States with regards to the Soviet Union's allegedly 
unabated conventional and nuclear weapon programmes only urged the latter to make commit- 
ments which on the face of it sounded grand, but were almost impossible to believe given the ani- 
mosity between the two superpowers. In his message to the General Assembly, President Bre- 
zhnev stated that his country would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, mooting 
"the idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction 
and... complete elimination... " 
The Soviet Union also announced its preparedness to agree on a complete ban on the develop- 
ment, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons .8 
President Reagan, speaking two days after Foreign Minister Gromyko read out President 
Brezhnev's speech, proposed four major points as an agenda for peace (a) elimination of land- 
based intermediate-range missiles; (b) a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile war- 
heads; (c) new safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war, and (d) substantial reduction in 
NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces .9 Although both superpowers put forward viable 
proposals, the session was unable to come to grips with them, and many of the issues like nuclear 
war and nuclear arms freeze were set aside for consideration at future regular sessions of the Gen- 
6 See UNDoc., A/S-12/PV. 16, pp. 2-13. President Reagan addressed the United Nations General Assembly on June 17, 
1982. 
7 World Disarmament: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, op. cit., p. 90. 
$ UNDoc., A/S-17lPV. 12, pp. 21-30. 
9 UNDoc., A/S-12JPV. 16, pp. 2-13. 
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eral Assembly. 
More than the General Assembly, negotiation activities within the Conference on Disarma- 
ment can be said to have made considerable progress. For example, the two annual sessions of 
the Conference (held in Geneva from February 7 to April 27 and June 13 to August 31,1989) 
devoted a major part of the time in elaborating a multilateral convention on the complete and 
effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and 
their destruction. 10 In this context it may be mentioned that the end of the Iran-Iraq war (July 
1988) provided the international community with an environment where the issue of chemical 
weapons could be addressed without encountering too many obstacles created hitherto by political 
necessity. 
The extended war on the other hand brought to the forefront certain security scenarios 
which were previously only hypothetical. For example, the threat of the regional proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological), and of medium and long-range 
weapon systems, became paramount in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's 
announced intention to use weapons of mass destruction (SCUDs mounted with chemical war- 
heads) was viewed by the coalition forces as a battle situation they would have to deal with. This 
widened the military options available to the Allied forces, including the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons, whose deployment would have had new and dangerous implications for security in the 
region. In the above context, the continually mooted proposal of declaring the Middle East as a 
nuclear weapon free zone becomes important. 
Concerning the nuclear test-ban, during the 1989 session the Conference held a number of 
informal consultancies on the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Although there was a strong 
desire among member states to start substantive work on this subject and a certain convergence of 
views on the question of a mandate for the ad hoc committee, no agreement was reached during 
the session on this point. Under the same item of the agenda, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific 
10 It is envisaged that 1992 will be the year in which the Chemical Weapons Convention will be concluded. For an ap- 
praisal of negotiations in this area see Thomas Bernaver, The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the 
Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, United Nations Publication, Sales No. GV. E 90.0.3,1990. 
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Experts on Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic events submitted to the Conference its fifth 
report describing initial concepts for a modern international seismic data exchange system. The 
group also continued its discussion on plans to conduct a large-scale experiment to test the pro- 
posed concepts. " 
In the area of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 
(non-aligned states) has been particularly active. In 1989 the Group submitted a proposal for a 
draft mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with this problem. The Group (of which Iran is a 
member) promoted its proposal (to have the problem dealt within the multilateral negotiating 
framework of the Conference) by drawing attention to the fact that, since the treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force in 1970, nuclear weapons had multiplied 
several times over, increasing the threat of annihilation. It added that, if global peace and security 
are to be guaranteed, the security of all nations must be met. 12 As mentioned earlier North-South 
issues have become pre-eminent following the end of the Cold War, in addition conflicts in 
Eastern Europe and the old Soviet Union are adding new dimensions to disarmament. For exam- 
ple, the multilateral deliberations on the question of disarmament and development are being 
reconsidered to meet the demands of the 1990s. 13 
On the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, the ad hoc Committee esta- 
blished in 1985 noted in its report to the Conference that 
"there continued to be general recognition of the importance and urgency of prevent- 
ing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to the accomplishment of 
tt See United Nations System: Institutional Guide, New York, United Nations, 1989, p. 137. 
12 Since 1979, the Group of 21 has submitted several draft mandates for an Ad Hoc Committee to start negotiations on 
the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. But due to the opposition by Western countries, these pro- 
posals have never materialised. In 1987, the Group of 21 proposed that the ad hoc body elaborate stages of nuclear disar- 
mament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-1; clarifying the issues involved in the prohibition of 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war - see CD1116. 
See also CD/64, CDII80, CD/309 and CD/526. (CD/ denotes documents pertaining to the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament). 
According to the latest proposal (1989) put forward by the Group of 21 the Ad Hoc Committee would be set up to: (a) ela- 
borate and clarify the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, and iden- 
tify the responsibilities of nuclear weapon States and the role of non-nuclear weapon States; (b) clarify the issues involved 
in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war, 
(c) clarify the issues involved in eliminating reliance or doctrines of nuclear detterence; (d) identify measures to ensure the 
effective discharge by the Conference on Disarmament of its role in this respect. See Annex II pertaining to Chapter VIII. 
13 See Jurgen Brauer. "Reviving or Revamping the Disarmament for Development Thesis? ", Bulletin of Peace Propo- 
sals, vol. 21, no. 3,1990, pp. 307-319. 
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its task ... It was recognised once more that as the 
legal and common objective. The 
work carried out by the Committee since its establishment contributed to the regime 
applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space. "14 
The Committee also agreed that substantiative work on the problem, would continue at the 
succeeding sessions of the Conference. 
Concerning the agenda item on new types of weapons of mass destruction, the Group of 
Socialist States and the Group of 21 maintained their support for the proposal to convene a group 
of qualified experts with a view to identifying any new types of weapons of mass destruction and 
making, as appropriate, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified 
types of such weapons. Western delegations maintained their view that as no new types of 
weapons of mass destruction had been identified since 1948 nor was their existence imminent, the 
practice followed thus far of making plenary statements and holding informal meetings of the 
Conference from time to time would suffice to deal with this question. 15 
Over the last two decades, negotiations which have taken place in the various multilateral 
disarmament bodies in Geneva have resulted in the following treaties: 
" The Test-Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow (1968). " The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (1968). " The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof (1971). " The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their destruction (1972). " The 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (1977). " The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979). " The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Inju- 
rious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (1981). " The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- 
14 United Nations System: Institutional Guide, op. cit., p. 137. 
is Aid p. 138. 
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Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty, 1972). " The Interim Agreement on Certain Meas- 
ures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972). " The Agreement 
on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973). " The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground 
Nuclear Weapon Tests (threshold test-ban treaty, 1974). " The Treaty on Underground 
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976). " The Treaty on the Limitation of Stra- 
tegic Offensive Arms (1979). 
The last three treaties have not entered into force, but each party has declared its intention to 
adhere to the treaties substantive provisions as long as the other does likewise. 
L2 The Agenda, Possibilities and Limitations of Multilateral Disarmament16 
The period leading up to Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 and its after- 
math have been characterised by a new global awareness, one in which genuine and lasting peace 
is being regarded as a viable goal if the United Nations system is used to settle disputes justly and 
fairly. The UN thus has before it an opportunity of fulfilling the basic ideals set out by its found- 
ing members in the form of a Charter nearly half a century ago. 
The opportunities and obstacles facing the UN in tackling its international agenda in the 
fields of security and disarmament are numerous. For example, the Security Council's will to 
avail itself of opportunities whereby naked aggression could be curbed in its early stages is still 
largely determined by the diktat of its members' national interest. For example, while the Coun- 
cil failed to condemn Iraq's aggression against Iran and turned a blind eye to the gross violation 
of human rights by the former for close to a decade (1980-1989), it was quick to change tack fol- 
lowing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (a principal supplier of oil to the West) in 1990. Still, the 
United Nations, and particularly the Conference on Disarmament, continue to play a constructive 
role in preserving and protecting the gains made in the area of security and disarmament. 
16 The formt of this section is based on a study done by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNI- 
DIR) entitled The United Nations Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects, (ed. ), Jayantha Dhanapala, New 
York, United Nations, 1991. 
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The agenda for multilateral disarmament has gone through considerable change, especially 
towards the end of the 1980s. Since this thesis covers events up to 1989, these changes will only 
be mentioned in brief. 
Not unlike the period following the departure of Iran from the United State's security alli- 
ance (CENTO) and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the start of the 1980s, 
there is much confusion now, following the end of the Cold War, as to how the new and changing 
military and economic components of security will interact with the foreign policy objectives of 
individual countries. Whereas the situation in the West with regard to disarmament has progres- 
sively improved following the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) in November 1990,17 the situation in the Persian Gulf has taken on new dimensions. The 
region remains as it was a decade ago - hostile to the economic and security interests of the West 
and its allies, notably Saudi Arabia and the gulf sheikhdoms. By punishing Iraq's aggression on 
Kuwait, the coalition force led by the United States has opened a new chapter - setting before the 
United Nations the challenge of devising a new security system, which will take into considera- 
tion the sovereign rights of the states in the region. Having said that, it must be mentioned that 
certain precedents, particularly the way the United Nations Security Council was used during the 
extended Gulf crisis, will not make the task any easier. 
Following the inconclusive end of the Iran-Iraq war and the more recent military action 
taken against Iraq, security in the Persian Gulf region remains high on the United Nations' 
agenda. The discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons industry and its chemical weapons capability 
(demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq war) brings to the forefront the need to check the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction into the region. In addition, with the already existing missile 
capabilities of certain countries (Iraq, Syria and Israel) and the presence of US warships with even 
17 The first round of the CFE talks began in Vienna in March 1989. Dramatically improved East-West relations, the 
determination of the two superpowers to reduce their huge military budgets, (and from mid-1989 onwards) the collapse of 
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe created the unprecedented auspicious conditions for the conclusion of a European 
arms-reduction treaty. In February 1990 the first major breakthrough occurred, when the Soviet Union and the United 
States announced their intention to reduce the number of their troops stationed in Central Europe. For further details we 
"Arms Control and Disarmament" in Political and Economic Encyclopedia of Western Europe, (ed), Frances Nicholson for 
Cambridge International Reference on Current Affairs (CIRCA) Limited, Harlow, Essex, Longman Group UK Limited, 
1990, p. 14. 
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more sophisticated strategic weapons aboard, the threat assessment and security calculations of 
countries in the region have only served to fuel the arms race. 18 The negative side of such a situa- 
tion is the growing possibility of pre-emptive strikes and the high propensity for armed conflict. 
On the positive side, the situation will oblige the United Nations to play a greater role in manag- 
ing regional security. It is to be hoped that this will engender a greater transparency in the mili- 
tary programmes and strategic planning of the main actors in the region, thus reducing the risk of 
conflict. 
As succeeding sections will demonstrate, the relationship between security and disarmament 
is crucial, and hence arms limitations and disarmament cannot proceed without taking this aspect 
into consideration. The individual security concerns of states often obstruct the formation of a 
wider strategy, encompassing the security of every member state and thus aiming to improve 
security internationally. This has led the disarmament machinery in the United Nations to evolve 
a process which enables all members of the international community to participate in a dialogue 
on security. In the case of Iran, which opted out of all collective security and military alliance 
arrangements in its post-Shah phase, membership of the Conference on Disarmament has been 
particularly valuable. As section two will demonstrate, the Conference became the principal 
forum for Iran to voice its security concerns. Its membership in the group of 21 non-aligned 
nations within the CD further demonstrated that it shared the hopes and insecurities of many of 
the developing countries. 
In examining the process of United Nations disarmament and its possibilities, it is 
worthwhile noting that despite the exuberance shown - it is beyond the mandate of the UN to 
function as a supra-national organ, issuing and enforcing global legislation for peace and disarma- 
ment. Hence, multilateralism as promoted by the UN does not control disarmament but aims to 
advance stage by stage to a juncture where consensus becomes critical to the ongoing process. In 
Is For a detailed account of the procurement of weapons systems by the Persian Gulf and Middle-East States in the 
post-Gulf war period, see article in the Financial Times, May 11,1992, entitled "Weapons deals hit prospects for Mideast 
Stability" by Tony Walker in Cairo, Mark Nicholson in London and Hugh Carnegy in Jerusalem. The authors open the arti- 
cle with the following observation: "Hopes for a more stable Middle East after Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War are buckling 
under the sheer weight of some $30bn (£ 16.7bn) in proposed new arms transfers - with the US among the main culprits in 
speeding deliveries to the region". 
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this respect some authors describe the multilateralism disarmament as consisting of "several dis- 
tinct stages that build upon one another dialogue, conceptualising, recommending and immo- 
bilising and lastly treaty-making". 19 
The dialogue stage takes place in the General Assembly and its organs (particularly the First 
Committee), where states are made aware of global security issues and in turn voice their security 
concerns. This process reveals the inter-dependent nature of security issues, while taking into 
account the legitimate security interests of each member state. It is here that global security is 
presented in the regional contexts, and that stark differences between the security concerns of 
developing and industrialised countries come to light. 20 
Although these debates and deliberations often culminate in the adoption of resolutions, 
these are considered more as recommendations without being legally binding. However, it may 
be said that discussions do produce future guidelines for the multilateral disarmament process and 
set certain limits (by the process of international customary law) on the freedom of "states to pro- 
duce, transfer and deploy weapons, as well as on State behaviour with regard to war and peace in 
the nuclear age-. 21 It is important to note that, whereas the role of the United Nations mainly 
involves discussions in various bodies (First Committee of the General Assembly, Disarmament 
Commission, ad hoc committees of the Conference on Disarmament, special sessions of the Gen- 
eral Assembly), negotiations take place only in the Conference on Disarmament which, as men- 
tioned in the preceding section, is an independent body (although it is financed by the UN and 
regularly reports to it). 
Although the Conference on Disarmament is a comparatively new institution within the 
United Nations (1979), the multilateral body is not able to function at its optimum level. The 
same variables which contribute to the relative inefficiency of other multilateral bodies of the 
United Nations seem to affect the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. Of these, 
19 Henning Wegener, "The Limitations and Possibilities of Multilateral Disarmament" in The United Nations. Disarma- 
ment and Security: Evolution and Prospects, op. cit. , p. 
84. 
20 The following section will deal with some of these discrepancies, especially in the context of nuclear issues and non- 
conventional weapons. 
21 The United Nations, Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects, op. cit., p. 84. 
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"repetitious resolutions and speeches, and unwillingness of delegations to adjust to major new 
events"22 are the most noticeable. It may be added that the disappearance of East-West antagon- 
ism has brought in its wake a host of new issues which threaten to polarise the world along the 
North-South and other emerging ideological axes, posing new obstacles in the path of interna- 
tional disarmament dialogue. 
The mulling over of position papers, resulting in time-consuming drafting exercises (in 
order to ensure consensus in the Conference), usually leaves important analytical tasks 
unfinished. This inertia has sapped the negotiating potential of the Conference of Disarmament 
and has resulted in larger disarmament issues being dealt with outside the forum. In this context 
it must also be noted that, because security of member states underpins any disarmament exercise, 
the constraints shown in weapons stockpiling and arms exports are often at a minimum. Hence, 
while the Conference on Disarmament actively seeks to build confidence among member states, 
the mad rush to acquire state-of-the-art weapons systems and the development of national arms 
industries are ever present impediments to general disarmament. Some authors take an even more 
critical view of the state of the United Nations disarmament process by suggesting that the "parli- 
amentarisation of disarmament negotiations and the strengthening of the influence of the General 
Assembly" have led to the negotiation process degenerating into "a general palaver, especially 
between North and South"23 
IL Iran and the Question of Disarmament 
The issue of disarmament for Iran (as with most other countries) is one which is determined 
by regional security demands, which continue to be the mainstay of its foreign policy. In the 
post-Shah period, Iran's approach to security has come to be based on the revolutionary doctrine 
of "Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic". This doctrine meant that Iran would hen- 
ceforth follow a strict policy of non-alignment ("Neither East Nor West") in all affairs of the 
22 Ibid., p. 85. 
23 Lothar Brock, "Negotiations, Palavers and Surgical Strikes", in The United Nations. Disarmament and Security: 
Evolution and Prospects, op. cit., p. 24. 
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state. Although it was never clearly defined, it signified a departure from the Pahlavi regime's 
pro-Western policies and strategies. 
This section will concentrate on Iran's position on various issues which make up the agenda 
of the Conference on Disarmament. Of these, nuclear questions which range from assurances to 
non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear non-proliferation to the need for a test-ban will be exam- 
ined. The issue of chemical weapons will be given special emphasis by virtue of the impact it 
had on Iran's policies during the Iran-Iraq war. In addition Iran's contribution during debates on 
regional disarmament, conventional weapons and the UN's role in disarmament will also be stu- 
died. 
II. 1 Nuclear Issues 
The main resemblance between Iran's position on nuclear issues in the pre-revolutionary 
period and in the post-Shah period is the decision to remain a party to the limited test-ban treaty 
and to the non-proliferation treaty, which it ratified in 1970. 
After the victory of the revolutionary forces in February 1979, the Islamic Republic has 
joined the ranks of those states which do not belong to a military alliance with a nuclear power, 
and have sought to obtain assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. By 
virtue of its ratification of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Iran is eligible for support and 
immediate assistance from nuclear-weapon member states if attacked or threatened with nuclear 
weapons. But its anti-American foreign policy and radical stance on non-alignment have made it 
more susceptible to becoming a victim of a situation in which - if it were threatened or attacked 
with nuclear weapons by one of the nuclear weapon states which is also a permanent member of 
the Security Council - it could not get any help, since the nuclear weapon aggressor would block 
any action by the Council 24 
24 In a debate in the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati stated that, be- 
cause of the "strategic significance" of his country, it remains not only "under constant and direct threat from conventional 
and chemical weapons, but also faces the perils of nuclear weapons"... CD/PV. 425. 
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The possibility of such a situation occurring prompted a conference of non-nuclear states to 
meet in Geneva (August 29 to September 28 1968) shortly after the signing of the NPT. 25 One of 
the main points on the agenda was how to ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon states. 
Many participants contended that the nuclear-weapon states should provide "negative" security 
assurances - namely commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear weapon states. During the conference, Pakistan put forward a draft resolution by 
which the conference of non-nuclear weapon states was to urge the nuclear-weapon powers to 
refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state 
which had renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. 26 The declaration which 
finally emanated from the Conference was seen by many as having made little progress, as it sim- 
ply reiterated the relevant provisions of the UN charter (especially under Chapter VII) without 
distinguishing between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons usage in the relations between states 27 
It was not until 1979, following the appeal by the First Special Session, that the Conference 
on Disarmament included the issue in its agenda under the heading "Effective international 
arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons". In July of the same year, a special subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament 
began work on the question. The mandate for the subsidiary body, which was first called the "Ad 
Hoc Working Group" and since 1984 the "Ad Hoc Committee", has remained the same: "to con- 
tinue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to 
assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" 28 
The debates on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament have 
focused on two main areas, (i) the scope or content of negative security assurances, and (ii) the 
form in which the assurances should be given. Iran's contributions in both these areas have been 
u See United Nations, The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970, New York, United Nations, 1970, pp. 307- 
326. The Final Document of the Conference is contained in UNGAOR A/7277. 
26 Pakistan's draft resolution is contained in UNDoc., A/Conf. 35/C. 1/L. 11. 
27 The ambiguity with regard to the above is to be found in a resolution proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany 
contained in UNDoc., A/Conf. 35/C. 1/L. 13/Rev. 1. The wording proposed by Germany was adopted as Resolution A of the 
Conference and can be found in UNGAOR A/7277, p. 4. 
28 See for example CD/11 and CD1964. 
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very much akin to the position of Pakistan, which is the spokesman for the Group of 21 (neutral 
and non-aligned members of the CD) on the issue of negative security assurances. 
Proposals for a general ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been made 
by member states of the Group of 21.29 Such a ban would be broader in scope than negative secu- 
rity assurances to non-nuclear weapon states since it would apply equally to nuclear and non- 
nuclear countries. The three Western nuclear-weapon states and other countries of the Western 
group have opposed these proposals, taking the position that prohibition of the use of nuclear 
weapons must be considered in the context of the prevention of war in general. Considering that 
nuclear weapons are an essential element of Western security, these countries have contended that 
States have the right to use the means they deem most appropriate in accordance with Article 2, 
para 4, and Article 51 of the UN Charter. 30 
11.2 Negative Security Assurances 
In this context many members of the Group of 21,31 notably Pakistan, 32 have demanded 
that unconditional assurances be given to non-nuclear weapon states. Iran is among those 
members which are parties to the NPT and have argued that, by foreswearing the nuclear weapons 
option, they expect the nuclear-weapon states to renounce these weapons as well. Foreign Minis- 
ter Velayati, addressing the Conference in 1987, said that the most "effective guarantee" in this 
respect would be a "total ban on the use of nuclear weapons", with nuclear-weapon states 
announcing their "adherence to this decision through internationally binding commitments". 33 
The Western countries, however, are reluctant to support unconditional assurances, let alone a 
total ban, arguing that the "no-use obligation" should also apply to countries which have not 
renounced the possession of nuclear weapons. 34 
See for example CD1280 and CD/407. Members of the Group of Socialist States (the Group of Eastern European and 
other States) and China have also supported this proposal. 
3o See for example CD/421. 
31 See for example Political Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State on Government of Non-Aligned 
Countries (1986); and Final Communiqudoff the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (1990). Also CD1280 
and CD/407. 
32 See CD/120; CD/161. 
33 See CD/PV. 425. 
34 See for example CD/1039. 
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In short, the discussion on negative security assurances has achieved very little progress. In 
the words of one author, "Efforts to harmonise the proposed criteria and arrive at an agreement on 
the scope and form of a common arrangement have not produced any results". The lack of har- 
monisation can be attributed to the conflicting positions of both non-nuclear weapon states and 
nuclear-weapon states on the subject. The former, of which the Group of 21 is the driving force, 
continues to press for the conclusion of an international legal instrument which would provide a 
uniform, unconditional and unlimited commitment of the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The existence, however, of non-parties 
of the NPT within the Group of 21 (eg. India) has meant that the group has refused to concede 
any obligations on the part of non-nuclear weapon states in exchange for security assurances. 
This has made the achievement of the unconditional assurance unattainable. 35 
As for the nuclear weapon powers, their intransigence can be attributed to individual nuclear 
doctrines. "Any revision of these doctrines, which might be the only way of reaching agreement 
on a common formula, is regarded by them as touching upon their most fundamental security 
interest" 36 
This intransigence caused the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances to conclude 
as early as 1983 that the "Working Group had exhausted its discussions on the subject". 37 
In the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament 
(1978), the member states of the United Nations recognised that the cessation of nuclear-weapon 
testing would make an important contribution to the goal of ending the qualitative improvement 
of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, and of preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 38 
China and France voiced their disagreement with the idea of complete prohibition of nuclear 
tests. France argued that cessation of tests would not contribute towards the prevention of the 
3S Thomas Bernaver, Nuclear Issues on the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, New York, United Nations, 
1991, p. 24. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., quoted from Report of the Ad Hoc Committee in CD/421. 
38 See Annex I pertaining to Chapter VIII. Paragraphs 50-51. 
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production of new types of weapons, since the two most heavily armed powers had accumulated 
sufficient data, as a result of past tests, to make any qualitative changes necessary. 
However, following consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States in June 
1977, trilateral negotiations, with the participation of the United Kingdom, began in July that year 
to bring about a comprehensive test-ban. Although the negotiations were private, the three nego- 
tiating powers submitted a report to the Conference on Disarmament stating that they had agreed 
that the treaty would require each party to prohibit, prevent and not carry out any nuclear-weapon 
test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control in any environment; and to refrain 
frdm causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon 
test explosion anywhere. They had also agreed that the treaty would be accompanied by a proto- 
col on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The negotiating parties had come to an under- 
standing that a variety of verification methods should be provided to enhance confidence that all 
parties to the treaty were in strict compliance with it. In conclusion, the three negotiating parties 
noted that they had gone far in their pursuit of a sound treaty, and continued to believe that their 
trilateral negotiations offered the best approach. 39 
The trilateral negotiations encouraged the United Nations General Assembly to adopt two 
resolutions in December 1980, on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Though the first resolu- 
tion, initiated by the non-aligned countries, the General Assembly reaffirmed the important need 
for a test-ban treaty, urged all members of the Conference on Disarmament to support the creation 
of an ad hoc working group to start multilateral negotiations, and called upon the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States to halt tests without delay, either by a trilaterally 
agreed moratorium or unilaterally. The resolution was adopted by a majority vote, with only the 
United Kingdom and the United States voting against. 40 The second resolution, sponsored by the 
Western countries, called upon the three negotiating powers to try to bring their negotiations to a 
successful conclusion, and also requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working 
39 The above information has been taken from The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985, New York, United 
Nations, 1985, pp. 68-69. 
40 See Genera! Assembly Resolution 35/145A, adopted by 111 votes for, 2 against and 31 abstentions. 
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group to initiate multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at its 1981 session. 41 
Due to a lack of consensus at the 1981 sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, the 
establishment of a working group was further delayed. The United States explained that, since 
the "review of its policy concerning nuclear testing, including the question of negotiations on a 
test-ban, had not yet been completed, it could not agree to the establishment of a working group". 
The United Kingdom maintained that the "tripartite forum offered the most realistic approach" 42 
Iran was among many countries who felt that "a comprehensive test-ban treaty should 
remain the primary objective of the Committee [Conference] on Disarmament". Speaking at the 
Conference's plenary, the Iranian delegate said that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty or CTBT 
had become "a symbol of a negotiation breakthrough", and failure to "reach agreement on this 
issue would seriously undermine the prospects for further arms limitations". Upholding the view 
put forward by the Group of 21, the Iranian delegate was of the opinion that working groups were 
the most suitable machinery for concluding negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and 
he hoped that one which addressed the issue of CTBT would be established soon. 
43 
At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1982), 
there was a general sense of gloom over the lack of progress. Any prospect of a breakthrough on 
the CTBT seemed to vanish when the United States announced its decision a few days after the 
conclusion of the special session, not to resume the trilateral negotiations on a test-ban treaty. 
However, the Conference on Disarmament decided, in the course of its 1982 session, to establish 
an ad hoc working group "to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating 
to verification and compliance, with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test- 
ban". " To date a comprehensive test-ban treaty has not been achieved. In concluding this part, it 
41 See General Assembly Resolution 35/145B, adopted by 129 votes for, none against and 16 abstentions. 
42 The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985, op. cit., p. 69. 
43 See CD/PV. 108. 
Treaties Pertaining to Nuclear Explosions are as follows: " Partial Test-Ban Treaty: signed and entered into force in 
1963.117 signatories at the end of 1990. Prohibits nuclear explosions anywhere but underground. Preamble commits sig- 
natories to seek to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". " Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty: Entered into force in 1970; 141 signatories at the end of 1990. Preamble especially article VI, recalls 
commitment to ban nuclear weapon tests. " Threshold Ban Treaty: Signed by the U. S. and the Soviet Union in 1974. 
Ratified and formally entered into force in 1990. Prohibits military nuclear explosions exceeding 150 kilo tons. Commits 
U. S. and Soviet Union to "continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessa- 
tion of all underground nuclear weapon tests". " Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Signed by the U. S. and the Soviet 
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would be in place to discuss the need for such a treaty and its implications for signatories of the 
NPT like Iran, which are allegedly in the midst of a nuclear programme, with possible military 
uses. 
Some observers are of the opinion that, with the apparent increase in nuclear weapon proli- 
feration in the non-Western world (e. g. Iraq in the post-Gulf War period), leaders like President 
George Bush - while showing real concern - have now allowed their diplomats to broach "the 
single best way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons: a comprehensive nuclear test-ban". 45 This 
particular author proceeds to give two reasons why a treaty on a nuclear test-ban would effec- 
tively curb nuclear proliferation. Firstly, that a country seeking to develop nuclear weapons 
"would want to test one or more", to show whether a weapon worked, "while helping to intimi- 
date neighbours". The second, not so obvious, reason is that a comprehensive test-ban would 
"lessen resentment of the powers that have nuclear weapons and keep testing new ones: the 
Soviet Union, China, the United States, France and Britain. And it would lessen the urge to copy 
them" 46 
The lack of interest shown by certain nuclear-weapon countries - namely the United States 
- in concluding a CTBT47 may result in many countries which have foresworn the nuclear 
weapons option rethinking their national security requirements. The time of reckoning draws 
near, since the adherents of the NPT must decide in 1995 whether to extend the treaty indefinitely 
or for a fixed period, such as another 25 years 48 
As to why leaders like President Bush have refused to discuss the idea of a CTBT, it is the 
Union in 1976. Ratified and formally entered into force in 1990. Prohibits nuclear explosions for "peaceful purposes" 
exceeding 150 kilo tons. Taken from The Defence Monitor, The Centre for Defence Information, vol. xx, no. 3,1991, p. 5. 
45 Anthony Lewis, "Ban Tests of Nuclear Weapons", International Herald Tribune, Jan 9,1991. 
46 Ibid. 
47 It is reported that, unlike the U. S., the Soviet Union under President Mikhail Gorbachev has made repeated gestures 
towards ending all nuclear explosions. In August 1985 the Soviet Union announced a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on 
nuclear explosions which it subsequently extended four times until February 1987. The Reagan administration, invited to 
reciprocate, refused. The Defence Monitor, op. cit., pA. 
ss At the most recent NPT review conference (1990), failure to achieve consensus on a final document was due to the 
unresolved issue of a timetable for a CTBT. A number of non-aligned countries, led by Mexico, tried to get the U. S. to 
commit itself to ending nuclear tests. "Some non-nuclear states are asking if their decision to forgo the nuclear option has 
been fairly reciprocated by nuclear weapon states". See Holly Porteous; "The case for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty", 
International Defence Review, March 1991, p. 209. 
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contention of some writers that 
"Mr Bush's positions appears to be a belief among conservatives that continued test- 
ing is a symbol of American status and power in the world. Mr Bush is always wor- 
ried about the political right, and refusing to even talk about a test-ban may seem to 
him a relatively small bone to toss to the right" 49 
H. 3 Iran and Nuclear Weapons Programme 
Iran's interest in the nuclear field can be traced back to the US Atoms for Peace programme 
in the 1950s. In 1957, at the inauguration of an American Atoms for Peace exhibit in Tehran, the 
Shah announced his country's willingness to cooperate in research on the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Since then, however, Iran's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons technology has been no 
secret 50 
In the post-Shah period, Tehran is reported to have revived and even expanded the Shah's 
"semi-clandestine nuclear weapons programme" with the aid of countries like Pakistan. This was 
corroborated after Iran's leading nuclear scientists held a high level meeting in January 1987, dur- 
ing which Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, the originator of the Pakistani bomb, visited Tehran to "assess 
the Iranian nuclear potential and discuss future cooperation with the Iranian leadership". The then 
president of Iran, Ayatollah All Khamenei, urged the participants to intensify their work "in 
defence of your country and your revolution". Soon afterwards it was learnt that Iran. and Pakis- 
tan had entered into an agreement on technical cooperation in military nuclear fields. 51 
By 1989 it was reported that Pakistan was helping Iran to build a reactor of Chinese design 
for the extraction of plutonium. In the same year, the alliance which was developing around Iran's 
nuclear programme grew to include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which - follow- 
ing the visits of high-level delegations from Iran - agreed to provide assistance in the area of stra- 
tegic weapons which were later upgraded to include nuclear weapons. 52 
19 "Ban Tests of Nuclear Weapons". op. cit. 
50 See for example Daniel Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982. 
Especially Chapter 5, which evaluates the nuclear weapons programme in Iran during the Pahlavi monarchy. 
51 yosscf Bodansky, "Radical States and Nuclear Proliferation: Racing to the Finish". in Defence and Foreign Affairs 
StrategicPolicy, Winter 1991-1992, p. 11-12. 
52 Ibid., p. 12. 
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The onset of the Gulf crisis (over Kuwait) served to accelerate Iran and Pakistan's nuclear 
programmes. Hojjatalislam Mehdi Karrubi, who arrived in Islamabad during this period, 
emphasised military cooperation between the two countries because of the "great need for the 
defence of this region". The visit yielded "special pacts concerning closer military cooperation, 
and Iran immediately deposited US$50 million in revolving funds in Pakistan banks for the sup- 
port of special key Pakistan defence programmes, mainly nuclear-related" 53 
If the above reports are accurate, including the most recent (July 1991) agreement with 
China, under which the latter is to provide the necessary expertise to complete an Iranian nuclear 
reactor, then Iran can be considered as one of those NPT signatories which have re-evaluated their 
security needs to include nuclear weapons. Although Iran continues to deny its capability of 
making atomic bombs, the head of its Atomic Energy Organisation, Reza Amrollahi, in August 
1991 criticised the superpowers for preventing the transfer of nuclear technology "in order to 
better control the Third World and suppress its resurgence". He said in conclusion that Iran's 
nuclear development was aimed at countering this doctrine, explaining that "with regard to politi- 
cal issues, our grave responsibility is quite clear" 54 
III. The Strategic Development of Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War 
It is now beyond doubt that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in its war against Iran. 55 This 
section will examine the issue of chemical weapons, their strategic deployment during the Iran- 
Iraq war, and the extent to which they have been credited with bringing Iran to the negotiating 
table. References to the Iranian delegation's response to chemical weapons use against its forces 
will further illustrate the impact this subject had on Iran's foreign policy. 
53 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 13. 
ss This fact has been verified by many reliable sources, including the International Committee for the Red Cross. It 
must be mentioned in this respect that, although the United Nations verified that chemical weapons had been used, it did not 
verify the user. For a highly plausible account, see "War's Dirty Chemistry", Newsweek, April 2,1984, pp. 54-56. Also see 
CD/PV. 242. for several references citing Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Those were made in a speech of the Foreign Min- 
ister of Iran, W. Velayati, to the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. 
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IILi Chemical Weapons Attack by Iraq 
As early as 1980 (the year the Iran-Iraq war started), Iran charged (although not within the 
newly formed Conference on Disarmament) that Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons in the 
Panjvin area. According to a report published in the Washington Post, Iranian sources com- 
plained that these weapons "caused blisters" 56 However it was not until 1982 that the usage of 
chemical agents by Iraq as part of its overall tactics against Iran was confirmed by the Western 
press. It was reported that the Iraqis, in order to stem advancing Iranian forces, had used non- 
lethal tear gas which was construed by the latter as being a lethal agent and caused them to retreat 
in total disarray. 57 
The effectiveness of chemical weapons is twofold: physically they can kill and maim, and 
psychologically they can scare and produce panic. The effects take place on two levels. At the 
tactical level, chemical weapons can "influence the shape and outcome of battle". At the strategic 
level, when used against the enemies' cities, they can produce "physical and psychological effects 
that may undermine morale and produce a decision to end the conflict". 58 A combination of these 
two factors, it can be said, "encouraged an appreciation in Iraq of the potential of lethal synthetics 
on the battlefield". 59 
Following from this, credible reports suggest that, in 1982, Iraq was using chemical agents 
in order to resist Iranian human wave formations and night attacks. By 1983, Iraq was deploying 
chemical weapons along its battlefront which exacted a fair number of casualties, most of them 
being maimed. Although Iran tried its best to attract the attention of the Western media and 
governments by publishing colour pamphlets describing the situation, these failed to elicit any 
response. 60 
56 Washington Post, November 17,1980. 
57 "Iraq's Scare Tactic". Newsweek, August 2,1982, p. 11. 
38 Thomas L. McNaugher, "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War", International 
Security, vol. 15, no. 2, Fall 1990, p. 15. 
sfl W. Andrew Terrill Jr., "Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War", StrategicReview, Spring 1986, p. 53. 
60 The most number of casualties were reported during the month of August and November 1982 from the areas around 
Piranshahr and Panjvin. ]bid. 
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By 1984, when the land war was already turning in Iran's favour and the first of several 
"final offensives" was being implemented, chemical weapon usage became a regular battle tactic 
for the Iraqi forces. This was also the year when UN investigations confirmed the use of mustard 
gas and a nerve agent61 against Iran's human-wave assaults. During February 1984, Iran's regu- 
lar army led by the Revolutionary Guards captured parts of the oil-rich Majnoon Islands. In 
response, Iraq mounted a series of counter-offensives to regain their lost territory but were unsuc- 
cessful. Finally, knowing that Iranian forces were ill equipped to face a chemical weapons 
attack, 62 the Iraqis began using the dreaded nerve agent, Tabun. Iran claimed that it lost nearly 
2,000 troops in that single offensive, and admitted that the casualties could have been much 
greater had it not been for the strong winds which dispersed the lethal gas. Nevertheless the Iraqis 
were unable to dislodge the Iranian troops from the islands 63 
Following this chemical weapons attack, the Iranian delegation to the Conference on Disar- 
mament did its utmost to stir into action the members of the international community represented 
there. The Iranian spokesman opened his speech by referring to an International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) press release which confirmed the usage of chemical agents against Iranian 
soldiers (two of whom died during the visit of ICRC delegates) 64 Thereafter the Iranian spokes- 
man made references to the individual and joint reports of the specialist team sent to Iran by the 
UN Secretary-General, which confirmed the use of chemical weapons. These confirmations of 
actual usage did not result however, in any joint condemnation of Iraq, which the Iranian delegate 
thought reflected a lack of responsibility on the part of the Conference, especially since Iraq's 
actions grossly violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Iranian spokesman concluded by calling 
upon all members of the international community, regardless of their political leanings, to 
"denounce and condemn, in the strongest possible terms, any violation of international law and 
61 See UNDoc., S/16433. Document reflects the report of the on-site investigations, conducted by experts dispatched by
the United Nations Secretary-General. 
62 Some authors have commented that, by the time of the Majnoon Islands chemical weapons attack, the Iranians had 
marginally improved their chemical defensive capacities. This was evidenced by the presence of protective masks, atropine 
injectors and limited amounts of protective clothing found among the Iranian dead. See Shahrain Chubin, "Tire Iran-Iraq 
War and Persian Gulf Security" International Defence Review, vol. 17, no. 6. June 1984, p. 711. 
63 Discussions with Hassan Mashaadi, Iranian Councillor for Disarmament Affairs. April 1992. 
" See ICRC Press Release, No. 1481, March 7,1984. 
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protocols" ... 
in the absence of which "there [would] be no difference in weapons for a violatior, 
whether the weapon be nuclear or chemical" 65 
111.2 Dangers of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 
In a sense, this closing remark made by the Iranian spokesman mirrors the concern in the 
Western world about the dangers of the proliferation of chemical weapons in the developing 
world. Take for example a statement made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency to a Senate hearing in 1984: 
"When I look at the remainder of this century and what kind of threats there are to 
security around the world, I personally put the threat of a nuclear war low, very low. I 
personally put the increasing use of chemical weapons around the world high", 66 
The United States' State Department in the same year condemned Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons, but not without criticising the Iranian government first for failing to accept a negotiated 
settlement, 67 (which would mean that there would be no winners in the Gulf war). This relatively 
mild official US position encouraged the Iraqi regime to continue to use chemical weapons. At 
that time there existed in the USA an official school of thought, which emerged via the US press, 
which called for punitive action against Iraq's chemical weapon storage facilities. But the feasi- 
bility of such a strike was abandoned on the pretext that there were not enough American aircraft 
strategically located. 68 
The failure on the part of the US and other Western government to check Iraq's use of 
chemical weapons and - in the case of some countries - to halt their supplies of chemical sub- 
stances to Iraq, caused the Foreign Minister of Iran to remark in the Conference on Disarmament 
that Iraq was only a "second degree agent" in the aggression against his country. The "first degree 
agents" were those countries that provided Iraq with the arms necessary for aggression. 69 
65 See CD/PV. 254. 
" US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Sub-Committee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government 
Processes of the Committee of Government Affairs. Joint Hearing on Chemical Warfare: Arms Control and Non- 
Proliferation 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington DC, 1984, p. 34. As quoted in Elisa D Harris, "Chemical weapons 
proliferation in the developing world "Rusi and Brassey's Defence Year Book, 1989, London, 1989, p. 67. 
67 "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War. Department Statement, March 5,1984" in Department of State Bulletin, 
No. 2085, April 1984, p. 65-66. 
68 See New York Times, March 30,1984. 
69 See CD/PV. 242. It is ironical that, at another plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Iranian 
-321- 
11L3 Iran's Options to Use Chemical Weapons 
There are some who tend to agree that Iran may have used chemical weapons, while adding 
that the available data has been known to be often incorrect or even incomplete 70 Even so, this 
does not answer the question as to why Iran was not able to make the use of chemical weapons a 
regular military option. In April 1988 for example, when Iraq launched a surprise assault against 
a depleted Iranian defending force of about 10,000 soldiers in the campaign to recapture the Fao 
peninsula, Iran could have effectively used chemical weapons to deter the superior Iraqi forces 
and thereby have avoided losing a strategic piece of territory, but this did not happen. A similar 
situation, although without the surprise element, presented itself a few months later, in June 1988. 
This time Iraq prepared a final assault with its formidable tank divisions to recapture the Majnoon 
Islands (occupied by Iran in 1983), and used chemical weapons in this campaign to regain lost 
territory. 
Iran's decision not to avail itself of the chemical weapons option in both the above cases has 
been attributed to Khomeini's absolute opposition to the use of such weapons especially against 
fellow Muslim combatants. 'Another explanation may lie in the factional infighting among 
policy-makers in Tehran and among Iran's field commanders, both of whom would have been 
considering criteria like the extent to which chemical weapons could alter a battle situation when 
weighed against Iran's deteriorating international position. 71 
One of the ironies of Iran maintaining the moral high ground by not settling for the chemi- 
cal weapons option was that, while it was not able to reap any strategic benefits, it was accused of 
being a user which added to its negative international image. One particular example illustrates 
this point. 
In March 1988 Iraqi troops used lethal gas to retake the small Kurdish town of Halabjah 
representative gave the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) credit for arranging a workshop in Munster in June 1984, 
which addressed the issue of the elimination of chemical weapons. With hindsight it is now known that the FRG was one 
of Iraq's main suppliers of chemical weapons technology. Also see CDIPV286. 
70 Iran's usage of chemical weapons is not a clear fact as when, where and how much remains uncertain. See Ballistic 
Missiles and Chemical Weapons, op. cit., p. 16. 
71 ]bid. 
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which being occupied by Iranian troops. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people died, a majority of 
them civilians. Two years later on May 3,1990 an article in the Washington Post accused Iran as 
well as Iraq of having used chemical weapons against the Kurds on that occasion. The accusation 
was mainly based on the finding that the cyanide gas which was used was an agent believed not to 
be among Iraq's assortment of chemicals at that time 72 Other reasons given in the above article 
such as Iran's absolute military need to maintain control over Halabjah by risking collateral dam- 
age to its civilian population can be discounted considering the fact that the "Kurds in this area 
had long sought independence from Iraq and had therefore sided openly with Iran"? 3 
111.4 United Nations Investigation on Chemical Weapons Use 
From March 13 1984, when the team dispatched by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar 
arrived in Tehran to investigate and verify usage of chemical weapons by Iraq, up to the disaster 
which befell the people of Halabjah in 1988, the Iranian delegation put the issue of chemical war- 
fare on the top of its disarmament agenda. It cited many instances where chemical weapons were 
wantonly used during this period, causing death and injury. 74 Disappointed at the failure of the 
Conference on Disarmament to reach a consensus on the issue, which would have led to the con- 
demnation of Iraq at the very least, the Iranian Foreign Minister said the only motive for this lay 
in the interest of some states which had "secured their arms markets at the cost of creating and 
sustaining tensions of the worst kind in the region". He added that "striving against the mer- 
chants of death" should be an important priority on the agenda of the Conference 75 
As Chapter VII of this dissertation illustrates, Iran warded off international pressure to bring 
the war to a close by setting out certain conditions which included heavy war reparations to be 
paid to it and unequivocal condemnation by the international community of Iraq as the aggressor. 
It is worthwhile to note in this respect that, even when there was mounting opposition within Iran 
n Washington Post, May 3,1990. 
73 Robin Wright, in the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 174. 
74 For example, a year after the first visit of the United Nations investigating team (i. e. since March 1984), Iran reported 
that Iraq had resorted to using chemical weapons on 26 occasions. See CD/PV. 299. 
75 See CD/PV308. 
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to continuing the war, brought about by the fear of being bombarded by chemical weapons, the 
leadership remained intransigent. In a letter to the Secretary-General on January 29 1985, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister asked about effective ways of preventing Iraq from using chemical 
weapons, independent from the wider framework for a total cessation of hostilities - which, he 
added, would be unacceptable to his government. Subsequently Iran suggested that the United 
Nations base a permanent mission in Tehran in order to monitor and report on the deployment of 
chemical weapons by Iraq, arguing that such a measure might play a deterring role. 76 This 
instance indicates that, while Iran thought of chemical weapons as being against the rules of war- 
fare, it was quite prepared to continue fighting using conventional means. 
The fact that Iran transported many of its victims of chemical warfare to various European 
capitals for treatment and requested members of the international community to extend humani- 
tarian help77 resulted in another team of UN specialists visiting Iran from February 26 to March 3 
1986. In the report which was completed on March 14 1986, the following parts reflect the nature 
of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war. 
Paragraph 42 of the report contained the testimony of a captured Iraqi pilot who said the 
reason no unexploded bombs were found on this mission was because "impact fuses were now 
being used in place of time fuses used previously". The pilot added that bombing tactics had 
changed from delivering ordnance from low altitudes to high altitudes. The pilot concluded that 
the use of 
"chemical bombs had to be specifically authorised and pilots were not permitted to 
examine critically those attached to their aircraft prior to undertaking a `special mis- 
sion'. In spite of this restriction, the pilot was able accurately to describe the colour, 
shape, marking and mass of chemical bombs being used in attacks against Iranian 
forces and his description coincided with our description of the bombs examined by us 
in 1984". 
In paragraph 44 of the report, the UN team underlined the validity of the information fur- 
nished by the pilot by noting that 
76 Ibid. Also Hassan Mashadi stated in a discussion with the author that the above idea was accepted favourably by 
many members of the Conference, but was scuttled by certain countries which included the US. 
77 See CD/PV347. 
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"The testimony of the Iraqi pilot given through an interpreter in the presence of all 
members of the United Nations team, was obtained without prompting or duress. The 
evidence is so vital that it cannot be ignored" 78 
Paragraph 56 under the heading "Summary and Conclusions" presents the findings of the 
investigations in the following manner: 
(a) "detailed examination of Iranian casualties showed ocular lesions, ranging from mild to 
severe conjunctivitis with intense palpebral oedema (swelling of the eyelid), skin lesions 
including large vesicles filled with amber fluid, cutaneous separations, dark pigmentations 
and lesions approximating to second degree burns.. In some of the cases respiratory injuries 
and reduced leucocyte levels were found. The same features were found in other casualties 
which were cursorily examined as well as in corpses. All lesions observed were caused, 
without any doubt, by mustard gas (yperite). 
(b) using special instruments designed to detect chemical warfare agents, low concentrations of 
mustard gas vapour were detected in numerous craters at three sites around Abadan. Con- 
taminated soil collected from a bomb crater (resulting from an attack the previous day on a 
field hospital), when analysed in laboratories in Europe, was found to contain mustard gas. 
In addition, a hair sample collected from a victim after he had been attacked with chemical 
weapons was shown to contain mustard gas. 
(c) examination of metal components of aerial bombs, collected from bomb craters around 
Abadan, showed that the items had come from bombs that were similar to those examined 
by the team in 1984. (During the present mission we did not find nor were we shown any 
other type of chemical weapons, such as artillery shells). 
(d) significant new evidence was provided during the interviews in Tehran with Iraqi (prisoner 
of war) casualties. They stated that their injuries had been caused by chemical bombs 
dropped by Iraqi aircraft during attacks on Iranian positions. 
73 Report filed as UNDoc., S/17911. The pilot was interviewed at a hospital in the Iranian city of Ahvaz on February 28 
1986. The Iraqi pilot's aircraft had been shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile several days before. 
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(e) important new evidence was also provided by a captured Iraqi pilot. 
Paragraph 57 lists the following unanimous conclusions following the investigations: 
(a) in the areas around Abadan inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used 
against Iranian positions by Iraqi Forces, 
(b) based on medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from 
the Fao area, chemical weapons were also used in that war zone by Iraqi Forces, 
(c) from the evidence examined by the specialists the type of weapon used was aerial bombs, 
(d) the chemical used was mustard gas (yperite), 
(e) the extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined with the time and 
resources available to us. However, from the over 700 casualties actually seen in Tehran 
and Ahvaz it is our impression that the use of chemical weapons in 1986 appears to be more 
extensive than in 1984. " 
The concluding paragraph 58 indicated that the investigation team, having conducted the 
examination of various sites, weapons components and numerous casualties in 1984,1985 and 
1986, together with circumstantial evidence, were agreed that: (i) Iraqi forces had used chemical 
weapons on many occasions against Iranian forces; (ii) and the agent used mainly has been mus- 
tard gas, although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed. 79 
Following the circulation of the above report by the UN team of specialists (1986) and a 
statement by the Security Council condemning the use of chemical weapons Certain members of 
the European Community also adopted special measures to impose controls on certain substances 
which could be converted into chemical weapons 80 However, Foreign Minister Velayati address- 
ing the plenary of the Conference, reported that since the adoption of the Security Council's state- 
ment, Iraq had deployed chemical weapons on five separate occasions in different places. Velay- 
79 Ibid. This report of the specialists was transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General. 
80 For example during talks concerning the ban of chemical weapons held at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva 
(February-March 1987), the United Kingdom proposed the establishment of a permanent system of routine inspections of 
chemical plants producing substances which might be diverted from industrial use to the illicit manufacture of chemical 
weapons. See Keesing's., vo1.: XCII1,1987, pp. 35164-35165. 
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ati proposed that, in the light of Iraq's flagrant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Confer- 
ence on Disarmament seeking the cooperation of the United Nations should implement the fol- 
lowing: first, re-condemn the use of chemical weapons as a "warcrime", second, investigate the 
suppliers of chemical weapons and substances to Iraq, third, impose a total ban on the exportation 
to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology which could be used to manufacture chemi- 
cal weapons, fourth, ensure the dispatch of an investigation team by the Secretary-General when- 
ever demanded by Iran at the earliest possible date, fifth, call on all countries to once again 
announce their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which had been weakened by Iraq, and 
sixth, make a direct call on Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of chemical weapons. 81 
In the period leading up to the massacre at Halabjah i. e. between the spring of 1987 and the 
spring of 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons on a number of occasions. 82 The Iranian delegates in 
the meantime could only propose more stringent action against Iraq, such as a total arms 
embargo, sanctions and even suspension of membership in the United Nations and other interna- 
tional organisations. In addition Iranian delegates reiterated their request for an effective interna- 
tional regime to monitor and prevent any violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.83 
III. S The United States Interests in a Ceasefire 
Iran believed - and with sufficient cause - that the lacklustre response by the Security 
Council in the face of what can be considered as among the most vicious usages of chemical 
weapons in modem warfare was directly attributable to the United States. Addressing a plenary 
session of the Conference in 1987, Foreign Minister Velayati said that Iraq had announced it 
would halt its "violation of international law" (presumably referring to the cessation of chemical 
weapons usage) only if the war was ended. Velayati added that the United States, which had pre- 
viously condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, was now preventing the Security Coun- 
cil from discussing the latest chemical weapon attack on the Iranian city of Sardasht (June 28, 
81 See CD/PV379. 
92 See for example CD/PV. 406, which list five occasions in April 1987 alone when chemical weapons were used against 
Iranian cities and military theatres of operation. 
23 See CD/PV 417. 
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1988) and receiving a technical report on the issue 84 This apparent change of US policy within 
the Security Council can be attributed to Iran's intransigence with regard to a cease-fire, (the 
period leading up to the acceptance by Iran of Security Council Resolution 598 which formally 
ended the Iran-Iraq war is documented in Chapter VII of this thesis). 
Given that it was contrary to US interests in the region to see a theocratic Iran emerge as the 
victor in the war, it was not surprising that the "response of US politicians to Iraq's use of CW 
[chemical weapons] against its own civilians outweighed their response to Iraq's use of chemicals 
against Iranian troops". 85 This attitude on the part of the US towards the means Iraq adopted to 
confront Iran marked a deliberate shift from its policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. Begin- 
ning in 1984, there was a noticeable tilt toward Iraq, which was evident from the re-establishment 
of diplomatic relations, with Baghdad, and the supply to Iraq of economic assistance and even of 
military intelligence gathered via American satellites 86 Correspondingly, the United States began 
to put heavier pressure on Iran. For example, in 1984 the US initiated "Operation Staunch" with 
the objective of stopping the supply of arms to Iran; combined with Iraq's bombing of Iranian 
cities and use of chemical weapons on the battle front, this brought tremendous psychological and 
economic pressures upon the policy-makers in Tehran. 87 
Although the desire of the US policy-makers was to bring Iran to the negotiating table, they 
were not surprised when what resulted was the putting together of a secret deal whereby arms 
would be traded for Western hostages. The Iran-Contra affair, as it came to be known, exposed 
that side of American policy which wanted to open a dialogue with Iran and hopefully pave the 
way for normalisation of relations between the two countries. In Iran too there were certain ele- 
ments who thought such a deal would not only satisfy the immediate need for arms but could pos- 
sibly lead to a rapprochement with the United States in the post-Khomeini era. This did not affect 
84 Sec CD/PV. 425. 
85 Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons, op. cit., p. 23. The author cites the example of a report issued by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee of the United States, which barely mentioned Iraq's use of gas against Iran, despite the fact 
that such use had recently been verified by a UN team. 
86 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Indianapolis, Indiana University 
Press, 1990, p. 63. 
97 Ibid., p. 64. 
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the United States' decision to re-flag Kuwait's oil tankers in order to guarantee them safe passage 
through the troubled Straits of Hormuz during the tanker war. It must be remembered that it was 
this decision which brought the United States into direct confrontation with Iran88 for the first 
time in the war and is credited in many ways to have contributed to Iran's decision to end the war 
by accepting the UN sponsored cease-fire. 
In the aftermath of the Halabjah tragedy in March 1988 (where Iraq used chemical weapons 
against its Kurdish population) the Foreign Minister of Iran, Velayati, blamed the Security Coun- 
cil especially the United States for ignoring Iran's request to send an investigation team to Sar- 
dasht the previous year, stating that this indifference had encouraged Iraq to intensify its deploy- 
ment of chemical weapons. He however acknowledged the efforts of the Secretary-General who 
tried his best to act in accordance to the mandate given to him by the General Assembly 89 The 
low moral of Iran's fighting forces including the highly motivated Revolutionary Guards, caused 
by increasingly effective chemical weapon attacks assisted by valuable intelligence provided by 
the US to the Iraqi forces, resulted in Iran's war information minister, Mr Kamal Kharrazi, stating 
this his country "may be forced" to reconsider its decision not to use chemical weapons in the 
future . 
90 
In concluding this section it may be mentioned that Iraq's ruthless use of chemical weapons 
in 1988 particularly in its campaign to regain the territories captured by Iran - namely the Fao 
Peninsula and the oil-rich Majnoon Islands, 91 resulted in the need for the policy-makers in Tehran 
is Although 70% of attacks on shipping were carried out by Iraq as part of a strategy to internationalise the conflict, the 
most notable clashes reported were between Iran and the United States Navy. For example, in July 1987, when the first 
re-flagged Kuwaiti tanker hit a mine, the United States chose not to retaliate immediately against the presumed source, Iran. 
But almost two months later, in September, US helicopters attacked an Iranian vessel on the grounds that the latter was lay- 
ing mines. Another serious incident occurred some three months before Iran formally accepted Security Council resolution 
598. In April 1988, after a US ship named "Roberts" struck a mine, the United States retaliated by attacking an Iranian oil 
platform with an export capacity of 150,000 barrels a day. For details of further incidents culminating in the shooting down 
of an Iranian civilian aircraft, killing 290 people, by the USS Vincennes weeks before Iran accepted Resolution 598, see 
ibid., p. 70-71. 
89 CD/PV. 453. Foreign Minister Velayati here is referring to General Assembly resolution 42/37 which was adopted by 
consensus in 1987, and in which part c called upon the Secretary-General to dispatch an investigatory team to the area. 
90 International Herald Tribune, March 24,1988. 
91 Journalist Robin Wright asserts in her book that chemical weapons were singly responsible for the retreat of Iranian 
soldiers from an estimated 4,000 square miles and at the cost of tens of millions of dollars in war material, at Al Fao in 
April 1988. In the Majnoon Island campaign, similar deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq resulted in Iran losing "the 
last strategically and economically important property in its hands". In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, op. cit., 
p. 184. 
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to look for new avenues for change. This change had to be sought by diplomatic means rather 
than military strategies, because it had become clear to the regime in Iran that it was almost 
impossible to curb Iraq's propensity to use chemical weapons. Moreover, given the complacency 
with which the premier political organ of the UN, the Security Council, acted in response to 
Iraq's continuous violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, it had become evident to policy- 
makers in Tehran that the war could not be won, at least not at the huge human and material cost 
involved. 
M. 6 The Question of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 
Although chemical weapons can be said to have contributed to bringing Iran to the bargain- 
ing table and accepting a diplomatic solution to the Iran-Iraq conflict, the fact that Iraq had 
demonstrated its offensive and defensive chemical weapon capabilities points to the larger ques- 
tion - that of proliferation. In the case of Iran at least, there can be little doubt concerning its 
future plans to be well prepared in both offensive and defensive capacities. This was made 
apparent when, following the implementation of Security Council resolution 598, Hojjat al-Islam 
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (current President of the Islamic Republic of Iran), addressing the 
officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on October 6,1988, stated that 
"With regards to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was 
made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive... We should 
fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriolog- 
ical, and radiological weapons. "92 
With the onset of the Gulf War, i. e. following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it is ironical to 
note that the single biggest threat facing the Allied troops was a chemical strike by Iraq. Reports, 
later confirmed, that Iraq had moved mobile Scud missile launchers into Kuwait increased the 
chances of a missile-delivered chemical attack on Arab and Western coalition forces in Saudi 
Arabia. US policy-makers, who for years had done the minimum to stop Iraq from using chemi- 
cal weapons against its own civilians and Iranian forces, were suddenly anxious about US troops 
92 "Radical States and Nuclear Proliferation: Racing to the Finish". op. cit., p. 12. 
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because of the very few counter-measures that are available to defend against a chemical weapon 
missile attack. 93 
On the other hand, while Iraq's decision not to use chemical weapons may have averted a 
more serious response from the Allied forces, i. e. a nuclear attack, on the other it has increased 
the commitment to and race for weapons of mass destruction in the region. It has been alleged 
that a number of regimes in the Arab world are actively pursuing a chemical weapons production 
programme. Syria is reported to have launched its chemical weapon's production in the mid- 
1980s. Libya attracted international attention in 1988 when the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency's findings showed that it was building a large chemical weapons plant at Rabta, 80 
kilometres south of Tripoli. 94 Because of the relatively simple process involved in converting 
products from a commercial chemical industry into weapons grade chemicals, chemical weapons 
have come to be known as the `poor-man's atom bomb'. In the strategic context, those Arab 
states which possess chemical weapons capability view it as a deterrent to Israeli nuclear 
weapons. However, this form of deterrent is not widely advertised for fear of reaction either from 
Israel or the West. The bombing of Iraq's military industrial complex during the war, followed 
by the UN's inspection and destruction of its chemical and nuclear weapons production facilities, 
has ushered in a new era - that of enforcing non-proliferation by military means. 
93 For a critical appraisal of the measures available to counter a chemical weapon missile attack, including in-flight in- 
terception and the use of protective suits and antidote kits, see Ruchita Vohra, "Spread of Chemical Weapons and the West 
Asian Crisis", Strategic Analysis, October 1990, pp. 861-864. 
94 Ibid., p. 855. The plant, which was claimed to be the largest chemical warfare agent production plant in the Third 
World, burnt down when a fire broke out in the plant in 1990. 
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Conclusion 
The Conference on Disarmament provided Iran with a platform from which to preach to the 
international community on the nature and scope of international disarmament. The Iranian dele- 
gation to the Conference attached great importance to nuclear issues and, in the aftermath of 
Iraq's attacks with chemical weapons, proceeded to press for the early conclusion of a convention 
which would altogether ban these weapons of mass destruction. 
Iran's acute awareness of the historical antecedents of superpower rivalry in the region, 
combined with its anti-American foreign policy, led policy-makers in Tehran to be constantly on 
the defensive. They described every action of the superpowers and especially of the United States 
as contributing to the overall deterioration of regional and international security. For example, 
the abortive attempt of the US military to rescue American embassy personnel from Tehran on 
the night of April 25,1980 was described by the Iranian spokesman to the Conference as an act of 
aggression which could have led to a "general conflagration with unforeseeable consequences", 
had the mission not been called off and had the Iranian Government not shown restraint. The 
Iranian delegate added that the use of force as exhibited by the US not only violated "a cardinal 
principle of the United Nations Charter" but also had a detrimental effect on other aspects such as 
the arms control process. 95 
Following the inaction of the Security Council and other political bodies of the United 
Nations in the face of the full-scale hostilities initiated by Iraq, the leadership in Tehran realised 
that many members of the international community were not willing to support the revolutionary 
government at the expense of jeopardising their relations with powerful Western countries led by 
the United States. This led Iranian delegates to the Conference to accuse those members of the 
international community who while professing "justice", had remained aloof and not condemned 
"the open aggression... of the Iraqi regime". In the immediate aftermath of the war, Iran reserved 
95 The last comment (preceeding the footnote) was a reference by the Iranian delegate to a statement made by the head 
of the American delegation at an earlier meeting, in which the latter had said that "anus control must be accompanied by 
restraint in international relations and strict observance by all Nations of the ... Charter of the United Nations". See 
CD/PV. 82. 
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special criticism for countries like France, which, while providing the Iraqis with offensive 
weapons, failed on flimsey pretexts to deliver logistical material (patrol boats in this case) to 
Iran. 96 It may be mentioned that this isolation served to strengthen Iran's resolve to go it alone. 
As the Iranian spokesman to the Conference declared: 
"... we believe that the war cannot be won only by sophisticated arms and munitions 
such as French Mirages and Soviet T-55 tanks but by the faith and morale of the 
nation. An army that does not draw its moral strength from "popular support" is an 
army that does not have real strength". 97 
This `popular support' was provided by the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a 
body which emerged from among the ill-organised but zealous komiteh guards who became much 
despised for their excesses in the early days of the revolution. The IRGC, in the words of one 
author 
"became the firm bastion of support for Khomeini and a counter-force to the armed 
forces ... to provide elan 
heroism and effective defence against internal uprisings and 
external enemies" 98 
Apart from being a dedicated fighting force, the IRGC expanded into military industrial 
activities, in many instances competing with the national defence industry controlled by the 
Defence Ministry. Certain observers are of the opinion that, following the regime's increased 
emphasis on the self-sufficiency drive in the defence industries sector, the Guards were by 
1986-1987 "directing as many as 37 classified R&D [Research and Development] and weapons 
development projects". 99 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (current President of the Islamic Republic) has 
been quoted as saying during the post cease-fire period (after the signing of Security Council 
Resolution 598) that 
"The Government is and remains indebted to the guards for the role they have played 
in buttressing the revolution from its inception till today ... These large numbers of 
devout and devoted men have offered their lives and have been active in battlefields. 
They are the firm basis ... of the survival of the revolutionary rule". 
100 
96 See CD/P. 108. 
97 Ibid. 
" Haleh Afshar in an unpublished paper entitled "The political role of the Guardian Corps of the Islamic Revolution", 
no date, p. 1. 
99 Anoushiravan Ehteshami in an unpublished paper entitled "Iran's Domestic Arms Industry", no date, p. 5-6. 
100 Quoted from "The political role of the Guardian Corps of the Islamic Revolution", op. cit., p. 13. 
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As evident from other chapters in this dissertation, Iran was never satisfied with the way 
that the United Nations functioned. It was especially critical of the failure of the world body to 
ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force in international relations. 
Iranian delegates to the Conference came to believe that a conventional war (like the one in which 
they were engaged with Iraq) could easily constitute the first step to a nuclear war, given the 
growing involvement of countries like the United States. In addition they felt that because Iran 
was "genuinely" non-aligned, it had become the victim of the "imperialist camp" and a "so-called 
superpower" which, in pursuing their interests were providing Iraq with sophisticated armaments 
to "exhaust the highly precious human and material resources ... in order to force [a] surrender" 
101 
If the year 1988 represented a period in world history which marked rising hopes and expec- 
tations throughout the world both in the field of disarmament and resolution of conflict, 102 a year 
later the "no war no peace" situation which existed between Iraq and Iran was a source of much 
concern to policy-makers in Tehran. Addressing the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament 
in 1989, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati blamed the impasse on Iraq's refusal to with- 
draw to internationally recognised boundaries, as ordered by the Security Council, along with a 
cease-fire viewed as a mandatory first step towards a negotiated settlement. The failure of Iraq to 
comply with what Velayati termed the "most prominent provision of resolution 598" had 
escalated tension. He reminded the forum that the Security Council was uniquely responsible to 
"ensure compliance with resolution 598" and to act in its capacity as the primary organ of the 
United Nations charged with maintenance of international peace and security. 103 
In the year 1989 following the cease-fire, Iran's delegation to the Conference confirmed its 
determination to push for an early conclusion to the convention banning chemical weapons. It 
III See CD/PV. 203. 
102 The achievements during this period which can be attributed to the United Nations were: the ratification of the treaty 
eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty 1987), the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran 
and Iraq in accordance with Security Council Resolution 598, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the 
continuing efforts to resolve the conflicts in South-Africa and Indo-China. 
tm See CD/PVS14. Iraq continued to occupy more than 2,000 square miles of Iranian territory after the cease-fire in 
July 1988. It only gave back the territory in the period following its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 
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did this by reaffirming its faith in the Conference on Disarmament as the "sole international body 
for disarmament negotiations" and called upon members and observers not to use the forum for 
"old polemics and politics of chicanery". As for the convention itself, Iran's spokesman said that 
it should ensure absolute prohibition, should be globally verifiable, unconditional and subject to 
no divergent interpretation. He added that adherence to the convention was particularly required 
from "those States which have used chemical weapons, those which assisted the violations in 
obtaining the technology to produce and use chemical weapons, and those which provided them 
with delivery systems". 104 In his address to the plenary session of the Conference on Disarma- 
ment in 1989, Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati stated that the reason certain influential members 
of the Conference were unwilling to take punitive action against Iraq for using chemical weapons 
lay in the fact that "the Iraqi Foreign Minister, in an interview with a Kuwaiti paper on the eve of 
the Conference, threatened that he would reveal the names of European suppliers of chemical 
agents and technology to Iraq, if those countries persisted in their pressure against Iraq". 105 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis Third Woridism comprised an important part of Iran's 
foreign policy. 106 In representing the cause of the Third World in the Conference on Disarma- 
ment, it was the practice of Iranian diplomats to address some of the most contentious issues fac- 
ing the international community, such as the relation between disarmament, development and 
international security, by laying the blame on those countries which fuel the arms race, leading to 
the depletion of precious economic resources which could be used for constructive purposes. 
In the view of the Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati, the arms race has been imposed on the 
Third World in such a way that, in spite of their economic and social problems, those countries 
are spending larger parts of their resources on armaments due to their "lack of confidence and 
international insecurity". He attributed this lack of tranquillity in international relations to the 
hegemonic aspirations of the superpowers, whose "suppressive policies against the Third World 
countries prevented them from achieving levels of independence, security and development". 107 
104 See CD/PV. 487. 
105 Sec CD/PV. 514. 
106 See Chapters N and V of this thesis. 
107 Sec CD/PV343. 
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While the above statement echoes the rhetoric of other revolutionary anti-Western states, 
like those states Iran almost always suggested remedies based on the mechanisms and procedures 
set by the United Nations. In this respect, Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy has never com- 
pletely departed from "normal state behaviour", and has demonstrated the truth of the comment 
that "The Iranian world view is neither purely Islamic nor a totally novel phenomenon in Third 
World intellectual trends". 108 
108 Iran and the World, op. cit., p. 5. For example, with regard to the role of the Conference on Disarmament in address- 
ing pertinent issues, the Iranian delegate commented "Resumption of serious negotiations with respect to the items nuclear 
test-ban, prevention of nuclear war and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was the least that this 
single multilateral negotiating Conference on Disarmament could achieve in order to bring some comfort to the real con- 
cerns and worries of the world community". Cb/PV. 286. 
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Chapter IX 
Summary and Conclusion 
Summary 
Part I of this dissertation, after a concise account of how Persia evolved into Iran, examined 
Iran's relations with the United Nations in the early years of the world body's existence. In par- 
ticular it looked at the Tehran government's successful use of the UN as a forum for advancing its 
own foreign policy, despite pressures from the big powers. 
Part II studied in greater detail the development of Iranian foreign policy during and since 
the Islamic Revolution, with special attention to such milestone events as the holding of hostages 
in the US Embassy and the Iran-Iraq War. Issues such as Human Rights and Disarmament in the 
context of the United Nations were also examined for their salience to Islamic Iran's foreign pol- 
icy and international relations. 
The Islamic Revolution and the downfall of the Shah's regime brought about an entirely 
new foreign policy in regard to the major powers. But whereas the old oil-based economic ties 
with the United States were severed, Iran in no way swung over to dependence on or alliance with 
the Soviet Union. In the halls of the UN, Iran continued to pursue its own independent Islamic 
line, regardless of the continuing polarisation of the Cold War. 
The Iranian revolution showed the world a new resurgent Islam, which alarmed not only the 
United States - fearing a serious imbalance of power in the oil-rich Middle East - but also Iran's 
immediate neighbours in the Gulf region. Tehran's single-minded pursuit of its goal of basing its 
policies on "pure" Islam had the effect of finally rejecting all foreign interference and domination, 
but also tended to isolate the country. 
Iran's outright support of what the outside world saw as terrorism and subversion inevitably 
had a negative effect on other Muslim countries of the region, but also on attitudes at the United 
Nations. Iran considered it was being discriminated against when its nationals were proposed for 
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high office in the UN system and were invariably rejected. 
The issue of human rights, which had hardly ever been raised while the Shah was the auto- 
cratic ruler of Iran, came into much greater prominence after the Islamic revolution, and was 
deployed via the UN by the opponents of the new regime as an instrument of international politics 
and as a weapon to attack the Tehran regime. 
Considering that one of the major grievances the revolution in Iran set out to redress was the 
question of human rights, any outside interference in this sphere was seen by the leadership as an 
attempt to undermine the revolutionary government. In this respect Iranian diplomats and 
delegates to the UN felt that the issue of Human Rights should be considered as falling within 
Article 2, Section 7, of the UN Charter, which meant that the matter was essentially one of 
domestic jurisdiction and therefore prevented the UN from intervening. However, events like the 
arbitrary detention of American Embassy personnel (the hostage crisis), and the summary execu- 
tion and detention without trial of those suspected of having links with the previous regime put 
Iran under the scrutiny of the United Nations' human rights proponents. In addition, news reports 
in the international media of sensationalised and literal versions of declarations made by the 
revolution's leadership about the pre-eminence of the Islamic code over international/Western 
social and civil codes, strengthened the hand of those who advocated moves to "broaden human 
rights internationalism" by reducing the "prominence imputed to the domestic sphere". 1 
Policy-makers in Tehran viewed any move to monitor or set international standards for 
human rights as interference in Iran's domestic affairs and as a form of imperialism. They did not 
agree with those governments and non-governmental organisations - weilding considerable 
power within the Commission on Human Rights - which held that reliance on traditional and reli- 
gious norms had proved inadequate in protecting basic human rights. When the Commission 
appointed a Special Representative to study and report on the human rights situation, Iran refused 
to co-operate. It perceived the move as part of an international conspiracy designed to undermine 
I See Julian R. Friedman, "Human Rights Intemationalism: A Tentative Critique", in Jack L. Nelson and Vera M. Green 
(eds. ), International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues, New Jersey, Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980, p. 29. 
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its revolution and its national integrity. However, following the successful role the UN played in 
bringing the Iran-Iraq war to a close, policy-makers in Tehran decided to end almost a decade of 
non-cooperation with the Commission on Human Rights and invited the Special Representative 
to visit the country in November 1989, to assess the human rights situation at first hand. While 
this move was welcomed by the United Nations and restored the confidence of many govern- 
ments in the Islamic Republic, the fact that the Special Representative to this date has not recom- 
mended in his reports to the Commission that his mandate be brought to an end, was and contin- 
ues to be a source of irritation to Tehran. 
Another complaint made by the Tehran government against the United Nations was the 
refusal of the latter to recognise Iraq as the aggressor and hence as the state which started the 
Iran-Iraq War. It felt that the world body had turned a blind eye on proof that Iraq was using 
chemical weapons not only against Iranian soldiers and civilians but also against its own citizens. 
It may be asked at this juncture what kept Iran from terminating its membership in the world 
body? To answer this question it is important to understand that, although the leaders in Iran 
remained uncompromising in their belief that Islam is the only just basis for conducting interna- 
tional relations, their acceptance of secular institutions like the UN is based on the need to avail 
themselves of the facilities offered by the organisation. Over the years the UN has become a 
universal meeting-point for the conduct of `old diplomacy, open diplomacy and quiet 
diplomacy'? In this respect Iran, through discussion and cooperation, argument and disagreement 
conducted its international relations along lines that were probably not all that alien to members 
of the world body. In common with many other countries, Iran - while unwilling to surrender its 
sovereignty to the world body - nevertheless found the UN a useful place to air ideas and beliefs 
and make contact with other governments. 
Clive Archer, in his examination of international organisations, sees the role of the UN 
(i) as an instrument for bringing about foreign policy objectives; 
2 G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings (eds. ), Diplomacy at the UN, Leicester University, Macmillan Press, 1985. See 
chapters 6 and 11. 
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(ii) as a forum in which governments interact; and 
(iii) as an independent actor. 
He further sees the above three roles as being synonymous with different periods of the 
organisation's life. For example, he considers the role of the UN as a foreign policy instrument as 
being dominant in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the role as a forum developer since the 1950s, 
when the UN saw a surge in its membership from newly independent states, while the UN as 
independent actor becoming explicit during Hammarskjold's term as Secretary-General and his 
handling of the Congo Crisis. 3 Although Archer offers no additional roles beyond this point, the 
three roles he put forward are useful in explaining how the world body and its charter form an 
integral part of the foreign policy processes of its member states. 
Iran's eight-year-long war with Iraq (Chapter VII) was the most profound factor to influence 
its post-revolution foreign policy process. The degree of UN involvement, especially that of the 
Secretariat under Perez de Cuellar, revived the image of the UN as an independent actor in a 
stronger but more benevolent sense. One author, describing the diplomatic prowess of Perez de 
Cuellar, notes that: 
"If the new Secretary-General showed his mettle early on by critical observations on 
the attitude to the UN of the bigger powers in general, he was nevertheless careful to 
interpret his brief judiciously, and therefore not count the risk of giving serious 
offence to them individually - the fate which had befallen both Trygve Lie and the 
'high and splendid' Hammarskjold. "4 
In this context the shift of negotiations concerning the Iran-Iraq War from the Security 
Council to the Secretariat signified something of a victory for policy-makers in Tehran and 
enhanced the role of the Secretary-General in the resolution of dangerous disputes. While the rea- 
sons for this are not obvious, interviews with Iranian diplomats who served at the UN headquar- 
ters in New York seem to suggest the following: before Perez de Cuellar took office and showed a 
certain sincerity in searching for a just solution to bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an early conclu- 
sion, policy-makers in Tehran feared that the scope of future negotiations would remain within 
3 Clive Archer, International Organisations, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 130-152. 
4 G. R. Berridge. Return to the UN: UN diplomary in regional conflicts, London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 15. 
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the Security Council, which until then had failed to recognise - Iraq's aggression. Perez de 
Cuellar's candid observations on the various shortcomings of the Security Council, and his 
recommendations in his first report which called for Council procedures to be streamlined so that 
it could act more "swiftly and decisively in crises", 5 revealed him to be a harbinger of change. 
Other factors, like Perez de Cuellar's admission that he could not dissociate himself from his ori- 
gins, i. e. from a developing country - and that he would strive to find a solution to the problem of 
international peace and security, 6 caused a former First Secretary of Iran's Permanent Mission at 
the UN in New York to remark: "His was the only office we could trust in dealing with the matter 
[the Iran-Iraq War] impartially" .7 In a sense, the policy-makers in Tehran felt they had found a 
legitimate counter-weight in the personage of the Secretary-General and his office to balance the 
one-sided nature of deliberations and resolutions emanating from the Security Council with 
regard to the ongoing conflict. The Secretary-General, whether personally or through a special 
representative or a team of specialists, also acted as a conduit through which Iran could communi- 
cate with those parties with which it had no diplomatic links. 
Policy-makers in Tehran also welcomed the involvement of the Secretary-General in the 
mediation activities because it brought out the conflicting perceptions which exist between dif- 
ferent governments and different groups of governments regarding the role of the United Nations 
in international politics. While most industrialised countries have tended to see the UN as the 
guardian of the status quo, the developing world has been inclined to look upon it as the agent of 
change. In addition the five permanent members of the Security Council, whose votes are crucial 
in the selection of the Secretary-General, have usually been reluctant to accept too much political 
independence in the Secretary-General, especially if his views and actions seemed likely to be at 
variance with their policies on a particular issue. 8 
s "Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation". Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, Unit- 
ed Nations, vol. 36,1982, pp. 3-8. 
6 See UN Chronicle, vol. XIX, February 1982, p-6- 
7 Interview conducted in Tehran in October 1990. 
8 See Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations, Dag Hammar- 
skjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1990, p. 17. The study was made possible by the Ford Foundation and the Dag Ham- 
marskjold Foundation. 
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This division of views was also acknowledged by Khomeini, albeit in different terms, and 
forms an important part of Islamic Iran's world view. According to Khomeini, the first division 
of the world into two camps is along the lines of power: "those countries and peoples who have 
power and use it to dominate and exploit others - namely the `arrogant' or `oppressors' (Mustak- 
barin); and those who lack power and are exploited and oppressed - namely, the `downtrodden' or 
the `oppressed' the (Mustazafin)". In the international political context, "the oppressor/arrogant 
camp consists of the two superpowers and their allies, while the camps of the 
oppressed/downtrodden are comprised of the Muslim countries and most of the Third World". 9 
A second division, according to Khomeini, is along ideological lines: "those countries that 
follow the United States' capitalist line - namely, the Western camp; and those that followed the 
Soviet Union's socialist line - namely the Eastern camp. "10 Khomeini believed that "true non- 
alignment" was the only viable path and that Iran had reached this stage by adhering to the princi- 
ples of Islam, often at great material cost. (Chapter IV of this thesis covers Iran's approach to 
non-alignment and the ambiguities this has caused in foreign policy formulation). 
Following from the pattern of events and the decisions taken by the policy-makers in 
Tehran during the war years (see Chapter VII of this dissertation), it becomes clear that, whatever 
ideological considerations are attributed to Iran's foreign policy-making, these were primarily 
underpinned by questions of national interest. In this context, the decision to use the good offices 
of the Secretary-General to facilitate a ceasefire in accordance with Security Council Resolution 
598 superseded the wishes of the more radical quarters of the Iranian clergy who were adamant 
that the war should continue. In other words, a war which was being continued on 
religious/ideological grounds and which, at its later stages was drawing in the powerful US armed 
forces on the side of Iraq, could not have been resolved without the mechanisms provided by the 
UN. 
9 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 
1990, p. 37. 
10 Ibid. 
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Linked to the issues of the Iran-Iraq war, Security Council politics and the involvement of 
the Secretariat was Iran's role in the Conference on Disarmament (dealt with in Chapter VIII of 
this dissertation). The Final Document emanating from the First Special Session on Disarma- 
ment, held in 1978, designated the Conference as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating 
body". 11 Iran is among the original members of the Conference, which includes the five nuclear 
weapon states, who are also the permanent members of the Security Council. The formation of 
the Conference and the start of its new mandate coincided with the establishment of the new 
Islamic government in Iran, and in this context the latter changed the way disarmament and secu- 
rity were viewed in one of the most strategic regions of the world. After the revolution Iran opted 
out of the United States led military alliance (CENTO), which was primarily responsible for 
maintaining stability in the Middle and Near Eastern regions, particularly the Persian Gulf. This 
meant that the concept of security had to be rethought by policy-makers in Washington. 12 The 
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan during this period further threw US security planning into 
confusion, leading US policy-makers to conclude that increased military presence in the area was 
the only viable option to safeguard their vital national interests in the region. 
After the upheavals of 1979 which saw the demise of the Pahlavi monarchy, the Islamic 
government unilaterally disengaged itself from all regional security functions and called for the 
formation of new security arrangements devoid of the presence of the United States or for that 
matter of the Soviet Union. To show its good faith and prove that it was committed to peace in 
the region, Iran cancelled large consignments of arms and military spare parts which were to 
tt See Annex I of Chapter VIII for the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I). 
12 In the words of one analyst 'he major casualty of the Iranian revolution was the Nixon Doctrine, not only as the 
operational mode of US policy in the Persian Gulf region, but also as a credible geopolitical doctrine. This was the result, 
firstly of the concern over the alleged 'excesses' perpetrated in the name of the Doctrine by successive US governments, 
particularly its uncritical backing of the Shah's authoritarian regime and largely unrestrained arms transfers to it and the 
contributions of these excesses to the ultimate overthrow of the Shah A second, and more significant, factor was a per- 
ceived contradiction within the doctrine over the way it operated -a contradiction between the objectives of the doctrine 
and the reality of its operation, between US perceptions of the Shah's role within this policy framework and Iranian public 
perceptions of such a role... While the USA found it difficult to influence the Shah's domestic style, the majority of Iranian 
people viewed him as an American puppet, faithfully executing orders from his Washington superiors at the cost of Iranian 
pride and national interest". Quoting a former National Security Council member, the author concludes that for the USA 
"The Iranian Revolution ... brought home the futility of trying to depend on surrogates to look after the vital interests of the 
United States", adding that 'he emphasis has shifted to being in a position to defend our interests by ourselves". Amitav 
Achaiya, "T'he Rapid Deployment Force and the Military Build Up in the Persian Gulf Region: A Critical Perspective", 
Australian Outlook, vol. 32, no. 2, August 1984, p. 90. 
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arrive from the United States a decision which was deeply regretted by Tehran with the onset of 
the war with Iraq. The situation from a Western strategic point of view, was that: 
"While Iran's limited but meaningful policeman role was lost, the revolution was 
thought to signal the shape of things to come. This fear was aggravated in the minds 
of the Sheikhs and kings of the Gulf states by Iran's calls for `exporting' its revolution 
- calls made at a time when the credibility of the USA as a reliable protector was at its 
lowest ebb". 13 
The onset of the Iran-Iraq war proved to be a relief for the Persian Gulf states and the 
United States, because it reduced the propensity of Iran's revolutionary forces to export the revo- 
lution. The threat of the spread of revolutionary Islam was considered to be so great that, even 
after a sustained campaign of chemical attacks carried out by Iraq against Iranian civilians and 
soldiers, the Security Council did not act in any concerted manner to stop Iraq from deploying 
those weapons (see Chapter VIII). There was no joint condemnation of Iraq for that activity from 
the Conference, even though Iraq's actions grossly violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 
Iranian delegates to the Conference responded to the above with a mixture of angry rhetoric and 
of recommendations about how the international community could monitor and prevent Iraq from 
deploying deadly chemical weapons. Disappointed that political necessity took precedence over 
international law in the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, Iran's Foreign Minister 
All Akbar Velayati lay the blame for the lack of consensus in condemning Iraq on those states 
which "had secured their arms markets at the cost of creating and sustaining tensions of the worst 
kind in the region". He added that "striving against the merchants of death" should be an impor- 
tant priority on the agenda of the Conference. 14 
In 1986, following the circulation of a detailed report prepared by a second visiting team of 
UN specialists (February 26 to March 3,1986) which confirmed that Iraq had used chemical 
weapons against Iranian civilians and forces, 15 Foreign Minister Velayati recommended that the 
Conference on Disarmament in seeking the co-operation of the United Nations should implement 
the following: first, re-condemn the use of chemical weapons as a "war crime", second, 
13 Ibid. 
1' See CD/Pv. 308. (Documents pertaining to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament). 
15 Report filed as UNDoc., S/17911. 
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investigate who were the suppliers of chemical weapons and substances to Iraq, third, impose a 
total ban on the exportation to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology which could be 
used to manufacture chemical weapons, fourth, undertake the dispatch of an investigation team by 
the Secretary General whenever demanded by Iran at the earliest possible date, fifth, call on all 
countries to once again announce their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which had been 
weakened by Iraq, and sixth, make a direct call on Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of 
chemical weapons. 16 
Other aspects of Iran's diplomacy within the Conference on Disarmament may be found in 
the stance it adopted on nuclear issues, namely on assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, 
nuclear non-proliferation and the question of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this context 
it may be mentioned that while Iran vehemently opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
continues to be a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its own nuclear programme 
has achieved much international attention, especially in the post-Iran Iraq war period. Although 
Iran has continually defended its right to exploit atoms for peaceful purposes, reports that "the 
two main centers of radical military nuclear development are Iran and North Korea", 17 have put 
Irans nuclear industry under greater international scrutiny. 
Iran, which in the early years had both supported the UN and used its processes in support 
of its foreign policies, went through a phase of total dissatisfaction with the world body, in partic- 
ular its failure to settle serious international disputes in an impartial manner. Nevertheless, Iran 
did reaffirm its faith in the goals of the Conference on Disarmament. In so doing, Iran demon- 
strated once again that, despite all the rebuffs it had received from the world body in recent years, 
it still sees the UN as an essential forum for international debate, as a vehicle for restating to the 
outside world Tehran's Islamic goals and, in the long-term, as a useful avenue for pursuing 
Iranian foreign policy. 
16 See CDIPv. 379. 
17 Yossef Bodansky, 'Radical States and Nuclear Proliferation: Racing to the finish', in Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Strategic Policy, winter 1991-1992, p. 10. 
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Conclusion 
Having examined the pertinent issues which governed Iran's post-revolution foreign policy 
in the United Nations, the conclusions which this dissertation arrives at can be divided into two 
parts. Firstly, those of a general nature, i. e. the criteria which determined the orientation of Iran's 
post-revolution foreign policy. Secondly, an assessment of the future of Iran's foreign policy 
with emphasis on how revolutionary a path can Iran hope to take, especially since the leadership 
is committed to restoring a certain normalcy to the conduct of her foreign relations. Normalcy 
cannot be taken to mean a separation of Islam and politics, nor a transformation of Iranian society 
into one resembling a liberal democracy. It can be understood to mean a growing trend by the 
policy-makers of that country to put more faith in secular institutions like the United Nations to 
solve problems and achieve set foreign policy goals. As the various chapters of this dissertation 
indicate, Iran has not lost its use of international organisations and if anything has emerged after a 
decade of turmoil and strife to play an important role with respect to issues facing the region and 
beyond. 
With regards to the first set of conclusions, it would not be wrong to state that the orienta- 
tion of Iran's foreign policy is based on issues directly affecting its national interests; these in turn 
are determined by certain specific criteria, which can be regarded as guiding principles which 
govern the making of post-revolution Iran's foreign policy. 
For example, one of the most important guiding principles of the revolutionary government 
was its rigid stance on independence. The principle of "Neither East nor West, " while signifying 
the nascent regime's complete break with the United States, also came to mean that only an 
independent Iran could keep Islam pure and vice-versa (only a pure Islam could keep Iran 
independent). In practice too, Iran went to great lengths to implement this principle of indepen- 
dence. For example, in the period after the revolutionary government was formed, it was 
announced that Iran's first priority would be to pay off its national debt, and this it did after great 
sacrifice. 
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The active component of Iran's "Neither East nor West" policy was most clearly demon- 
strated in its approach to the already existing concept of non-alignment. If non-alignment had 
hitherto projected a philosophy of passive resistance to superpower politics, leaders in Iran 
involved themselves in the movement - seeing it rather as a platform for direct confrontation with 
the superpowers. In this context the Prime Minister of Iran, Hussein Musavi commented that 
many countries and peoples "regard the Islamic Revolution [Iranian revolution] as a historical 
experience and a model for revolt against western and eastern imperialists. " 18 (See Section III. 1 
of Chapter IV). 
Interrelated with the above principle, another criterion which determined the orientation of 
Iran's foreign policy was the requirement to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic. The 
extent to which the revolutionary regime was prepared to go to fulfill this principle is illustrated 
by its dependence on ideology in matters of domestic and foreign policy, and by the enormous 
costs the revolution and war exacted from the Iranian society. From eliminating internal opposi- 
tion - and bearing the brunt of being ostracised as one of the worst violators of international 
human rights - to doing deals with its sworn enemies (the United States and Israel) in order to 
continue to prosecute its war with Iraq, the revolutionary leadership employed all means to safe- 
guard the Islamic Republic. Some authors have remarked in this context that "Buying security, 
however, does not mean selling out independence or ideology. " 19 
The third foreign policy principle that emerges from studies undertaken in the preceeding 
chapters is the promotion of Iran's Islamic ideology as a vehicle for change among oppressed 
peoples, especially in Muslim countries. While the "export of the revolution" was seen as a real 
threat by Iran's neighbours and caused apprehension among the superpowers, it gradually came to 
be regarded as more rhetorical than active. Towards the end of the first revolutionary decade, 
1$ Kayhan International, January 16,1984. Certain specialists on Iranian affairs have stated that "According to the 
Iranians, the tendency of alignment/non-alignment is the external manifestation of the state of mind of a given ruling elite ... 
true non-alignment is possible only when the thought process of the people and leaders is completely emancipated from pol- 
itical oppression, economic exploitation, cultural manipulation, mental slavery and all other causes of fear and alienation". 
From the Islamic perspective this is only possible when "one is subservient only to God and to no other power on earth". 
See A. H. H. Abidi, "Revolutionary Iran's Perception or Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement, Non-Aligned 
World, vol. 2, no. 3,1984, p351. 
19 Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik", Foreign Policy, no. 70, Spring 1988, p. 114. 
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particularly in the aftermath of the Haj Tragedy (July 1987, when Saudi security forces in Mecca 
shot and killed Iranian pilgrims), the Iranian Speaker publicly acknowledged that there existed 
serious differences among the world congregation of Muslims (ummah), especially along political 
and religious lines. This led Iranian leaders to explain that in the future the revolution's universal 
aims were to be achieved by setting a superior example and not by its active involvement in the 
affairs of other countries. The only visible exception to this declaration is the Lebanon, where 
Tehran continues to exert considerable influence and is actively involved. 
The external threat which the regime has faced in the last decade has necessitated the use of 
symbolism and ideology in foreign policy. This however did not mean that pressing geopolitical 
concerns would always be cloaked by symbolism and ideology. For example, although the 
Islamic governments' expectations of the United Nations have changed since Iran was first 
invited to participate in the San Francisco Conference to prepare the UN Charter in 1945, then as 
now, Iran's "focal objective" has been "how to preserve its integrity and independence, interna- 
tional life and international relations ... 
" Towards this end Iran saw the reason of the existence of 
the world body as being mainly political, i. e. "to maintain the peace and security of the world 
through political as well as legal means. " (See Section III of Chapter II). More recently however, 
during the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian academics have criticised the UN Security Council for having 
failed to denounce Iraq's aggression. In their opinion, this was mainly due to the overt political 
nature of the Council which prevented it from fulfilling its legal role, specifically the maintenance 
of international peace and security. 
In another respect, ideological and geopolitical concerns worked almost in tandem. The 
Iranian leadership's original objective of winning the war with Iraq, i. e. to punish and remove the 
aggressor, was probably seen by policy-makers in Tehran as a solution to something the Shah 
thought he had achieved by signing the 1975 Algiers Accord and through military deterrence, 
namely security along the western border of Iran. Destroying the un-Islamic regime of Saddam 
Hussein and liberating the Muslims of Iraq, and even marching on towards Jerusalem were the 
main ideological themes used towards achieving this goal. Indeed, the policy of non-compromise 
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which Tehran adopted with regard to Khomeini's original war aims - Iraq's withdrawal from 
Iranian territory, reparations, and the removal of Saddam Hussein - were not even partially 
fulfilled when Iran decided to accept UN Security Council resolution 598, which formally ended 
the conflict. Some authors have put forward the hypothesis that resolution 598 signalled that: 
"Iran's world view had completed a cyclical reversal - from the revisionist dream to 
shape the Gulf along Islamic lines to acquiescence in the status quo established by the 
Shah in the mid-1970s. "20 
It is ironic that certain of Iran's war aims were satisfied two years later, when Iraq - in the 
aftermath of its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990 - decided to return almost 2,000 sq/km of 
Iranian territory which it had occupied and sent almost 100 sophisticated aircraft to Iran for safe 
keeping during the Gulf War, aircraft which Iran has since claimed as its own in partial fulfilment 
of war reparations. Despite the foregoing argument that Iran had to abandon its "revisionist 
dream", it is clear that Tehran will continue to influence the Shia's in Iraq and to seek the removal 
of Saddam Hussein. This will help the present regime to justify the huge investments of blood 
and fervour over the last decade and may even be the precursor for a real peace in the region. 
Revolution and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy 
The second part of the conclusion, while addressing the larger question of the future direc- 
tion of Iranian foreign policy and the extent to which it can be considered revolutionary, will 
show that pursuit of Islamic goals is not immune to cost-benefit calculations. In fact, in the tur- 
moil after the revolution and the formation of an Islamic government - Iran's external affairs have 
been characterised by greater stability than its internal affairs. The main reason for this has been 
the high degree of pragmatism which policy-makers in Tehran have employed in the area of 
foreign policy. In turn, this can be attributed to the need for realistic decision-making in an inter- 
national environment which was far from hospitable to the new regime's world view. 
20 Maim Karsh, "From Ideological Zeal to Geopolitical Realism: The Islamic Republic and the Gulf" in Efraim Karsh 
(ed. ), The Iran, Iraq War: Impact and Implications, London, Macmillan in association with the Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, Tel-Aviv, 1989, p. 27. 
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It has often been remarked that Iranian foreign policy is violently reactionary, and it is easy 
to understand how this opinion was formed. Foreign policy is the area where the unity of Iran's 
political leadership has been most severely tested. In the early part of the revolutionary decade, 
just during the period when power was coming to rest exclusively in the hands of those loyal to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, various revolutionary factions vied to influence foreign policy. To be heard 
in those days, it was often necessary to adopt as radical a stance as possible on issues, without 
endangering the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic. This caused the "official- 
unofficial division in the foreign policy making process". With the benefit of hindsight, it is now 
known that many acts of random violence attributed to the Iranian government actually originated 
from individuals or groups having no links with the government. 
In spite of being considered revolutionary and hence dangerous, Iran's foreign policy 
towards her neighbours and other states is seen on closer examination to demonstrate a degree of 
pragmatism, especially in the latter half of the revolutionary decade. For example, Iran's rela- 
tions with Turkey and Pakistan, two predominantly Muslim countries with non-Islamic govern- 
ments did not suffer. Apart from occasionally reminding them of their obligations and duties as 
Muslim countries, Iran considered both countries as friends and overlooked many factors which 
otherwise should have disallowed the relationship. Turkey's state philosophy of purging the reli- 
gious element from politics (started during the reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) 
and Pakistan's close association with the United States were not as important to policy-makers in 
Iran as the fact that both countries were important economic allies. Moreover Pakistan was a use- 
ful diplomatic ally (for President Zia-ul-Haq's early attempts at pleading Iran's case at the onset 
of the war, see Section II of Chapter VII), and in later years a supplier of technology (see Section 
11.3 of Chapter VIII) to Iran's nuclear programme. Turkey on the other hand, while being a major 
trading partner of Iran was also the principal link to the occident. 
Iran's policy towards Afghanistan was closely linked to its Soviet policy. This involved a 
delicate balancing act on the part of Tehran, which while unequivocally condemning the Soviet 
invasion of the "Muslim nation of Afghanistan" (which it saw as the greatest pretext for the 
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American presence in the Persian Gulf region, see Section III. 1 of Chapter V) was careful not to 
antagonise its northern neighbour, aware that it could lose valuable support in situations involv- 
ing direct confrontation with the United States and her allies. It has been observed in this context 
that, although Iran had a choice of enlisting Soviet support to balance the Western support for 
Iraq by remaining silent on the situation in Afghanistan, it chose not to do so - realising that this 
would do irreparable damage to its Islamic credentials and undermine the foremost guiding prin- 
ciple of its foreign policy, i. e. strict non-alignment. 
However, when it came to making a choice while facing a situation that was perceived as 
threatening to jeopardise the very survival of the Islamic Republic, brought about by the activities 
of the Iranian communist party TUDEH, Tehran acted with great alacrity - smashing and outlaw- 
ing the party in 1983, and expelling 18 Soviet diplomats which it accused of complicity. 
Although this incident did not prevent Iran from entering into agreements with the Soviet Union 
in 1986 and 1987 on oil and gas exploration and the reopening of a gas pipeline, Tehran remained 
suspicious of Moscow's intentions until changes took place in Soviet policy on a number of 
issues important to Iran, such as Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. 21 
Iran's attitude towards the Persian Gulf states was conditioned by their aid to Iraq during the 
war, their manoeuverings in OPEC and their close military co-operation with the United States. 
Any ideological considerations were quickly overridden by these issues, once Tehran realised the 
difficulty of exporting the revolution to these societies (some of which had sizeable Shia popula- 
tions, like Bahrain and Kuwait). In 1981 when the Gulf sheikhdoms created the Gulf Co- 
operation Council (GCC), this was viewed from Tehran as being an "anti-Iranian military pact" 
formed to isolate Iran from the economic and political life of the Persian Gulf region. Iran also 
saw the GCC as a "cover for the expansion of Saudi influence" in the region, and ultimately as 
"an instrument of US policy in the Persian Gulf, much the way radical Arabs viewed Iran under 
21 "What is important in these new Soviet-Iranian relations is that this policy had the blessing of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who met with Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Sheverdnadze in February 1989, and thus closer relations cannot 
be challenged as being against his wishes. Even Rafsanjani, despite his earlier misgivings, had to regularise his relations 
with Moscow by visiting the Soviet Union in June 1989 shortly after Khomeini's death". Shireen T. Hunter, "Post- 
Khomeini Iran", Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 5, Winter 1989-90, p. 143. 
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the Shah". 22 By the end of the Iran-Iraq war and more recently after Iraq's aggression against 
Kuwait, policy-makers in Iran were able to dictate their terms for improving relationships in vari- 
ous fields from an acquired moral high ground. 
Iran's relations with the United States have been the most contentious issue facing policy- 
makers right from the conception of the Islamic Republic. The hand of the "Great Satan" is seen 
by policy-makers in Tehran to influence every aspect of world politics; and although various 
leaders including Ayatollah Khamenei have not ruled out an opening of diplomatic relations with 
the United States on a new basis of respect by the latter for Iran's revolution and Islamic identity, 
no constructive moves towards this end have yet materialised. Remoulding a relationship may 
prove more difficult for Tehran, given that it would challenge its very world view - that the world 
is divided into those who follow the path of God and belief, and those who follow the path of 
Satan and disbelief. 
In the United States too there seems to be a reluctance to deal with the Islamic Government; 
this was true even in the post-Khomeini period when Washington was exerting all possible 
influence to seek the release of Western hostages. It was clearly demonstrated when a petition 
signed by 186 members of the US Congress on 7 September, 1989 advised the United States to 
support the Iranian opposition rather than accept the word of those in power. 23 This resolution 
was discussed widely in the Iranian media and strengthened the arguments of the opponents of 
improved US-Iranian relations, reinforcing the belief that the Americans were a truly arrogant lot. 
Before the onset of the Gulf War in 1991, the basic US attitude was that, because the Cold 
War had ended, Iran was no longer important as it could not be sucked into the Soviet orbit; and 
if the United States was patient the Iranians would have no choice but to restore relations on 
American terms. But when Iran stayed away from being involved in the Gulf War and soon 
thereafter singularly influenced the process by which all the Western hostages were released, the 
United States was still undecided on how to reciprocate Iran's show of goodwill. 
22 Quoted in Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1990, p. 120-121. 
23 "Post-Khomeini Iran", op. cit., p. 145. 
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Revolution and Democracy 
On a closing note it would be in place to examine certain aspects of transforming the world 
system by a post-revolutionary society and the issue of democracy in a post-revolutionary society. 
While it is recognised that social upheavals are intended to promote progress, they also often pro- 
mote destruction. Projected on to the international level post-revolutionary societies adopt poli- 
cies that at one level maintain and at another level undermine the world system. A post- 
revolutionary society like Iran maintains the world system, for example, by participating in the 
work of the United Nations which calls for certain conventions to be followed which in turn rein- 
force the prevailing order. Yet by harbouring the potential for launching revolution in other coun- 
tries, and by offering evidence that an alternative order is a viable option, post-revolutionary 
societies like Iran always threaten to undermine the world system. If this alternative order were 
to bring about change (not necessarily replicate itself) in several countries, mutually reinforcing 
each other, it is possible that the world system as it exists might face transformation. 24 
Another aspect which is pertinent to post-revolutionary Iran is the question of democracy. 
Academic and religious circles in Iran frequently discuss what kind of democracy would suit 
them best. Given Iran's decade-long experience with Islamic government, it is hard to imagine 
the growth of a liberal democracy. At present it would not be wrong to say that what exists in 
Iran is an authoritarian democracy; while ensuring a large measure of political control, this often 
results in repression and betrays the egalitarian promise of the revolution. Participatory demo- 
cracy, while conforming to the Islamic ideal (the principle of Shura or Consultation), remains 
unviable in a post-revolutionary society like Iran mainly because of a combination of internal and 
external pressures. Hence, in the words of one author: 
"If the short-run dilemma facing post-revolutionary societies is to gauge the trade-offs 
between competing models of democracy, the long-run challenge is to devise novel 
forms of political and economic democracy suitable for local conditions. "25 
2" Similar arguments have been put forward by Fred Halliday, "Revolutions and International Relations: Some Theoreti- 
cal Issues", (paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association and the British International Stu- 
dies Association, London, 29 March to 1 April 1989). 
u James H. Mittelman, "The Dilemmas of Reform in Post-Revolutionary Societies", International Studies Notes (of 
The International Studies Association), vol. 15, no. 2, spring 1990, p. 69. 
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Historically, Islam's confrontations with other civilisations produced an enhancement of its 
power and glory. But in modem times the outcome has been otherwise. This can be mainly attri- 
buted to the loss of the creative capacity which enabled Muslims to blend with other cultures. It 
can only be hoped that, with the development of new patterns of authority in Muslim countries, 
this creative spirit will be re-instilled. 
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Chapter VI - Annex I 
Proposed Bill of Human Rights in Islam 
Quoted f rout A brarnewspaper, Dec. 30,1989, page 9 
Believing that in Islam, fundamental rights and freedoms are indispensible parts of the religion and 
that no one has the right to violate these liberties whether in specific cases or in general and that no one 
can suppress or ignore them, for these rights are infallible decrees of God contained in the Holy Book 
and sent to man through the last prophet,... 
Members of the Islamic Conference Organization declare the following: 
All human beings are equal in their status, esteem, principal duties, etc., without having any 
distinction on the basis of race, color, language, sex, nationality, political beliefs, social status and 
other considerations. 
The right to life is guaranteed for every human being. It is mandatory for the peoples of all societies 
and governments to defend this right against being violated. Taking a human life is prohibited unless it 
is done according to Islamic Shari'a. 
Resorting to any method resulting in massacre, either in a general form in a specific case is 
prohibited. 
Safeguarding the lives of human beings in accordance to the will of God and on the basis of Islamic 
Shari'a is a duty. 
In war or in armed confrontations, the murder of those not involved in the conflict, such as aged 
men, women and children, as well as dismembering the bodies are not permissible. The wounded have 
the right to be cared for. 
Any human being has the right to defend his reputation during his lifetime and after passing away. 
The government and society will defend his corpse and tomb against desecrations. 
Women are equal with men. Women are equal with men in their human status and enjoy special 
rights in using them and in performing their duties. Women also enjoy civil rights and financial 
independence as well as the right to keep their names and that of their forefathers. 
Parents have the right to determine their children's education on the condition that they consider the 
interests and future of their children on the basis of values and ethical principles of Islamic Shari'a. 
Since human beings instinctively follow Islam, no one should be forced to change his religion. 
Man is born free and no one has the right to humiliate, suppress, or exploit him. Subservience to 
anyone but God is prohibited. 
Any person, within the framework of Islamic Shari'a, has the right to free travel, choosing of 
residence inside or outside his country. If sought by law, he is allowed to seek asylum for his well- 
being. 
Confiscation of property is not allowed unless in cases where public interest is served. 
Any person is entitled to safe and secure conditions for himself, his relatives and his property, 
Anyone has the right to he tree in conducting personal matters at home amd among his family, as 
well as in dealing wilt ins property. Spying, surveillance and tarnishing the names of individuals is not 
allowed and according to Islamic Shari'a, the government must offer protection from arbitrary 
interference. 
The home of individuals are immune from breach of privacy at all times. Personal residence must not 
be destroyed or confiscated. The residents must not in any way be evicted illegally and no one must 
enter the residence without permission to do so. 
The individual under arrest is considered innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial where he is 
given every guarantee to defend himself. 
Arrests without legal and religious reasons, limiting the freedom of an individual, forcing him into 
exile and punishment are not allowed. Any kind of physical and psychological torture, any 
mistreatment or insult is prohibited. 
Hostage-taking as a means of blackmail or pressuring anyone to surrender is not allowed. 
Every individual enjoys freedom of conscience and expression through any means in the context of 
the principles of Shari'a. 
Provocation of ethnic, racial and nationalistic enmity or any act resulting in any form of racial 
discrimination is not allowed. 
Resorting to Law is the right of all citizens. 
Freedom in society is the prerequisite for the guarantee of fundamental human rights. Any misuse or 
taking advantage of it is absolutely prohibited. 
Chapter VII - Annex I 
United Nations Resolutions on the Iraq-Iran War 
Decisions 
On 23 September 1980, the president of the Council issues the following statement: 
Members of the Security Council have today exchanged views in informal consulta- 
tions on the extremely serious situation prevailing between Iran and Iraq. They have 
taken note of the sharp deterioration in relations and of the escalation in armed activity 
leading to loss of life and heavy material damage. 
Members of the Council are deeply concerned that this conflict can prove increasingly 
serious and could pose a grave threat to international peace and security. 
Members of the Council welcome and fully support the appeal of the Secretary- 
General addressed to both parties on 22 September 1980, as well as the offer that he 
fhas made of his good offices to resolve the present conflict. 
The members of the Council have asked me to appeal, on their behalf to the Govern- 
ments of Iran and Iraq, as a first step towards a solution of the conflict, to desist from 
all armed activity and all acts that may worsen the present dangerous situation and to 
settle their dispute by peaceful means. 
At its 2247th meeting, on 26 September 1980, the Council decided to invite the representative of 
Iraq to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "the situation between Iran 
and Iraq". 
At its 2248th meeting on 28 September 1980, the Council decided to invite the representa- 
tive of Japan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question. 
(1) Resolution 479 of 28 September 1980 
The Security Council, 
Having begun consideration of the item entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq". 
Mindful that all Member States have undertaken, under the Charter of the United Nations, 
the obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justicve are not endangered. 
Mindful as well that all member States are obliged to refrain their international relations 
from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State. 
Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibil- 
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq. 
1. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle 
their dispute by peaceful means in conformity with principles of justice and international 
law; 
2. Urges them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would 
facilitate the fulfilment of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; 
3. Calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which 
may lead to a further escalation and wiodening of the conflict; 
4. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for teh resolu- 
tion of this situation; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours. 
Adopted unanimously at the 2248th meting. 
(2) Resolution 514 (1982) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2383rd meeting on 12 July 
1982 
The Security Council, 
Having considered again the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq". 
Deeply concerned about the prolongation of the conflict between the two countries, result- 
ing in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering peace and 
security. 
Recalling the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the 
establishment of peace and security in the region reques strict adherence to these provisions. 
Recalling that by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. 
Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980, as well as 
the statement of its President of 5 November 1980 (S/14244). 
Taking note of the efforts of mediation pursued notably by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and his representative, as well as by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. 
1. Calls for a cease-fire and an immediate end to all military operations; 
2. Calls further for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognised boundaries; 
3. Decides to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the 
cease-fire and withdrawal, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a 
report on the arrangements required for that purpose; 
4. Urges that the mediation efforts to be continued in a coordinated manner through the 
Secretary-General with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honourable settle- 
ment acceptable to both sides of all the outstanding issues, on the basis of the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for soveriegnty, independence, terri- 
torial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 
5. Requests all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuta- 
tion of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution; 
6. Requests the Secretary-Geeral to report to the Security Council within three months on the 
implementation of this resolution. 
(3) Consequences of the Prolongation of the Armed Conflict between Iran and Iraq 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the item entitled "Consequences of the prolongation of the armed conflict 
between Iran and Iraq", 
Noting the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, in which all States expressed 
their determination to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. 
Reaffirming the principles that no State should acquire or occupy territories by the use of 
force, that whatever territories had been acquired in this way should be returned, that no act of 
aggression should be committed against any State, that the territorial integrity and the sovereignty 
of all States should be respected, that no State should try to interfere or intervene int he internal 
affairs of other States and that all differences or claims which may exist between States should be 
settled by peaceful means in order tht peaceful relations should prevail among Member States. 
Recalling resolutions 479 (1980) of 28 September 1980,514 (1982) of 12 July 1982 and 
522 (1982) of 4 October 1982 ont he question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq", 
unanimously adopted by the Security Council. 
Further recalling the statements made by the President of the Security Council on 5 
November 1980 and 15 July 1982. 
Taing note of the report of the Secretary-General of 7 October 1982. 
Considering that the Security Council has already called for an immediate ceasefire and an 
end to all military operations. 
Considering further that the prolongation of the conflict constitutes a violation of the obliga- 
tions of Member States under the Charter. 
1. Considers that the conflict between Iran and Iraq and its prolongation and recent escalation, 
resulting heavy losses in human lives and considerable material damage in a politically and 
economically strategic region, endanger international peace and security; 
2. Affirms the necessity of achieving an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces to 
internationally recognised boundaries as a preliminary step towards the settlement of the 
dispute by peaceful means in conformity with the princifples of justice and international 
law; 
3. Calls upon all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the con- 
tinuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution; 
4. Requests thqe Secretary-General to continue his efforts, in consultation with the parties con- 
cerned, with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement. 
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States informed on the implementa- 
tion of the present resolution. 
41st plenary meeting 
22 October 1982 
(4) Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Confer- 
ence 
The General Assembly 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on co-operation between the United 
Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Recalling its resolution 3369 () of 10 October 1975, by which it granted observer 
status to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Recalling its resolutions 35/36 of 14 November 1980 and 36/23 of 9 November 1981. 
Noting with satisfaction the continued development of co-operation between the United 
Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Noting the strengthening of co-operation between the specialised agencies and other organi- 
sations of the United Nations system and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. 
Taking into account the desire of both organisations to co-operate more closely in their 
common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions relating to international peace 
and security, disarmament, self-determination, decolonisation, fundamental human rights and the 
establishment of a new international economic order. 
Noting also the signing of co-operation agreements between a number of specialized agen- 
cies and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. 
Convinced of the need to strengthen further the cooperation between the United Nations and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Noting further the proposals of the Secretary-General. 
1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General and endorses the propo- 
sals contained therein; 
2. Requests the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to intensify 
co-operation in their common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions 
relating to international peace and security, disarmament, self-determination, decoloniza- 
tion, fundamental human rights and the establishment of a new international economic 
order; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General `to prepare guidelines based on resolutions of the General 
Assembly for promoting co-operation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference; 
4. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Organiza- 
tion of the Islamic Conference, to organize an annual meeting, beginning in 1983, between 
the secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the secretariats of the 
United Nations and other organizations concerned within the United Nations system to 
exariine the stage reached in the development of co-operation and to put forward proposals 
for promoting co-operation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference; 
5. Encourages the specialized agencies and other organizations concerned within the United 
Nations system to continue to expand their co-operation with the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, inter alia by negotiating co-operation agreements; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take steps to strengthen the co-ordination of 
the activities of the United Nations system in this field with a view to intensifying co- 
operation between the United Nations and the United Nations systeni and the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference; 
7. Calls upon the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth ses- 
sion on the state of co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference; 
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 
"Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. " 
41st plenary meeting 
22 October 1982 
(5) Resolution 522(1982) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2399th meeting on 4 
October 1982 
The Security Council, 
Having considered again the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq, 
Deploring the prolongation and the escalation of the conflict between the two countries, 
resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering 
peace and security, 
Reaffirming that the restoration of peace and security in the region requires all Member 
States strictly to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980. as well as 
the statement of the President of the Council of 5 November 1980 (5/14244), 
Further recalling its resolution 514 (1982), adopted unanimously on 12 July 1982 and the 
statement of the President of the Council of 15 July 1982(5115295), 
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (5/15293) of 15 July 1982, 
1. Urgently calls again for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations; 
2. Reaffirms its call for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries; 
3. Welcomes the fact that one of the parties has already expressed its readiness to co-operate in 
the implementation of resolution 514 (1982) and calls upon the other to do likewise; 
4. Affirms the necessity of implementing without further delay its decision to dispatch United 
Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal; 
5. Reaffirms the urgency of the continuation of the current mediation efforts; 
6. Reaffirms its request to all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to 
the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution; 
7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of 
this resolution within 72 hours. 
(6) Resolution 540(1983) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2493rd meeting on 31 
October 1983 
The Security Council, 
Having considered again the question "The situation between Iran and Iraq, " 
Recalling its relevant resolutions and statements which, inter alia, call for a comprehensive 
cease-fire and an end to all military operations between the parties, 
Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 20 June 1983 (5/15834) on the mission 
appointed by him to inspect civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to military 
attacks, and expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General for presenting a factual, balanced 
and objective account, 
Also noting with appreciation and encouragement the assistance and co-operation given to 
the Secretary-General's mission by the Governments of Iran and Iraq, 
Deploring once again the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of 
civilian lives and extensive damage caused to cities, property and economic infrastructures, 
Affirming the desirability of an objective examination of the causes of the war, 
1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts with the parties concerned, 
with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement acceptable to both 
sides; 
2. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular, the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all their aspects, and calls for the inunediate cessation of 
all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas; 
3. Affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, calls on all States 
to respect this right and also calls upon the belligerents to cease immediately all hostilities 
in the regionyyof the Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbour works, ter- 
minals, offshore installations and all ports with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to 
respect the integrity of the other littoral States; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the parties concerning ways to sustaih and 
verify the cessation of hostilities, including the possible dispatch of United Nations 
observers, and to submit a report to the Council on the results of these consultations; 
5. Calls upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as 
well as marine life in the region of the Gulf; 
6. Calls once more upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any 
act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict and, thus, to facili- 
tate the implementation of the present resolution; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the parties regarding immediate and effec- 
tive implementation of this resolution. 
(7) Resolution 552(1984) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2546th meeting on 1 June 
1984 
The Security Council, 
Having considered the letter dated 21 May 1984 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (5/16574) complaining' against Iranian 
attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors in accordance with the United Nations Charter, 
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States to the principles and purposes of the United 
Nations Charter, 
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, 
Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace and secu- 
riry and its vital role to the stability of world economy, 
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the 
ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the area and 
have serious implications for international peace and security, 
1. Calls upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the right of free navi- 
gation; 
2. Reaffirms the right of free navigation in international withdrawals and sea lanes for shipping 
en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the 
hostilities; 
3. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States that are not parties to the 
hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to 
a further escalation and widening of the conflict; 
4. Condemns these recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 
5. Demands that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be no interference 
with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities; 
6. Decides, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to con- 
sider effective measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the situation in order to 
ensure the freedom of navigation in the area; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the 
present resolution; 
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
Resolution 598 (July 20,1987) 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 582(1986) 
Deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a cease-fire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq 
continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human life and material destruction, 
Deploring the initiation and continuation of the conflict, 
Deploring also the bombing of purely civilian population centers, attacks on neutral ship- 
ping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed 
conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, 
Deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may take place, 
Determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq, 
Convinced that a comprehensive, just, honorable and durable settlement should be achieved 
between Iran and Iraq, 
Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular the obligation 
of all member states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, 
Determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and 
Iraq, 
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of. the United Nations, 
1. Demands that, as a first step toward a negotiated settlement,. Iran and Iraq observe an 
immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and with- 
draw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, 
confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal and further requests the Secretary- 
General to make the necessary arrangements in consultation with the parties and to submit a 
report thereon to the Security Council; 
3. Urges that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949; 
4. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to cooperate with the Secretary General in implementing this reso- 
lution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, 
acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues in accordance with the principles con- 
tained in the Charter of the United Nations; 
5. Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain lrom any act which 
may lead to further' escalation and widening of the conflict and thus to facilitate the imple- 
mentation of the present resolution; 
6. Requests the Secretary General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question 
of enthrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to 
report to the Security Council as soon as possible; 
7. Recognizes the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and the need for 
reconstruction efforts with appropriate international assistance once the conflict is ended and 
in this regard requests the Secretary General to assign a team of experts to study the ques- 
tion of reconstruction and to report to the Security Council, 
8. Further requests the Secretary General to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and 
with other states of the region measures to enhance the security and stability of the region; 
9. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed on the implementa- 
tion of this resolution; 
10. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to insure compliance with this 
resolution. 
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UNITED NATIONS 
9 8'a dJ 
Chronology of United Nations Negotiations 
to End the Iran-Iraq War 
Informal and Unofficial Background Note 
1980 
22 September Secretary-General of the United Nations offers his good offices to both Iran and Iraq 
with a viev. to assisting them to settle the conflict by peaceful means. 
2$ September Secretary-General, in the context of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, brings the 
conflict between Iran and Iraq to the attention of the Security Council. 
After consultations with Council members, the President of the Security Council issues 
statement supporting the Secretary-General's offer of good offices and appealing to both 
Governments to settle their dispute by peaceful means. 
25 September Secretary-General requests the Security Council to consider the situation with utmost 
urgency. 
28 September Security Council adopts resolution 4719 (1980) calling upon Iran and Iraq to refrain im- 
mediately from further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means. Ex- 
presses the Council's support for the efforts being made by the Secretary-General and 
the offer of his good offices. 
10 October Secretary-General appeals to Iran and Iraq to allow vessels trapped in the area of con- 
flict to leave safely. 
5 November President of the Security Council issues a statement supporting the Secretary-General's 
proposal to send a representative to the region in order to facilitate authoritative con- 
sultations and calls on Iran and Iraq to co-operate wit` the Council and to support the 
Secretary-General's efforts. 
li No%cmber Secretary-General appoints former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, then leader of 
the Opposition, as United Nations Special Representative for Iran and Iraq. After con- 
sultations at Headquarters, Mr. Palme leaves New York on 16 November for the area. 
20-24 November Mr. Palme and team visit Teheran and Baghdad. 
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25 November On return from his mission, Mr. Palme informs the Secretary-General that both parties 
have agreed in principle to free 63 foreign ships caught in the Shatt-al-Arab by the 
fighting. 
26 November Mr. Palme informs the press about the agreement in principle concerning the free 
passage of ships immobilized in the Shatt-al-Arab. and also that related arrangements are 
being worked out by the UN Secretariat 
1981 
13-15 January United Nations Special Representative Mr. Palme and team make second visit to 
Baghdad. 
10-17 January Mr. Palme and team make second visit to Teheran. 
IS-2I February Mr. N, line and team hold further talks in Baghdad and Teheran 
lb June Iran and Iraq exchange 42 wounded prisoners on Cyprus. 
2_0-21 June Mr. Palme and team in Teheran. Talks with Prime Minister Rajaic. Speaker Rafsanjani 
and Chief Justice Beheshti. United Nations proposals for cease-fire, troop withdrawals 
and negotiations discussed. 
22-23 June Mr. Palme holds talks in Baghdad with President Saddam Hussain, Deputy Prime 
Minister Tariq Aziz and Foreign Minister Saddoun Hammadi and discusses proposals. 
26-28 June Round of talks in Teheran and Baghdad during which revised United Nations plan is 
presented. 
25 August Eighty-five prisoners of war (45 Iranian. 40 Iraqi) exchanged at l. irnaca, Cyprus, under 
International Committee of the Red Cross supervision. 
1982 
24-27 February Mr. Palme and United Nations team hold talks in Baghdad and Teheran and present 
refined plan on basis of June 1981 proposals. 
16 June Iran and Iraq exchange wounded prisoners of war in Cyprus tinder International Com- 
mittec of the Red Cross arrangements. 
l2 July Security Council adopts resolution 514 (1982) calling fix an immediate cease-tire. 
withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries, the dispatching of United 
Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal, and 
the continuation of mediation efforts. It also requests all other States to abstain from ac- 
tions which might contribute to the continuation of the conflict. 
IS July On behalf of its members, President of Security Council issues a statement urging a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
4 October Security Council adopts resolution 522 (1982), whose operative paragraphs essentially 
reiterate those of resolution 514 (1982). In addition, it welcomes the readiness of one of 
the parties to co-operate and calls upon the other to do likewise. 
22 October General Assembly adopts resolution 37/3 calling for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal 
of forces and peaceful settlement of the disputes between the two States. 
28 October Iran requests Secretary-General to send fact-finding mission to inspect civilian areas 
allegedly attacked by Iraq. 
1983 
21 February President of the Security Council issues a statement urgently renewing Council's 
previous calls for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, and a peaceful settle- 
ment of the conflict. 
2 May Iran formally requests Secretary-General to dispatch a mission to inspect civilian areas 
subjected to military attack by Iraq, indicating that mission could also visit Iraq to in- 
vestigate similar Iraqi allegations. Iraq is consulted and agrees. 
12 May Secretary-General informs Iran and Iraq of his decision to dispatch a mission to inspect 
civilian areas in both countrics which have been subject to military attacks. 
20 May to 2 June Secretary-General dispatches United Nations mission to the region to inspect sites in 
Iranian and Iraqi war zones. 
10 June Iraq requests the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate 
the situation of prisoners of war in Iran and Iraq. The Secretary-General initiates con- 
sultations with the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
20 June Secretary-General presents United Nations missions report to Security Council. Mis- 
sion's findings indicate heavy and intensive destruction of civilian areas in Iran by aerial. 
artillery and missile attacks and during military occupation, and light damage in Iraq's 
civilian areas. 
29--0 September Secretary-General and his Special Representative Olof Palme meet the Foreign Ministers 
of Iran and Iraq in New York. 
31 October Security Council adopts resolution 540 (1983) condemning violations of international 
humanitarian law, calling for the immediate cessation of all military operations against 
civilian targets, affirming the right of free navigation in the Gulf and calling on States to 
refrain from actions which might further escalate the conflict. The resolution also re- 
quests the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts and to consult with the 
parties on ways to sustain and verify the cessation of hostilities, including the possible 
dispatch of United Nations observers, 
22 November Iran asks Secretary-General to send second fact-finding mission to area to update 
previous report on civilian areas- 
5 December Secretary-General of Gulf Co-operation Council meets Secretary-General to ask for ac- 
tion to prevent spreading of conflict. 
II December Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on situation and on positions of both 
parties on resolution 540. 
1984 
10 February Secretary-General addresses separate messages to Iran and Iraq expressing his concern at 
the mounting toll in life and continued suffering, indicates intention to dispatch a "dual 
purpose" mission to the war-stricken areas in both countries, which would also hold 
talks in both capitals concerning other questions related to the conflict. 
8 March Secretary-General announces dispatch of mission to investigate Iranian allegations con- 
cerning the use of chemical weapons. 
13-18 March United Nations team of specialists inspects evidence in war zone. 
26 March "Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons" submitted to 
Security Council. Secretary-General deplores use of chemical weapons. 
30 March Security Council strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons, calls on the States 
concerned to observe the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemns all violations of interna- 
tional humanitarian law and calls for a cease-fire and a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
I June On an initiative by members of the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Security Council 
adopts resolution 552 (1984) calling upon all States to respect the right of free navigation 
and demanding that attacks on commercial ships en route to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
cease. 
9 June Secretary-General addresses message to the Presidents of Iran and Iraq calling upon both 
sides to end, and in the future to refrain from initiating, deliberate military attacks on 
purely civilian population centres. 
10 June Iran and Iraq accept Secretary-General's appeal, both requesting verification measures, 
with Iraq also specifying that there should be no military concentrations in civilian 
areas. 
12 June Undertakings by Iran and Iraq in response to Secretary-General's appeal to refrain from 
deliberate military attacks on civilian population centres become effective. 
14 June Secretary-General informs Security Council of his decision to set up two inspection 
teams to verify allegations of violation of the agreement to end attacks on civilian areas. 
On 15 June, Council me, ncers agreed with Secretary-General's proposed measures. 
21 June Personnel of United Nations inspection team A arrive in Baghdad. 
26 June Personnel of United Nations inspection team B arrive in Teheran. 
Secretary-General addresses notes verbales to Governments asking them to support the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in ensuring respect for the Geneva Conven- 
tions, and to serve as Protecting Powers for prisoners of war in Iran and Iraq. 
29 Junc Secretary-General addresses letters to Iran and Iraq stating that concentrations of troops 
in civilian areas would be a violation of the spirit of the undertakings on civilian areas, 
and also calling for solemn commitments by both not to use chemical weapons for any 
reason. 
17 September United Nations inspection team in Baghdad investigates allegation of attack by Iran on 
civilian areas; concludes that no deliberate attack occurred. 
31 December In compliance with resolution 552 (1984), the Secretary-General reports to the Security 
Council on officially reported attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf. 
1985 
11-17 January United Nations mission inspects prisoner of war camps in Iraq. 
18-25 January United Nations mission inspects prisoner of war camps in Iran. 
22 February Report of United Nations mission on prisoners of war concludes that in neither country 
were prisoners of war treated as harshly as alleged by the others. 
5 March Statement by President of Security Council expressing alarm over reports that Iran and 
Iraq are attacking civilian areas. Appeals to both Governments to exercise restraint and 
to continue to honour their undertakings to the Secretary-General, made on 12 June 
1984. 
9 March Secretary-General sends message to both Presidents calling for observance of 12 June 
1984 undertakings on civilian areas. 
15 March Security Council issues statement calling for the implementation of the moratorium on 
attacks against purely civilian population centres, with a view to finding a peaceful set- 
tlement of the conflict. 
18-26 March Secretary-General meets in New York with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and the 
Foreign Minister of Iraq and presents them with his eight-point proposals to seek an end 
to the conflict. 
7.8 April Secretary-General visits Teheran and Baghdad. 
12 April Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on his visits to Iran and Iraq, states 
that both Governments desired peace, had confidence in his efforts and were agreed that 
his proposals presented to them in March could serve as a basis for further discussion. 
Report proposes that Security Council invite both sides for a renewed examination of all 
aspects of the conflict. 
25 April Security Council f'resiclcn; issues kurmal -statement strongly condemning use of chemical 
weapons. Expresses readiness tu invite Iran and Iraq to re-examine all aspects of the 
conflict. 
2? De ember Secretary-General reports tu the Security Council on 61 incidents in the Gulf of attacks 
on and interceptions of merchant shipping. 
1986 
II February Secretary-General urges that concerted efforts be made to end the war, on the basis of 
his eight-point proposal. 
`_4 February Security Council adopts resolution $82 (1986) which deplores the initial acts that caused 
the war as well as its continuation and escalation, especially the use of chemical 
weapons. It calls for an immediate cease-tire, the withdrawal of all forces to interna- 
tionally recognized boundaries, a comprehensive exchange of prisoners of war and the 
submission of all aspects of the conflict to any means of peaceful settlement. It also 
urges other States to exercise utmost restraint in order to avoid further escalation of 
hostilities. 
12 %larch Report of mission of specialists issued. confirming the use of chemical weapons by Iraq 
against Iranian forces on many occasions. 
21 March President of the Security Council issues a statement strongly condemning the use of 
chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranian forces as well as the prolongation of the con- 
flict, and expresses concern over the risk of an extension of the conflict to other States. 
3 July Secretary-General repeats call for halt to attacks on civilian areas, offers to reactivate in- 
spection teams and reiterates offer of his good offices to end the conflict. 
14 August Secretary-General states he is gratified that statements by the Iranian and Iraqi Govern- 
ments indicate that both sides desire to refrain from attacks on civilian areas, and calls 
for restoration of moratorium. He expresses grave alarm over escalation of the conflict 
and calls for its end. 
29 August Security Council expresses great concern over the possible escalation of the Gulf war 
and the widening attacks on merchant shipping and civilian targets. It endorses the 
Secretary-General's continuing efforts, especially in the domain of chemical weapons, 
and attacks on civilian areas. 
3 October Secretary-General, in a statement to the Security Council, notes the depth of interna- 
tional alarm over the prolongation and escalation of the Iran/Iraq war. He emphasizes 
the urgency of the situation and stresses the necessity for the Security Council to 
establish a basis for negotiation acceptable to both parties. 
8 October Security Council resolution 588 (1986) expresses deep alarm over the prolongation and 
escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, and calls upon both parties to fully iniplctncnt resolution 
582 (1986). The resolution requests the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts and 
report to the Council by 30 November 1986. 
26 November Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, in compliance with resolution 588 
(1986), conveys positions of Iran and Iraq on resolution 582 (1986) as well as on general 
and specific issues in the conflict. He concludes that the differences between the two 
sides prevent specific proposals to implement resolution 582. He also draws attention to 
the growing danger in the region from attacks on merchant shipping. He asks Council to 
persevere in efforts to establish a basis for securing co-operation of Iran and Iraq. 
22 December President of Security Council expresses Council's serious concern at the situation, 
deplores violations of international humanitarian law and urges Srcr_, ary r=^n^-ca! to con- 
tinue his efforts. 
31 December Secretary-General reports to Security Council on 101 incident_, ;: o the ":: uif 
1987 
13 January Secretary-General, at press conference, calls for a new approach, namely a more deter- 
mined joint effort by members of the Security Council, and in particular the five perma- 
nent members. Secretary-General provides members of the Security Council with some 
elements which could be used as a basis for their common work. 
16 January Statement by President of the Security Council expressing concern over escalating 
hostilities, appealing to the parties to comply with Security Council resolutions 592 
(1986) and 588 (1986), expressing appreciation for the Secretary-General's efforts and 
urging him to persevere in those efforts. 
26 January Secretary-General, at Islamic Summit in Kuwait, makes proposals aimed at breaking the 
impasse in mediation. 
February The five permanent members of the Security Council start working as a group on the 
question of the war between Iran and Iraq. 
8 May Report of United Nations investigative mission confirms repeated use of chemical 
weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces. 
14 May Security Council statement condemns repeated use of chemical weapons, also condcmns 
prolongation of conflict, expresses concern over danger of its extension. 
20 July Security Council adopts resolution 598 (1987) which, a year later, bccan: c., the 
framework for reaching cease-fire agreement of 8 August i j'8. 
14 August Iraq officially informs Secretary-General that it welcomes resolution 598 and is ready to 
co-operate with him and Security Council in its implementation. 
11-14 September Visit of Secretary-General to Teheran and Baghdad during which he discusccs With of- 
ficials of both countries possibilities for the implementation of resolution 591t. The 
outline implementation plan is presented to both parties. 
22 September Secretary-General meets with President Khamcnei of Iran to discuss certain points of 
resolution 598. Other meetings were held the same day between the Secretary-General 
and/or his staff and Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani. 
26 September Secretary-General's working lunch with Foreign Ministers of five Permanent Members of 
Security Council: they express support for his outline implementation plan. 
28 September Secretary-General meets with Foreign Minister of Iraq. Tariq Aziz. in New York. 
29 September Secretary-General meets with Director-General for International Organizations of the 
Foreign Ministry of Iran. Jaafar Mahallati, in New York. 
9 October Secretary-General meets with permanent members of Security Council to discuss Coun- 
cil strategy regarding resolution 598. 
15 Oc; ober Secretary-General submits his implementation plan to the Foreign Ministers of Iran and 
Iraq. 
o November Secretary-General meets with the five permanent members of the Security Council to 
discuss the replies he has received from Iran and Iraq in response to his letter of 15 Oc- 
tober to both Governments. 
2-3 December Secretary -General meets in New York with Iranian delegation led by Deputy 
Foreign 
Minister Larijani. 
8-9 December Secretary-General meets in New York with Iraqi delegation led by Tariq Aziz. 
10 December Secretary-General reports to Security Council on his meetings with Iranian and Iraqi 
delegations on implementation of resolution 598. He says that a fresh impulse is needed 
from the Council. 
24 December Following consultations of the Security Council, its President reaffirms the commitment 
of Council members to resolution 598 as a whole as "the only basis for a comprehen- 
sive, just, honourable and desirable settlement of the conflict". 
1988 
4.5 Jar. t::! r., Secretary-General meets with Permanent Representatives of Iran and Iraq. He informs 
both parties that he feels that a new round of consultations cannot be undertaken unless 
there are clear assurances from both sides that such consultations would lead to real 
progress. 
I9-28 January Secretary-General meßt:. repeatedly with Acting Permanent Representative of Iran and 
with the Permanent Representative of Iraq concerning implementation of resolution 598. 
29 January and I February Secretary-General makes statements at informal consultations of the Security Council on 
his efforts to end the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and informs the Council that he in- 
tends to continue his contacts with both parties. 
24-25 February Secretary-General meets with representatives of both countries concerning implementa- 
tion of resolution 598. 
I-15 March Secretary-General meets five times with the Acting Permanent Representative of Iran and 
twice with the Permanent Representative of Iraq. 
16 March Security Council meets to discuss Iran-Iraq conflict; expresses support for the Secretary- 
General's efforts to implement resolution 598 and his intention to invite both Govern- 
ments to send special emissaries to New York to hold consultations. 
18 March Secretary-General addresses letters to the Presidents of Iran and Iraq inviting them to 
send emissaries to hold consultations with him on implementation of resolution 598. 
Secretary-General briefs Security Council members on his invitation to the Presidents of 
Iran and Iraq. 
21 March Iran requests dispatch of mission to investigate alleged use of chemical wcapons by Iraq. 
22 March Secretary-General makes statement in Security Council regarding his invitations to Iran 
and Iraq to send special emissaries for a new round of consultations to end the war. He 
appeals to both parties to stop attacks on civilian areas and to desist from creating fur- 
ther obstacles to the implementation of resolution 598. 
24 March Iran again requests dispatch of mission to investigate alleged use of chemical weapons by 
Iraq. 
25 March Secretary-General holds two meetings with Iranian Acting Permanent Representative. Mr. 
Mahallati. He informs him that a mission will be arriving in Teheran on 28 March to 
examine victims of alleged chemical weapons attacks. 
27 March United Nations experts depart for Teheran to investigate the use of chemical weapons. 
The team visited Iran (28-31 March) and Baghdad (8-11 April). 
28 March Iraq requests Secretary-General to dispatch mission to investigate the situation of 7.000 
Iraqi prisoners of war in Iran. 
United Nations experts examine chemical warfare victims in Teheran hospitals. 
Secretary-General issues statement condemning use of chemical weapons. 
4 April Iraq requests Sccretary-General to dispatch a mission to Baghdad tu examine victims of 
alleged Iranian use of chemical weapons. 
6-7 April Secretary-General holds meetings in New York with Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran. 
Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani. 
8 April Security Council meets to discuss status of Iran's and Iraq's positions on resoliait+i: 59t. 
11-12 April Secretary-General meets in New York with Senior Under-Secretary of the N-linistry of 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Mr. Wissam Al-7-zhawie. 
13 April Secretary-General meets with the five permanent members of the Security Council to 
brief them on his recent talks on the Iran-Iraq conflict with the representatives of both 
sides. The full Council is briefed by the Secretary-General in the afternoon. 
25 April Secretary-General transmits to Security Council "Report of the Mission dispatched by 
the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the 
conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq". 
9 May Security Council adopts resolution 612 (1988) stating its dismay at the Mission's conclu- 
sions that chemical weapons continue to be used in the conflict on an even more inten- 
sive scale than before. 
19 May and 16 June Iran requests Secretary-General to dispatch another mission to investigate the use of 
chemical weapons by Iraq. 
1-4 July United Nations experts in Teheran investigate use of chemical weapons. 
2 July Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addresses letter to Secretary-General regarding situa- 
tion of prisoners of war. 
3 July Iranian commercial airliner is shot down by "USS Vincennes" in the Gulf. 
4 July Iraq requests United Nations and International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate 
the fate of Iraqi prisoners of war in Iran. 
5 July Iran calls for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the downing of Iran- 
ian airliner. 
In a press conference in Geneva, the Secretary-General said that he hoped to send in the 
near future a mission to investigate the situation of prisoners of war in Iran and Iraq. 
Iraq requests Secretary-General to dispatch a mission to Baghdad to investigate alleged 
use of chemical weapons by Iran. 
9 July Team of experts departs Geneva for Baghdad, spending 10 through 11 July investigating 
alleged use of chemical weapons by Iran. 
11 July Iran expresses readiness to receive mission dispatched to investigate situation of 
prisoners of war. 
14 July Security Council meets to discuss downing of Iranian commercial airliner. 
17 July Iran informs the Secretary-General of its formal acceptance of resolution 598 (1987). 
18 July In a letter to the Secretary-General, Iraq defines its position on resolution 598 as total 
acceptance. 
20 July Security Council resolution 616 (1988) expresses deep distress at downing of Iranian civil 
aircraft, stresses need for rapid implementation of resolution 598 (1987), reaffirms its 
support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement that resolution and commits 
itself to working with him in the development of his implementation plan. 
'l) July SecretarN-Gcnerat transmits to Security Council "Report of the Mission dispatched by 
the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the 
conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq". 
Secretary-General dispatches technical team to Iran and Iraq in connection with im- 
plementing a cease-fire between the two countries. 
21 July Secretary-General dispatches mission to Iran and Iraq to investigate the situation of the 
prisoners of war. 
22 July Secretary-General inform; representatives of Iran and Iraq that he would like to receive 
the Foreign Ministers to enter into intensive discussion with him on Jiff tc; u aspects of 
his implementation plan of Security Council resolution 598, 
25 Jul), "Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of 
the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Iraq" is submitted to the Security Council. 
25 July to 2 August Visit of technical tearn headed by Lt. -Gcn. Martin Vadset (Norway) to Iran and Iraq to 
work out modalities for implementing the immediate cease-fire called for in resolution 
598. 
26 July Security Council President states that Security Council is united in supporting Secretary- 
Gencral's efforts and informs both the Iranian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers accordingly. 
President of Security Council states that Council is firmly united in condemning any use 
of chemical weapons. 
Secretary-General begins his talks with Iranian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers aimed at 
bringing about implcmentation of Security Council resolution 598. Between 26 July and 
7 August, he meets with the Foreign Minister of Iran 9 times and with the represen- 
tatives of Iraq 6 times. 
4 August United Nations technical team headed by General Vadset returns to United Nations 
Headquarters and reports to Secretary-General. 
6 August Iraq declares readiness for a cease-fire. 
7 August Secretary-Gcncral reports to the Security Council on the implementation of operative 
paragraph 2 of resolution 599, recommending the establishment of a Learn of' observers. 
the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). 
8 August Secretary-General in the Security Council calls for a cease-fire on 20 August. the 
deployment of United Nations observers, the beginning of direct talks between Iran and 
Iraq on 25 August. Urges both parties to exercise utmost restraint and refrain from any 
hostile activities on lard. at sea and in the air in the period before entry into effect of 
the cease-fire. Security Council endorses Secretary-General's call. 
9 August Security Council decides in resolution 619 (1988) to set tip UNIIMOG immediately for a 
period of six months. 
10 August First elements of UNIIMOG advance parties arrive in Iran and tray. 
II August Secretary-General dispatches Mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical 
weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. 
12 August General Slavko Jovic (Yugoslavia) appointed as Chief Military Observer. UNIIMOG. 
19 August "Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of 
the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Iraq" is submitted to the Security Council. 
20 August The cease-fire takes effect. 
25 August Secretary-General opens talks between the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq in the 
Palais des Nations in Geneva. 
26 August Security Council adopts resolution 620 (1988), recalling its resolution 612 (1988), con- 
demning the use of chemical weapons and encouraging the Secretary-Gcncral to carry 
out promptly investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any 
Member State. 
I September Secretary-General names Jan K. Eliasson. the Permanent Representative of Sweden to 
the United Nations, as his Personal Representative on issues pertaining to the implemen- 
ta: ion of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). 
14 September Secretary-General's Personal Representative reports to the Secretary-General in New York 
on the status of the talks held at Geneva, due to be pursued in both New York and 
Geneva in the latter part of October. 
30 September - Secretary-General begins a round of talks in New York with 
6 October the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq to discuss questions 
relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 
598(1987). A joint ministerial meeting is held on 1 October. 
In the context of the General Assembly's General Debate, a 
statement is made before the Assembly by the Foreign Minister of 
Iran on 3 October and by the Foreign Minister of Iraq on 4 October. 
31 October -- A series of meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Iran and 
11 November Iraq is opened in Geneva by the Secretary-General. Seven joint 
ministerial meetings are held, three under the chairmanship of the 
Secretary-General and the last four under the chairmanship of his 
Personal Representative. The Personal Representative reports at a 
press conference that, although there has been no breakthrough, 
positive results can be achieved at the next meeting through 
careful preparation and reflection. 
14-15 December Secretary-General, while attending the General Assembly debate on 
the question of Palestine in Geneva, meets separately with the 
Foreign Minister of Iraq and with the Permanent Representative of 
Iran to the United Nations in Geneva with a view to "move the 
negotiating process forward". 
1989 
7-8 January Secretary-General meets in Paris separately with the Foreign 
Ministers of Iran and Iraq, both of whom are attending the Paris 
Conference on chemical weapons. 
Following these meetings, the Secretary-General asks his Personal 
Representative to travel to Iran and Iraq for further consultations 
Late January Secretary-General's Personal Representative visits Teheran and 
Baghdad and holds consultations with authorities in the two 
countries on the implementation of Security Council resolution 
598(1987). The Secretary-General expresses confidence that the 
exchanges which took place during the visit and the indications 
received from both sides can add momentum to the peace process. 
8 February Security Council, by its resolution 631(1989), unanimously decides 
to renew UNIIMOG's mandate for a period of seven months and 22 days 
and calls upon the parties concerned to implement immediately 
Security Council resolution 598(1987). 
Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq are in New York at the time of 
the Security Council meeting. 
9-10 February Secretary-General meets with the Foreign Minister of Iraq 
on 9 February and with the Foreign Minister of Iran on 10 February. 
Discussions cover both procedural and substantive matters relating 
to the implementation of Security Council resolution 598(1987). 
Joint ministerial meeting is held on 10 February to discuss further 
steps to take towards achieving the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 598(1987). Agreement is reached to convene 
another joint ministerial meeting in the latter part of March 
following preparatory talks between United Nations officials and 
delegations from both sides. 
Early March Governments of Iran and Iraq are invited to send delegations to New 
York for the-preparatory talks concerning the upcoming joint 
ministerial meeting. Thorough and intensive discussions take place 
with an Iranian delegation on 2 and 3 March and with an Iraqi 
delegation on 8 and 9 March. The Secretary-General's Personal 
Representative reports that he is satisfied with the results of the 
talks. 
Late March - Further preparatory talks for the joint ministerial meeting are 
Early April held on 30 and 31 March in New York with the Iraqi delegation led 
by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, the 
Secretary-General of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and the Ambassador 
of Iraq to the United States. On 6,7 and 10 April, talks take 
place with the Iranian delegation, which is headed by the Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Iran. 
13 April Secretary-General issues a statement announcing that a new round of 
direct ministerial talks under his auspices is to take place in 
Geneva starting 20 April. 
Chapter VII - Annex III 
j J..: j UNITED NATIONS 
ýýý, 
Security Council Resolution 598(1987) 
of 20 July 1987 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 582(1986), 
Deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a cease-fire, the conflict between 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss 
of human life and material destruction, 
Deploring the initiation and continuation of the conflict, 
Deploring also the bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks on 
neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian 
law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical 
weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
Deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may 
take place, 
Determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq, 
Convinced that a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable settlement 
should be achieved between 'Iran and Iraq, 
Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and in par- 
ticular the obligation of all Member States to settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered, 
Determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq. 
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, 
1. Demands that, as a first step towarc. < a negotiated settlement, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all 
military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the in- 
ternationally recognized boundaries without delay; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a team of United Nations 
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal and fur- 
ther requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in con- 
sultation with the Parties and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council: 
3. Urges that prisoners-of-war be released and repatriated without delay 
after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Con- 
vention of 12 August 1949; 
4. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to co-operate with the Secretary-General in im- 
plementing this resolution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, 
just and honourable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding 
issues, in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
5. Calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain 
from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict, 
and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and 
Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into respon- 
sibility for the conflict and to report to the Council as soon as possible; 
7. Recognizes the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and 
the need for reconstruction efforts, with appropriate international assistance, once 
the conflict is ended and, in this regard, requests the Secretary-General to assign 
a teary. of experts to study the question of reconstruction and to report to the 
Council; 
8. Further requests the Secretary-General to examine, in consultation with 
Iran and Iraq and with other States of the region, measures to enhance the 
security and stability of the region; 
9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the im- 
plementation of this resolution; 
10. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure 
compliance with this resolution. 
United Nations Department of Public Information 
Chapter VII - Annex IV 
Iran's Reply to Resolution 598 
Detailed and official position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Security Council resolution 
598 (1987) 
1. Resolution 598 (1987) has been formulated and adopted by the United States with the expli- 
cit intention of intervention in the Persian Gulf and the region, mustering support for Iraq 
and its supporters in the war, and the diversion of public opinion from the home front. None 
of these objectives correspond to the legitimate objective of seeking a just. solution to the 
conflict. 
2. Resolution 598 (1987) has been formulated without seeking consultation from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. As it reflects the Iraqi formulae forythe resolution of the conflict, it cannot 
therefore be considered a balanced, impartial, comprehensive and practical resolution. 
3. If the United States and the countries supporting Iraq harbour the illusion that they can ter- 
minate the war in favour of Iraq through an unjust and partial resolution, they are well 
advised to review the experience of the Council over the past several years following the 
liberation of Khorramshahr and the expulsion of the Iraq forces of occupation from most of 
the occupied territory inside the Islamic Republic of Iran. Be Islamic Republic of Iran, as 
the victim of aggression, is the main party to determine how the war can be terminated, and 
no change can be effected in the course of the war as long as conditions of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran are not met. 
4. The Security Council is obliged to explain why the Iran-Iraq war, exactly at the time when it 
is approaching its final stages, has turned into a breach of peace, thus necessitating recourse 
to Article 39 of the Charter. Ironically enough, the initiation of the war by Iraq on 22 Sep- 
tember 1980 and occupation of a vast part of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
was a breach of world peace. The Security Council, however, chose to remain silent then. 
Little wonder, then, that the United States, in an outright show of support for Iraq even 
forced the Security Council to oppose' the amendment of some permanent and non- 
permanent members of the Council as to considering the war from the very outset as a 
breach of peace. 
5. Be first Article of the United Nations Charter accords "suppression of aggression" priority 
over all other objectives. And yet, the Security Council in its first resolution regarding the 
conflict (resolution 479 dated 28 September 1980) called on Iran, a Member State of the 
United Nations, to practically submit to aggression. Be Secretary-General, on the other 
hand, has, through his subtle initiatives, endeavoured to gradually compensate for the 
Council's "purposeful error. " The recent hypocritical political manoeuvre of the United 
States forced the Security Council to support the aggressor once again and hence openly 
violate the first and foremost objective of the Charter. 
6. Be Security Council, by virtue of its submission to the resolution presented and actively 
pursued by the United States, has, in practical terms, turned itself into a party to the conflict. 
As such, We Security Council will not be able to play a positive and constructive role as 
regards the war, and it will find it expedient in the future to modify this position. 
7. Be Islamic Republic of Iran had previously warned that the adoption of this resolution is a 
prelude to the expansion of tension and further exacerbation of the situation. What has tran- 
spired since its adoption points in the same direction. The United States immediately 
brought its armada into the Persian Gulf and intends to increase its military presence in the 
area. Be incidents that took place in Saudi Arabia with American provocation and American 
military support for the export of Iraqi oil through Kuwait have soured the relations between 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and these countries. And military operations by Iraq are con- 
tinuing unabated. 
8. Be United States increased presence and military provocations in the Persian Gulf which 
have led to further escalation of tension in the region constitute clear violations of paragraph 
5 of resolution 598 (1987). As such, the United States is the first violator of the resolution 
whose formulation and adoption has been an American undertaking. If the Security Council 
is honestly committed to its own resolution, it follows that We Council must take a clearcut 
position on the violation of the resolution by United States. 
9. Be United States, through mounting pressure on the Security Council to adopt another reso- 
lution, seeks to take measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran and prepare the grounds 
for confrontation with Iran. Such efforts would only lead to the expansion of tension and 
further isolation of the Security Council from the political arena of the conflict. Be Islamic 
Republic of Iran would not hesitate to confront any provocative measure on the part of the 
United States. However, the Security Council is well advised to realign its decisions with 
the principles enshrined in the Charter. Meanwhile, the best possible line of action lies in 
strengthening the positive aspects of We present resolution so that it would pave the way for 
future co-operation and adoption of constructive measures. 
10. Be crisis in the Persian Gulf is not unrelated to the question of the Iran-Iraq war. However, 
due to its significance and sensitivity, it calls for special attention. 
Failure in resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf will precipitate the expansion of the 
conflict to unpredictable dimensions. Berefore, any efforts to restore peace and security in 
the Persian Gulf must be accorded first priority. In this connection, paragraphs 5 and 8 con- 
stitute the critical parts of We resolution. 
11. Be Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries in the region are, prior to and more than any 
other countries, interested in and committed to the stability and security in the Persian Gulf, 
freedom of navigation and the unimpeded flow of oil. The crisis in the Persian Gulf was 
initiated, perpetuated and expanded by Iraq and brought to a climax following the Kuwaiti 
invitation of superpowers and consequent military intervention by the United States. All 
these developments, and in particular the violation of paragraph 5 of the resolution due to 
the intensified United States military presence in the area, have adversely affected the possi- 
bility of action on the part of the Secretary-General, on the basis of paragraph 8 of the reso- 
lution, in connection with security and stability in the region. 
12. Resolution of the crisis in the Persian Gulf lies in the commitment of both parties not to 
attack commercial ships, withdrawal of foreign forces from the area and strict observance of 
neutrality on the part of all littoral States, particularly Kuwait. Only the restoration of tran- 
quillity in the Persian Gulf holds out any hope for positive political action regarding other 
aspects of the conflict. 
13. Iraq has violated the terms of resolution 598 (1987) by launching several offensive opera- 
tions immediately following its adoption. Some instances of these violations have been 
reported to the United Nations by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and are contained in documents 5/18997 and 51 19002. The Iraqi aerial attack against 
Tabriz is another clear and unequivocal example of Iraqi violation of resolution 598 (1987) 
and its hypocritical policy, which, ironically, was engineered by Iraq's supporters, and to its 
best satisfaction. While expectation of a minimum of consistency between Iraq's words and 
deeds is most reasonable, it is not known for what reasons the Security Council has turned a 
blind eye in the face of such flagrant violations by Iraq of its resolution. 
14. Pronouncement of Iraq as the aggressor and the party responsible for the conflict as well as 
determining damages and war reparations are essential for a thorough study of the conflict 
and formulation of a final solution. The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready. to co-operate with 
the Secretary-General in this field. 
15. Resolution 598 (1987) has condemned once again the use of chemical weapons, bombard- 
ment of civilian quarters, attacks on ships and civilian aircraft and violation of international 
law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases. Yet, no practical measure has been foreseen to 
prevent the repetition of these crimes. The Islamic Republic of Iran is awaiting the response 
of the Secretary-General to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran dated 10 August 1987 (5/19029) regarding the important issue of use of 
chemical weapons particularly after the Iraqi chemical attack on the city of Sardasht. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran is also prepared to consider any proposals on other aspects of the 
war related to international humanitarian law. 
16. The Islamic Republic of Iran has submitted to the Secretary-General of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross various proposals for repatriation of different groups of POWs 
and, in some instances, has acted on unilateral basis. The Islamic Republic of Iran is 
prepared to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the ICRC for implementation of these 
proposals or any other proposals on the basis of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. 
17. The eight-point plan of March 1985 of the Secretary-General has been the only practical 
plan thus far taking various aspects of the war into account which has not been in force due 
to Iraqi opposition. This plan is still a suitable ground for future efforts of the Secretary- 
General. 
18. Be Islamic Republic of Iran hereby renews its confidence in the Secretary-General and is 
prepared to continue co-operation with him within the framework of his independent efforts 
and initiatives. 
19. Constructive and commendable endeavours of certain impartial members of the Security 
Council to arrive at a balanced and positive resolution did not reach the desired results. 
However, grounds have beer laid so that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its 
co-operation in a manner that would lead the Security Council to a just position. Undoubt- 
edly, clearcut pronouncements on the responsibility of Iraq for the conflict, declared by 
some countries, constitute the most important element in the just resolution of the conflict. 
Be Islamic Republic of Iran takes note of all positive endeavours and expresses its apprecia- 
tion. 
Chapter VII - Annex V 
Iraq's Reply to Resolution 598 
Letter dated 23 July 1987 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General 
I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 20 July 1987 and to inform you that the Iraqi 
Government has studied the text of Security Council resolution `598 (1987), adopted unani- 
mously by the Council on 20 July 1987. The President of the Republic of Iraq has instructed me 
to transmit to you the position of the Iraqi Government, which is as follows: 
1. Be Iraqi Government welcomes the resolution and is ready to co-operate with you and with 
the Security Council so as to implement it in good faith with a view to finding a comprehen- 
sive, just, lasting and honourable settlement of the conflict with Iran. 
2. On the basis of the contents of the resolujion and its binding character under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, it is, of course, obvious that Iran's clear approval of the resolution, confirmed to 
you, and its clear readiness to fulfil its obligations thereunder, without any terms or condi- 
tions, in good faith and with serious intent, are essential for the fulfilment of the correspond- 
ing obligations which rest upon us. In that regard, I have set forth in paragraph 1 above our 
complete readiness to co- operate with you in fulfilling those obligations in good faith with 
a view to finding a comprehensive, just, lasting and honourable settlement of the conflict. 
3. In welcoming the resolution, the Iraqi Government proceeds from the premise that the text 
thereof is an integral and indivisible whole in respect of the contents, the time-limits and the 
measures for the implementation of all its paragraphs, and in particular from the premise of 
immediate and mutual advantage from its implemen- tation to all the parties concerned. 
4. Be Iraqi Government takes the expression "without delay, " which appears in paragraph 1 of 
the resolution, to mean that the withdrawal shall be completed within a period not exceed- 
ing 10 days from the date of the general cease-fire. The determination of this period derives 
from the precedent of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, which was 
effected within 10 days, between 10 and 20 June 1982, even though that withdrawal was 
unilateral and took place in the absence of a cease-fire from the other side. 
5. Be Iraqi Government takes the expression "without delay, " which appears in paragraph 3 of 
the resolution and concerns the release and repatriation of prisoners-of-war, to mean that the 
prisoners shall be released and repatriated within a period not exceeding eight weeks from 
the date of the cease-fire. Furthermore, the Iraqi Government understands that this operation 
shall, in accordance with the third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, be effected in 
co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and that this is a humani- 
tarian and moral question having no connection in any way with the negotiations on other 
matters pending between the two countries. 
6. The Iraqi Government is ready to co-operate with you sincerely in the mediation efforts 
entrusted to you in order tv achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement in 
accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. 
The Iraqi Government will submit its proposals and define its position on other pending 
questions when negotiations commence concerning the comprehensive settlement, as called for in 
the resolution of the Security Council. 
7. Iraq understands that, as soon as the cease-fire begins, it will be able to utilize its ports, its 
coasts and its internal and territorial waters and also that it will be able to enjoy, on a foot- 
ing of equality with Iran, freedom of navigation in the international waters of the Arabian 
Gulf. 
8. With regard to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Iraqi Government wishes 
to emphasize that it is ready to engage in consultations with you concerning the inquiry into 
responsibility for the conflict and its protraction and concerning the body to which this task 
should be entrusted. 
9. The Iraqi Government welcomes the contents of paragraph 8 concerning measures to 
enhance the security and stability of the region, and proposes that, in the stage following the 
establishment of peace between Iraq and Iran, you convene a meeting of the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs of the States of the Arabian Gulf, under your auspices, to study ways and 
means of guaranteeing security, stability and the freedom of international navigation in the 
region of the Arabian Gulf, on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of the States con- 
cerned, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and observance of the provisions of 
international law. 
10. Lastly, the Iraqi Government, in keeping with the nature of the resolution adopted by the 
Council and in the light of the strong desire of the international community to bring about 
peace as a matter of urgency, hopes that the period of time required for the submission of 
your report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution, in pursuance of 
paragraph 9, will be short so as to prevent any procrastination or delay from any quarter 
whatsoever. 
(Signed) Tariq AZIZ 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Iraq 
Chapter VIII - Annex I 
Final Document of United Nations Special Session 
on Disarmament I 
(Complete Text) 
The First Special Session Devoted to Disarmament (SSD 1) of the UN General Assembly 
was held at the UN headquarters in New York from 23 May to 1 July 1978. Presidents, Prime 
Ministers and other national leaders from 149 nations participated in the discussions. Therefore 
the session ended, the Assembly adopted by consensus on 30 June a Final Document consisting 
of an Introduction, a Declaration, a Programme of Action, and recommendations concerning the 
international machinery for disarmament negotiations. , 
The text of the Final Document reads as follows. 
The General Assembly, 
Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons 
and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars, 
Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essen- 
tial for the prevention of the danger of nuclear yar and the strengthening of international peace 
and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the 
achievement of the new international economic order, 
Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, 
through coordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more 
effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control, 
Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly 
devoted to disarmament. 
L Introduction 
1. Attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has 
always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time 
sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival 
has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate 
means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today 
constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has 
therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international 
relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective 
process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the 
arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and 
urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the 
nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security 
and peaceful future. 
2 Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to interna- 
tional peace and sectirity and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conven- 
tional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of develop- 
ment, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order 
and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind. 
3. Dynamic development of detente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all 
regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions condu- 
cive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reduc- 
ing the danger of war. Progress on detente and progress on disarmament mutually comple- 
ment and strengthen each other. 
4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an 
end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly 
appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is 
not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that 
some limited agreements have been reached, '. 'effective measures relating to the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude 
man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not 
been either any real progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been 
possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and 
human, that are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race, and which should be 
made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a 
race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries. " 
5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples, that 
the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, 
security and economic and social development are indivisible and have therefore recognised 
that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal. 
6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what 
will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General 
Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament. 
7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facili- 
tated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present 
Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises 
also the following three sections: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and recommenda- 
tions concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. 
8. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and com- 
plete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the 
elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and 
reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire 
range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the 
United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples 
of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing 
situation, outline the objectives and the priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles 
for disarmament negotiations. 
9 For disarmament, the aims and purposes of which the Declaration proclaims, to become a 
reality it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by 
common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent 
realisation in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through 
agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing 
through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control. Procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obliga- 
tions thus assumed had also to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of 
Action. 
10. Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the "political 
will" of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can 
also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery 
designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. Consequently, it 
would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and 
the negotiating organs, have the appropriate organisation and procedures that would be most 
conducive to obtaining constructive results. The fourth and last section of the Final Docu- 
ment has been prepared with that end in view. 
H. Declaration 
11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from 
the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. 
Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on 
earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, 
increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. 
Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and 
material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping 
to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and 
tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative 
refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances 
are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates 
international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process 
of detente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardises the 
security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non- 
nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war. 
12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further 
relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful 
coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation 
and understanding. The arms race impedes the realisation of the purposes, and is incompati- 
ble with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for 
sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or pol- 
itical independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peo- 
ples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the 
struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domi- 
nation or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of 
armaments technology by racist regimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community 
faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament 
to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such regimes, especially 
through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council. 
13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry 
by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of 
strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective 
implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and 
the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement 
and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effec- 
tive international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace 
must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and 
settle disputes by peaceful means. 
14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must 
all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limi- 
tations, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international 
security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disar- 
mament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened. 
15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognise and 
understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience 
may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United 
Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disar- 
mament with the full cooperation of Member States. 
16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on arma- 
ments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher 
levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and 
most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases 
in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on 
the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the 
want and poverty in which two-thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of 
resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but 
also technological and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all 
countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social conse- 
quences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible 
with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity 
and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of 
disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help promote the well-being 
of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries. 
17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international 
community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of the reduction of 
armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the 
world provide some encouragement. 
Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or 
eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The 
fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the 
arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the 
goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no 
negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need 
now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed 
along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. 
18. Removing the threat of a world war -a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the 
present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed 
to disarmament or face annihilation. 
19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and 
complete disarmament under effective international control. 
The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate 
the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for 
settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from 
international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. 
Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements 
on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament taking into 
account the need of States to protect their security. 
20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of 
nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of 
nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons. 
At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to 
lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken. 
21. Along with these, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or 
prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this 
context, an agreement on elinunation of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a 
matter of high priority. 
22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be car- 
ried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on 
the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing 
stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their 
security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces 
and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant coun- 
tries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conven- 
tional weapons, based, in particular, on the same principle, and taking into account the 
inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or 
foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law con- 
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, as well as the need of recipient 
States to protect their security. 
23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons 
the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injuri- 
ous, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. 
24. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other meas- 
ures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to 
the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures 
and to further relaxation of international tension. 
25. Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental 
principles set forth below. 
26. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of 
the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as 
well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples 
under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination 
and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non- interference in the internal affairs 
of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self- 
defence in accordance with the Charter. 
27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsi- 
bility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate 
and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately 
informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, 
without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. 
28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. 
Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. 
All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to 
participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a 
direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all 
States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, 
and, together with other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. 
It is therefore important to secure their active participation. 
29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced 
manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group 
of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should 
be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. 
30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non- 
nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed. 
31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of 
verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence 
and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the 
verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be deter- 
mined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for 
the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification 
process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as 
other compliance procedures should be employed. 
32. All States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals 
designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of 
nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, 
effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non- nuclear-weapon States against the use 
or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and 
international peace and security. 
33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements 
freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those 
agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear 
weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon states, constitute an important 
disarmament measure. 
34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self- determination 
and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Char- 
ter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are 
directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all 
of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. 
35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the 
former would help greatly to the realisation of the latter. Therefore resources released as a 
result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and 
social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap 
between developed and developing countries. 
36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disar- 
mament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, 
to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance 
with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied 
on a non- discriminatory basis. 
37. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by 
parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve in general the interna- 
tional situation. 
38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with 
negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations lead- 
ing to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 
39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms 
race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the 
qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the 
development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological 
achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes. 
40. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When mul- 
tilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made 
to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full conpliance of all parties with the pro- 
visions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal. 
41. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States 
should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from 
actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a con- 
structive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. There are cer- 
tain negotiations on disarmament under way at different levels, the early and successful 
completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arms 
limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal. 
42. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member 
States hereby declare that they will respect the above-stated objectives and principles and 
make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III 
below. 
IIL Programme of Action 
43. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the 
implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and 
principles established in the Declaration on disarmament. The present Programme of Action 
contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as 
a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the 
necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general 
and complete disarmament under effective international control. 
44. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which 
should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to 
prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress toward general and complete disar- 
mament. 
45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass 
destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may 
be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of 
armed forces. 
46. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items con- 
currently. 
47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilisation. It 
is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the 
danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons. 
48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear- weapon States, in 
particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a spe- 
cial responsibility. 
49. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a w-y, and requires meas- 
ures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of 
nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance 
of the existing arsenals of the nuclear- weapon States and other States concerned. 
50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at 
appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States con- 
cerned for. 
cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; 
cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and 
the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. 
a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for pro- 
gressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of 
delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. 
Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation 
or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear arma- 
ments. 
51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective 
nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a 
significant contribution to the above aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear 
weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proli- 
feration of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations now in progress on a "treaty 
prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful 
purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty, ', should be concluded urgently and 
the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view 
to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. 
All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, fol- 
lowing General Assembly endorsement, could attract the widest possible adherence. 
In this context, various views were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that, pending 
the conclusion of this treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear- 
weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. In this connection, some nuclear- 
weapon States expressed different views. 
52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude 
at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the 
second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). They are invited to transmit 
in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed 
promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading 
to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. It should 
constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of estab- 
lishment of a world free of such weapons. 
53. The process of nuclear disarmament described in the paragraphs on this subject should be 
expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of on0'oing negotia- 
tions and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States. 
54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or 
international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limi- 
tation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon 
States and other States in the regions concerned. 
55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to 
progress in conventional disarmament on a worldwide basis. 
56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear 
weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 
57. Pending the achievement of -this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, 
and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents 
and non-ybelligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to 
undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force 
in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
including the use of nuclear weapons. 
58. In this context, all States and in particular nuclear-weapon States should consider as soon as 
possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, 
the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international 
agreement and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States 
should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations 
among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could 
be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the 
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General 
Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pur- 
sue efforts to conclude as appropriate effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived 
at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure. 
61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged 
with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the pro- 
cess of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into 
account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all 
the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the 
zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. 
62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give under- 
takings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each 
zone, in particular: 
a. to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; 
b. to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone. 
63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudices to other measures which may be 
considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable: 
a. Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure The full application of 
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the special session on the adherence 
to it. 
b. Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become 
parties to those instruments which have not yet done so. 
c. In Africa, where the Organisation of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denu- 
clearisation of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps when- 
ever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective. 
d. The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs 
above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions 
where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where 
the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon- 
free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pend- 
ing the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly 
declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other 
way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the 
stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their 
nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration 
should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a Middle East 
nuclear-weapon-free zone. 
e. All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination of keeping their 
countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate 
from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly which is 
keeping the subject under consideration. 
64. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world, under appropriate con- 
ditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, tak- 
ing into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening 
the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. 
In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of 
peace, inter alia, in: 
a. South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of 
such a zone, in conformity with their views; 
b. Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the General Assembly and its relevant 
resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region. 
65. It is imperative as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non- proliferation is on the one 
hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear- weapon States beside the existing 
five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually elim- 
inate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part 
of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to 
stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament by urgent application of measures 
outlined in the relevant paragraphs of this Document, and all States undertaking to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons. 
66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international 
agreements to minimise the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeo- 
pardising energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear- weapon States should jointly 
take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal 
and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
67. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non- proliferation, such 
as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohi- 
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those 
instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments 
has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend 
might continue. 
68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardise the full exercise of the inalienable rights 
of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. 
All States should also have access to, and be free to acquire technology, equipment and 
materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the 
developing countries. International cooperation in this field should be under agreed and 
appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy 
Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
should be respected without jeopardising their respective fuel cycle policies or international 
co-operation, agreements, and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy provided that 
agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied. 
70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of Resolution 32/50, international coopera- 
tion for the promotion of the transfer and utilisation of nuclear technology for economic and 
social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened. 
71. Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the final commurvque of its 
Organising Conference. 
72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat- 
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
73. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
74. States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded 
so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section. 
75. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of 
all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of 
disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations 
have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotia- 
tions. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible 
application of the convention through its early signature and ratification. 
76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and 
use of radiological weapons. 
77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological 
achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures 
should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of 
mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be 
appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of 
weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of 
new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept 
under continuing review. 
78. The Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the need for a further prohibi- 
tion of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order 
to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use. 
79. In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea- bed and the 
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested - in consul- 
tation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and 
the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review 
Conference and any relevant technological developments - to proceed promptly with the 
consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms 
race in that environment. 
80. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and 
appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 
81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual 
reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within 
the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the larg- 
est military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional 
armaments reductions. 
82. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of mili- 
tary potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of 
undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence 
of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and lim- 
itations would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a 
significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this 
end should be continued most energetically. 
83. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and mul- 
tilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by 
the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into 
account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of 
self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the 
principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, 
and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undimitushed security of all States. Such 
measures might include those in the following two paragraphs. 
84. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences where appropriate condi- 
tions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of dif- 
ferent aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declara- 
tion of Ayacucho subscribed in 1974 by eight Latin American countries. 
85. Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on 
the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in partic- 
ular, on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or 
enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to 
protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence 
of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that 
right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Princi- 
ples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States. 
86. The 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Con- 
ventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious to to have Indiscrim- 
inate Effects should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considera- 
tions, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including 
those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects. The 
conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were 
the subject-matter of previously c9nducted discussions. 
87. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task. 
88. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States and especially producer 
States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States. 
89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute 
figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other 
militarily significant States would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the 
arms race, and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used 
for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the 
developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all 
participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all 
of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of 
reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all 
the aspects of reduction of military budgets. 
90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to 
facilitate the reduction of military budgets bearing in mind the relevant proposals and docu- 
ments of the United Nations on this question. 
91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agree- 
ments and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification 
in such agreements. 
92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should 
be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every 
effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non- 
discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or 
jeopardise their economic and social development. 
93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue 
policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. 
Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing 
for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following and 
other measures yet to be agreed, should be undertaken: 
1) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications 
failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in 
areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk 
of conflict. 
2) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for 
existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament. 
3) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the 
economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on 
world peace and security. 
94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social 
development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military pur- 
poses to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the 
developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of 
qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship 
between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim 
report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the 
final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action. 
95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc 
Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the 
Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 
December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in 
mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the 
context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international 
economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special 
emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of 
resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, partic- 
ularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a 
reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the 
formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, 
regional and international levels. 
96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting 
international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the 
Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant 
experts. 
97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts, appointed by him, 
continue the study of the inter-relationship between disarmament and international security 
and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as requested in resolution 
A/RES/32/87C. 
98. The thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly should determine the 
specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already sub- 
mitted including those made by individual countries at the special session, as well as other 
proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the General Assembly 
would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General. 
99. In order to mobilise world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures 
set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments 
race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted. 
100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations 
and its specialised agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of 
printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race 
as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures. 
101. In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session. 
102. The General Assembly proclaims a week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of 
the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament. 
103. To encourage study and research on disarmament the United Nations Centre for Disarma- 
ment should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the arma- 
ments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and 
publications on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing 
countries, and should disseminate the results of such research. 
104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the 
disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non- 
governmental organisations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them 
and the United Nations. 
105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to 
the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious informa- 
tion concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments 
race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international 
control. 
106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems 
created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and govern- 
mental and non-governmental international organisations are urged to take steps to develop 
programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels. 
107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education 
and, in this connection, urges that organisation to step up its programme aimed at the 
development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, 
inter alia, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States 
should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the 
curricula of their educational institutes. 
108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the 
developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellow- 
ships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to 
the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the 
financial requirements of 20 fellowships at the thirty-third regular session of the General 
Assembly, for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations bearing in mind the sav- 
ings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations. 
109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the 
field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be con- 
ducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this pur- 
pose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a 
comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advis- 
able in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security 
prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. 
The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that 
the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an 
appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the 
implementation of the programme. 
110. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for 
maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During 
and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there 
should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the neces- 
sary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of 
States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an 
international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for 
the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress 
any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall per- 
mit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and 
establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the per- 
sonal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed man- 
power for a United Nations peace force. 
112. In addition to the several questions dealt with in this Programme of Action, there are a few 
others of fundamental importance, on which, because of the complexity of the issues 
involved and the short time at the disposal of the special session, it has proved impossible to 
reach satisfactory agreed conclusions. For those reasons they are treated only in very general 
terms and, in a few instances even not treated at all in the Programme. 
It should be stressed, however, that a number of concrete approaches to deal with such ques- 
tions emerged from the exchange of views carried out in the General Assembly which will 
undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of the study and negotiation of the problems 
involved in the competent disarmament organs. 
IV. Machinery 
113. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival 
of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been 
made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political 
will, the international machinery should be utilised more effectively and also improved to 
enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its 
role in the field of disarmament. 
In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been 
produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disar- 
mament machinery be revitalised and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament 
deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. 
For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament - 
deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, 
whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership. 
114. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsi- 
bility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this 
field, and in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate 
and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - and 
be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United 
Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organisation, of all disarmament efforts out- 
side its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. 
115. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the 
United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the 
implementation of disarmament measures. 
An item entitled `Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions 
adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the provi- 
sional agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. 
116. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures 
applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commen- 
dation should be subject to full review by the Assembly. 
117. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions 
of disarmament and related international security questions. 
118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established 
by resolution 502 (VI), a Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the 
United Nations. 
The General Assembly decides that: 
a. The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the Gen- 
eral Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on 
various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and 
recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Com- 
mission should, inter alia, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disar- 
mament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to 
the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament; 
b. The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the 
committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem 
necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on sub- 
stantive issues be adopted by consensus; 
c. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. It will sub- 
mit for the consideration by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly a report on 
organisational matters. In 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not 
exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the General 
Assembly; 
d. The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the 
effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions. 
119. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held 
on a date to be decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. 
120. The General Assembly is conscious of the work that has been done by the international 
negotiating body that has been meeting since March 14,1962 as well as the considerable 
and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament. 
The General Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multila- 
teral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of con- 
sensus. It attaches great importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in 
an appropriately constituted negotiating body: the Committee on Disarmament. 
The General Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consulta- 
tions among the member States during the Special Session of the General Assembly 
Devoted to Disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear- 
weapon States, and 32 to 35 other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of 
the thirty-second session of the General Assembly; that the membership of the Committee 
on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals; that the Committee on Disarmament 
will be convened in Geneva not later than January 1979 by the country whose name appears 
first in the alphabetical list of membership; and that the Committee on Disarmament will: 
a. Conduct its work by consensus; 
b. Adopt its own rules of procedure; 
c. Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the 
Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act 
as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organising the 
business and timetables of the Committee; 
d. Rotate the chairmanship of the Committee among all its members on a monthly basis; 
e. Adopt its own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General 
Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee; 
f. Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and 
provide its formal and other relevant documents to the Member States of the United Nations 
on a regular basis; 
g. Make arrangements for interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the 
Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are 
the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the sub- 
ject matter of such proposals or working documents; 
h. Invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the 
Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion; 
L Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided. 
121. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could 
facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. 
122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with 
universal participation and with adequate preparation. 
123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament 
and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United 
Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened- and its research and 
information functions accordingly extended. 
The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by United Nations 
specialised agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations sys- 
tem with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also increase 
contacts with non-governmental organisations and research institutions in view of the valu- 
able role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other 
ways that - may be considered as appropriate. 
124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected 
on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable 
geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under 
the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, includ- 
ing a programme of such studies. 
125. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member 
States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and 
suggestions submitted to them and reflected to a considerable extent in the Final Document 
have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session and to its positive con- 
clusion. 
Since a number of those proposals and suggestions, which have become an integral part of 
the work of the special session, deserve to be studied further and more thoroughly, taking 
into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made both in the general 
debate of the plenary and the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Secretary General 
is requested to transmit, together with this Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative 
and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of 
the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the 
recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session. Some of the 
proposals put forth for consideration of the special session of the Assembly are listed below: 
a. Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concern- 
ing Romania's position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted 
on 9 May 1978 (A/S- 10/14); 
b. Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of 
the General Assembly (A/S-1 0/AC. 1/2); 
c. Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the 
arms race (A/S-10/AC. 1/4); 
d. Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Moni- 
toring Agency (A/S-10/AC. 117); 
e. Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for 
Disarmament Research (A/S-10/AC. 1/8); 
f. Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority (A/S- 
10/AC. 1/9 and Add. 1); 
g. Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Contribution to the 
seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban" (A/S- 10/AC. 1/12); 
h. Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Invitation to attend 
an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many" (A/S-10/AC. 1/13); 
i. Working paper on disarmament submitted by China WS-10/AC. 1/17); 
j. Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of 
confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide con- 
vention on confidence-building measures (A/S-10/AC. 1/20); 
k. Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to 
promote arms control and disarmament (A/S- 1 0/AC. 1/21); 
1. Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of 
disarmament (A/S-10/AC. 1/23); 
M. Proposal by the United States of America on the establishment of a United Nations Peace- 
keeping Reserve and on confidence-building measures and stabilising measures in various 
regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitation of observers to manoeuvres, and 
United Nations machinery to study and promote such measures (A/S-10/AC. 1/24); 
n. Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a polemological agency (A/S- 
10/AC. 1/25); 
o. Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening 
of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace- 
keeping (A/S-10/AC. 1/26 and Corr. 1 and 2); 
p. Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament 
Fund for Development (A/S-1 0/AC. 1/28); 
q. Proposal by Norway entitled "Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and 
disarmament efforts" (A/S-10/AC. 1/31); 
r. Note verbale transmitting the text, signed in Washington on 22 June 1978, by the Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to the 
limitation of conventional weapons (A/S-10/AC. 1/34); 
s. Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament" 
(A/S-10/AC. 1/35); 
t. Statements made by the representatives of China on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final Docu- 
ment of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC. 1/36); 
U. Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarisation and disarmament of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/S- 
10/AC. 1/39); 
v. Proposal by Costa Rica on economic and social incentives to halt the arms race (A/S- 
10/AC. 1/40); 
w. Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session 
(A/S-10/AC. l/L. 2 to L. 4, A/S-10/AC. 1/L. 7 and L. 8); 
X. Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms 
race (A/S-10/AC. 1/L. 6); 
Y. Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of 
further testing of nuclear weapons (A/S-10/AC. 1/L. 10); 
Z. Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and 
prevention of nuclear war (A/S-10/AC. 1/L. 1 1); 
aa. Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Medi- 
terranean (A/S-10/AC. 1/37, para. 72); 
bb. Proposal by the Government of Senegal for a tax on military budgets (A/S- l0/AC. 1/37, 
para. 101); 
cc. Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC. 
187/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification (A/S- 
10/AC. 1/37, para. 113); 
dd. Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases from 
foreign territories and withdrawal of troops from foreign territories (A/S-10/AC. 1/37, para. 
126); 
ee. Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an Ad Hoc account in the 
United Nations Development Programme to use for development the funds which may be 
released as a result of disarmament measures (A/S-10/AC. 1/37, para. 141); 
if. Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accor- 
dance with Article 26 of the United Nations Charter (A/S- 10/AC. 1/37, para. 179); 
gg. Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarma- 
ment organisation (A/S-10/AC. 1/37, para. 186). 
126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly 
reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make 
further collective efforts aimed at strenthening peace and international security; eliminating 
the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting 
and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilising the resources thus released in a 
manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the 
economic conditions of the developing countries. 
127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special 
session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to 
reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and pro- 
cedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration or the Pro- 
gramme of Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decisions agreed 
upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs 
will discharge their functions in an effective manner. 
128. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the number of States that participated in the general 
debate, as well as the high level of representation and the depth and scope of that debate, are 
unprecedented in the history of disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or Government 
addressed the General Assembly. In addition, other Heads of State or Government sent mes- 
sages and expressed their good wishes for the success of the special session of the Assem- 
bly. Several high officials of specialised agencies and other institutions and programmes 
within the United Nations system and spokesmen of 25 non-governmental organisations and 
six research institutes also made valuable contributions to the procedings of the session. It 
must be emphasised, moreover, that the special session marks not the end but rather the 
beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. 
129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the 
special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples, further 
mobilise world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarma- 
ment. 
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Group of 21 
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Original: ENGLISH 
Draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on item 2 of the agenda 
of the Conference on Disarmament - Cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear disarmatrent 
I. In the discharge of its responsibility as the single multilateral 
disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the 
Final Document of SSOD-I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish 
an Pd hoc Committee under item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and nuclear disarmament". 
2. The Conference requests the Pd hoc Committee, as a first step, to 
elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive 
issues for multilateral negotiations as follows-. 
(i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear 
disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document 
including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear 
weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear weapon States in the 
process of achieving nuclear disarmament= 
(ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and 
in the prevention of nuclear war; 
(iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on 
doctrines of nuclear deterrence; 
(iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as 
the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament 
and in this context its relationship with negotiations relatinq to 
nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other 
restricted forums. 
3. The Ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and 
future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament 
before the end of its 1989 session. 
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